

# THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANKAR'S ADVAITA VEDANTA

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S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA





The Philosophy of Sankara's *Advaita Vedanta* presents a philosophy in its most comprehensive and tenable account, on which the entire edifice of Indian culture, civilization, religion and philosophy seem to have been rest-a philosophy which has been mooted from the basic tenets of Upanishads. This present volume undertakes an effort to bring into the open the philosophy of *Advaita Vedanta* through a textual interpretation of *Brahmasutra Bhashya* with reference to Sankara's own classical interpretations and works. The aim of this scholarly work is to present a just interpretation of Sankara's *Advaita Vedanta* textually for a correct understanding for the readers and scholars who have genuine interest in the philosophy of *Advaita Vedanta*. The philosophy of non-dualism that Sankara propagates in a definite answer and solution for all questions centring round the understanding of Man and his meaningful existence. It is hoped that the readers will be greatly benefited from this piece of work.

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OF SANKAR'S  
ADVAITA VEDANTA**

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# **THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANKAR'S ADVAITA VEDANTA**

**SHYAMA KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAYA**  
M.A.P.R.S. (CAL.)  
Mouat Gold Medalist  
Retired Professor of Philosophy  
Ravenshaw College, Cuttack



**SARUP & SONS**  
NEW DELHI - 110002

*Published by*  
**SARUP & SONS**  
4740/23, Ansari Road  
Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002  
Tel. : 3281029

*The Philosophy of Sankar's Advaita Vedanta*

© Reserved  
1st Edition - 2000  
ISBN 81-7625-222-0

**PRINTED IN INDIA**

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Published by Prabhat Kumar Sharma for Sarup & Sons,  
Laser Typesetting at Chitra Computers and Printed  
at Roshan Offset Press, Delhi.

## Preface

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'The Philosophy of Advaita Vedanta'—a textual thematic interpretation of Sankar's own work on Brahmasutrabhasya, with special reference to his classical commentaries, is a genuine scholarly work of the great and profound scholar of Vedanta Prof Shyama Kumar Chattopadhyaya, Prof S. K. Chattopadhyaya was a great teacher and genuine scholar with a rare quality of a true thinker, who selflessly dedicated his entire life-time in the pursuit of knowledge and true learning. Academics was pursued only for the shake of knowledge and teaching. The great scholar of Vedanta had unique scholarship and profound knowledge in all fields of both Indian and Western Philosophy, although he lived by Vedanta. He was endowed with a profound knowledge in Sanskrit and classical texts which enabled him to understand the subject in its original and true being, and also to acquire a command over it. For his genuine scholarship in "Vedanta", the U. G. C. selected him for the preparation of a Original Text on 'Vedanta' which was written by Prof. S. K. Chattopadhyaya in the form of this present volume with unadulterated ideas and genuine scholarship. Effort is thus made to bring out this book on "Sankar's Vedanta" with reference to the original texts and his classical commentaries with the idea that this book may usher in true rays in furthering the knowledge and true understanding of Sankar's Advaita Vedanta for the students and researchers, showing the way in which they pursue their learning with utmost sincerity and dedication.

S. K. Chattopadhyaya

*Editor*





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## Introduction

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A textual thematic interpretation of Sankara's entire *Brahmasutrabhasya*, running through all the four *Adhyayas* and sixteen '*padas*' of the *Vedantasutras* of Badarayana, such as this book, prepared under the U G C. scheme, claims to be, is, perhaps, quite new in any language. I toiled to bring out this textual thematic rendering of Sankara's *Brahmasutrabhasya* in English in the hope that the book will have much wider circulation with the result that many others will, some day, come to share my conviction that the Vedanta of Sankara is no sectarian dogma, that it is the perennial philosophy of mankind. There are some textual and very erudite interpretation-works (*Tika*) on Sankara's entire '*Bhasya*' in Sanskrit, such as, the *Bhamati* of Vacaspati Misra and the *Ratnaprabha* of Govindananda, but these works are not *thematic*. There are, again, countless number of *Thematic works* on Sankara's *Advaita* philosophy in different languages, including those that are in classical Sanskrit, but I am not sure if these can pass the test of being 'textual', and if any of them can justly claim to be an interpretation-work of Sankara's *Brahmasutrabhasya* from end to end. I do not rule out the possibility of being mistaken in my above observation, but I am not, perhaps mistaken in my claim that a textual thematic interpretation of Sankara's commentary on the *Brahmasutras* in English was not attempted by any person earlier. This interpretation-work does not, however, proceed *word-wise*, not even *Sutra-wise*. It proceeds *Theme-wise* and is textual in the sense that it follows faithfully Sankara's own exposition in letter and spirit.

As the pages of all the twelve chapters of the book will show, I have followed Sankara's writings in the original Sanskrit texts, and did not depend on any translation-works in English or in any indigenous language. To be frank, I did not find any such translation work, literal like that of Dr. Thibaut, or free translation as by many others, either dependable or textually correct. I did not also depend on the versions of Sankara Vedanta given by others, although I looked into great many works of that nature. My original plan, however, was to present Sankara's *advaita* philosophy in the light of the classical interpretations of the two foremost schools of Sankara Vedanta the *Bhamati* school of Vacaspati and the *Vivarana* school, which follows the *Pancapadika* version of Sankara's philosophy. Could I stick to that plan and programme, it would have been a much easier task for me. As a matter of fact, I had made considerable progress in my writings under the guidance of the '*tika*' of the Acarya's direct disciple Padmapada and that of the illustrious Vacaspati Misra, when, highly presumptuous although it will sound, I came to detect what appeared to me, a cardinal error, less open in Vacaspati but more pronounced in the *Pancapadika* account of Sankara's '*adhyasa*', in the writings of persons thousand times more gifted and erudite than this humble author. This error lay in the supposition that Sankara, in his *Adhyasabhasya*, and in reply to the hypothetical objector (*purvapaksa*), had actually given an explanatory account of how '*atma-anatma-adhyasa*' could happen, or could be possible as an event. It is to be remembered that in the very opening line of the *Adhyasabhasya*, Sankara had described this '*adhyasa*' as beginningless (*anadi*) and also as '*nausargika*' (that which

obtains in the very nature of things). So, the question, which agitated my mind, was, could it be that the great master had contradicted himself by giving an explanatory account of the *origin*, even of the *possibility* of that, which is, by his own pronouncement, '*anadi*' (beginningless)? The versions of the case given by one, who was the nearest disciple of Sankara, and by another, who could be almost his junior contemporary had the Acarya lived a longer life, suggest that Sankara, in reply to the objection raised by the *purvapaksa*, had *actually given* an explanatory account how the *atma-anatma-adhyasa* could *become possible*. This, to my mind, seemed preposterous. I found that the Ratnaprabha, a more lucid work, had also followed suit. The several *oddities* of the supposition of an '*adhyasa*', which these illustrious interpreters seem to have regarded as '*Jiva-initiated*', escaped the notice of all of them without a single exception. What is most regrettable, these master-commentators attempted to cover up what I felt to be a glaring mistake by certain ingenious improvisations of their own—each in his peculiar way. How an explanatory account which involves an *infinite regress* could be a logical explanation baffled me. The case in question was not at all like such cases where Sankara have introduced the analogy of the *seed and the sprout* (*vyankuravat*). It, on the contrary, seemed to resemble such cases which Sankara condemned as '*andha-parampara*' blind *regressus ad infinitum*. How a flagrant logical fallacy could constitute a logical explanation gave me a rude shock. Could an *anadi* (beginningless) *naisargika* (perennial) '*adhyasa*' be equivalent to a series of '*adhyasa*' stretched in an infinitely regressive process?

Besides, it did not strike anyone of them that an explanatory *causal* account of *adhyasa* implies there being *three* conditions, which have to be regarded in absolute distinction. These are: (a) a locus where some content was to be superimposed *illicitly*, (b) an adventitious, and so an *illicit* content, which was to be superimposed, and (c) a human agent, a percipient subject, who was to do that *illegitimate* exercise. It can be seen, each condition implies or presupposes *illicitness* or *illegitimacy* instead of explaining it. Next, they did not seem to have noticed that in a philosophical system, such as, the *Advaita* of Sankara, where everything is Brahman, and so *Atman*, and where there can be nothing else beside or outside that all-comprehensive reality, the so called '*anatma*' (not-Self) cannot be a '*category*' or fact *metaphysically* distinct, standing readymade and handy in order to be superimposed on the *atma* (the self), *ab extra*. Another intriguing question that agitated my mind relentlessly and drove me to the limit of exasperation was, if I, being a '*jiva*' of the *Advaita* conception, *am* also the Brahman itself in a state of enlightenment called *vidya*, can it not be that this my behaving *ignorantly* as a distinctive individual, under the impact of *avidya*, has a place, even as a distortion (*vivarta*), in the outer expression of that non-dual Reality which has phenomenally and *epistemically* manifested or *appeared as mam*? Am I a separate fact? I felt convinced that I could not be a separate and *metaphysically* distinct entity, rolling on in the cosmic process beginninglessly on account of some '*original sin*' or moral lapse of my own, on account of an *adhyasa* committed *by me*. On the contrary, I felt if the *Advaita* account of Sankara, and of the Upanisads, be true, I can only be, *as myself*, a distorted appearance of the very same non-dual Reality, and that my *avidya* has a place, or is *one with*, the *avidya-phase* of the Reality, which, although is its non-dual self-identity *as itself* (as *Atman*), nonetheless, *appears* as cosmic multiplicities in its *avidya-phase*. I felt convinced, and I am still convinced that none of the classical commentators of Sankara, in spite of their great erudition and mastery over Sanskrit language, could sail clear off invidious *dualism* in their account of Sankara's '*adhyasa*' and that their propensities to hunt with the hounds under the cover of the magic-word '*vyavaharika*' and running with the deer under the cover of another magic-word '*paramarthika*' do not provide a *terra firma* to their commitment to absolute non-dualism of the great master.

In a state of utter desperation, and as my last resort, I appealed to Sankara himself for light, while reciting all the lines of the master in his *Adhyasabhasya* times and again. Unbelievable although it will seem to all, the Acharya appeared in my dream, or let me put in the other way, that I *dreamt* of him as appearing in all his shining splendor, and *pin-pointing* the very lines of his *Adhyasabhasya* which contained his *real reply* to the question, which was posed through the device of *purvapaksa*, and some other lines, which held the clue to the solution of the puzzle. He suggested that all have blundered in taking the concept 'adhyasa' *literally*, while the concept was *intended* to be understood as a picturesque *figurative description* of an error-situation, regarded *postmortum*, that is, *after* the error had ceased in being *detected* as an error. He also gave me to understand that all have blundered in taking his *playful answer* to a foolish point which was raised through the device of *purvapaksa* in order to demonstrate logical impropriety of such a question and this reply to it as his *real answer* to a legitimate question. I was thrilled, my heart welled up with emotion as I woke up, and saw the solution at once. I am not asking anybody to give credence to my dream-experience, an occult fact which I myself cannot explain. But the *logical facts*, which I hope will silence my detractors, *are there* in my textual presentation of themes, such as, 'Avidya', 'Adhyasa', and 'Anirvacaniya', elaborately treated in as many as three closely argued chapters, viz. Chapters III, IV and V. After patiently, and also sympathetically going through them, where I have given a comparative and critical review of the classical interpretations on the issue *vis-a-vis* my own in the light of each wording of the master in his *Adhyasabhasya*, let the dispassionate readers and possible critics decide for themselves whether I have actually scored quite a number of points of advantage and importance against my illustrious predecessors or not. This strange development necessitated my rejection of more than two hundred pages of prepared manuscripts, drafted on classical lines, and to fall back upon Sankara's own writings, whenever I found it difficult to swallow up traditional interpretation on crucial issues. This has rendered the '*Aloka*', an all together new commentary on Sankara's texts on the *Brahmasutras*, drafted on *thematic* lines, to meet the requirements of a modern student, acquainted with the trends of philosophical thinking in the West as much as in the East.

This lines, pin-pointed in my dream are, '*na cayamasti nyamah purovavahita eva visaye visayantaramadhyasitavyumiti, a-pratyaksepit hyakase vallastalamalinatadyadhyasyanti Evamaviruddhab pratyagaitmanyopyanatmadhyasah*'. These may be rendered in the following way. It is *not* also the fact that there is such a rule that superimposition of *some other* content is to take place on an object which ostensibly (*eva*) is situated in front. Although the sky (ether) is invisible (and, therefore, not so located in front), the dullard superimpose on it bottom and duskiness. The illicit superimposition of not-self on the universally overperceived Self is *in this way* not repellant to fact (*aviruddha*). Here, Sankara was stating the rule itself, and not an *exception* to what would be the general rule, and was enforcing it by means of an illustration of very singular and unique nature. But the classical interpreters without a single exception understood it otherwise, that is, as an exception to the general rule. They understood that the general rule was that in all cases of illicit superimposition, an adventitious content was to be superimposed on an object situated in front. They could not follow that Sankara had rejected that supposition, which he himself had posed as an objection through the device of *purvapaksa*, by means of his concluding statement cited and explained above. This is really unfortunate. We cannot afford to enter into details—which have been worked out in the chapters under reference. To expose the absurdity of the *purvapaksa* contention (admitted as a valid point by the classical interpreters) let us ask. Do we ever superimpose a foreign content *knowingly* on an object situated in front? Do we superimpose a snake, or snakey character on a rope, *known to us as situated in front*? In the snake-rope illusion, is the rope ever known as situated in front *at the moment* when the illusion takes place? Does it not lie unperceived (*a-pratyaksa*) and so, as *not given*



at all in front at that moment? Were it, at that moment, 'given' in front, and also known as that, could the illusion of misperceiving a rope as a snake take place? Is not this all absurd? Now, let us ask, when do we actually locate the rope as given in front, and the snake as ungiven, and so, a foreign content? The only reply that makes sense is that we discover that the object really there in front was a rope and that we had misperceived it as a snake, and thereby, had superimposed wrongly a foreign content to what was actually there (although not known or perceived to be there at all) only when the illusion had been detected as an illusion and had ceased to be. That we superimpose a wrong content on something actually situated in front, can, therefore, be a meaningful statement in the context of a retrospective assessment of an error-situation, which had already passed away. An 'adhyasa' is, therefore, a figurative description, *postmortem*, of an error-situation, which, as a state of positive ignorance, has been rightly called 'avidya' by Sankara. 'Avidya' and 'adhyasa' are not separate entities, and the description that the latter is due to the former, or that the former is the cause of the latter is simply an elaboration in language, by means of *imageries* and *figures*, of the self-same fact. This, then, knocks the bottom of the *purvapaksa* contention that in every case of illusion, we superimpose a foreign content on an object situated in front and known as that. After having given a *reflective analysis* of an error-situation in his so called definition or description of *adhyasa*, Sankara compared his own notes with those of the rival schools in order to arrive at a commonly agreed view, and there after, he elucidated the phenomenon of error further by means of certain homely illustrations. While doing this, he had the apprehension that his reflective interpretation of an 'adhyasa' (which has been detected and known), particularly, the two illustrations cited by him might mislead his readers into believing that the *postmortem* figurative description of 'adhyasa' is equivalent to *adhyasa* as a *live* fact, that is, equivalent to a *live* error, which is a state of *avidya*. This was the reason why he playfully posed an illegitimate and factually wrong question through the device of *purvapaksa*, then gave a 'casual' reply to it—which corresponded to the question, point-by-point, and could be a real answer had the question, requiring a causal explanation of *adhyasa* been a legitimate question and admissible in the situation under consideration, and then, finally, he rejected it outright as not conforming at all to the rule, if *adhyasa* is understood as a *live* state of ignorance or misperception. Look at the beauty and ingenuity of the illustration of the sky-illusion! This illusion is one which persists with us, and we continue to misperceive the sky as huge cauldron dusky in appearance, even though we know what we perceive is not the sky but the shadow of our globe projected in empty space, and bound by the limits of the horizon. Is not our misknowledge of the all-pervading formless unitary self as invested with the cosmic appearance of plural things and beings an exact parallel to this image? Had Sankara intended his last illustrated case to be an exception to the general rule guiding *adhyasa*, could not that master of Sanskrit speech, add the qualifying or limiting word '*sarvatha*' and formulate his statement as '*na ca ayam asti niyamaḥ sarvatha pūrovasthite eva viśaye viśayāntaram adhyasitavyam*'?

That an illusion or error is, or involves, illicit superimposition of a foreign content on a locus which repels it is, therefore, a *reflective figurative description* of an error-situation *after* it has been corrected. This fully accords with the fact that, *as and when*, we are in error, we do not know that we are in error, and therefore, it is not possible to formulate a description of that state. Even then, the fact stands out that it is this live state of error or 'misknowledge', which we seek to elaborate upon in the post-error state by the 'figure' or 'imaginary' of a *superimposition* of a foreign content on a locus which rejects it. When doing this, we however, ought to remember two things: (a) That when error or illusion was a *live experience*, it 'happened', that is, was a 'given experience' in spite of us, that it was not actively manipulated by us, (b) That this super-imposition was not originally known *as that*, that there was no distinctive awareness of the locus *as it is*, nor was there any

awareness that the content known in error-experience was a *foreign content*. Such being the case, the questions *how* an error took place, *how we superimposed*, whether the locus was situated in front or not, are all illegitimate and meaningless. In other words, explanatory causal account is ruled out by the very nature of illusion *as and when* it occurs. Sankara seems to have been alive to the fact that his reflective figurative description of a state of error in term of the 'figure' of an illicit 'superimposition' might give rise to the misunderstanding that an error or illusions which, to be sure, is a state of *avidya* or ignorance, is *known to be an illicit superimposition* when it actually occurs and so long as it lasts, and that the dullard (*vala*) might quarrel over the question of its *origin*, and attempt an explanatory causal account of that which does not call for such an explanation at all! This seems to be the reason why he gradually assimilated the concept of 'adhyasa' to the standard Vedantic concept '*avidya*', step by step—first, putting it as '*smṛti-rupaparatra purvadrstāvabhāsa*', then, as '*anyasya anyadharmavabhāsa*', and finally as '*a-tasmin tadbuddhi*', which last is defining '*adhyasa*' in term of '*avidya*'.

The conclusion to which my above discussions led was that '*ātmanātma-adhyasa*' which is *anadi* and *naiṣargika*, is a phase of *epistemic* existence that obtains here, that it does not call for any causal explanation, and finally, that the human scale-goat, his lapses—moral or otherwise, should not be held responsible for this *avidya being there*. In other words, *we are not answerable why, avidya is there—why we mistake the true Self for the false self, that is, for our individual egos*. Now, this is a clear departure from the traditional account of *avidya*, or *ajñāna* as it is otherwise called. By this, and our new account, we are not to inquire *how*, or at what point of time, this our epistemic existence, vitiated by *avidya*, and involving misconception about the nature of the true self, first began. It is only left to us to effect an escape from this state of cosmic delusion—an epistemic circumstance, nothing metaphysical. This becomes possible, as Sankara states in the concluding sentence of the *Adhyasabhāṣya*, by conscious recognition of *absolute one-ness* of the Self (*atmaikatva*), and by the realisation that this one non-dual Self is *all the reality* (*Brahman*). From this, by deduction it follows that the plural and the manifold (*nanatva*) are 'mere' appearances, or 'illusory' appearances. Sankara thereafter, undertakes to show that it is this 'truth of fact', that is, *one-ness* of the Self and Reality, and its absolute non-dualness, that the Vedānta, in the form of the revealed teachings of the Upaniṣads, propagates all through out *vathā cāyamārthah sarvesam vedāntanam, tathā vāyamasyam saritṛakamimamsayam pradarsayisyamah*)

Such being the preamble of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* given by Sankara himself, I, in this thematic commentary work, started by giving an explanation of the specific nature of Sankara's *Problem* and *Approach* to the Vedānta in the first chapter, keeping in view the contemporary claim in Western philosophy that philosophy does not have any genuine problem to solve. Thereafter, I worked out the peculiar relevance of the concept of *Adhyasa* and of Sankara's *Adhyasabhāṣya* in the second chapter. In this, I compared the classical interpretations of the two principal schools of the Advaita Vedānta but adhered to what seemed to me to be Sankara's own view on the issue. In Chapters III, IV and V, I gave a textual exposition and critical analysis of three cardinal concepts of Sankara viz., *Avidya*, *Adhyasa*, *Anirvacanīya* and showed in details, and also in depth, how the classical versions of *Avidya* and *Adhyasa* do not fit into Sankara's own writings, and why these should be rejected. No one is a greater authority on Sankara's Vedānta than Sankara himself. So I decided, thereafter, to look into the classical commentaries in the light of Sankara's own wordings in his text, in his text, instead of reading Sankara and interpreting him in the light of the classical commentaries. Then, since Sankara had himself undertaken to establish absolute one-ness of the Self (*atmaikatva*), and also to show that Reality, which is Brahman is this non-dual Self, it was clear that the means of

liberation, according to him, was the intuitive realisation of Reality as the *one* Self and *one* identity of all. In conformity with this, I introduced the first *sutra*, '*Athato Brahmajijnasa*', thematically, as the concept of 'Reality as the Self'. Rendered into our familiar terminology, this means 'The concept of Brahman as the one non-dual *Atman*'. This, then, is the fundamental issue, the one central theme of the Vedanta as a *metaphysical system*. What could be the theoretic basis of this metaphysical theme, a truth of fact? I brought in the two succeeding *sutras* '*Janmadyasya yatah*' and '*Sastrayonityat*., interpreted in the way Sankara has done, as furnishing the required answer to the problem. The title of the next chapter that is, Chapter VII is, 'The Ground of the Metaphysical doctrine of Reality as the Self'.

This ground, however, is no inferential argument, as Sankara has explained in the context of the second *sutra*. Nor is this ground any conceptualistic *postulation* as can be found in most of the other schools of Indian metaphysical systems. This ground is the explicit statements of the Upanisads, or the '*vedanta-vakyas*', as Sankara has named them. These constitute a 'revealed' authority, which is regarded as an extraordinary (*alaukika*) *pramana* (source of knowledge) by the orthodox schools. This *pramanu*, although a form of *indirect knowledge* (*parokhsajnana*), is admitted as self-valued (*svatah pramana*), self-sustained, and as absolutely immune from conflict with all *laukika* (ordinary) *pramanas*, such as, perception, inference etc. Its absolute indubitability emanates from its being *apauruseya* (impersonal), in being the revealed 'truth-perceptions' of absolutely de-conditioned minds, and it is in this last sense that Sankara, as I have shown, accepted its absolute inviolability and not in the Purvamimamsa sense of a self-existent body of verbal arrangement or system, transmitted from one '*sarga*' (creation) to another. This revealed authority, otherwise called the *Śruti-pramana*, forms the ground of the metaphysical doctrine that takes Reality as absolutely nondual, formless, quality-less, indeterminate, and all-comprehensive. Being *as such* -self-luminous and free, and assimilates to it all existential pluralities of *names* and *forms* (*namarupa*) as its phenomenal manifestations, which come out of it, are sustained in it, and finally disappear in it—this being their absolute immutable ground, their one substance, their one truth, and their one self-identity (*atman*). It was very characteristic of Sankara that he gave a two-fold interpretation of the third *Sutra* - '*Sastrayonitvat*' one interpretation which places it as an argument complementary to the *śruti*-evidence cited in the second *sutra*, and the other interpretation which connects it with the most vital *sutra* of the first *Adhyaya*, namely, the fourth *sutra*— '*Tattvasamavayat*'. As I have shown in my interpretation, if the second *sutra* shows that all phenomenal pluralities of physical names and forms have Brahman, the Reality as their one absolute ground by reason of emanating from its aspect of '*ananda*' of 'free-play', the third *sutra*, by Sankara's first interpretation, shows that all the *sastras*, all branches of knowledge and of human disciplines, have for their material basis the aspect of '*cit*' (self-luminous *caitanya*, the *jñāna-svarupa* of Brahman, the Reality. This amounts to saying that there could not be any expression of knowledge or wisdom, even of our follies and foibles, had not Reality itself been *consciousness-as-such*. This, then, provides the much needed logical aid to Sankara's second interpretation of the third *sutra* that the *sastras*, such as, the *upanisads*, constitute the required evidence and the proof supreme of the metaphysical doctrine of 'Reality as the Self', as also to the fourth *sutra*, which argues that a harmonious interpretation of the *śrutis* can furnish the theoretic basis of the metaphysical doctrine of the Advaita. The logical point that develops out of the dual interpretation of the third *sutra* is that the Brahman-doctrine is not founded on *anything alien*, any arbiter outside Brahman, since if the *sastras* constitute the *ratio cognoscendi* of Brahman, — the one Reality and the Self, this Brahman, again, is the *ratio essendi-cum-ratio existendi* of the *Sastras*.

The admissibility of the *sastras*, or the revealed texts, for becoming the theoretic ground or *pramana* of the metaphysical doctrine of the Vedanta being thus established, a sustained effort was needed to prove the fact that the revealed texts, taken *harmoniously*, do *actually* accomplish this object. So, my eighth chapter bears the title 'The *sastrapramanakatva*' the Metaphysical doctrine of Brahman as the '*Atman*'. Sankara's arguments under the fourth *sutra* have not only been exhaustive and conclusive but are a marvel of analytical thinking yet to be surpassed. It is astounding with what grace and facility he met the arguments of the various schools of the *Mimamsa*, the most renowned among the analytical philosophers of India. I shall not enter into the details of one of the largest chapters of this book. Suffice it to say that, to my mind, Sankara succeeded most eminently, not only in establishing that there is really a *vastupara*' section of the Vedas in the shape of the Upanisads, but also in demonstrating why, *from the very nature of the case*, the proof afforded by this branch of the *sastras*, should be accepted as the one and only admissible proof in the matter.

But even when '*sastrapramanakatva*' of the Advaita theme of unity of Reality and the Self, rather the absolute *one-ness* of the two concepts of their metaphysical system, is established, there remains much ground for dissensions from various quarters. In the first place, there are some who have deeprooted bias against a philosophical system which ostentatiously displays its adherence to revelation or revealed authority, and seeks to justify itself on that specious plea alone. Many are prone to call this rank dogmatism, and to regard it as the very negation of philosophy as a meaningful rational discourse. There are, again, many who do not believe in the *absolutistic claim* that truth is *one* and *indivisible*, that there cannot be *plural metaphysical* systems, or that *plural metaphysical* systems, if such are actually there, are all misnomers. In other words, many are sceptical about the possibility of a thoroughly absolutistic metaphysical system. Besides, there are good many people, who, like our contemporaries in the West, the linguistic analysts and the conceptual analysts, who would ridicule the very suggestion of there being a metaphysics and ontology, in other words, a philosophy with *factual claim*, the claim to be an *informative* knowledge with *transformative* bearing upon the making of human personality. It is singularly remarkable that neither Sankara, nor the author of the *Brahmasutras*, failed to anticipate such modern objections and to provide for a solid defence against them. In the light of the Vedanta *sutras* and Sankara's arguments, in the *Tarkapada* and elsewhere, against logic (*tarka*) which is either *rootless*, or is an arbitrary extension of reasoning in the form of *postulational* constructions from the data of *ordinary* experience, I developed my ninth chapter, bearing the title 'The Logicality of the Advaita Vedanta Claim'. It was found that a true metaphysics with ontological claim rests on a *different* kind of 'given experience', of the kind that the *srutis* give utterance to, and is neither all moonshine, nor is it an arbitrary manipulation with the several 'Ideas of Reason' which Kant had condemned. Logic by itself is no source of knowledge, it is merely the methodology. If not geared to given experience of some form or other, it becomes erratic, desultory and self-defeating.

Next, the claim of the Advaita Vedanta to be the one true metaphysical system worth its name, necessitated close examination of the claims of the rival metaphysical systems, the Sankhya, the Nyaya-vaishesika, the Buddha, the Jain, the Saiva and the Bhagavata—which exhibit different patterns of the so called metaphysical thinking. I have attempted an elaborate exposition of the Advaita refutation of these rival metaphysical system in my tenth chapter, perhaps, in a more thorough-going way than has been done up till now, in the light of the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary on them in the *padas* I and IV of *Adhyaya* I, and the *padas* I and II of *Adhyaya* II.

In the remaining two chapters, chapters XI and XII, I attempted to bring out what I understood to be the Advaita Metaphysics of Sankara in all its facets and the Advaita view of Liberation of *Moksa*. This I did by closely looking into the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary, on the issues relevant for my purpose, from end to end, across the entire breadth of the texts, in all its *Adhyayas* and *padas*. Although Chapter XI and Chapter XII bear separate titles, such as, 'The Advaita Metaphysics through the Brahmasutras' and 'The Jiva and Brahman . Bondage and Liberation', they are to be taken as one whole. Chapters IX and X, as is evident, deal with issues which are to a great extent polemical. I felt it necessary, therefore, to present the Advaita philosophy of Sankara in the light of the *sutras* and commentaries as a whole and to relink the dissertation to the fourth *sutra* of *Adhyaya I, pada I*—'*Tattu samanvayat*'

As a patient-reader of the concluding two chapters will find, the exposition of the Advaita Philosophy of Sankara, given in these pages is altogether new, and different on many essential and important points from the classical expositions of the two famous schools—The *Bhamati* and the *Vivarana*. It was my initial difference with those classical schools on the issue of the nature of *atmanatma-adhyasa* which made this difference. Although I have admitted the value of '*avaccheda*' and '*pratibimba*' for illustrative purposes, these being only 'analogies' and not 'truths of fact' so far as the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary on them are concerned, I am of the conviction that Sankara's metaphysics needs a different descriptive title, much favoured by Sankara himself, such as, '*Anirvacanīyatavada*'. This designation, so very implied in Sankara's presentation of the Vedanta, to my mind, cannot be improved upon. I do not know how '*avacchedvada*' or '*pratibimbavada*' escapes the dualism incipient in them. When 'analogies', metaphors, and other modes of figurative speech, are literally taken and confused with actual states of affair, then instead of solving difficulties, which are already there in an intelligible putting of themes, all revelatory and so extraordinary, we create grounds for fresh difficulties and confusion.

The Vedanta, which is the philosophy of Upanisads, does not begin with any *a priori* concepts when it talks of '*Brahman*', '*Atman*', '*Maya*', '*Avidya*', '*Atma*', '*Anatma*' etc., nor does it define any of them in advance of experience. The Upanisads are all records of experiencing Reality in modes very much different from our conventional way of regarding it in our habitual experience and behaviour. Were it not possible to experience all and everything thing as one indivisible unity, there could not be any Speaking of Brahman as the all-comprehensive. Were it not possible, again, to experience this Brahman, the *objective unity* of all that *appear* several and independent, as the one self-identity of all, and so, as the one non-dual Self, there could not be any speaking of *this* Brahman (*etadaksara*) as that *Yadaksara*), that is, as the eternally self-realised '*Atman*'. All these are not mere words, —the underlying *reality-experience* makes them meaningful, as it also necessitates their use as the much needed 'expressions'. Here, we have the episode of a Reality, which although stands out eternally as its immutable, all-accomplished, non-dual and indivisible '*Itselfsantam*', '*śivam*', '*advaitam*', nevertheless, also *phenomenally* displays itself in the infinitely varying modes of cosmic manifestations, which latter also get articulated in the experience of the actual and the possible (*bhūtasca bhavyasca*). If the first is the *paraaspect*, the *metaphysical being-in-itself* of Brahman, the other represents the *apara*-aspect, the purely *epistemic* aspect (its *esse* consisting in its *percept*) of Brahman. Had not this epistemic aspect also obtained there, even as a state of make-believe, there could not be the realm of *avidya*, the realm of our conventional experience of infinite pluralities, *apparently* substantive, and distinct from one another. The explanation of *avidya* is not to be sought in the follies or natural draw-backs of the *jivas*, the human scape-goat. The *Jivas* apparent loss of Brahmanhood is a part of the very same drama in which the Being-as-such, as the Upanisads narrate



although one in its being-as-itself, 'intended' to assume many forms and names. That all this is figurative, there is no doubt about that, but this 'figure' of *assuming* infinitely plural forms has been a conceptual necessity just to articulate how the cosmic pluralities of our conventional experience could be there, if Reality, *as itself*, is one and indivisible. It is in this context, that Sankara introduces his conceptual-device, a mere analogy, of *Maya*. This '*Maya*', like '*avidya*' is an epistemic concept, nothing metaphysical. The question of the relation of this concept to Brahman, the question if '*Maya*' is *śakti* (potency) of Brahman or not, would have been relevant, had this '*maya*' been a metaphysical issue. What the Vedanta is concerned with, is showing the path of possible transition from *avidya* to *vidya*, from a life of engrossing make-believe to a life of truth perception, and this transition, in all its substance, is an epistemic affair. This is to be effected by developing a new form of understanding and assessment in course of certain radical changes in the temperament and attitude, and this does not involve any material change in the nature of reality as such. The rope, the substantial fact, remains all throughout *as it is*, all changes take place within the mechanism of misperception, which prompted taking it as a snake. It is really astonishing that Sankara's '*mayaviva mayaya*' could bring forth a real '*maya*' - stuff in the minds not only of the non-Advaitists, but even in the minds of Sankara's principal adherents of the two schools. '*Maya*' can work wonders, indeed, although it is an epistemic concept, nothing metaphysical.

In my presentation of the Advaita Metaphysics through the *brahmasutras* as a whole, I have taken careful note of both *spastalingaka* and *aspastalingaka* Vedanta *vakyas* that relate to Brahman. Brahman, to my mind, has been introduced and discussed in the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary in five ways to facilitate grasping of the Brahman—the one in a progressive way—(a) as the *nimitta cum-upadana karana* of the cosmic order of plural manifestations, (b) as the *one* worshippingable (*upasya*) through diverse phenomenal forms or symbols, (c) as the *one* knowable (*jñeya*) reality, underlying, supporting (*āyatana*) and sustaining all plural *names* and *forms*, their one substance, (d) as all that is there either, as the reality or its appearances, that is, as the *para* and the *apara* Brahman and (e) finally, as the one *realised* and also *realisable identity* of all, that is, as the one indivisible Self (*Ātman*), the realisation of which is the *vidya* that liberates. As I followed through Sankara's presentation of these several themes in the light of the *sutras*, it struck me as singular that neither the *śruti*-texts, nor the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary on them, exhibited any interest in throwing out any issue as all together irrelevant or out of the way, that all through out there has been a sustained effort to unify and integrate the diverse clues to *Brahmavidya* under the vision of one unitary and absolute truth of fact: Is not all and everything that *is* there, or *appears*, the one Brahman? It can be seen that as a source of knowledge, the *śrutis*, as an indirect form of knowledge (*parokṣa jñāna*), communicate information in the *objective mode* of speech, and present Brahman as though it were an *objective content*, even though as the one indivisible reality and substance underlying the plural *appearances*. But this has been, again, circumvented by the *śrutis* themselves when they called upon *direct realisation* of Brahman as the one pure and absolute identity, that is, as the very Self itself of all and everything—the *Ātman*, in the *transcendental mode* of self-experience. This seemed to me to be a singular discovery made by the Advaita of Sankara which escaped the understanding of all non-Advaitists, who remained reconciled with the 'objective mode' of regarding Brahman as the Absolute person, a transcendental duplicate of the empirical individual, standing *out there* in some form of *distinction* from the latter, internal (*svagata*) or otherwise.

There are many facets of the Advaita doctrine on which I found the classical interpretation of the schools too out-dated, and also *not conforming* to the letter and spirit of Sankara's own writings. For instance, Brahman *as itself* is to be regarded as the *paramārthika śatta*, not simply because it is

the reality ultimate and uncontradicted, but also because realisation of Brahman as the absolute identity of all, is the *supreme value (paramartha)*. The Vedānta is a value-oriented discipline, not a mere theoretical philosophy. The concept of the Self or *ātma* is found to be essentially a '*functional concept*', and the so called *anatma*' (not-self), if was found, is not a distinct *metaphysical* fact, standing out there in absolute opposition to it. There are two tides in the self-manifestation of Reality, an *outgoing* tide in which the one self gives itself to its many appearances, which in being invested with that self-hood, parade as many selves and substantivities, and an *in-moving* tide in course of which all outer-manifestations stand denied as *not* the Self *as such*, (*sa asa neti netyātma*) and turn into the so called '*anatma*', the not-self. In a metaphysics, where everything is Brahman and the one non-dual Self, the not-Self (*anatma*) is not, and cannot be, a distinct category. One and the same person may be a Professor, a Brahmin, a poor man, an old man, a father, a husband, and so on, and yet when falling back upon his inner sense of self-identity, all the outer forms of self-hood may stand denied. This is, of course, an analogy.

The very title of the last chapter, 'The Jiva and Brahman' Bondage and Liberation' is intended to suggest the Advaita truth that it is *avidyā* or ignorance, a perennial epistemic development, which stands in between the '*Jiva*' and its Brahmanhood, and it is the realisation of this Brahmanhood as its true nature and Self that signifies its release from bondage. The falling off of the physical body has no significance in this liberation. What is needed is complete lapsing of the sense of bodied existence, or withdrawal of the sense of one-ness with the body. The enlightened remains disembodied even when apparently living as a bodied individual, as Sankara himself has said. Without such enlightenment there can be no release from the bondage of phenomenal life with the falling away of the body, since disembodiedness (*a-sarīratva*) is not a physical affair at all.

It can be seen that although Sankara, or for that matter, the Advaita Vedānta, finds no favour with the *jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda* and regards intuitive knowledge of absolute one-ness of the *Jiva* and Brahman as the *one* means of liberation, Sankara accommodates pious and righteous actions (*Karma*), both as means of *krama-mukti* (liberation by stages) and as contributory factors towards the development of the much need mental attitude, temperament and disposition, otherwise called the *sādhana-catustaya*, which he regards as the absolute pre-requisites of an inquiry as to the nature of the true Self. Even when everything is said, it, however, needs reiteration that it is the *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyaśana* of the truths of fact that the *śrutis*, such as, the Vedānta texts advocate that can culminate in liberation, provided the absolute pre-requisites, the four-fold *sādhana*s, are there, consequent upon performance of righteous and obligatory duties, or even independent of them, as Sankara puts it in his commentary on the first *sūtra*.

At the fag end of one's academic life, it is difficult to say to what extent one is indebted to others for the grasp of philosophical problems one has developed, and how much of it is due one's own self. More than fifty years ago, I developed great love for Sanskrit language and literature as a student of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta. I also enjoyed the rare privilege to sit at the feet of good many Oriental scholars and a whole galaxy of renowned teachers, such as, Professor K C Bhattacharya, Professor S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. S. N. Dasgupta. Sankara Vedānta was one passion of my academic life, and I have read and taught the *Bhāṣya* for more than four decades now, and perhaps, I learnt more about it in my discussions with my students than from any other source. In the preparation of this volume, I have profitted a good deal from the writings of the classical interpreters and their adherents of both the schools of the Advaita Vedānta, although I have differed with them on many vital issues in my interpretation of Sankara. The Bengali Edition of the 'Vedānta Darsana' by Mahamahopadhyaya Pramathanath, complete up to the fourth *sūtra* in two big volumes

of about 1000 pages each, and the published writings of Mahamahopadhyaya Jogendranath greatly helped me in my reading of the classical interpretation-works of the Bhamati and the Vivarana schools. To my *Suruputra*, Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya, I am heavily indebted for the encouragement and inspiration I received constantly during the entire period of my preparation of this volume. He not only had the kindness to go through the initial five chapters of the book with meticulous care, offering many helpful suggestions wherever he found my presentation cumbrous and uncouth but he also responded readily and warmly to my endless correspondences in which I invited his reaction to my new discoveries in Sankara's writings.

I am indebted also to my daughter Dibyasree and to my son Saumyo Prokash Chattopadhyaya, who helped me greatly in the preparation of the manuscripts and the type-scripts, and also checked my many references. Above all, I am deeply indebted to my wife, who sustained me in my struggle for existence and in my academic pursuits, who encouraged me to write this book, and had actually drafted in outlines the programme of the entire work under my guidance in the hope that the University Grants Commission would accept it, but who could not live to see her cherished work actually written and completed. Is not living in the fond and affectionate remembrance as true a living as living in flesh and blood?

## Sankara's Problem and Approach to the Vedanta

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Sankara undertakes to interpret the *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana, not as an end in itself, but in order to expound through that means what he understood to be the philosophy of the Vedanta—which, again, meant for him the philosophy of the Upanisads taken as a harmonious and systematic whole. The fact that he had also written down elaborate commentaries on the principal Upanisads<sup>1</sup>, presumably before his commentaries on the *Brahmasutras* and the *Bhagvad Gita*, goes to show that through a detailed critical and comparative study of the Upanisads he had already formed in his mind some idea about the *key-note* and the most crucial themes, and that these then became central and vital in his interpretation of the *Brahmasutras* as also in his rendering of the Vedanta philosophy. This is in glaring contrast with Ramanuja's claim in his polemical work that he had been much nearer to the Vedanta *sutras* in his literal interpretation of them in conformity with the *Brahmasutravrtti* of Bodhayana and the glosses on the *Vrtti* by old masters<sup>2</sup>. Sankara, in spite of his deep reverence for Badarayana and adherence to the *sutras*, takes the *Brahmasutras*, not as an original or independent treatise enjoying co-equal authority, but rather as expository and illustrative, although laconically, of the most fundamental tenets of the Upanisads. For him, therefore, the *Brahmasutras* derive their authority from the original Upanisadic texts, and so they must necessarily conform to those texts<sup>3</sup>, and the meanings of the *sutras* will have to be taken, interpreted, and understood, in the light of the Vedanta texts, particularly, in the light of what in the Vedantic parlance go by the name of '*Mahavakyas*'.

The *sutras* of Badarayana, says Sankara, have one single purpose and this is to string together the 'flowers' (cardinal themes) of the Vedanta *akyas* (sentences)<sup>4</sup>. The *sutras* are to cite and present the relevant Vedanta texts aphoristically, and not to institute or formulate any independent inferential argument<sup>5</sup>. This being the case, Sankara, unlike Ramanuja, cannot be expected to be unduly assiduous in interpreting the *sutras* *Verbatim* without reservation. Nor can he be expected, like Ramanuja, or for that matter, like Bodhayana or Upavarsa, to take the two *mimamsas*—the *Dharmamimamsa* and the *Brahma-mimamsa*—as forming integral parts of one single system<sup>6</sup>. As one deriving one's most distinctive ideas and points of departure from the Upanisadic texts themselves, Sankara's authority and relevance may be considered on equal footing with Upavarsa or the earliest interpreters of the Vedanta in spite of the fact that historically he belonged to a much later period. Sankara is untiring, and he and his followers are unsparing, in emphasizing radical distinction, nay, virtual opposition, between the aim and purpose of the two parts of the revealed texts—the *Karmakands* and the *Jnanakands*.<sup>7</sup> Sankara cites no authority other than the Upanisadic texts themselves and their avowed

meaning in support of this his radical opinion. This also shows that it was the Upanisadic texts themselves which guided Sankara in his interpretation of the *Brahmasutras*, and that it was not the words of the *sutras*, exclusively, which guided him in formulating his view of the Vedanta.

There could, however, be a stronger reason for Sankara's bringing down the *Brahmasutras* in tune with the cardinal tenets of the Upanisads. The five hundred and fifty-five *sutras*, presented in four chapters, mostly consist of two or three words each, and are unintelligible in themselves. "They refuse", as Radhakrishnan observes, 'Proteus-like, to be caught in any definite shape' and leave everything to be done by the interpreter or commentator<sup>8</sup>. The light of wisdom which can resolve their apparent unintelligibility and senselessness and render them into relevant points at issue has therefore to be incorporated from outside. And what could be the better and more significant source of this light than the Upanisadic texts themselves which the *sutras* themselves are purported to present aphoristically? This is exactly what Sankara seems to have felt.

It is not intended to minimise importance and sagacity of Badarayana as the author of the *Brahmasutras*. Whether he was the same person as Vyasa or not is of little philosophical interest<sup>9</sup>. The task of a *sutrakara* is possibly more onerous and difficult, requiring greater diligence and wider comprehension than that of a commentator. But even then it has to be told that Sankara was just an ordinary commentator. On the authority of Badarayana himself we come to know that there were some other and older interpreters of the Vedanta, such as, Asmarthya, Audolomi, Kasakrisna and others. Some of them undoubtedly upheld different views on the relation of the individual soul to Brahman as also on the nature of liberation or release<sup>10</sup>. To have garnered, thrashed out, ordered and systematised multifarious tenets of the Upanisads into a well-knit and compact treatise must have required a genius at once superhuman and superb. This credit goes to Badarayana as it goes also to Jaimini, the author of the *mimamsa-sutras* in his own sphere. But the task of correlating the aphorisms to appropriate upanisadic texts, of inducing a meaning into them in general accord with the aphorisms themselves as also with what Sankara accepted as the one *central theme*<sup>11</sup>. In the basic teachings of the Upanisads (the absolute transcendence of Brahman, the spiritual principle) must have required a genius no less superhuman. This credit goes to Sankara even supposing that Dr. Dasgupta<sup>12</sup> is right when he opines that the *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana are more amenable to a theistic interpretation and the older tradition in the Vedantic teaching had been predominantly theistic, it cannot possibly be meaningfully contested that the absolutistic interpretation of the *sutras* by Sankara in the light of his concepts of *Adhyasa*, *Avidya* and *Maya* has been the crown and glory of the *Brahmasutras* themselves. If Upavarsa or Bodhayana, Dramida, Tanka, Bhatprapanca, Bharuci, Kapardi and others could have the authority or freedom to render the Vedanta in their own ways, there is little justification for denying similar freedom to Sankara even though he is assumed to have broken away with the older tradition. One who builds up a tradition of one's own is generally looked upon as one who has done away with the existing tradition. What is to be the true Vedanta (final truth) is neither to be decided *a priori*, nor by historical reference. Reason and intuition working in perfect harmony can alone decide the issue.

Strangely enough, Sankara does not claim any credit or originality for his philosophical view. The philosophy he propagates and defends in, according to him, not to be looked upon as his own, he desires it to be accepted as *the* Vedanta philosophy of the Upanisads. In his commentary<sup>13</sup>, he only claims to have brought out in clear relief what he regards as the *true* and the *proper import* of all the Vedanta texts. Thus, neither the *Brahmasutras*, nor the masterly and to many, highly ingenious and original commentary of Sankara on them, can be supposed to have been intended by their authors to be taken as an elaboration of an independent philosophy of the person himself. This is in due



conformity with the oriental tradition in philosophy in more than one sense. In this tradition, every new advocate or propagator of a philosophy claims to have given expression to a view which was *there already*, sanctified by tradition, and which he had derived from ancient teachers<sup>14</sup>. The more characteristic feature of this tradition is that truth is looked upon as 'given' and hence not as an *innovation*. Philosophy is the 'seeing' of a 'truth' or fact which is already there. It can be a rediscovery but no construction or manipulation, no theoretic device either, for which the person can claim any credit. The Vedanta claims to be, in all its diverse schools, the highest wisdom<sup>15</sup>, the truth, absolute and ultimate. The absolute standpoint, the ultimate truth or fact of all existence, has to be regarded as impersonal and trans subjective—whatever *in concreto* it may be finally settled to be, or decided upon. The individual contemplator or seer regards it as transcendent of his personal association, as autonomous, self-shining 'truth or fact' open to all those who seek for it properly. So Sankara would feel amply retarded if his claim to have brought out the one self consistent meaning of all the Vedanta texts be admitted. He has no other philosophy to propagator than the philosophy of the Upanisads which is to him the same as the Vedanta.

There are two other significant characteristics in the Indian Philosophical Tradition which distinguish it sharply from the contemporary analytical tradition of the west. A Philosophy, such as, the Sankara Vedanta, is *informative* knowledge, yet it stands on a footing radically different from that of natural sciences. In the contemporary western tradition however, there can be no informative or descriptive statement, no statement about a truth or fact or nature of things, outside the scope of natural sciences. 'What is *there*' is an empirical question and has to be ascertained and decided not by any conceptual device but by empirical observation. Philosophy has no relevance in this sphere. Contemporary western tradition is pronouncedly anti-meta physical, if metaphysics, and in that sense philosophy, is credited with delivering any truth or fact. All facts are, according to this tradition, empirical, and what is empirical is verifiable, directly or indirectly, in terms of sense perception<sup>16</sup>. Nothing that is existential or factual can become a philosophical problem. Philosophy is not knowledge, technically speaking. It does not have any factual core or content. It can, at best, be elucidatory<sup>17</sup>, a conceptual analysis<sup>18</sup>, or analysis of language<sup>19</sup>, at the worst, that is, as metaphysics in the sense of a body of knowledge of transcendental realities, it is puerile nonsense<sup>20</sup>. The contemporary western analysts have taken great pains to demonstrate how the pseudo-problems of metaphysics arise. Some of them trace them to some sort of 'quandary response'<sup>21</sup>, some to defective analysis of language or linguistic misuse<sup>22</sup>, and some again, to some kind of mental cramp, some psycho-neurotic stress<sup>23</sup>. This is not the place to enter into a critical examination of these contemporary western theses<sup>24</sup>. Suffice it to point out that the Indian tradition in philosophy is radically opposed to this tradition. Indian Philosophy, in all its schools, takes philosophy as factual knowledge which is ultimate and supreme<sup>25</sup>. Philosophy is *tattvajnana*, knowledge of reality, whatever, this reality may be. Indian Philosophy is, without exception, a metaphysics, even when reality is defined in term of the purely sensible or sensuous as in the Carvaka school, or as an unsubstantial flux as in Buddhism. Philosophic knowledge, in the Indian tradition, is to deliver ultimate truth about all existence, including the human situation or condition. Though informative, it is not, however, purely theoretical, that is, not a knowledge for its own sake. Philosophy is not only to inform what *really is there* but also what we, as empirical individuals (*jivas*), may hope for. The problem of Reality and the problem of human destiny are treated inter connectedly as inseparable aspects of one final inquiry. If this be no philosophy, let it be something else—the name does not matter. And this something, whatever may be its name, has been prized by the Indian Philosophers, and the Indian mind even today remains committed to these problems. The other characteristic, equally vital although not vigorously stressed so far, is the Indian gradation with in the realm of informative knowledges, in the domain of what

may be described as 'truths of fact'. There is not one, and no single kind of facts, no one simple mode of 'given-ness'. Consequently, there is no one single and well-defined kind of informative knowledge. A fact is, of course, a 'given' content, but there are, and can be, different and even alternative forms or modes of 'given-ness'. The Indian notion of sense or senseorgan is also much wider. Even the mind, ridiculed by Gilbert Ryle as the 'ghost in the machine'<sup>27</sup>, and the intellect or *buddhi* do not fall outside that category. The Kantian dichotomy of 'sense' and 'understanding' which created later on the distinction between what was named 'knowledge' and mere sophistry, and which gave a spur to modern analytic movement, did not find a place in the Indian account of knowledge of facts in which the mind and intellect, no less than bare sense-organs, function in unison. Although the distinction between two levels of experience, such as, *paravidya* and *aparavidya*, is commonly noticed in the Vedantic literature, it is incipient in all-Indian schools of philosophy. There is a higher knowledge and a lower knowledge both equally 'given' and both informative knowledge. The lower knowledge is the one, habitual, ordinary and conventional. Even the knowledge that science can give us—the natural sciences at their utmost stretch, belongs to the lower order. The higher knowledge, also informative, is the one that is enlightened, no less intuitional, but circumspect, and so far unconventional. This need not be taken as mere play upon words. The lower knowledge, although suphemistically called 'knowledge', turns out, on the event of transition to the higher knowledge to be 'ignorance'<sup>28</sup> or false knowledge. So, in the Indian programme, there is distinction within knowledge, such as, between true knowledge and what, on the ultimate analysis, turns out to be false knowledge, and so no knowledge proper. The transition from the lower to the higher is marked by a radical transformation of the individual—his outlook and valuational consciousness. Thus, the informative knowledge at the upper level becomes transformative wisdom<sup>29</sup>. This wisdom is not *extension* of informative knowledge of the lower level to its farthest limit. Philosophy as informative knowledge of the upper level cannot, therefore, be replaced by natural sciences even at the highest limit of their development. It remains a *new* kind of factual knowledge. It replaces, supersedes and cancels all horizontal surface knowledge by a vertical and deeper understanding. The Indian philosopher calls it *vidya*, *tattvavidya* (knowledge of reality as it is in itself) or plainly, *tattvajnana*. This helps realisation of the supreme end of life (*nihisreyasahetu*)<sup>30</sup>. That knowledge is inferior knowledge, and so no knowledge proper, which does not redeem, does not liberate<sup>31</sup>. The supreme goal, the state of liberation has been variously conceived in the Indian systems. It does not necessarily mean a life or state beyond death<sup>32</sup>. A metaphorical rendering of the word 'death' rather than the literal seems to fit more commonly and eminently into the general texture of the Indian philosophical thought<sup>33</sup>. In whatever meaning the concept of liberation be taken, it is philosophy as *Tattvavidya*, and philosophy alone, that can serve as the means thereto.

Sankara's philosophy and its problems will have to be considered in the light of the foregoing observations if we are to keep close to the texts. Sankara does not, in his philosophical enterprise, start with an analysis of, or, reflection upon, the given order of experience in the way it is normally done by most philosophers or metaphysicians. His *adhyasabhasya* which is the prelude to, as also the key-note of, his *Brahmasutrabhasya* is not to be looked upon as an independent treatise in metaphysics, developed, without any reference to the *status*, through a critical analysis of our conventional knowledge and behaviour. It is not his acute analysis of the phenomenon of illusion and error—although a landmark in epistemological and metaphysical thinking—which leads and guides him to an absolutistic metaphysics. Had that been the case, the modern analyst could bring it down under his improvised category of 'quandary response' and explain it away<sup>34</sup>. His *Adhyasabhasya*, on the other hand, was calculated to bring into clear relief the crucial logical point in the Vedantic argument: what grounds can there be for Believing in a transcendent absolute experience—grounds

for our acceptance of the revealed testimony of the Upanisads as to the nature of reality in preference to the delivery of our habitual direct experience? This logical point: how to resolve, in a convincing manner, the conflict between the two testimonies equally powerful, —the testimony of the scriptures and the testimony of our habitual direct personal experience—seems to have escaped serious notices of all other commentators of the *Brahmasutras*. Their preference for scriptural testimony, in the event of any such conflict, has remained, more or less, an article of faith, and so virtually unexplained. With Sankara, however, the case has been all together different. His espousal of scriptural testimony has neither been wholesale nor, again, absolutely, unconditional.<sup>17</sup> His censure of the kind of knowledge which arises from vatic injunctions and relates to performance of duties and fulfillment of obligations, the kind of knowledge which had *dharma* for its subject-matter (*visaya*), in common with all forms of *laukika* (ordinary or conventional) knowledge is an instance on the point<sup>18</sup>. It will perhaps be a mistake to take the view that Sankara censures any knowledge as such. His censure of a form of knowledge is rather due to the nature of its content, its sub or *visaya*, where this latter is vitiated by falsity. *Avidyavadvi-sayarva*, (the fact of a certain knowledge presenting a sublatable content) is what stands in the way of its acceptance as the truth and so uncontradictable. If our normal perceptual knowledge is discredited as vitiated by falsehood, the reason is the same, that is, the very nature of its content goes to disprove its claim to ultimate truth. If the knowledge which is unleashed by proper understanding of the Vedanta texts is regarded by Sankara as final and uncontradictable, even the impersonalness (*apauruseyata*) of the Upanisads is not the whole reason, not, again, the sufficient condition. The ritualistic part of the Vedas, the *Karmakanda*, be it noted, is considered by him unfit for final acceptance in spite of its impersonal origin, a claim Sankara does not debate or disclaim. For this acceptance of a certain kind of knowledge, that is, a certain *pramana* as final, to the detriment of all other forms of knowledge, Sankara gives a logical reason. In spite of his unswerving adherence to the Upanisads as the final court of appeal in philosophical debates, Sankara is thus not a dogmatist and his Vedanta doctrine is not an exercise in an *argumentum ad verecundiam*.

The logical reason is: our conventional acceptance of a certain kind of experience or knowledge as true cannot be either the final guarantee or the logical ground of its being true. Truth or true knowledge of fact, *Vidya*, is that which reflects, or with, the nature of a thing as it is itself<sup>19</sup>. Any *pramana*, any form of knowledge, which involves distinction of subject and object as also between *pramana* and *prameya* (knowledge and known) is vitiated by falsehood, says Sankara<sup>20</sup>. The reason is: such knowledge or experience presupposes a bodied being, endowed with sense-organs, as the subject or knower (*pramata*) and this is not a truth of fact but only a false core. The real subject is the witnessing consciousness (*Saksi*)<sup>21</sup> which by its very nature is transcendent of the subjective *Vrtti* and its cognate content, that is, the empirical form of the subject and its collateral object. And Sankara undertakes to show that this view of the real subject and of the ultimate falsity of all cognitions which rest on the presupposition of the subject of knower as a bodied being not only conforms to the true import of the Upanisads but is also the view which stands to reason. In the face of this claim (provided this can be substantiated, and Sankara has no doubt that it can be substantiated) Ramanuja's thesis that all the *pramanas* or means of knowledge necessarily relate to some distinctive objective content<sup>22</sup>, that there is no *pramana* which can establish the indeterminate and non-distinctive, and finally, that the distinction of knower, knowing and known is an inseparable feature of all cognitions becomes an unphilosophical common place.

Sankara's problem, as also his aim in the *Brahmasutrabhasya* is to establish that all the Vedanta texts tend towards the view of '*atmaikarya*'. This, in the context of Sankara's philosophy, insofar as Sankara in all matters draws from the Upanisadic texts, means the absolute identity of "Thou" *Team*)

and "That" (*Tat*) This rendering of the unity or one-ness of the self also finds favour with his followers who wrote commentaries and glossaries on his commentary '*Atmaikarya*' then, means absolute one-ness or non-otherness (*ananyata*) of the empirical individual (*jiva*) and the Absolute self (*Brahman*) This knowledge of absolute non-otherness (*ananyata*) of the empirical person, is according to Sankara, the absolute height of enlightenment. It is the realisation of this unity as non-otherness which alone can extirpate, root and branch, the ingrained irrationality, the beginning less unreason, which has vitiated all our conventional knowledge and understanding and determined all our habitual reactions and responses, not fundamentally different from those of ordinary beasts. By no other means can there be an escape from the root-evil which has been the cause of all our sufferings, of the stress and strain and the living death which we so helplessly undergo and endure

Now, Sankara's problem, the task to which in the preamble he declares to have set himself, gave rise to certain other problems as well, no less formidable He was to establish through his commentary that the Vedanta texts, taken in their entirety and in harmony, propagate '*atmaikatva*' that is, absolute one-ness of the empirical self, the self we know in our conventional way of knowing, with the absolute we know in our conventional way of knowing, with the absolute self which is transcendental This thesis alongwith the claim that this knowledge of absolute identity or non-otherness is the supreme knowledge and this alone can extricate ourselves from the bondage of life creates the problem how can this so-called supreme knowledge, which has nothing, in common with the ordinary run of experience, be rendered intelligible even as a prospect or possibility? It will not do to say that this is so, and the one-ness of the self has to be accepted as a fact because the revealed testimony of the scriptures declares it to be the supreme knowledge (*paravidya*) Apart from all other objections which can be pertinently raised (which are all irrelevant as far as Sankara is concerned since Sankara is not a dogmatist and does not take the Upanisads as a body of dogmas) Sankara, as against rival commentators has to establish first, that the Upanisads themselves actually propagate '*atmaikatva*'— absolute identity of the phenomenal selves with the absolute self, and next, that the phenomenal selves are really phenomenal, that is, all mere appearances, and that all our conventional forms of knowledge are vitiated by *Avidya* by error The claim of the Vedanta as delivering up the ultimate and supreme truth, Sankara feels, cannot be accommodated through any artificial compromise with our conventional knowledge. It will not do to say only this that while one is the higher knowledge, the other one is the lower, and that there is a difference of degree only Sankara feels, as we also ordinarily feel, that the difference between the knowledge that *all are one* and indivisible, and the knowledge that *reality is several* and plural, is radical. So, if one is to be accepted as the *Vidya*, as knowledge of truth, the other one must be demonstrated and logically established as *avidya*, that is, as contrary to the fact as it is itself, and so false. Not only that, it will be necessary also to redefine falsehood— the false being that which is ordinarily accepted as true without reservation and not debated or questioned but which is liable to contradiction and sublation. In otherwords, the definition of ignorance (*avidya*) and falsehood is to conform to the Sankarite definition. Sankara falls back upon the concept of *adhyasa*, that of illicit superimposition, to explain this unbridgeable gap between two kinds of knowledge, one ordinary and habitual, the other extraordinary and unconventional, both involving *absolute* claim to be *the* knowledge or *the* truth, when only one of them can be the truth. It is not thus a mere accident that Sankara begins with an account of *Adhyasa* and on the metaphysical level admits the concept of *Maya*.

The *Mayavada* (doctrine of nescience) of Sankara has been described by all rival commentators as an unwarranted hypothesis grafted gratuitously on the Vedanta doctrine of the Upanisads. Sankara's great reverence for Gaudapada and his admiration for the *Mandukyakarika* of the latter led many

even to suspect him as a covert Buddhist. The age of communal apathy and vituperation is now over. No *doctrine* can be slighted or condemned, nowadays, simply on the plea that it bears affinity with or endorses outwardly a trend of thought of some other community. If truth is 'impersonal', and open to all who seek for it, it cannot be the peculiar preserve of a particular school and absolutely shut out from others. Sankara's great merit, it will be shown, consists in justifying the claim of the Vedanta to be the 'Vedanta', that is, the ultimate and final reach of all knowledge, and of the human understanding. It is to be the saturation-point beyond which there can be no intelligibility and no demand or desire for further fulfilment. Quite naturally, the explorative movement towards the ultimate has to pass through all gradual approximations without resting anywhere in order to reach at the top. It cannot be absolutely, wayward any strange having no analogous relationship, not even any symbolic parallelism with other systems of thought.

Whether or not the texts of the Upanisads, even the *sutras* of Badarayana, lend any material support to Sankara's concept of *Maya* has been very closely and tenaciously debated by Sankara's adherents and opponents alike. This is not the place to join in that controversy which will be done later and in some other more relevant context. Suffice it to point out at this place, and most assuredly, that without such a concept the gap between the two testimonies—the *laukika* or ordinary on the one hand, and the *laukika* or impersonal and extraordinary on the other, the gap between *paravidya* and *paravidyā*, between metaphysics and science, cannot be properly explained. And as for the Vedanta or the Upanisads, the radical distinction between *vidya* and *avidya*, between *sreyas* and *preyas*, between *amṛtatva* and *amṛtatva*, is a conceptual common place. The esoteric, the mystical, the *rahasyavidyā* which the Upanisads in one of its rendering literally means, cannot even be proposed as a kind of *Vidyā*, a knowledge of truth, without subscribing to the view that the gap between Reality and its appearances is not negotiable through compromise or formal readjustment, that *reality* is *not* as it appears, it only appears *as* it appears.

The concept of *Maya*, at the metaphysical level, renders this existential gap and a consequent distinction between two kinds of *śeṭa* (reality) intelligible. But this metaphysical concept needs a logical support nearer home. This is afforded by the concept of *adhyasa* which Sankara introduces as the key-concept in the preface to his commentary (*bhasyabhumika*). Nothing is nearer to us than our common and ordinary experience. Intelligibility of a concept, logical and remote, requires that it should be at least analogous to what we directly know, in the light of *which* it can be explained. Happily enough, our immediate and 'given' experience affords instances, not only of veridical perception but also of illusion, error and hallucination. The most striking feature of all given experience, including the veridical and the illusory, is that it is not doubted or disputed and its truth-claim is admitted unreservedly unless it is contradicted and as a consequence of that sublated or *canceled*. If and when this happens, the erstwhile 'given' truth, that which was unreservedly believed in, is rejected outright without even partial accommodation and its truth-claim automatically lapses. On the analogy of common error and illusion, then, Sankara explains the possibility of there being at once two radically different ways of knowing of the self-same fact, where one only reigns as true even though unknown for the time-being and the other although known and believed to be the very truth is liable to sublation and rejection.

Coming to solve or resolve the riddle how the Vedanta doctrine of '*Atmaikatva*' (absolute oneness of the empirical selves with the absolute self which is transcendent), which, on ultimate analysis, means transcendental one-ness of Reality, (*Brahman*) which is indivisible, can be the truth, supreme and ultimate, even though the given multiplicities of subjects and objects of our ordinary knowledge and experience *appear* to be incontestable facts of existence, Sankara introduces the concept of *Maya*



at the metaphysical level and the concept of *adhyasa* at the epistemic and logical level. The concepts are really complementary. They may even be accepted as the same, and are calculated just to emphasize that the given show of things and its collateral experience—that which science and common experience swear by — is a transcendental illusion, an unmitigated falsity, and, therefore, if we are at all interested in the truth, we shall have to take recourse to a programme of de-conditioning, and look beyond the conditional phenomenal. Truth is transcendental, and can only be reached by transcendence, and this transcendence is not any form of re-conditioning, as Bradley might have put it, it is achievable by a process of absolute 'de-conditioning' only. All false appearances, and their cognate experiences, which take them not as false but as realities themselves, arise through a process of conditioning of the truly given by adventitious factors (*agantuka dosas*). This is true of the *Pratibhasika* (the merely seeming) and the *Vyavaharika* (the phenomenal empirical) as well. Truth does not admit of degrees, what is false was false even when it was apprehended otherwise. This analysis of truth and falsity is the special feature of Sankara Vedanta, of the Advaita doctrine of the Upanisads developed in the 'commentary'.

That Sankara's doctrine of Maya is 'the logical pendant to his doctrine of Brahman as the undifferented self-shining truth'<sup>41</sup> as prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, cannot be disputed by one claiming acquaintance with the texts. But whether both the Sankararite concepts— of Brahman and Maya, 'are' to be accepted in faith and only interpreted in thought' may require a certain emendation<sup>42</sup>. Even the disproportionate importance accorded to *sravanavidhi* by the commentators of the Vivarana school particularly, seems to be somewhat misplaced, if we take note of the depth of logic which not only the Bhamati schools but also the schools of the Vivarana have displayed in their analysis of the concepts, particularly of the concepts of *adhyasa* and *ajnana*. Sankara is undoubtedly a 'believer' as all his followers are. But this need not lead us to the view that there is dis-proportionate overweightage on faith or scriptural revelation in Sankara Vedanta even though Sankara is only a commentator and not a propounder of an independent philosophy of his own. For the practical aspirant bent upon realising the supreme spiritual truth and securing release through *Srutvana*, *manana* and *nididhyasana*, acceptance in faith what is to be subsequently realised in immediate intuition may be an indispensable pre-requisite. But that is the Vedanta in practice. As a purely theoretical and logical doctrine, the value of the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara is no less. This seems to have been demonstrated by Sankara himself in his analysis no less than his *later* followers, the authors of *Khandana*, *Advaitasiddhi* and other treatises who got their clues from Sankara's commentary. The fact which requires emphasis is that Sankara, as different from other commentators, has attempted a logical formulation, elaboration and defense of the philosophical doctrine of the Upanisads without relegating the sayings or the texts to the limbo of the dogma. This explains why he felt it necessary to begin with the concept of *adhyasa*, the logical base of his concepts of *ajnana* and *Maya* and adopted it as the key-concepts of interpretation of the *Brahmasutras*, and of the Vedanta as he understood it to be.

## References

- 1 Dr. S. N. Dasgupta speaks of ten, while Prof. Radhakrishnan names eleven Upanisads, vide Dasgupta—History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 430; Radhakrishnan Vol. II p. 450.
- 2 *Tanmatanusarena sutrasarani Vakyavyante* Sri Bhasya.
- 3 All arguments and expositions have to be 'Srutyamugrhitā' B. B. 2.1.11
- 4 Vedanta hvakyakusumagrathanaarthatvat sutranam. B. B. 1.1.2

- 5 Tasmajjanmadisutranāṁ nanumanopanyasartham, Kintarhi?— Vedanta-vakya-pradarsanaṁ B. B. 112
- 6 'Samhitametad sarirakam jaiminiyena sodasalakṣa neti sastrakavasiḍḍhiḥ' ramanuja's quotation from Bodayanavrtti, S. B. 5
- 7 See Sankara's commentary on *sutra*, I.1.4
- 8 History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II, p. 431
- 9 Radhakrishnan, Hist. Ind. Phil. Vol. II, p. 433. Prof. Belvalkar suspects multiple authorship of the Vedanta Sūtras Ind. Phil. review, October 1918.
- 10 Radhakrishnan—Hist. Ind. Phil. Vol. II, p. 432.
- 11 This is embodied in the Śloka 'Brahma satyam jagannithya jiva brahmaiva naparah' In his Adhyasabhasya Sankara puts it as 'atmakarva'. B. B.
- 12 S. N. Dasgupta—History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I, pp. 420-21.
- 13 'Yatha ca ayamarthah sarvesam vedantanam, tatha veyamasyani sariraka-mumamsayani pradarsayisyamah' B. B. 12 (Adhyasabhasya).
- 14 'Iti susrumah dhīranam ye nastat yacacaksire (Kenya 13 Isa 10,13) is not an admission peculiar to Upanisads. reference to past teachers and their views is a characteristic feature of all oriental schools
- 15 The very words 'darsana' or 'Tattva sakṣatkara' used in the Indian context means intuitive or direct knowledge.— a 'given knowledge' intuited or revealed.
- 16 The word may 'mean' end of the Vedas, that is, the Upanisads. But this is an incidental meaning a historical accident. The more suggestive and philosophical meaning (which is also not rejected by the historical) is that it is the end of all knowledge. The utmost limit and supreme knowledge which leaves nothing further utmost limit and supreme knowledge which leaves nothing further to be known or explained.
- 17 Ayer—language, Truth and Logic, possibly gives one of the clearest expression of a point of view commonly shared by contemporary western philosophers in the Post-Wittgensteinian period.
- 18 See Wittgenstein—Tractatus logic-Philosophicus, 6.54
- 19 Metaphysics is commonly believed to be a case of conceptual Revision Vide Pears—The nature of Metaphysics
- 20 This is the general Wittgensteinian view
- 21 See particularly Ayer—Language Truth and Logic, Particularly Chapter I.
- 22 Pears—The nature of Metaphysics, pp. 20-22.
- 23 *Op. cit.*
- 24 See, J. O. Wisdom—Philosophy chapter
- 25 This will be done in the concluding chapter
- 26 This knowledge is unattainable by Science. The distinction between scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge is radical. They do not belong to the same level of enquiry
- 27 Gilbert Ryle—The concept of Mind, Ch. I. Descartes' Myth.
- 28 The word 'ignorance' is taken here as positive misconception, or misperception. It is not mere absence of knowledge—not knowing, it is wrong knowledge
- 29 See my paper—The concept of Integral knowledge (Sri Aurobindo—Homage from Visa Bhamati 1972.



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- 30 Cf Prasastapada bhasya-'dravya-guna-karma-' samanya-visesa-samavayanam padarthanam tattvajnana nihsreyasohetuh'
- 31 'Sa vidya ya vimuktaye' The Gita.
- 32 Indians do not subscribe to the belief of perpetual death. They, on the other hand, believe in eternal freedom and immortality. Death, to them means 'to be caught into the cycle of Samsara,- birth death and rebirth'. One endures living death in ignorance.
- 33 Mrtyoh sa mrtyumapnoti ya iha naneva pasyati 'katha 2. 1.10 Br Aranyak. 4.4 19.
- 34 Pears-The Nature of Metaphysics, pp, 20-22.
- 35 This seems to argue against Prof. K. C Bhattacharyya's statement that in the Vedanta there is articulation in thought which is primarily accepted in faith. Studies in philosophy, p. 95
- 36 'Avidyavadvishyani pratyaksadini pramanani sastraani ccti ' B B 9 (Adhyasabhasya)
- 37 'Vastusvarupavadharanam Vidyamahuh. (Adhyasabhasya).
- 38 'Tam etam avidyakhyam atmanatmanoritarotaradhyasam puraskrtya serve pramana-prameyavyavaharam laukika vaidikasca pravrttah'. Adhyasabhasya.
39. (Adhyasabhasya) 'Evamahampratyayinam assessor svapracarasaksini pratyagatmani Adhyasa...etc. 'See also B S B. 1.1.4..... tatsaksitvena pratyuktaiva'.
40. See Sree Bhasya - 'Savisesavasto-visayatvat sarvapramananam
- 41 See Deussen- The Philosophy of the Upanisads, p. 16
42. Studies in Philosophy Vol. I, p. 95.
- 43 *Ibid*, Prof Bhattacharyya writes ' They are in fact to be accepted in faith and only interpreted by thought' our contention is that the concept of Maya need not be so accepted - it may be shown to be a necessary postulate of reason.

## The Relevance of Sankar's Adhyasabhasya and the Concept of Adhyasa

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Sankar prefaces his commentary on the Brahmasutras by an account of *adhyasa*. He seems to have felt that in no other way the supreme 'truth of fact' – '*atmaikatva*', which, according to him, the Vedanta (as embodied in the Upanisads and aphoristically presented in Badarayana's Brahmasutras) propagates, can be brought home to a commoner and made logically intelligible. That which claims to be the supreme and ultimate truth does not require to be hedged or protected as an article of pious faith, a religious dogma or a sectarian creed. It has to be shown as sharable, as open to whosoever seeks for it. A direct access to it may require fulfilment of conditions which are extraordinary and which, from the very nature of the case, may call for some special disciplining of the mind and training, not ordinarily feasible. What is an open truth, a truth for all, may remain unseen and unrealised due to subjective predisposition which screens it off and distorts its image. Sankar himself assumes as much and no more. The impediments of subjective predisposition can work as a sufficient condition for rendering an open truth of fact into something esoteric, transcendental and even into something esoteric, transcendental and been mysterious. "With a golden plate the Real's face is covered over" says the Upanisads," and a lifting up or dispersal of the veil becomes necessary to get at the truth, to 'see' it". Is Sankar unjustified in taking his cue from countless passages of the Upanisads having similar import? The truth eternal, the truth self-manifest and, therefore, open, is, again, hidden in the cave<sup>2</sup> and remains shut out on account of factors and circumstances which are adventitious and external. A discovery or exploration, a pilgrimage to the *sanctum sanctorum* means as much. But there is to be created a sense of urgency for the quest. This can be done by exposing the conventionally accepted truth of fact as inherently false by a rigorous logical analysis. This Sankar attempts in his *Adhyasabhasya*. Sankar seems to have felt that the claim of the Vedanta to embody the supreme truth of fact remains vacuous, if, by some means, if, at least by means of an analogy drawn from common experience, the fact or theme cannot be communicated, cannot be demonstrated as a logical possibility. The concept of *adhyasa* achieves this purpose. Indian philosophy, particularly of the spiritual kind, has played a dual role,—as communicable knowledge or philosophy, and as a mode of realisation. The first can be called *tattvadrsti*, a glimpse into the truth, the latter as *tattva saksatkara* which is held out as a practical end to one seeking release (*mumuksu*) from the bondage of life as it is ordinarily lived. Sankar has been a seer and a spiritual guide. His *Viveka Cudamoni*, *Upadeshasahasri*, *Vakyaavrtti* and other cognate works present him in this role of a teacher—and spiritual guide. His commentary works, however, present him as an

interpreter, a philosopher and dialectician of rare erudition and logical insight. His *Brahmasutrabhasya*, otherwise called 'Sariraka-Mimamsa', is a work of this latter order.

His principal interpreter, however, do not appear to have considered his concept of *adhyasa*, in its 'intended' and proper relevance and full implication. Sankar's principal interpreters (*tikakara*) are Padmapadacarya, otherwise called Sanandana, who was a direct disciple of the master, and Vacaspati Misra who flourished quarter of a century after him. Their sub-commentaries or *tikas*, the *Panlopadika* and the *Bhamati*, disagreed in some essentials, and gave rise to two major schools of Advaitic Scholarship in the writings of their followers—The Vivarana and the Bhamati schools. But in spite of profound insight and proximity to the master and his teachings, the originators of the two schools in their scholastic formulation of the issues and over-thorough presentation of details seem to have atleast partially missed or neglected the *peculiar relevance* of Sankar's concept of *adhyasa* for the Vedanta of Sankar's conception. To begin with the Bhamati.

Vacaspati, the author of the Bhamati, does not appear to have gauged the full range of the concept so pertinaciously introduced in the very opening line of his *Bhasya* by Sankar himself. He, on the other hand, expressly in the opening paragraph of his *Tika*, limits the use and relevance of the concept of *adhyasa* to showing and clarifying the technical admissibility of the first *sutra* which purports to initiate an ardent and purposeful inquiry as to the nature of Brahman or Atman. His scholastic learning leads Vacaspati to smell a logical fallacy such as, *Vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi*, otherwise called *sat-pratipaksa* in the very supposition that Brahman or the self may be a fit subject-matter of a purposeful inquiry (*jijnasaspadam*).<sup>1</sup> That which is clearly known already, and is not dubitable—*asandigdha*, and also that the knowledge of which does not facilitate any fruitful purpose—*a-prayojana* is not worth an inquiry. Contrary wise, that which is unknown or dubitable and the knowledge of which leads to some practical fulfillment is the fit object of an inquiry. Now, since everybody is directly aware of himself as the 'I', and no one ever denies or disputes about his own identity or 'self', and moreover, since, in spite of this self-knowledge, no one has ever become free from the bondage of life, therefore, the words in the first *sutra* of Badarayana, and also the *sutra* as a whole, do not appear to have any relevance. It is to circumvent and neutralise an objection of this sort, so Vacaspati thinks, that Sankar introduced his concept of *adhyasa*, and by its means, even in the opening sentence of the *Adhyasabhasya* demonstrated utter falsity of our conventional notion about the self and there by established the urgent need of a fresh inquiry. That Sankar condemns our conventional knowledge of the self as vitiated by *adhyasa* (illicit super-imposition), or as it is otherwise put, by *adatmyadhyasa* (misidentification), is a fact, and is not to be debated about. But what is *not* a fact and so may be at once debated is that Sankar introduced his concept of *adhyasa* and felt it necessary to preface his entire commentary on Brahmasutras by his *adhyasabhasya* merely to exhibit logical propriety and relevance of Badarayana's first *sutra* — '*athato Brahmajijnasa*'. In fact, the type of the question that Vacaspati has raised and discussed in the first paragraph of his sub-commentary, Sankar has raised and discussed in the last part of his commentary on the first *sutra*.<sup>2</sup> There, Sankar has asked whether the concept of Brahman is *prasiddha* (familiar) or *aparasiddha* (unfamiliar), and has disposed of the alternatives with his characteristic subtlety. His concluding remarks have been '*idam prati vipratipatteh*'—although familiar, the *specific* nature of self, the all-Reality, requires to be judiciously settled and decided upon. This then steals a march on Vacaspati and shows the impropriety of connecting the concept of *adhyasa* as such with the logical admissibility of Badarayana's first *sutra*.

While the Bhamati explains the relevance of the first *sutra* of Badarayana in the light of the concept of *adhyasa* introduced by Sankar in the *Adhyasabhasya*, the Vivarana school, by and large,

moves in the opposite direction, and explains relevance of Sankar's concept of *adhyasa* in the light of the first *sutra*.<sup>2</sup> Yet Pancapadika, initially, was nearest to what was undoubtedly the master's real intention—that is, utilising the concept as the *Key-note of the entire Vedanta* of his conception.<sup>3</sup> But Padmapada allowed the great vision to slip away. His scholastic mode of presentation led him away from the right direction. Thus, instead of following up, at one stretch and inter-connectedly, all that Sankar had put in his *Adhyasabhasya*, Padmapada and his followers fell victims to the scholastic urge to split up the whole into fragments to discover, severally, the expressions in Sankar's text, which give an idea of what could be taken as the *Isaya* (subject-matter), *prayajana* (use or purpose) *mangalavakya* (benedictory utterance) etc. etc.,<sup>4</sup> all traditional fads and rumblings which gave oriental philosophy the appearance of a sectarian creed or religious dogma. As a result of all these, Padmapada and his followers missed the wood in the trees. Even then, one must be thankful to Padmapada, and particularly to Prakasataman, for the fleeting glimpse<sup>5</sup> as if the *Adhyasabhasya* and the *Sutrabhasya* in Sankar's commentary were two treatises, not one,—since the traditional definition of a *bhasya*<sup>6</sup> binds a commentator too closely to the wordings of the *sutra* to allow the kind of freedom and originality Sankar has displayed in the section on '*adhyasa*'. Evidently, in that age, the idea of a *bhasya bhūmika*, a general introduction or preface to a philosophical treatise or exegetical work, was not so current, or did not receive favourable attention of scholars. Labouring under this assumed and forced necessity to establish *Adhyasa bhasya* as an integral part (and not as the preface) of Sankar's *Brahmasutra-bhasya* and to prove its relevance by forging connection with the first *sutra*, Padmapada and his followers exerted themselves to show how the concept of *adhyasa* itself, although not expressly stated in that *sutra* was really implied (*sūcya*)<sup>7</sup> in it. The first *sutra* states that release from the bondage of life can be effected by knowledge of the self or Brahman. This suggests, according to Padmapada and his followers, that the state of bondage insofar as it is eradicable by right knowledge (*Jñānāntivartya*) is a consequence or result of misapprehension and is itself unreal (*aparamarthika*), and what is *aparamarthika* and not a truth of fact, must be *adhyastika*. Thus, the relevance of the concept of *adhyasa* is sought to be established in term of the significance of the first *sutra*, particularly as a logical consequence of the word '*atah*' (on account of this, that is, 'for release from bondage') in the *sutra*.

The traditional interpreters of Sankar's commentary by and large, seem to have missed that real mark. Sankar seems not to have been worried at all for the relevance of Badarayana's first *sutra*. So far Vacaspati has imagined too much. The undue anxiety as also perplexity of the Vivarana school respecting the relevance of the concept of *adhyasa* itself is even less intelligible. Sankar's own statement at the end of *Adhyasabhasya*—'*yatha cayamarthah sarveam Vedantanam, iatha vayamasyam sarirakamimamsayam pradarsayisyamah*' shows the *Adhyasa -bhasya*, as the *key-note of the entire vedanta* of Sankar's understanding. Whether the concept of *adhyasa* is implied (*sūcya*) in Badarayana's first *sutra* is an irrelevant issue. If the concept has been made more explicit in a later *sutra* of Badarayana, such as, '*Tadgunasartvat*' as the Vivarana school holds, is equally pointless.<sup>8</sup> Such may be the case, or may not be the case. Sankar did not learn his Vedanta from the Badarayanasutras. He was not an ordinary commentator who slavishly follows the letters and syllables of a *sutra*, which considered apart from the context, that is, some relevant themes of the Upanisads, is meaningless jargon. The Vedanta, so Sankar thought propagates a philosophy which cannot be rendered intelligible, cannot be grasped in its true essence, without the supposition that all our conventional knowledge and understanding is vitiated by falsehood. This means that *paravidya* is transcendent of the *aparavidya* and that there can be no resting with the *apara*, since it is rooted in *adhyasa* and ignorance.

As far as the *sutrabhasya* was concerned, the real point at issue was, so Sankar felt, how the central theme of the Upanisads and the Vedanta—*atmakotva* which means not only one-ness of *Tat*

and *Tvam*, as the traditional interpreters have held<sup>11</sup>, but also *indivisible one-ness* of all existence (*satta*), could be made logically intelligible as *the* truth of fact. This truth which the Brahmasutras, according to Sankar, labour to communicate piece-meal is *not* empirically evident. Our conventional knowledge and belief which guide and sustain our habitual behaviour and usages (*naishargika lokavyavahara*) seem to run counter to this Uedantic truth. So both cannot be credited with delivering the truth of fact. A real gap, therefore, opens between two *vidyas*, each having an absolute truth-claim, although discrepant and irreconcilable. How is this conflict of two testimonies—one of our conventional mode of knowing and understanding and the other held out by the revealed testimony of the Upanisads—to be resolved? How is again, the logical possibility of there being two kinds of knowledge, each with an absolute claim to hold of reality, to be explained and made intelligible? The logical possibility of there being two world-views, radically apposed at all points but both claiming to be the absolute truth of fact, is explained only when one can be convincingly shown to be the illusory appearance of the other, and so as an *adhyasa*. This Sankar has attempted to do in his *Adhyasabhasya*, first, by suggesting that there has been, or there really is, a state of *adhyesa* vitiating our conventional belief and practice, thereafter, by an acute analysis of the very nature of an *adhyasa*, and finally, by demonstrating that the self-discrepancy, which our conventional knowledge and behaviour entail and involve, cannot be accounted for except on the basis of the conclusion that a state of *adhyasa* has actually vitiated all the processes.

It is worth noting at this juncture that Sankar did not want to reject or deny either of the two world-views—the ordinary conventional and the extraordinary transcendental—as a fact of *possible* experience. He, on the other hand, sought to accommodate, even to rehabilitate both as facts of life. Reality is apprehended in two ways—as it is and as it appears, only it is *not* as it appears, it *appears* as it appears. This implies nothing occult or unintelligible. It only suggests that there are two *vidyas*—*para* and *apara*, both claiming to hold of Reality. But since both claim to be *the* truth, they cannot be the truth of the same level. One is phenomenal and subject to prevailing conditions, the other is transcendental, and being unconditional and absolute, requires for its realisation a rigorous process of *de-conditioning*. The need for de-conditioning can be established by exposing falsity of the conventional conditional of the *naishargika lokavyavahara*. This Sankar has attempted to do in the *adhyasabhasya* the falsity which is exposed is transcendental falsity of the conventional (*vyavaharika*). This does not enable one to prevent the appearance from *appearing*. This enables one to regard the conventional, hitherto accepted as the final and absolutely true, as suspect. Transition to *para* *vidya* can be effected by transcendent experience alone, where the appearances cease to appear; not by logic, not also by listening to thousand-fold pronouncements of the srutis<sup>12</sup>. Transcendent experience, according to the Vedantists, follows upon absolute de-conditioning achieved through *nididhyasana* in a state called *samadhi*. A return back from the transcendent state to the phenomenal conventional results in thorough de-valuation of the conventional appearances, which, even though appearing there after, come to be regarded as *tuccha* (de-valued). This state of transformative wisdom the Vedanta has termed as '*Jivanmuktatva*' (released-inbondage). This is the spiritual goal that the Vedanta recommends for its adherents—*Jivanmuktata*.

The classical *tikakaras* and their adherents of the two principal schools of Advaita Vedanta, the Bhamati and the Vivarana—have done nothing basically wrong by seeking to establish logical link between Sankar's concept of *adhyasa* and Badarayana's first *sutra*. But they, in that way, have succeeded only in showing partial *relevance* of the concept, not its absolute importance or indispensable necessity. They, in their attempt, have established that Sankar's concept of *adhyasa* has not been a mere innovation arbitrarily foisted upon the Brahmasutras, that it either involves logical justification of Badarayana's first *sutra* (as Vacaspati held) or is logically implied or involved in the

several wordings of that first *sutra* (as the Vivarana school defended). But this cannot be accepted as doing full justice to Sankar of to his concept of *adhyasa*. It is necessary to establish its indispensability, its being intrinsic and integral to Sankar's Absolutism. It is necessary to demonstrate it as the 'key-note' of Advaitism of Sankar's meaning. There have been rival commentators of the very same Brahmasutras. They also dwelt upon the 'necessity' of *brahmaijnasa* and dilated on our habitual ignorance of the nature of Brahman. They also sought to establish the fact that knowledge of Brahman is essential as a means of release from bondage, although they did not understand by knowledge of Brahman the same as Sankar understood by it, nor did they hold that knowledge alone could be the means to that supreme end. What caused fundamental differences among the rival commentators of the Brahmasutras as regards their conception of bondage and means of release is their several conceptions of the nature of the ultimate reality, Brahman. If this is granted, Sankar's concept of *ajhana* as *adhyasa* should be viewed in logical relationship to his peculiar conception of Brahman as Atman (in the sense that all is essentially one non-dual self (*atmakarva*). That which hampers realisation of this truth is our conventional experience or understanding which takes the plural subjects and objects and their shared order as ultimately real. Insofar as this latter apprehension presents a distorted view of what is real and a truth of fact, it has to be regarded as *Adhyasa*, or as vitiated by *adhyasa*.

In all fairness to Padmapada it has to be noted that Pancapadika sighted this crucial point but allowed it to slip away. Thus the author of Pancapadika argued: '*anarthahetoh prahanaya*' (the desired objective) and '*atmaikatvavidyapratipattaye*' (to establish the truth that the self is non-dual) is the *visaya* (subject-matter or theme), but why has Sankar in the *bhasya* dilated so much on misidentification of 'I' and 'Thou', condemned the conventional knowledge and behaviour as involving mistaken identity of self with body, the senses etc., and has viewed them all as vitiated by ignorance? Padmapada assumes and does not seem to go to the root what *pramatrpramukham karirivabho- kirtvam* (agentship and enjoyed-ship of the self beginning with knower-ship) is viewed by Sankar as an evil (*anartha*). Sankar's reason is, this forms an integral part of our conventional understanding or usage (*naisargika lokavyavahara*) which has to be condemned as vitiated by ignorance and *adhyasa* in a context where *sarvatmaikarva* or *atmaikarva* is the truth of fact. In fact, the conventional is a *distortion* of the ultimate, and this Sankar seeks to show in his *Adhyasabhasya*. His impeachment<sup>14</sup> of the totality of our recognised *pramanas* (sources of knowledge), including the redoubtable *sastrapramana* (scriptural authority) becomes intelligible in no other way. His stand is thus radical. He proposes supplantation of one order of being and experience by another that is materially different and so absolutely transcendental. He is not interested in establishing merely that the self is one pure undifferented consciousness, but he also seeks to establish, at the same time, that this one self is the sole reality—*atma ca brahma*. He aims at liquidating and de-valuing not only the phenomenal plurality of selves, but also the totality of objective appearances, including the plural selves and their collateral objects. This, then, transports the true 'subject' beyond the phenomenal subjects and objects, and regards the phenomenal subjects and objects as failing within the self-same distorted objective manifestation. It is in this way alone that the Upanisadic declaration that when this one is known nothing else remains or stands out as unknown, and also that the knowledge of this one self is the foundation of all knowledge (*Brahmavidya sarva vidya pratistha*)<sup>15</sup> can be shown to be a statement of an incontrovertible truth. Knowledge of Reality, once we have access to it, becomes the final proof, the touch-stone, whereupon the appearances can be either all disposed of as mere appearances and nothing substantial, or viewed in the light of Reality as its several phenomenal appearances which, as a matter of course, *appear* only.



In his *Adhyasebhāṣya*, Sankar is arguing not only that our conventional knowledge and behaviour in respect of ourselves is vitiated by mistaken identity of the self with the not-self, that is, the point he is trying to make out is not simply that we are ignorant of the true nature of our 'self' and this has been the root-cause of all evil (*anartha*), but also that our conventional belief in the given real order as consisting of plural subjects and objects knower and known, enjoyed and the enjoyed, is grounded in that self-same *adhyasa*. It is this second aspect which assumes prominence in Sankar's castigation of all *praman-prameya vyavahara*, both *laukika* and *vaidika* (*alaukika*). The classical interpreters of the two schools, it will be shown, have not taken serious notice of this second part of Sankar's contention, yet these two aspects are complementary. What is being censured is not simply our conventional knowledge of the self as empirical individuals but also our conventional belief in the reality of the given objective order of plurality—the plural subjects and objects which make up the totality of objective cosmic appearance. *Para vidya*, which the Advaita Vedanta is to lead up to, supplants and corrects both. '*Atmaikatva*' is irreconcilable not only with *nanatva* (manifoldness) of the self but also with the *visayatva* of the self, the one Reality,— as is evidenced in our conventional taking of that one self and reality as the manifest objective order of multiple subjects and objects, the world.

Our ordinary regard for the self, as also our conventional knowledge of ourselves is vitiated by ignorance and falsity in virtue of our ready and blind *participation* in the objective appearance of plural subjects and objects believing it unreservedly to be real, and not otherwise.

But what can be the nature of this *adhyasa* which screens off reality, the one self, from us and renders us a victim self-deception? Is it caused, engineered or manipulated, or is it given there already—if not as a fact of existence, at least as a fact of experience? Is it eternally there already, or has this been worked upon us as a deception by an alien power, or have we, the victims, ourselves consciously or unconsciously reared it up and got enmeshed into its throes? The classical interpreters do not seem to have been very thorough or circumspect in examining this question in its several aspects. They have failed to notice that the idea of this *adhyasa* of self and not-self as an *event* or happening does not make any sense. They have failed to notice also that an *adhyasa* is known as that only *post mortem*, that is, at or after detection, and that the causal factors or conditions that might have contributed to its development or origin can be stipulated only by way of a reflective analysis, and never at the time the *adhyasa* happens—where an *adhyasa* is an event in time. Apparently, they have been misled by the grammatical forms of the expressions '*adhyasa*' (super imposing), '*adhyasyati*' (super imposes), '*adhyasitavyam*' (needs to be super imposed) etc. etc. in Sankar's *Adhyasabhasya*. But even where an *adhyasa*, that is, an illusory or a delusive experience is an event or happening in time, such as, in the cases of 'rope-snake' and 'nacre-silver' illusions, can it be meaningfully said that the victims, deliberately or inadvertently, superimposes a 'snake-form' or a 'silver appearance' on the rope or silver situated in their front as distinct entities? Is not the 'snake-form' or the 'silver-appearance' on the rope or the nacre a consequence, an end-product of the illusions? The usages, such as, '*adhyasyati*', '*adhyasya*' etc. show the aberration and natural limitation of a grammar working on the model of subject-predicate form in which a verb-form is often misrepresented as an activity of the grammatical subject, the nominative.

Coming to the *adhyasa* of the type of self-not-self misidentification that Sankar speaks of in the very opening line of the *Adhyasabhasya* one may ask how can this be understood as an illicit or illegitimate superimposition of one thing, such as, the not-self upon another thing, such as the self, and in the reverse order, of the self upon the not-self? To be sure, in *rerum nature*, there is only one fact, such as, the self. The not-self is the end-product of the delusion-grafting process. Moreover, an



act of superimposition for its consummation requires three items—a content to be superimposed, a locus that upon which it is to be superimposed, and the agent who is to do the act. Where do we get all these three in the alleged self-not-self superimposition where there is only one item, and even the agent or experiencer is an end-product of the delusion-working process, and assimilable either to the self (in *vidya* or to the not-self (in *avidya*)? And this is not all, superimposition requires an 'objective citation' where something is experienced as other than itself, where on the screen, so to say, or a concealed locus, a distorted appearance is projected. But, in the case we are considering, where do we get such an objective situation at all, since all that is there is the perennial subject which cannot be the object! Do we not put the cart before the horse by seeking to explain this *adhyasa* as an 'occurrence' by reference to its supposed conditions or factors? The classical commentators do not appear to have noticed this point. That Sankar in his exposition showed the path out of the word will be clear from our exposition later on.

The *adhyasa* that Sankar introduces as his key-concept in the *Brahmasutrabhasya* and which he postulates as the screen or veil shutting out Reality experience from us and working as a gap or wedge between the two kinds of *vidyas—apara and para* has, as he sees, three natural characteristics. In the first place, it is of the nature of misidentity (*itaretaradhyasa*) of self and not-self,—mistaking one for the other, more appropriately, mistaking one *as* the other. This works in two ways—making out a not-self of the self, a snake of the rope, an objective appearance of the pure subject, and in the reverse order, making a self-dependent, self-complete, and therefore, an absolute reality of the phenomenal appearance, the not-self. The distinction is subtle and the diction of English speech is not very adequate. In the opening sentence of the *Adhyasabhasya*, Sankar speaks of illicit superimposition (*adhyasa*) of *Visaya* and its properties (*dharma*) on the *Visayi*, the pure self, and thereafter, in the reverse order of the illicit superimposition of the *Visayi* and its *dharma*s upon the *Visaya* (not-self). This mode of stating is incidental to the imagery inherent in the linguistic expression 'superimposition', and described in term of that imagery, this *adhyasa* is like putting the not self upon the pure self at first, and then transposing the self (thus schematised)<sup>4</sup> upon the not-self. But translated or expressed in the imagery of given experience, superimposition of a snake on the rope means experiencing the rope *as* a snake, or having a snake- experience. In the context of superimposing *Visaya* on *Visayi*, it, therefore, means experiencing *Visayi* as *Visaya*, or having a *visaya*-experience simply, thus making out, or rearing up a not-self, *Visaya*, or objective order of, that is, *in respect of*, the *visayi*, the self or the subject. This is making the self to appear and to be mistaken *as* the not-self—thus rearing up a not-self where there was none. Understood in a similar manner, the superimposition of the self upon the not-self (which has been analysed and stated as secondary) means regarding the not-self, the objective order, as all the Reality (as self-established, self-shining, unrejectable and absolute as is the self and also as satisfying). This then shows that the not-self is not a separate, co-eval or co-equal fact but just a distortion or wrong way of regarding the one fact, the self or the subject. The *anatma* or not-self is nothing but the *atman* or self miscognised or misconceived as different, that is, as *anatma*.

In the second place, this *adhyasa*, in the sense of misidentity of self and not-self, is perennial, a fact of nature (*natsargika*), not an event in time. Sankar, in his *Adhyasabhasya* describes it as without a beginning (*anadi*) and as having no end (*ananta*), if not got over and dispelled by *Vidya* or right knowledge. What Sankar means is, perhaps, that it is beginningless in the sense of being unrelated to time-series. All cosmic determinations and manifestations of knower and known, enjoyer and enjoyed, aged and act, figure in time, but their *ratio existendi* is beyond time and incapable, therefore, of any determination in term of the temporal order. This *fact* of self-not-self *adhyasa* is beginningless,

if not as a fact of existence, atleast as a fact of experience, and is not an *adhyasa* a fact of experience or empirically existent? But while an ordinary illusion, such as, the rope-snake illusion is accidental and has a beginning and also an end, there are certain extraordinary illusion which, though phenomenal, seem to be beginningless and an in alienable feature of mundane existence. Sankar cites one such instance in his *Adhyasabhasya*, the deeper significance of which, it will be shown, has escaped the notice of all his classical commentators, in spite of their unimaginable erudition. The illusion of the Sky as a cauldron with dusky appearance is the instance. The movement of the heavens with stars and planets around our globe may be another instance. In the light of our modern scientific knowledge we may stipulate as to *how this happens*, but can we ascertain when this for the first time *happened*, and what was the state when this did not happen? The self-not-self *adhyasa* is roughly analogous, to the sky-illusion and Sankar brought forth this analogy to stress its beginninglessness as also its inexplicability. The traditionalists of the two schools of Advaita Vedanta, however, fall back, generally, upon the illustration of *Vijankura* (seed and sprout) to explain the supposed beginninglessness (*anaditva*) of this *adhyasa* and its attendant cosmic appearance. There has been, it is argued, a beginningless series *atmanatmanodhyasa* (self-not-self superimposition), each preceding determining each succeeding, or to put otherwise, each succeeding being determined by each preceding in an infinite series in time. They are of the opinion that beginningless *adhyasa*, otherwise called '*naisargika*' can be explained in term of such infinite regress of determination and that this may not be objectionable as the supposition is free from the fallacy of mutual involvement and interdependence (*parasparasrayitvam*)<sup>17</sup> But this is making a virtue of another logical fallacy, such as, *infinite regress*. The mistake lies in the acceptance of the concept of superimposition too literally, that is, not as a reflective description of an illusion after it is over but as an explanatory account of a living state of delusion when in force. In this (latter situation) it is not literally any superimposition, and is not known as such. The idea of an infinitely regressive series of *adhyasas* is the sense of super-imposition would require an infinite series of dual presentations—a self and a not-self-to be superimposed one upon another, and since the not-self in each figuration has to be accepted as a distortion of the self and as an end-product of *adhyasa* conceived as a process, we would be putting the cart before the horse in all stages of such explanatory account. It is true that Sankar, in some places of his *Brahmasutrabhasya*, has himself taken the help of the analogy of *vija* and *ankura* (seed and sprout); but, as we shall show hereafter, his purpose was different—just to illustrate that an attempted explanatory account of a fact which by its very nature is inexplicable and has, therefore, to be admitted without explanation, entails an infinite process of reasoning, and that such infinite process indirectly shows its logical indeterminability. This then is not making a virtue of the infinite process but rather demonstrating its wantonness if pressed into service as a mode of explanation where no explanation is needed. In his *Adhyasabhasya*, however, Sankar appears to give an account of *atmanatmanodhyasa* as a *graduated process*<sup>18</sup> But his account in this context like the Kantian account of the triple syntheses that human cognition involves—the synthesis of apprehension, of imagination, and of recognition, is logical account of the various factors which make up *adhyasa*, in order of logical precedence and succession, and so the logical sequences presented by Sankar should not be misread and misconstrued as a sequence in time-order. It is safer, therefore, to accept the concept of the beginningless in this context in the sense of the timeless.

The third and the most important characteristic of this perennial *adhyasa*, like of any other *adhyasa* is its irrationality and illogicality. It misrepresents, distorts. It is '*atasmin tadbuddhi*'. It takes a thing what it is not and never can be. It is thus an aberration. It should not be there, yet it is there; should not occur, yet it occurs. Moreover, when it is in force, a living thing, it is indistinguishable from right knowledge and veridical experience. Like true knowledge it also has an absolute claim to

truth, but loses this claim absolutely again, when it is detected and sublated. It is not a collateral truth, one truth by the side of another, nor is it a partial truth which can somehow be assimilated to the whole. It is the truth-pretender and is uncompromising, but when detected and known as false it gives up all its claim to truth absolutely. The perennial *adhyasa* of self and not-self, says Sankar cannot be logically accounted for as to its possibility any more than we can logically explain why the invisible sky is ignorantly taken as the cauldron-shaped visible space above, bounded by horizon and assuming a blue or dusky appearance when it is clear. The irrational is not capable of a rational explanation. It is nevertheless a fact of experience. The perennial *adhyasa*, says Sankar, is *mithya-jnana-nimitta* (occasioned by false knowledge). But this amounts to explaining *adhyasa* in term of itself since *adhyasa* is itself *mithya-jnana* it is simply to meet the exigency of a popular demand for causal explanation that a distinction, a rather artificial one, is made between *adhyasa* as experience and *adhyasa* as the content of that experience, or rather, *adhyasa* as showing the structure of that experience and one aspect in called as the cause of the other. In fact, *adhyasa* and *avidya* as *adhyasa* any *mithya-jnana* are inter-related concepts describing two aspects of the very same thing.

Contrasted with the *naisargika adhyasa* discussed so far, the commonly known *adhyasas*, such as, the rope-snake and the nacre-silver nacre illusions are events in time. But even these are not manipulated by us, they are also 'given' in the way our other experiences are 'given'. In their formation, besides the circumstances which determines *naisargika adhyasa* and give rise to our conventional knowledge and behaviour, there are to be traced certain adventitious (*agantuka*) determinants functioning as defects (*dosa*). But even these ordinary and commonly recognised *adhyasas*, or illusions do not involve conscious manipulation, such as, superimposing one object or the characteristic (*dharma*) of one object upon another object<sup>20</sup>. The objection<sup>21</sup> which Sankar raises with the help of the artful device of a *purvapaksa* (opponent) against his own claim<sup>22</sup> that there has been transcendental an *adhyasa* (misidentification) of self and not-self, also an illicit interchange of properties (*dharma*) between the two, and that our conventional understanding and usage all reflect this fundamental confusion *avidya* deserves a closer look than it has been given so far by the traditionalists. The objection, it has to be clearly noted, by way of stating what an *adhyasa*, even a commonplace *adhyasa* is, actually dilates upon what it looks like. The objection posed through *purvapaksa* by Sankar is '*Sarva hi purovasthite vtsaye vtsayantaramadhyasyati*'—in a state of illusion, everyone superimposes one object upon another situated in one's front. But this condition it is argued, is not fulfilled in the suggested *adhyasa*, of *atma* and *anatma*, and so by reason of that, it cannot be admitted even theoretically as an *adhyasa*. Traditional interpreters failed to see that it was a playful objection raised from popular view-point, from the view-point of an unenlightened commoner. Taking this seriously as an objection and by trying to understand Sankar's statement on *adhyasa* as a superimposition of one thing upon another too literally they have all missed the mark. An *adhyasa* as a live experience is not the same as it is described to be or as it looks like.

By means of this objection Sankar wanted to bring home to us the fact that when we reflect back upon a state of illusion (after it is corrected), an illusion looks like one answering the given description. When we reflectively want to understand or determine it (after the illusion is got over and the real object or content has been discovered), it seems to have the following characteristics:

- (1) There was an illicit super-imposition,
- (2) One object or its property was super-imposed on another,
- (3) This latter object, in radical contrast with the one superimposed, was really 'given' and so was in front of us.

- (4) There was a mutual exchange or transference of properties. In *retrospection*, we discover that the superimposed, and so that which was not really 'given in front' appeared to have been given in front, and partook of 'this-ness' or 'there-ness' which truly belonged to the other, the locus, and again, this other, which was truly 'given', and so was located in front, exhibited a property other than its own and as a result, passed as that object which was really not there but was simply 'superimposed'. This then is the way we understand an illusion in a *reflective* taking when the state of illusion has been got over and is no longer in force. This is also the language in term of which we describe it *post mortem*. Now, let us face the question: Is an illusion, *as and when* it happens, exactly *this* as described, and also *known* as that? Evidently, could it be known as it is described to be, at the time of its incidence and before correction, *it could not have happened*. When an illusion takes place, and as long as it persists, an illusion is never known as a super-imposition and nobody ever superimposes one object or its characteristic upon another, knowing the latter to be really situated in front. This, gives it a peculiar *indeterminability*, since it is never known *as it is* when in force, and cannot also be taken to be (at the moment of its incidence) as it is reflectively described to be. So, the validity of the description is limited to itself, that is, to the fact *as and when* it is described *post mortem*. The objection of the *purvapaksa*, then, given expression to what an illusion *looks like* to lay observer *after it is corrected*, and when it is no longer there. Sankar's so called definition of *adhyasa* given in the earlier part of the text *smrtirups paratra purvadestavabhasa* will also have to be treated in like manner—that is, not as a definition in the technical meaning of that expression, but as a description, the validity of which is limited to the incidence of its being described through a reflective taking of it. There can be no definition of the indefinable, no determination of the indeterminable (*anirvacuniya*). And is not *avidya* or *adhyasa* the indeterminable in Sankar Vedanta?

The above analysis throws a new light on that part of the text which contains the supposed objection of the *purvapaksa* and Sankar's final reply.<sup>22</sup> We can stipulate as to what an illusion or *adhyasa* *looks like* or may be interpreted as when it is no longer in force, but cannot know *what it is* when it is in force, any more than we can know an illusion when we are under its spell and do not know it to be an illusion. Now, the validity or relevance of the description being limited to the fact *as described post mortem*, it can be said that an illusion only *looks like* (in reflection) the superimposition of one object upon another which latter is given in front. Does this imply that there must be *two objects* *as and when* there is an illusion or that one of them should *really* be 'given' in front, and in direct sense-contact? Does it, again, imply at all that, besides the super-imposed which is given as an object and a content insofar as it alone is experienced (when there is illusion), this other or another, upon which the former is supposed to be superimposed, is also really 'given' at the same time, and is experienced as a given 'object' (*visaya*) in front? In point of fact, in an experience, such as, illusion, only one objective content is known and experienced so long as illusion persists. The other, the supposed locus, is never 'given' as an object or content so long as illusion endures. Had it been also given, the superimposed could not have been 'given' or experienced, and there would not have been an illusion. Such being the case, that is, there being only one objective content, and that content, insofar as it is 'given' as a content of experience, *appearing as out there*, what is the relevance of the supposition that there is to be another fact, and that also as objective entity, a *visaya*, and also, situated in front or in direct sense-contact? Apparently, an illusion, so long and insofar as it is itself, that is, an illusion, does not answer this description. It only looks like that in a reflective

review of it without being actually so. So, Sankar's final reply has a deeper meaning than has been ascertained so far by his interpreters<sup>23</sup> '*Na cayam asti niyamah puravasthite evavisaya visayantaramadhyastavyam*'<sup>24</sup> This has been interpreted by the 'classical' commentators to suggest certain case of exception in which the locus of superimposition is not an object situated in front, is not a *direct* content, in being inferable only<sup>25</sup>. But it is quite possible to interpret Sankar's statement in the context *literally* and to mean that 'it is not also the rule<sup>26</sup> the principle underlying an occurrence such as illusory experience) that in illusion an alien content (*visayantara*) is to be superimposed upon an object situated in front (*puravasthite eva visaye*). An illusion as a given experience may as well look like that without any one of the suggested circumstances actually taking place. The sky is incapable of being given as out there but in illusion it appears to be given, it never has the characteristics the ignorant perceive in it, yet it is so perceived.

In illusion, nothing is taken as it really is, but always as *what it is not*. An illusion is wrong perception in a state of *avidya* or ignorance. The conditions of veridical experience do not obtain in illusion. Thus, the so called locus need not be *actually given in front*, it need not be even *actually presented* or 'given', and need not, therefore, figure *actually* as any objectivity or *visaya* at all. In fact, were the locus actually given as a content or object (*visaya*), and were it in direct sensecontact and, in that sense, given in front, our experience would have registered it then and there as the content known, and there would not occur any illusion. The locus, therefore, is not *actually* presented either as an object (*visaya*) or as something given in front (*puravasthita*). It is in our reflective taking only that we interpret or represent it in that way. The so called super-imposed content—the illusory content, again, is not actually superimposed, rather it is *actually given* and also given as the *sole content* in front as and when illusion occurs, and so long as it persists. In our reflective taking only, it *looks as if it were superimposed*. Therefore, without an *actual* act of superimposition having taken place, without a content having been *actually* superimposed, without a locus having been presented as an object and so in front, there is no bar to our understanding or interpreting an illusion or *adhyasa* in the said way. This interpretation of Sankar's meaning seems to be more appropriate and is in perfect accord with the spirit of the text. Sankar's illustration in this part of the text, that is, the sky illusion also bears it out. The illustration has a certain peculiarity not commonly found. In the snake-rope illusion, illusion consists in perceiving a snake which is not there. What is actually there, although not known and not also known to be there, is the rope. The illusory experience in this case, cannot be expressed in a judgement such as 'The rope is a snake' but only as 'There is a snake'. In the illusion of Sankar's illustration here, however, the judgment is not to take the form 'there is a bottom, or there is a dusky aspect'. It is expressed in the form 'The sky has a bottom, the sky is dusky'. But the sky, not being a perceivable content, is neither *actually* 'given' or presented in the moment of illusory experience, nor is it capable of being, presented and directly known *as it is* even subsequently, when the illusion is detected as an illusion and is got over. The sky is never presented and is never 'given' as an object (*visaya*). It is neither *puravasthita* nor is it capable of being the *visaya* of any perceptual judgement. Even this 'its not being either *puravasthita* or a *visaya* of a perceptual experience' does not stand in the way of its *appearing* as *puravasthita* or *visaya* in the cited illustration. So what matters is some thing apparently figuring as a *visaya* and appearing as *puravasthita* in the case of an illusion. It does not matter if it is neither *puravasthita* nor capable of being a *visaya* in the case in question. It need not be what it is felt to be, or what it is described as, since fulfillment of any such condition militates against its being the content of an illusion. This unfolds its mysterious nature, this renders it a mystery. As for the so called 'locus' of an illusory superimposition in the cases of illusion previously discussed, neither the fact of superimposition



was *known* to have taken place, nor was the locus *known* to have been actually given in front as an object, when illusion *actually* took place. All these only *seem* to have been there when we *reflectively* review an illusion already got over. But Sankar's last illustration of the sky-illusion brings forth a peculiar case. This is no case of *post mortem* reflection where an illusion looks like having been something which it could not possibly have been when it actually occurred. On the contrary, here, an illusion is to be *actually* a superimposition of certain characters to what is incapable of ever being an object, a *visaya* from the very nature of the case, and incapable also of figuring in front, if there is to be this illusion at all. In this case, then, although the *illusion is there*, the supposedly given locus, the object or *visaya*, is neither capable of being 'given' as the *visaya* or object, nor is it capable of being situated in front and in direct contact. The sky, for instance, to which certain shape or colour (*talumalinatadi*) is ascribed, is incapable of being presented as a *visaya* of direct experience<sup>21</sup>, incapable of being localised in front<sup>22</sup>, incapable also of being the logical subject of the judgment, as it is, from the nature of the case, incapable of having any colour or shape. This illusion, for its very possibility, then requires that its supposed locus is not at all to be a given locus, not at all to be a *visaya*, not at all to be given in front. Non-fulfillment of any one of these conditions will render the judgments 'The sky is dusky or the sky was bottom' a valid perceptual judgment and not a judgment of illusion. Here the superimposition becomes an illicit superimposition and so an illusion, only so far as there is really *no object* or *visaya* to which the perceived characters can be attributed or ascribed<sup>23</sup>. So, this illustration shows that illusion in order to take place may require *non-presentation* of locus as object or *visaya*, and so also its *non-presentation in front*. In cases like snake-rope illusion also, in order that there may be an illusion, it is necessary that the so called locus, such as, the rope, must not be *presented as the visaya* or objective content, must not also be at the time '*given in front*' and perceived to be there. What is required is that certain unsubstantial features, creatures of misperception, such as, the snake-form, should shed off adjectival character and assume the role of a substantive objectivity *out there* in space which, from the very nature of the case, amounts to becoming an illusory appearance. Thus, the objection posed as the abjection of a theoretical opponent, loses its ground completely. Sankar's accommodation of the objection earlier in the text<sup>24</sup> and attempted defense of his position by suggesting that the self is not a non-object (*avisaya*) and also not one incapable of being given in front (*parovasthita*) as a direct object on all counts (*ekantena*) can be taken up as an instance of '*arundhati nyaya*'<sup>25</sup>.

Sankar desires to suggest that no ascertainable reason can be put forth why an illusion should happen at all except that it is due to ignorance (*ajnana-janya*) and that this ignorance (*ajnana*) is of the nature of not-knowing what, in fact, is the case (otherwise called (*avarana* 'of the fact in question) and also *apparently knowing* something else which, from the nature of the case cannot be the case (otherwise called *Viksepa* of an illegitimate content). It is due to false knowledge of what is what (*dharma-dharminoh-mithyajnananimithah*), and can be removed or eradicated only when we get an *access* to the truth of fact,—not otherwise. Our conventional understanding of the given order as real and as consisting of plural subjects and objects is a case of illusion of the type of regarding the invisible sky as dusky or as a cauldron with a bottom. 'Ignorant children or the dullard amongst us (*valah*) take the sky as really so, but the well-informed know that such judgments as 'the sky is dusky' or 'the sky has a bottom' are vitiated by ignorance and falsity. Our conventional understanding of Reality is vitiated in like manner. And all our conventional forms of knowledge together with their contents (*pramana-prameya vyavahara*) are vitiated likewise—*avidyavadvisayani pratyaksadlni pramanani sastrani ceti*.

There is a very significant point in this wholesale condemnation<sup>12</sup> of all recognised and conventional *pramanas* by Sankar which we cannot afford to miss and so this has to be discussed before we close this chapter. It will be shown in the next chapter that Sankar's classical interpreters of both the schools, burdened as they were with scholastic niceties of exposition mainly, did not take serious notice of this apparently self-stultifying statement of Sankar which seeks to establish or prove Brahman or Atman as the one truth, castigating at the same time all recognised sources of knowledge and *means of proof*. Yet this can be the only logical position for Sankar who regards all like-*vyavahara* and the conventional understanding upon which it is based as vitiated by mistaken identity of self and not-self, that is, by the perennial *adhyasa* discussed so far. One great strength of the Sankarite position is that the arguments of all rival commentators of the Brahmasutras alleging that there is no *pramana*<sup>13</sup> on the basis of which the Advaita view of Reality as *nirvisesa*, or the Advaita view of the self as non-dual formless, pure consciousness can be established become all pointless and irrelevant. Sankar's reply to such objection will be: There can be no *pramana* of the kind maintained by the rival theorists because all the so called *pramanas* of the conventional sort are themselves vitiated by ignorance and falsity and are, on the ultimate analysis, all *a, pramanas*. Wherever, there is a distinction between knower and known, subject and object, there is *adhyasa* or illicit superimposition since without the superimposition of the ego on pure consciousness or misidentification of the two, as Sankar has attempted to show, there can be no *pramata* (knower) and so also no known content (*visaya*), and finally, no knowledge involving distinction of knower and known. So, the pertinent question which Sankar may pose here is: how can the recognised *pramanas*, which, by their very nature, are all vitiated with falsity and ignorance, be expected to be any *pramana* in respect of anything other than the false? The non-advaitists would be simply breaking their heads against this stone-wall of defense without getting any head-way. There are also a number of statements of the Upanisads in Sankar's support. The truth transcendental is not attainable by logic, not also by means of a whole multitude of valid statements, only he whom it exposes may have an access to it<sup>14</sup>. This is, undoubtedly, a very interesting position.

This wholesale condemnation of all recognised methods of knowledge and of all grounds of proof reminds one of the paradox of the liar<sup>15</sup>, which caused so much headache to the western philosophers. That it also came as a shock to the redoubtable Vacaspati Misra is evidenced by the fact that the Bhamati omitted to offer any comment on this point<sup>16</sup>—how is the Advaita view of reality to be established or proved in a situation where all proofs and sources of knowledge are condemned as having been vitiated by falsity? The point that Sankar presses here is very significant for the Vedanta doctrine of his conception in spite of its apparent paradoxicality. This was raised and discussed elaborately by the present author in a paper in the proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress<sup>17</sup>. For contrast, we have the paradox of the liar of Epimenides, the cretan who said that 'all Cretans are liars, and nearer home, the paradox of the statement 'Sarvam *mithya bravimi*'—'whatever I state is false' mentioned by Bhattacharya<sup>18</sup>. The peculiarity of these paradoxes is that the statements in order to be true must be false. The paradox involved in Sankar's statement is: how is falsity or vitiated nature of all '*pramanas*', methods of knowledge and of proof to be established without involving this knowing, as also this proof, in the same process of denunciation? Moreover, as suggested already, in the event of all proofs and sources of knowledge being by their very nature vitiated, how can the Vedantic truth of '*atmaikatya*' be established and certified? As far as the former aspect of paradox is concerned on adherent of Sankar may devise an escape in the Russellian way, which in spite of its ingenuity is at most a verbal trick<sup>19</sup>. Sankar meets the point in a different way.<sup>20</sup> But how to resolve the paradox relating to the second part of the question?



Neither Vacaspati nor Padmapada appears to have clearly seen this paradox or devised a solution of the riddle. Both concentrate on elaborating the *specific grounds* that led Sankar to censure all the *pramanas* in the way he did. Vacaspati, for instance, avoids discussion on the paradox by treating the entire passage in Sankar's text, such as, '*tanmatram avidyakhyaṃ atmanatmanoritaretaradhyasam puruskṛita sarve pramanaprameya vyavahara laukika vaidikasca pravṛttau sarvaṇi ca sastrāṇi vidhipratishedha- moksaparāṇi*'—as simply illustrative or explanatory of '*lokavyavahara*' mentioned by Sankar in the opening paragraph of the Adhyasabhasya. He connects it with the word '*iti*' in the passage, '*aḥamidam mamedam iti natsurgika ayam lokavyavaharah*' and ends with the remark that the point is so very clear that it requires no explanation at all—'*nigadavyakhyatam*'<sup>41</sup>—although he adds an explanation in his own way later on. Nor is the Pancapadika, or for that matter, Vivarana of Prakasataman more illuminating or helpful in the solution of the above paradox. Both the schools appear to have sensed a paradox of different nature and dilated on that paradox. Thus, Padmapada sees another and a new paradox when he writes '*avisyavadvishayatve sati asruyadosanugamat a-pramananyeva syurityaksepah*'<sup>42</sup>—insofar as the *pramanas*, have their object-matter all vitiated by *avidya*, they themselves get vitiated by the defect of their locus (*pramata*), and turn to be other than themselves and so as '*a-pramanas*'. His page headings also, such as, '*laukikavaidika-sarva-pravṛttau avidyavat-purusasritatvopapadanam*'<sup>43</sup>, and also '*laukikavaidika-sarvavyavaharanamavidyavat visayatvam*'<sup>44</sup> seem to sense the problem but the solution offered goes in another direction and does not really touch the paradox. 'What then becomes the *pramana* of the Advaita view of Reality'? It is amusing also that in successive editions of the Pancapadika, attempts have been made to leave out or distort crucial words and expression of Sankar's text to keep out the Vedic or *sastrupramana* from the general censure<sup>45</sup>. Vacaspati also senses the risk of all *pramanas* turning into *a-pramanas* when he comments '*pramayah phalasyabhava pramanam na pravarteta, tatha ca pramanam a-pramanam syat ityarthah*'<sup>46</sup> but he also does not meet the puzzle mentioned above in any clear-cut manner.

All conventional *pramanas* may be shown to degenerate into *a-pramanas*—a circumstance which is self-defeating and self-contradictory, but an ascertainment of that circumstance in minute details does not solve the problem in question in any way. The question remains as before. What then becomes the ground of evidence in support of the Advaita theme of '*atmatkatva*' as being the truth of fact? how is this latter established and by what kind of *pramana*? Not that the traditional interpreters did not know answer to this question, or that Sankar's treatment in the text had any poverty of suggestions as to the direction in which the answer was to be sought and secured. Even, then, the fact stands that the answer has not been brought out clearly as the problem itself was not sighted in its true complexion by the classical writers of the two schools of Advaita Vedanta.

The fact is, Sankar's emendation of all the conventional *pramanas*, both *laukika* or ordinary, and *vaidika* or extraordinary, is not an unrelated issue in his exposition of the *advaita* view-point. It is vitally connected with Sankar's claim of '*atmatkatva*' being the only truth of fact. There can be no way of establishing this except by way of wholesale condemnation of the conventional *pramanas* which deliver plurality of selves and their cognate objects as the truth of fact,—which uphold and defend our conventional view of the real order, the world of our *apara vidya*. '*atmatkatva*' is not a *visaya*, is no object-matter. It stands for a self-conscious experience, an apperceived or felt identity with all that is there. Does an experience of an immediate sort depend on or require a proof outside itself? It may, of course, be disproved by another experience of the same immediate sort. But where a self-conscious experience is self-fulfilling and is not de-valued or sublated by any other experience logic cannot throw it out<sup>47</sup>. The Advaita view of truth, takes truth as self-revealing (*svaprakasa*) and not as dependently revealed (*Paradhinaprakasa*). The self-revealed needs no proof, no extraneous

circumstance to establish it—it needs no *pramana* in the conventional meaning. The conventional *pramanas* all involve a phenomenal knower and all involve distinctions of *pramata*, *prameya*—and *prama*, and so long as these distinctions are maintained, there can be no access to the absolute non-distinction or one-ness of reality. Even scriptural testimony besides involving distinction of *pramata* and *prameya* involves distinction of *sisya* and *sasitra*<sup>48</sup>. So, Sankar is upsparring in his emendation even of the vedanta texts and through the device of *purvapaksa* raised the question. *katham canntena moksaastrena pratipaditasya atmaikatvasya satyamupapadyate iti*—how can 'atmaikatva' be regarded as the truth of fact when the organ comporting this truth such as, the Vedanta Vakyas or the *moksa sastra*s themselves, involving, as they do, distinction of the instructor and the instructed, have to be regarded as vitiated by falsity? How, again, can the Vedanta-vakyas, which in their syntactical combination of multiple words are relational in set-up and so false, give rise to the truth-realisation, such as, the self is everything (*Brahmatmatva*)<sup>49</sup>? So, there is no attempt by Sankar to dodge the issue.

It has already been stated that, according to the Advaita Vedanta of Sankar, the supreme truth of fact does not depend on any proof,—only its distortion requires to be exposed and falsified. To get at the *vidya*, the veil of *avidya* is to be removed or pierced through — the *avidya* has to be exposed as *avidya*. In this latter task, the *moksa-sastra*, such as the *vedanta*, has been the most powerful means. Even logic or ratio-cination is an auxiliary means<sup>50</sup>. The detection of the false as false, even a partial realisation of the conventionally true as suspect, is helpful and is an indirect means (*pramana*) of the discovery of the supreme truth of fact. We are seeking an escape from darkness to light, from ignorance to truth, from distortion to the fact itself. It is by knowing the distortion as distortion that we come to discover reality. The discovery of a truth of fact does not require any new or additional effort once the distortion, the no-fact posing as fact, has been corrected and removed. This has systematically been the pleading of Sankar. The truth supreme is *Nityasiddha* (eternally self-established) and is not a *Sadya* or *apya* or *samskarya vastu*—nothing that is newly to be brought into being, newly to be attained or to be reformed and resuscitated<sup>51</sup>.

How do we discover the rope to be the really presented object in a situation of seeing the snake in the rope? We do not know it as the rope so long as the delusion lasts, so long as we do not come to realise that the snake-appearance is false. What are the circumstances that can lead to the detection of the illusion as an illusion? It may be that finding the snake-appearance not to behave as a snake, that is, by throwing a stone at it from distance we may at least assure ourselves that whatever it may be it is not a love object. This may dispel our fear, and by nearer approach and closer inspection, we may convince ourselves that *it is not a snake* and that our previous perception of it as a snake was a misperception. That it is *really* a rope, as a form of discovery, does not require any additional theoretic or cognitive effort. This realisation just flashes upon the mind as soon as the illusion of the snake is got over. Even verbal testimony may be of service in overcoming this illusion. Suppose a reliable speaker informs me that he had also once mistaken it as a snake but had subsequently found that it was not a snake although it had the look of a snake. Possibly, this also may lead me to doubt the veracity of my perception, and later on, by acting upon this suggestion that it may not be a snake, and with the help of a certain process of reasoning I may *know* that it is *really* not a snake even without physically examining it. This, then, shows that the knowledge of the falsity of the false by means of the recognised *pramanas* may *indirectly* help us to discover the truth without directly contributing to, or, what may otherwise be called, *causing* that discovery. This amounts to saying that the very *pramanas* which would otherwise sustain the belief in the false as true may themselves lead to the detection of the false as false, leaving the truth to assert itself.

We habitually take the conditions that remove ignorance in the sense of negative not-knowing, or which correct ignorance in the sense of positive mis-knowing, as the conditions or *pramanas* of the knowledge which apparently follows upon the removal of ignorance. As expressed in the common and ordinary vocabulary of Indian philosophy, a *pramana* is the instrumental cause of *prama* or valid knowledge—*pramayah karanani pramanani*. But, in the Advaita Vedanta usage, it should be understood negatively to mean that which counters *aprama* or removes ignorance—*ajnana-nivartakam pramanam*. Not that any Advaita treatise on epistemology has defined a *pramana* in the suggested way. But this should have been done. Now, understanding 'pramana' in this negative way, Sankar has accepted the Vedanta-texts as the principal *pramana* in respect of *Brahman*, *Brahmatmatva* or *Atmaikatva*. *Tarka* or *anumana* (inference or reasoning) insofar as it accord with the *srutis* (revealed texts, here the Upanisads), that is, *srutyanyusari tarka* (also *smrti*) has also been admitted as an auxiliary proof or means of knowledge. But Sankar also speaks of a direct, although *terminal* proof (*antya-pramnam*)<sup>32</sup> which he calls 'anubhava'<sup>33</sup>, 'avagati'<sup>34</sup>, and also 'Brahmavagati'<sup>35</sup>. This follows upon *sravana*, *manana* and *nididhyasana* of the Vedanta *mahavakyas* (great sayings), such as, 'Tat Tvam Asi' — that Thou Art. But it should not be forgotten that Sankar call these items 'pramanas' just to accommodate the popular demand for the so-called proofs. Technically speaking, the case under review is extraordinary. It is an *object-matter* or a theme capable of proof only when regarded externally, and from the popular view-point. Regarded in its real essence and *as it is*, *atmaikatva*, *brahmatmatva* or *sarvatmata* is a self-conscious, self-shining experience which cannot be taken as an object (*visaya*) or as a mere *state* of affairs without distortion, although at the discursive level it is unavoidably so taken. Descriptive language misdescribes the indescribable which is beyond all imagery, beyond all figures and forms of speech *avanmanasoocara*.

The Vedanta truth — 'all-being-one-self' is to be a self-conscious self-experience. The subject that is the ground of this experience is indistinguishable from it, is a self-conscious principle, which can never become an object without distortion. In phenomenal reference, this subject is the Witnessing consciousness — *Saksi*. It is the very ground of all proof and being so, is not a probable content. How to prove that which is to be the ground of all proof? It is also not literally knowable. By attempting to grasp the subject as a knowable object one would simply distort its nature and get at something other than it. This exercise is both irrational and futile. If any body is content with this exercise, no body, needs quarrel with him. But, in the very nature of things, the Vedanta disallows this prerogative on the part of an empirical person or knower since such a person or knower is an embodiment of *ajnanavrtti*. His pretention to literally know that which cannot be so known does not legitimize his claim. The so called proofs or evidences looked for themselves prove to be self-contradictory and false when logically pressed. In a situation where the *pramata*, the *prameya*, and the *pramana*, are all found to be vitiated by falsity, does the demand for proof make any sense? Does not the claim of the non-advaitista like Ramanuja that there is no *pramana* delivering the *nirvisesa*, that all recognised *pramanas* establish only the *Savisesa-vastu-visaya* turn out to be the vindication of the Sankarite position, in stead of being its refutation? Had Sankar's rivals gone through Sankar's *Adhyasabhasya* carefully, and followed its implications closely, they would not have, perhaps, indulged in arguments which are so pointless and frivolous.

## References

- 1 Isa 15, also Br Aranyaka 5.15.1., Maitri 6.35
- 2 Katha 1.2.12., 1.3.12.
- 3 The Bhamati-Tikaprambha- The fallacy or hetvabhasa called 'vyapakaviruddha' or 'satpratipaksa' may be presented thus. To the argument that Brahman is a fit object of inquiry since it is unknown and the inquiry is purposeful, as in the case of *dharma*, there may be the counter argument- Brahman is not a fit object of inquiry since it is already known and its knowledge has not achieved any purpose (release from bondage), such as, an inquiry as to the existence of a pot in clear light and in contact with the sense-organ of an alternative person, or about the existence of a crow's teeth (vayasadanta), which is non-existent and an inquiry into which serves no practical purpose
- 4 B B 1.1.1
- 5 cf Vivaranaprameyasamgraha – 'Prathamāsūtra adhyasaḥ sakṣaḥānuk to 'piar that jñāta ityupapaditvat sīdyatyeva
- 6 Pancapadika-(saksatantropodghatah prayojanamasya bhasyasya p. 2 (Benaras Edition 1891).
- 7 Ibid., p. 2.
- 8 "Sutrartha varnyata yatha vakyaḥ sutranu-karibhiḥ. Svapadāni ca varnyante Bhasyam bhasyavidō viduḥ" also, 'Tatredam bhasyanina sutrarthakalamapi pratipadayatyato navyakhyanarhamitye tam sankitam dosam . ' Pancapadika vivarana p. 2. (Benaras Edition 1892). 'Nanu katham bhasyadvayameva visayaprayojane pratipadayati Ibid., p. 2
- 9 Pancapadika, pp 1-2, Pancapadika vivarana- pp 2-3, vivarana prameya, pp. 48-61 (Bengali Edition, Vasumati Sahitya Mandir, Calcutta).
10. See Vivaranaprameyasamgraha. Ibid.
- 11 See Pancapadika and Bhamati. One-ness or non-dualness of the Jiva and Brahman is not the only theme that the Advaita propagates it propagates also falsity of the world appearance, of all phenomenal multiplicities, plural subjects as also objects, although these are certified as real by conventional knowledge and behaviour
- 12 'Naisa tarkena matirapaneya etc' Katha 1.2.23. also Mundana 3.2.23
13. Pancapadika, p. 1
- 14 B. S. B. 'avidyavadvisayanī pratyaksadinī pramanāni seṣṭāni ceti.'
- 15 Mundaka. 1.1.1, B. Aranyak. 4.5.15, Chandogya- Sixth Prapathaka.
- 16 The analogy of the Kantian schematised category (which alone can be applied to an object of possible experience) has been felt helpful in this context. It may be remembered that the pure category as general *a priori* logical rule is not directly or immediately applicable to such object. cf Kant- schematism of the pure intellect in the critique of pure reason. It may be noted that Vivaranapramaya Samgraha brings out this point when it speaks of superimposition of not-self on the self in the former's original nature (svarupena) but of superimposition of the self on the not-self in the former's assumed and modified form (samastarupena) B. P. S. p. 125.
- 17 Bhamati' purvapurvadhyasa tadvasanavisayikṛtasya uttarottaradhyasa visayatvavirodhot'
- 18 Adhyasabhasya.
- 19 This is the common rendering of an *adhyasa*. see Adhyasabhasya.
- 20 Adhyasabhasya 'Katham punah pratyagatmani aviseaye adhyasa visayataddharmanam ? etc.'
- 21 Adhyasabhasya- Opening sentence.

- 22 Adhyasabhasya- 'na cryam asti niyamah, etc.'
- 23 Cf Bhamati and Pancapadika. Their views have been examined in the next two chapter in detail.
- 24 Adhyasabhasya.
- 25 See Bhamati.
- 26 Or that it is never the rule...
- 27 Akasa is generally taken as inferable through perception of sound. But Pancapadika takes it as *apratyaksa* but not *aparoksa* for that reason, since, according to it, sense-contact is not an indispensable condition of direct experience. This sophistry was uncalled for
- 28 Since it is all-pervading.
- 29 What is meant is that the dusky cayldron-like appearance is no character of anything which is its substance or support. It is a floating appearance without a linkage, is really the object (apparent) the *visaya* in itself although it is misgudged as a character of or predicate of an X which is not there.
- 30 See Adhyasabhasya.
- 31 The tiny lustrous speck called the star Arundhati in Hindu mythology cannot be pointed out all at once.
- 32 'Tameyamavidyakhyanamatmanatmanoritaretaradhyasam pureskrtya serve pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahara laukika vaidikasca pravrttiah servant ca sestrani vidipratishedhamoksaphroni' ... Adhyasabhasya.
- 33 'Nirvisesavastu vadibhih nirvisesa vastuni idam pramanamiti na sakyati vaktum, savisesa vastuviasayalvat sarvapramananam' See Bhasya, p. 65 (Bengali edition—Ed. by Durgacharan).
- 34 Katha U. I.2.2.3., Mundaka 3 2 3 .
- 35 Epimenides, The Cretan said 'all Cretans are liars, His statement therefore to be true must be false This is the paradox.
- 36 Bhamati-Tika on Adhyasabhasya.
- 37 My paper on 'the concept of indeterminability' Pratap Seth lecture on the Vedanta, Kanpur 1972, 46th Session.
- 38 Cf Vakyapadhyai III 3/25, 27, 28
- 39 Russell—Meaning a truth ch vii Russell introduces his famous theory of types to distinguish two levels in the question
- 40 Sankar, however, resolves the knot not by any verbal trick but by an internal criticism of the *pramanas* and their supporting conditions, See Adhyasabhasya.
- 41 Bhamati—See comment on the part.
- 42 Pancapadika.
- 43 Pancapadika, p. 31 The meaning is 'In all laukika and vaidika motivation dependence on a person harbouring ignorance is constitutive factor'.
- 44 Pancapadika, p. 33 The meaning is 'all laukika and vaidika usages or forms of behaviour have objects or ends vitiated by falsity'.
- 45 Pancapadika (Vizianagram series 1891), p. 30, shows omission of the word 'Vaidikasca' in footnote
- 46 Bhamati The meaning is 'the *pramanas* would not be in operation in the absence of there being valid knowledge maturing it no appropriate results, so the *pramanas* would turn into a-pramanas—such is the meaning

- 47 'Antyamidam pramanamatmatkatvasya pratipadakam, natak param kincid akankhyomashi ' B. S. B. 2.1.14' tadavagatah sarvotharatvat' Bhamati in the same context.
- 48 B. S. B. 2.1.14.
- 49 *Ibid.*, ' Katham tu asatyena vedantavakyena satyasya Brahmatmatvasya pratipathirupapadyeta.
- 50 *Ibid.*, ' srutyadayah anubhava dayasca yatha sambhavam iba pramanam'
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 *Ibid.*, -'antyamidam pramanam'
53. *Ibid.*,
- 54 *Ibid.*, - ' . tadavagati satyamevaphatam' ' . avagatiya badhena dhamatratmavado dusito veditavyah'
- 55 'Vakyartha-vicarenadhyavasana-nirvrittea brahmavagatih'

## Adhyasabhasya: Avidya

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In this chapter, a textual exposition of Sankara's *Adhyasabhasya*, the key-note to the Vedanta of Sankara's conception, is being attempted to show that the ideas expressed in the earlier chapters are not foreign to, or discordant with, the letter and spirit of the text. As a serious co-labourer in the field with requisite insight to gauge the depths of Sankara's intended meaning will have the candidness to admit, a considerable portion of the text is untranslatable in English language and diction without distortion of meaning. A literal translation of passages will, therefore, be avoided where there is any risk of misrepresentation but the exposition of the major themes of the text will be supported at all places by necessary quotations from the original.

'*Atmaikatva*' (absolute one-ness of the self) is the one theme of the entire Vedanta of Sankara's conception, and in his Bhasya, named by him as '*Sariraka Mimamsa*', Sankara claims to have attempted an exposition and also defence of this theme<sup>1</sup>. This one self, is again, Brahman<sup>2</sup>, that is, Reality in its entire comprehension and all-inclusiveness. *Vidya* (true knowledge)<sup>3</sup> of this one reality is not only the foundation of all truths (*vidya*)<sup>4</sup>, it is also the one truth of fact, which, if and when realised, leaves no residual fact to be known over and again<sup>5</sup>.

But this *Vidya*, which the Upanisads all convergently<sup>6</sup> teach and the Advaita Vedanta upholds as its goal is shrouded from us, is *guhahita, gahvarestha*<sup>7</sup> (set in the secret place and hidden in its depth), and unattainable except through *adhyatma-yoga* (meditation centering upon the nature of the self). The Vedanta literature is only preparatory to it. By dispelling darkness of ignorance, it can render the mind receptive in its regard, but cannot deliver it up directly—insofar as the *sruti* is only an indirect means of knowledge. This truth of fact, the one-ness of the self, is self-established and self-shining, and does not depend on any extraneous agency or factor in order to be revealed. It is not dependently revealed (*paradhinaprakasa*), and that which is revealed in that way is *jada* (unconscious), where as, the self-shining truth, called *vidya* in cosmic reference, but which is the same as the self or Brahman (there being no distinction of knower, known and knowledge in the transcendent), is of the nature of self-shining pure consciousness. As self-shining pure consciousness, this self, this truth of fact is not literally describable in the diction of conventional language and speech. It is not a *visaya*, no object-matter or content. It is the one subject, transcendent of all conventional subjects and objects. Being the foundation of all proof, of all knowledge, it is neither (*pramanasapeksa*) (dependent on any proof or any source of knowledge) nor is it literally knowable as a given objective fact or content.



The diction of conventional language by its very nature is unsuitable for expressing it, unsuitable for its description. This is what is meant by saying that it is not *literally* knowable or describable. The blame for this predicament is not to be laid at the door of this truth, transcendental and non-conventional. It rightly devolves upon the conventional language and its usage. Our given experiences, our conventional way of understanding things, our general mode of behaviour or way of life, our linguistic usages and modes of speech are all vitiated by a fundamental error. Little wonder, therefore, that all these should inherently fail to grasp the truth, in its proper perspective, and would signally distort its image. That this has really been the fact Sankara attempts to bring home to us in the very opening passage of his *Adhyasabhasya*.

The problem, as already explained in the earlier chapters, has been 'how to communicate the incommunicable, to render intelligible what, from the very nature of the case, cannot be put into the idiom of conventional language, cannot also be brought under logical categories of common use'. The position would have been beyond redemption had it not been that our conventional understanding, way of life, and linguistic behaviour was *in some way related to* this truth even as a distortion of it. The *lokavyavahara* which, according to Sankara, is *nausargika* that is, beginninglessly 'given' and not consciously manipulated, is not an isolated issue, one fact over and above and additional to another,—there being no means of escape, no way of transition, from one to the other. In point of fact, our conventional understanding, mode of behaviour and linguistic habit is a distorted presentation of what *is*, or *should have been* the case. A calm and judicious reflection on it, an analytical and critical consideration of its nature, is likely to give it out as a distortion, as vitiated by falsity. The discovery of the false even as a suspect may create conditions for a closer inquiry. This may ultimately lead to the discovery of the truth and also redound as the discovery of the false *as* false and spurious (*tuccha*). So, Sankara, begins with critical contemplation of the nature of our conventional understanding, behaviour and usage<sup>1</sup>.

A word of caution is necessary at this juncture. Although Sankara starts with his *Adhyasabhasya*, this *bhasya* is not the starting point<sup>2</sup> of his Vedanta philosophy. Here there is really no paradox. *The philosophy of the Vedanta is indeed the philosophy of the Upanisads*. Sankara's *Adhyasabhasya* is a preface or an introduction to it. His *Adhyasabhasya*, or for that matter, his account of *adhyasa* or illusion, is not his whole philosophy. Nor is it a clue to an *independent* metaphysics. Such supposition would involve a case of *hysteron proteron*. The Vedanta metaphysics is, in fact, the earlier issue. To work out a logical defence as also to prepare the ground for its acceptance, the *Adhyasabhasya* has figured in Sankara's planning. So much is said simply to counter the mistaken impression that a modern scholar, deriving inspiration from contemporary analytic tradition of the West and swearing by its slogan, is likely to get from our exposition of *Adhyasabhasya* that Sankara's metaphysics is the product of what is derisively termed in contemporary western phraseology as 'quandary response'<sup>3</sup>.

The Vedanta of Sankara's conception takes the view that the world of plural subjects and objects is, at bottom, an illusory appearance<sup>4</sup> of one indivisible self of the nature of pure, undifferented, consciousness. This self which appears as manifold *only appears* as it appears, but *is not* as it appears to be. Its manifold appearances are due to progressive 'objectivisation'<sup>5</sup> of the subject. This process is not a human manipulation; it is beginningless (*anadi*) and also theoretically endless *ananta*—the exception being that it ceases for the aspirant who can, by seeing through it, get out of it. But it does not cease cosmically. This *Appearance* is there *by way of appearing* *by way of objective manifestation* as the *reality* is there *by way of conscious self-identity and self-finding as absolute existence, consciousness and bliss (freedom)*. The process of 'objectivisation' which in one reference may be termed seeming and playful, in another references, shows itself as a process of irrational

growth giving rise to distortion, and not to any substantial extension of reality which could be regarded as its *development*. This view is characteristically Sankarane in distinction from the non-Advaitic Vedanta, built upon *parinamavada* in any form<sup>17</sup> The Upanisads abound, in varied metaphorical descriptions of the process of 'objectivisation'<sup>18</sup> With these we are not concerned here. We are concerned only with the fact in question, that there has been an 'objectivisation' taking the subject in mistaken identification with its objective appearance, the ego-sense or 'I', and a progressive materialisation of this 'I' through identification with the mind, the sense-organs, the body, and even with 'other bodies' and physical objects. This process of 'objectivisation' is no presupposition of the system, not a fundamental assumption. Nor is it accepted in faith merely on the authority of the revealed texts. It is a mystery that by its very existence demands a solution. But the solution the final solution at any rate, is a practical affair, and meditation or *nididhyasana* as explained in *vivekacudamani*, *upadeshasahasri* and similar texts is the means there. The path of appearance lies through progressive 'objectivisation and de-subjectivisation' the path to reality moves in the opposite way through progressive 'de-objectivisation' until the subject in its purity is reached. There upon, all become, that is, all come to be realised as *one* indivisible reality, the self.

In the depth of the Advaita-Vedanta reality, there is neither thought (relational presentation of concepts) nor language or speech<sup>19</sup> Language needs a speaker, thought a determinate thinker, an experiencer (*pramata*). This is bound up with the emergence, rather with the appearance of 'I', the ego, on the scene. This 'I' is the necessary presupposition, an immanent constituent of both thought and speech. It is the minimum assertible in thought and speech. It is the minimum assertible in thought and speech, and when asserted, it takes the form 'I am' or 'I exist'. Russell's independent particulars being 'all ego-centric' are in fact 'I-centric' regarded in this way. Prof. Ayer criticises 'I am or exist' as a degenerate statement<sup>20</sup> But its degeneracy is only an infallible sign of its primacy in thought and speech. It may simply be ejaculatory, as Ayer expresses<sup>21</sup> But this ejaculation is the minimum that can be expressed in any language. The 'I' is the most fundamental demonstrative, and as demonstrated, it necessarily takes the form 'I am' which means 'I exist'<sup>22</sup> This is also the most indubitable as Sankara has explained, and as his *tikakaras* of both the schools of the Advaitavedanta have elaborated<sup>23</sup> 'An or 'exist' in 'I am' or 'I exist' is, not of course, a genuine predicate but this creates the urge for a genuine predicate for greater articulation and so for greater *determination*. This is fulfilled when one says *I am This ahamidam*<sup>24</sup> Sankara would take Ayer upside down. There is no degeneracy in the indeterminate, there is degeneracy in determination, and this increases with every increase in the process of determination. In fact, this is the theme projected by Sankara in the very opening line of the *Adhyasabhasya*. When from the level of mere *assertion of existence* in progressively specific and determinate terms, that is, from the sheer descriptive level of 'what else I am' one passes to the *enjoying* level, to the level of 'I' as the agent, the enjoyer (*karta, bhokta*), when from the less 'assertive' level of the experiencer, knower, the describer, the witness (*pramata, jnata, darsaka vyahupita*) one passes to the more *self-imposing* level of the doer and the enjoyer, a greater degeneracy results<sup>25</sup> This is illustrated in Sankara's 'mine this' (*namadam*)<sup>26</sup> Is there no degeneracy in the erstwhile substantive's turning into the adjectival, and in the erstwhile predicative's changing into the role of a substantive and enjoying greater focus of attention, emphasis, and so importance? 'This mine' or 'This is mine' no doubt doubt presents 'This' as the enjoyed and the 'owned', while it presents 'I' in the role of an enjoyed and owner—so apparently in a superior position in relation to 'This'. But this superiority, the facied overlords in the ownership and enjoyer-ship he speaks of the *Infatuation*, dependence and so bondage to 'this' which is a subversion of the 'I's previous role as a dispassionate, non-attached observer and is, therefore, a shrinking of openness and freedom. Freedom is indeterminacy. The greater

the determination, the greater the assertiveness, the lesser is the freedom, and so, greater is the degeneracy

Assertion is 'going out' of the tranquil, the unspeakable silence. In 'I am' or 'I exist' the self, so to speak, 'goes out' of itself and by way of positing itself *objectified* itself. It, then, becomes an objectivity, although the minimum speakable, so also the minimum objectifiable. Therefore, the assertion 'I am' or 'I exist' may not be a *full* assertion and the 'am' or 'exist' may not be a predicate of any description. But it will be wrong, not to take it as an assertion. It is at least the mode of the subject posing or 'presenting' itself as an object (*visaya*) to itself if not *literally*, at least metaphorically. This is a mode of self-alienation inasmuch as the subject is reproduced as an object to itself. It gives rise to 'self-feeling' or 'self-positeness' of the subject, now posing as a 'person', the individualised subject and so a determinate speaker, or simply, as the 'self-feeling and self-asserting subject. The assertion in question as an expression of reflective or introspective experience, has the individualised and *personified*<sup>21</sup> subject as its content. Coupled with its indubitability this self-feeling, this self-positeness, or self-assertion in 'I am or exist' posits the individualised self as a content to itself—a content which is unrejectable and, as that, is characterised by existence indistinguishable from its 'being conscious', its assertibility<sup>22</sup>. But the characters, such as, 'existence' and 'conscious being' pertaining to the content here are *derivative*. They emanate from a core, such as, 'existence-consciousness' assuming the role of an over-viewer, witnessing consciousness and holding the entire figuration of '*the subject being an object to itself*' aloft and, in that process, 'shedding' or imparting unrejectability (conscious 'being-there') to it<sup>23</sup>. The phase of experience in 'I am or exist', to be brief, *deputises*, so to say, in phenomenal and in a given determinate form, the self as pure subject, which latter is self-luminous existence, indeterminate, and unobjective (*avisaya*)<sup>24</sup>. The whole thing amounts to, in the Sankararits terminology, superimposition of the ego (*ahamkara*) — a primal mode of *ajñāna-vṛtti*, a 'posed other-than-itself' reared up through that posing, a self that is not-self, *on* the true self, which is indeterminate, and the nature of which is constituted by pure undifferentiated consciousness (*cidātma*)<sup>25</sup>.

In 'I am', therefore, we have the self-experience of a pseudo-self, a deputised self, shining in the borrowed light of the pure self, and thereby, posing and passing as the true self, and partaking of unrejectability which is the very essence of the latter. In this way, the true self, which is a non-object *avisaya*, becomes indirectly an object through its phenomenal and so symbolic expression as the ego,—in the same way as the sky, which by its very nature, is incapable of figuring as a *direct delimited object*, all the same, *appears* as an object, limited and determinate, with colour and shape<sup>26</sup>. The peculiarity of the experience symbolised as 'I am' is that it entails no reference to the world of facts or to the experience of such a world of facts. It is only by way of withdrawal from the world of facts and the collateral experiences that the introspective or reflective 'I am' can be secured. The realisation (getting at) of this experience involves suspension of experiences of other kinds and 'bracketing of' the objective order—the order pertaining to *yusmat* and *idam* (you and this), the second and the third person as distinguished from the first person singular<sup>27</sup>.

That 'I am' is the minimum speakable. What is beyond it, and is its transcendental ground<sup>28</sup> is literally unspeakable. This 'beyond' is not any 'I', not any person, any literal<sup>29</sup> knower doer or enjoyer *puruṣa*, *pramāta*, *karta* or *bhokta*. In cosmic and also individual reference<sup>30</sup>, that is, *as considered under the forms of cosmic whole and the fragmentary individual objectivity* which are, according to Sankara, *ajñānavṛttis*, it is the transcendent (and not the *ajñānavṛttis* them-selves) that *appears* as the Person, Knower (Experiencer), doer and the Enjoyer, cosmic or individual. This falls within the range of the speakable. Speakability is dependent on determination of some kind, real or

fancied. The indeterminate is necessarily unspeakable. It is speakable only indirectly<sup>36</sup>, just as the sky which is no perceivable object may appear indirectly as a presented object through its apparent determinations in term of shape and colour which are all external to it<sup>37</sup>, and cannot, therefore, be meaningfully referred to it. The determinate alone as directly and literally speakable. The speakable admits of different gradations, dependent on progressive determination of the pure indeterminate in forms of the ego, the various modes of *antahkarana*, the *indriyas*, the gross body—all constituting empirical subjectivity. This subjectivity, empirical and phenomenal, is, according to the Vedanta, not a thing of the moment. It is generally regarded as the cumulative product of *avidya-samskaras* accumulating in a beginningless process. This empirical subjectivity *impersonates* the pure self—its phenomenal duplicate, so to say. The indeterminate in being expressed (distorted) through this medium, appears as phenomenal subjectivity and the collateral objectivity. At every stage, the object or objectivity is in and through a pre-formed subjectivity, having its mooring in that subjectivity—a collateral appearance deriving its materiality, unrejectedness, and also indubitability from the antecedent subjectivity.

If 'I (exist)' or 'I (am)' is symbolic of the pure self—'given' or 'posited' as an object or a content to itself (content of witnessing consciousness), the statement, such as, 'I wish', 'I resolve', 'I feel, or will' which have multiple<sup>38</sup> modifications of *antahkarana* (nor the whole of *antahkarana* incipient in the ego) as their basis, hold reference to objective contents which, although inseparable from the subjective modes, are yet apparently distinguished from them<sup>39</sup>. The objective contents of this level are necessarily posited as inward (psychic) facts on account of their association with *internal* organs. Further down—the process of determination when the *antahkaranas vrittis* operate through the so-called external senses (senses which externalise), we have 'I see, hear, smell, taste, touch', and the collateral objectivities, in distinction from their sense-organs,—their media of determination, are necessarily given as 'out there'<sup>40</sup>. Their 'outsideness' is relative to the senses which *externalise* them. Each form of objectivity is thus in and through a form of subjectivity; it grows and matures along with the latter and the greater the determination accruing in the subjective, the greater is the determinateness, specificity, and apparent definiteness of the objective content. In this way, the whole phenomenal order of plural subjects and objects comes to be manifested in and through the whole phenomenal subject, taken distributively, and also as an integrated totality. This then, becomes an argument in support of the Sankarite view that the phenomenal order, the order of existence and experience of *loka-vyavahara*<sup>41</sup>, is an 'appearance', and an illusory presentation of one unitary, non-dual self through *ajnanavrittis*, which by covering up the Reality, give rise to the phenomenal order as a 'viksepa'—a projection, which is a distortion of Reality and so false. In order to describe states of affairs of this sort, we called this as progressive 'objectivisation' of the one subject, which is unattached (*asanga*) and so a non-object (*avisaya*)<sup>42</sup>.

From witnesshood (*saksitva*) to *pramaitva*, from *pramaitva* to *karitva*, from *karitva* to *bhokitva*, is the development of *deformed* subjectivity. From *saksivedyatva* to *prameyatva*, from, *prameyatva* to *karmaphalatva* or *karyatva* (*karma*), from *Karmaphalatva* to *bhogyavisayatva*—such is the development of the engrossing and encumbering objectivity. This 'out-ward' march of events results in bondage—the subject getting eclipsed in objectivity. This brings suffering and distress<sup>43</sup>. The path of freedom lies in the 'in-ward' movement. But although there is realisation of freedom at every upward stage by degrees and volumes, full freedom, called emancipation or release (*moksa*) from the perennial evil (*anartha*), can only be realised in returning back to the pristine indeterminate essence which is symbolised in *atmaikatva*, in *Brahmatmakata*<sup>44</sup>. The *Adhyasabhasya* of Sankara introduces us to this view of Reality and release<sup>45</sup>. It censures all our conventional *prama* and

*pramanas* as vitiated by ignorance and falsity<sup>20</sup> as all *adhyastika* (involving illicit superimposition or mistaken identification). It also gives an account of *adhyasa*, its logical and metaphysical nature and *modus operandi*<sup>21</sup> This last issue, called *anirvacani-yukhyati* is the central and the most crucial part of *Adhyasabhasya*, as also of the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara. In the light of these issues, we shall now split up the text and show that our rendering of Sankara's philosophy has, at no place, strayed away from Sankara's own exposition.

Including the interrogatives which by posing questions or possible objections on behalf of an opponent (*purva-paksa*) facilitate further clarifications and elaboration of the point at issue, there are thirty-eight sentences<sup>22</sup> all together in Sankara's *Adhyasabhasya*. Of these (I) The first-two<sup>23</sup> sentences bring out in a nut-shell the entire subject-matter of the *Adhyasabhasya*, a procedure remarkable for its subtlety as also for its depth of perspective. (II) Thirteen sentences, which follow the first-two, introduce, analyse and then elaborate on Sankara's *anirvacaniyakh-yativada*, otherwise called the theory of *adhyasa*, the most crucial theme in the entire exposition. (III) Seventeen sentences present Sankara's a view of *avidya* which may be taken as presenting the same matter from metaphysical, as different from the logical angle, or as bringing in an issue which is concomitant to and inseparable from the other issue. (IV) In course of four sentences which follow next, Sankara demonstrates in what way there has actually been an *adhyasa* (wrong apprehension of a content where it is not, nor ever can be), in the case of the true self. (V) In the concluding two sentences, Sankara condemns this *avidya* or *adhyasa* as the root evil (*anartha-hetu*) and upholds that it is true knowledge (*vidya*) of the self as one indivisible or undifferentiated essence (*atmaikatva*) alone that can eradicate it. He also promises, in this connection, to show that the entire Vedanta, the Upanisads taken as a harmonious whole, bears out this his rendering of the truth supreme<sup>24</sup>.

For convenience of our presentation we shall take the metaphysical portion, delineating Sankara's doctrine of *Avidya*, covering roughly sections 1 3 4, and 5 above first,—leaving the logical issue, *adhyasa* as introduced and explained by Sankara and in our grouping placed in second section above, to be treated in the second part of our textual exposition (chapter IV).

A literal rendering of the two opening sentences in Sankara's text may read as follows: 'Inasmuch as mutual identification (*itatetarabhava*) of an object (*visaya*) with the subject (*visayi*), (accessible to the cognitive references as 'Thou' (or this) and as 'I'—*Yasmadasmadpratyaya-gocara*), by nature as radically opposed as it darkness to light<sup>25</sup> (*tamahprakasavadviruddhasvabhavaybh*) being admitted as illegitimate (*anupapattan siddhayam*), the mutual identification of their characteristic properties is even more so (*tuddharmanamapi sutaram itatetarabhavanupapattih*), therefore, the supposition of a superimposition of object (*visaya*), (cognised as 'Thou' (this), and its properties on the subject (*visayi*) (the essential nature of which is pure consciousness (*cidaimake*) (and which is cognitively apprehended as 'I'), and contrariwise, the supposition of superimposition of the subject (*visayi*) and its characteristics on the object (*Visaya*) will have to be admitted as false (untenable), *yusmatpratyayagocarasya-visayasya tadviparyayena visayinah taddarmanance visaye adhyasah mithyete bhavitum yuktam*. Notwithstanding this, failing to discriminate (*itatetaravivekena*) one from the other, the substantives and characteristics so radically distinct (*atyanta viviktayoh dharmadharminoh*), and superimposing self-identity of one upon another as also the characteristics of one upon those of another (*anyonyasmin anyonyatmakatam anyanyadharmanca adhyasya*), and thus affecting a union of the real and the false (*satyanrtemithunikrtya*) on account of ignorance (*mithyajnbananumittah*), there has resulted this natural beginningless usage and behaviour of mankind, such as, 'I this' (I am this), mine this'<sup>26</sup> (*ahamidam mamadam iti naisargikoyam lokavyavaharah*)



Put into a language less elegant, direct and also less scholarly, what Sankara, says in these two sentences is as follows. The world of our experience is distinguished even by ourselves *categorically* in to two realms—that of subjects (knowers, doers and enjoyers) and that of objects (the known, the accusatives, the enjoyed). This distinction has nothing scholastic about it. It is a common-place distinction insofar as it is admitted by all and this distinction is as radical as is light from darkness. This becomes evident in the polarity involved in our cognitive references, when we inwardly and introspectively follow the direction of 'I-consciousness' in what is called self-consciousness, and follow *outwardly* the direction of what we refer to as 'Thou', 'This', 'That', 'It', and so on. The concepts are poles apart in their referential meanings. Such being the case, that is, the subject and the object being two mutually distinct and even radically opposed categories, there should not arise any instance of ignorant confusion about their nature as also about their distinction. It would be extremely silly, therefore, if any confusion in respect of them ever arises: if we take the subject, the nature of which is revealed in 'I-consciousness' as conscious, witness (*drasta*) as an *object* (*drsyā*). An object, in being distinguished from the knower, the agent, the enjoyer—all conscious formations, is not only an external entity 'out there' in space, but, insofar as it is manifested *by* consciousness, is 'given' to an observer, and is enjoyed by a conscious enjoyer, it is also *Jada* (*unconscious*) in being dependently revealed (*paradhina prakāsa*), and so subject-articulated. The (*substantives*— the subject and object, being themselves so very disparate and mutually unidentifiable, it stands to reason that their defining characteristics or essential properties (*dharma*) must be regarded as even more disparate and more unidentifiable (*sutaram itaretabhavanupapatti*). It, then, follows, logically that any identification of these two mutually exclusive substantives, the subject and object, or exchange of the essential properties of one for those of the other, must be looked upon as false (*mithya*) and ungrounded in fact. Yet, consider the nature and condition, the sequence and import of the conventional or habitual mode of experience, behaviour and usage of mankind in general. Every one feels, speaks reacts and behaves as 'I am this', as if the subject is or can be a presentable object. This happens when one confuses one's 'self' with himself as a bodied being, an individual person, an agent, a phenomenal knower, a Mr. Smith, for instance. This is presenting a subject as an object, the *visayi* as *visaya*. Then, again, one, in one's day-to-day behaviour, living, and usage, in respect of a presented object, such as, a parse, an state or a house says that 'this' is mine'. Evidently, here, by calling an object as *mine* one misidentifies an object with one's self or takes it as a part of one's self. This is the reverse process of misidentifying a *visaya* with the *visayi*. Can there be any more glaring instances to show that we habitually live in a state of utter ignorance and confusion—that we both misidentify the subject with the object and the object with the subject, wrongly transpose their characteristic qualities, and that our normal and natural behaviour rests on this fundamental ignorance and confusion?

This then, is a censure, both of our normal and natural way of living and of our normal and conventional mode of believing. Both rest upon basic ignorance (*avidyā*) of the true nature of all that we claim to know rightly-ourselves and our world of objects. The issue raised is thus a metaphysical issue. If this is *avidyā*, what then is right knowledge (*vidyā*)? Whatever that *vidyā* might be, it is clear that if that knowledge ever dawns upon us, we will be awakened to a new and previously unknown state of things, and the foundation of our existent and prevalent belief (which is ignorance) being removed, the *nausargika likavyavaharas* which have been reared up on that wrong belief and nourished and sustained by it, will forfeit their commission. There is, then, bound to emerge a transformation of our life and experience—a radical transformation of ourselves. What are we, pray, normally, except certain modes of livings and believings?



We donot know what we are, we donot know also what the world of objects is in its true complexion. Yet we do believe that we actually know all these. What then is the nature of our present knowledge? It is one knowledge against another that should have been, and a substitution for that other. How are two knowledges of the same content, where one is the radical apposite of the other, related? They can only be related as *true* and *false*. Both cannot be true simultaneously. Can both be true alternately? Not so, if the law of real does not admit of alternation. What is that law of the real? Evidently, if it is to be a law of the *real*, by its very nature, it does not, and cannot admit of alternation. Reality or truth does not contradict 'itself'. The two apprehensions, the two understandings, the two knowledges of the self-same fact, if discrepant, can only be taken as *vidya* and *avidyarth*. If the given, conventional knowledge be *avidya*, as seems to be clear from its self-contradictory nature, it has to be taken as an *adhyasa* on *vidya* which is yet to arrive. So Sankara passes on to determination and logical elaboration of the concept of '*adhyasa*' introduced by him. To this part we shall turn up in the second part of our exposition later.

What is wrong with 'I am this' or 'mine this'?—one may ask. There may be several explanations<sup>11</sup>. That which is introspectively secured as 'I' is never a *presentation* never a 'this'—an open object, on the contrary, it is that to which a presentation appears, to which something else is presented. That being the case, what sense can there be in the equation of 'I' with 'this' or in identification of one with the other, or even in presenting, 'I' as 'this', that is, as a presentation, or attributing 'this-ness' as a predicative quality—more particularly, when, the 'this' is as good a substantive as is 'I'? 'I (am) *this*' may also be taken as symbolic, a common factor of countless appositive sentences such as, 'I Sankara', 'I Vasespati', 'I am Mr. Stuart' etc., as also of countless predicative statements, such as, 'I am this bodied person, I am fair-complexioned, I am the writer, the speaker, the climber, the king and what not. In settings like these, either there is what the Vivarana school<sup>12</sup> puts as *ekarvadyasa* ('I am Sankara') or *tadatmyadyasa* (I am old.), or simply, the *protective* taking of 'I' as an objectivity, a presentation of some kind. The cases resembling '*Mamedam*' (mine this) are different. 'I' is here in the possessive case, and this possessive 'I' is the enjoyer. Sankara speaks of progressive estrangement of the nature of the self in ignorant misidentification. The witnessing self becomes, in phenomenal limitation, the *pramata*, thereafter, the *karta*, and then the *bhokta*, and when there is a total eclipse of its nature in the throes of objectivity of its own manipulation, it is the object which becomes the 'self' of the subject now immersed in infatuation. This is illustrated in 'my property, my wife, my son, my friend, *is me*'. There is another way of rendering '*mamedam*'. If in '*ahamidam*', '*aham*' is either '*idam*', or '*idam*' (is a predicative character of '*aham*' in being its determinant, the relations are just reversed in '*mamedam*',—the '*idam*' turning to be the *aham*' 'In me', or my infatuated self turning into an adjectival character of '*idam*'.

Sankara's main purpose, however, was to bring home to us the inherent self-contradiction and falsity lurking in these conventional usages and habitual reactions. To prove his case convincingly, he makes an appeal to nothing esoteric, but to some fact or feature regarding which there can be no difference of opinion. '*Ahamidam*', '*Mamedam*'—such is *lokavyavahara*. This is vitiated by falsity says Sankara but why? To discerning eye, it will be clear that Shankara is his own best commentator. The classical interpreters have introduced lots of issues which are either irrelevant or which have their appeal for a traditional sophisticated mind<sup>13</sup>. Sankara, is more modern in outlook, and have no love for verbosity or scholastic flare. Sankara, in the very opening sentence, has stated the reason why the *lokavyavahara* cannot be regarded sacrosanct., 'I' and 'thou' (this) are polarly related and are as opposed as light and darkness. The ground of this contention is *lokaprasiddha anubhava*—experiences direct and immediate which every one has, and so regarding which there cannot arise,

any difference of opinion. 'I' is secured in introspection, 'thou' or 'this' in extrospection, they are felt poles apart by reason of the cognitive reference in inward and outward direction. That *I-sense* and *thou-sense* are different and poles apart is *lokaprasiddha* (commonly accepted). This Sankara expresses by the word '*siddhayam*'. Further, it can be seen that to secure 'I' bracketting of the 'thou' or 'this' is a prime requisite; so also, full realisation of 'thou' or this will require a total eclipse or shadowing of 'I'. So 'I' and thou (this) should not be confused, interchanged or misidentified although they are generally misrepresented in common usage and behaviour. This is Sankara's protestation.

But this is scarcely everything that Sankara means or intends to say. The reason is: Why does this that should not have happened, happen actually? Again, is the subject (*visayi*), Sankara speaks of, the same as 'I', the ego, or something else, which also is given in *I-sense*? Again, is the object (*visaya*) the same as that which stands in opposition to the subject, an independent, exclusive reality, 'out there', or is it the entire manifested and so the whole of objectively given order, comprising the phenomenal subjects and objects in their totality? Had it been so, why should he subsequently speak of the subject the *visayi* as *cidatma* in '*visayini cidatma*'? Evidently, after showing the illogicality of the confusion involved in misidentification of the commonly known subject, the ego, the 'I' with 'thou' or 'this', he next passes on to the illogicality of the misidentification also of the transcendental subject with the object. This is apparent from the use of the systactical '*Ityatah*' down the line which means 'following from the same ground—*mutatis mutandi* or *paripassu*', and from the use of the appositional '*Cidatma*', qualifying *visayi*, the subject. This transcendental subject is also *asmatpratyayagocara* through the deputised, etc., form (*ahampratyayi*). In fact, as far as the Vedanta is concerned, the true subject is the transcendental subject, the phenomenal subject is pseudo-subject, the deputised subject, although it is the direct subject is pseudo-subject, the deputised subject, although it is the direct subject; while the transcendent is the indirect subject. So the question is what is the subject of Sankara's meaning—what is *visayi*? What, again, is the object, the *visaya*? This is, indeed, the crux of the problem and the real point in Sankara's exposition. To put it otherwise, is our introspective knowledge of the self or subject, or the extrospective knowledge of the object valid knowledge or *vidya*? To emphasize the absurdity of the supposition, let us ask: are there two *reals*, mutually exclusive, and independent of one another, and is Sankara a dualist? It is evident that none of the suggestions is acceptable. So it appears that not only the *lokavyavahara* is vitiated by falsity, even the *lokaprasiddha*—that which forms the limit of human experience and understanding is not also free from error and confusion. But why this? Again, how does this *lokaprasiddha* view of subject and object become vitiated? Again, if vitiated, why does this also gain ground?

The reply that Sankara gives is: the root of error is incipient in human knowledge, experience and understanding as such, incipient in all *pramana-pramdeya-vyavahara*, both *laukika* and *vaidika*. The *naisargika lokavyavahara* of the type of '*ahamidam*', '*mamedam*' is doubly false. It is vitiated by falsity and ignorance as it runs counter to the *pramana-pramdeya vyavahara*, the evident exclusive relation subject and object, self (*visayi*) and not-self (*visaya*), 'I' and 'thou' (this), which is, directly apprehended in the introspective awareness of 'I' and extrospective cognition of 'thou, or 'this'. But this *pramana-prameya-vyavahara* is also vitiated in its own turn. The division or duplication of Reality in term of the subject and object, in term of polar manifestations, in the subjective series and objective series—in term of 'I' and the other than I (*yanmat*) is itself grounded in ignorance and confusion, and it, therefore, false. But this falsity is not evident to our *pramana-pramdeya-vyavahara*, however rigorously and circumspectly we may employ and operate its mechanisms. The reason is: our *pramana-pramaya-vyavahara* of any form necessarily presupposes it and works upon the basis of this crucial ignorance. This can, therefore, neither discover nor correct it. It is to this task of

correction, and eradication, root and branch, of this *basal* ignorance that Sankara addresses himself. For this essential task, he takes refuge in *paravidya* propagated by the Vedanta of his conception. There is to be a plunge in the transcendent. The Vedanta by exposing the falsity of all *pramana-prameya-vyavahara*, both *vaidika* and *laukika*, is to prepare the ground of this plunge into supreme illumination.

The state of supreme illumination rejects the *pramana-prameya-vyavahara* as *ultimately* false, based as this latter is on dualism of subject and object. In this ultimate stage, all duality and division are transcended<sup>24</sup>. The Vedanta does not, however, usher in this supreme illumination as a *new state* which was not there. The Vedanta is to remove the handicap, the veil of ignorance that shrouds it from our view, and what is this veil of ignorance (*avidya* except our *a-paravidya*, cultivated and sustained by our *pramana-prameya-vyavahara* ? Sankara Vedanta is thus a supersession of *aparavidya*. It discredits all our accredited sources of knowledge and our accepted view of things. In this context, Adhyasabhasya becomes a critique of our conventional epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, religion, linguistics as also of our unenlightened behaviour and way of life (*lokavya-vahara*), which latter is not far removed from that of the beasts -*pasvaduḥśvavisesat*.

The basic core of irrationality lies in a primal *adhyasa* (illicit superimposition or misidentity) which, as empirical individuals we have all accepted blindly as a fact of real existence,—as a sequence obtaining in the very nature of Reality itself. This is the division of Reality into the subjective and objective series as knower and known, enjoyer and enjoyed, as *visayi* and *visaya*. This is rooted in an *adhyasa*, although we do not know it as such. How this is at all known, how it happens, how it operates, what kind of thing it can be logically ascertained to be—all these questions will be answered as we progress with Sankara's text. The suggestion of this primal *adhyasa* is there in the opening lines of the *adhyasabhasya*, in '*asmadpratyaya-gocare visayini cidatmake yusmadpratyaya-gocarasya visayasya, tadviparyayena visayinah taddharmananca visaye adhyasah mithyeti bhavitum yuktam*'.

Now we shall take up seventeen sentences grouped under Section 3, four sentences of Section 4 and the concluding two sentences under Section 5, group by group in the order they are presented by Sankara himself. These sentences all discuss about the primal ignorance, the primal and basic *adhyasa*, its *modus operandi*, its *demonstrability*, its *root cause* and also its *cumulative* results. As the *bhasya*, here, besides being *gambhira* (having incredible depth of meaning) is also *prasanna* (incredibly lucid), an English rendering of the whole may not be very misleading. Thus, Sankara says:

"This *adhyasa*, with (logical) characteristics as thus analysed, the wise (*panditah*) regard as '*avidya*'; contradistinguished from it, is the ascertainment of the nature of a thing *as itself*, and this they call '*vidya*', such being the case, a thing is never affected (*sambadhyate*), even by a jot (*anumatrenapi*), by the defect or merit of whatever is illicitly superimposed upon it. All our *pramana-prameya-vyavahara*, *laukika* and *vaidika*, all our *sastras*<sup>25</sup> having for their import injunction<sup>26</sup>, prohibition<sup>27</sup> and exhortation for release from bondage<sup>28</sup> are based on this misidentification of self and not-self which has been named (also censured) as *avidya*. How can the *pramanas*, such as, perception, etc., and the *sastras* also be characterised as having subject-matter vitiated by *adidya*, do you ask? The reply is, one who is devoid of the false sense (*abhimana*) of 'I' and, 'mine' in the body, senses etc. can never have any urge for the *pramanas*, there being no *pramata*<sup>29</sup> (knower). Without enlisting (*anupdaya*) the support of senses etc., there cannot be any operations, such as, perception, etc. The senses also cannot function without moorings in some locus or substratum. Nor, again, can one, who does not harbour the illicitly superimposed body as one's own self, have any

use or employment with it<sup>42</sup>. Nor, again, in the absence of all these (encumbrance or determinations), can there be any *pramātrva* (knower-hood) of the self which is free from all associations (*asanga*). Nor can there be any *pramanapravṛtti* where there is no knowing self, no self as a knower (*pramātrvāmuntarena*). Therefore, it follows that all our means of knowledge, such as, perception etc., and even the *sastrapramanas* have their subject-matter or import all vitiated by *avidyā*.

'There is no difference with behaviour of the beasts and other lower species of living creatures. Just as the beasts and other animals (*pasvadayah*) being drawn on by sound and other sensations, received by means of auricular and other senses keep away from what they feel as unfavourable, and move up to that which seems favourable to them, just as cattle run away in fear of life from a person rushing towards them, club in hand, and about to strike, but move up to a person approaching them with hands full of green grass, so also do human beings, however discerning, keep away at the sight of bullies coming toward them with cruel gaze and drawn up swords in hand, but move up to those who have just the opposite aspect. So, the *pramāna-pramēya-vyavahāra* of human beings is virtually the same (*samanah*) as that of beasts and lower creatures. The modes of animal experience and behaviour are generally admitted as characterised by lack of discernment; on grounds of noticeable sameness, the experience and behaviour of the so called rational human beings under similar circumstances may then be adjudicated as being the same'.

'In behaviours conforming to the scriptural regulations also, although the human agent, acting discerningly, cannot be supposed to be ignorant altogether insofar as he acts in regard to the condition of survival of the self after death, yet his actions are not based or conditional upon, the knowledge of the self as *asamsari* (not rotating in the cycle of existence), of the self, free from caste-determination, such as, Brahmin, Kṣātra, etc.,—which is ascertainable through the enlightenment of the Vedantic literature only—the reason being that such knowledge would be of no use there (*anupayogāt*) and would also militate against such practices (*virodhatca*)'

'Before the dawn of knowledge of the self of the kind described (*prak ca tathabhūtātma vijñanat*), the *sastras* in force (*pravartamanam*), do not enjoy immunity from their subject-matter being vitiated by *avidyā* (*avidyavadvīśayatvam na stivartate*), thus, the sastric injunctions, such as, a Brahmin should perform sacrifice' remain in force by admitting (*asṛitya*) specific *adhyāśas*,—such as, the caste character (*varṇa*)<sup>43</sup>, the stage of life (*avasthā*)<sup>44</sup>, age (*vayah*)<sup>45</sup> etc., on the true self'

The import and purpose of the above text of seventeen sentences have already been discussed in a general way. Sankara, therein, claims that all our epistemic, practical and socio-cultural distinctions, such as, *pramāta*, *pramēya* and *pramāna*; *karta*, *Karma* and *karmaphala*, *bhokta*, *bhogyā* and *bhoga*, *brahmin*, *kṣātra*, *Vais*, *Yōund*, *adult*, *old*, *brahmacārī*, *gṛhī*, *sannyāsīn*, *I*, *thou*, *It*, *subject*, *object* and *relation*, etc., etc.—all and sundry, rest upon the primal *Adhyāśa*, that is, misidentification of self as non-self and vice-versa, and are therefore, vitiated by primal or basic ignorance (*avidyā*), under the over powering spell of which, we as empirical persons all live, move and have our being. This ignorance, again, is a mechanism of *distortion*. It makes a thing appear as what *it is not*, nor ever can be. But in and through its mystifying functioning, the essence of things (*vastrasvarūpa*) remains in tact, it is not in the least affected, nor does it undergo any real modification or change. This primal ignorance (*avidyā*) and equally primal *adhyāśa* vitiate all our so called sources of knowledge (*pramāna*), both ordinary, such as, perception, inference, etc., and extraordinary, such as, the scriptural testimony, including the *mokṣasastras*. The vicious mis-presentation which determines the knower (*pramāta*) as an empirical person the 'I', determines the 'Thou' and 'It' also. It, then, successively and in general progression, determines the agent, the enjoyer on the one hand,

and the deed, the enjoyed, etc., on the other. There may be a difference of degree between our ordinary practices (which are indistinguishable from the errant behaviour of lower animals), and other apparently enlightened practices under the guidance of the revealed authority of the scriptures. But all of these are vitiated by the self-same primal error of confusing the self with the not-self, and the not-self with the self. This conclusion is vindicated by demonstrative reasoning, partly contained in these lines, and partly in the lines that immediately follow. The argument is reminiscent of Kant's deduction of the pure forms of intuition<sup>20</sup>. They may be distinguished as in Kant into *a priori* reasoning or 'metaphysical deduction' and what Kant called 'transcendental deduction'—demonstrating that a thing could not be what it is if the suggested principles were not admitted<sup>21</sup>. To facilitate connected presentation of Sankara's demonstrative argument, we shall bring in the four sentences of our group 4 alongwith these. Those four sentences read as follows.

'Misrepresentation of that in a context where it does not hold (which is characterised by its absolute negation—*atyantabhava*)<sup>22</sup> is what we have described as '*adhyasa*'. Thus, finding one's own sons or a wife in affliction or at ease, one is likely to feel (*empathically*)<sup>23</sup> as if one's own self is afflicted or happy—thus misattributing external properties to one's own self; similarly, there is misattributing of properties which characterise the body only—in 'I am plump', 'I am emaciated', 'I am fair complexioned', 'I stay', 'I move', 'I climb' etc., so also misattribution of properties which characterise the senses only—in 'I am dumb', 'impotent, deaf or blind'; then, misattribution of properties which belong to the inner sense (*antahkarana*)<sup>24</sup> or mind only, such as, 'I desire, resolve, doubt, affirm etc., etc'. In this way, one illicitly superimposes the introspective 'I' on pure consciousness (*pratyakaitma*) which is only the witness (*saksi*) of limitless modifications of *antahkarana* (*asesasvapravahar*), and in reverse<sup>25</sup> movement, illicitly superimposes this pure consciousness on the *antahkarana indriyas* etc. In this way (*evam*) this beginningless (*anadi*), apparently endless (*ananta*), and self-imposed (or self-initiated) and so *naisargika* (obtaining in the process of nature) *adhyasa*, the nature of which is constituted by misrepresentation and which (in its own turn) is the inaugurator (originator) of agentship and enjoyership (*kartrtva-bhoktrtva pravartuka*) is open to direct knowledge of own and all (*sarvalokapratyukta*)<sup>26</sup>.

Sankara, in this group of four sentences as also in seven sentences beginning with '*dehendriyadisu*' and ending with '*pratyaksadini pramanani sastraani ceti*' developed his argument in explanation of the nature of *avidya* and in justification of his postulation of the concept in two stages roughly analogous to Kant's metaphysical and transcendental expositions otherwise called deductions<sup>27</sup>. The earlier statement begins with a whole statement which is thereafter explained part by part ending with a general statement which confirms and re-states the previous position, much like a '*nigamana*' of inferential reasoning<sup>28</sup>. The reasoning involved is factual, not formal<sup>29</sup>.

Sankara argues 'Without there being one's misplaced sense of '*appropriation*'<sup>30</sup> or empathic identity (*abhimana*) with one's body and One's sense-organs, (including the inner sense called the mind), and taking of these as I or mine, there can be no cognising subject (*pramata*), and consequently, no such 'formation' or 'issuing-forth' as is involved in acts or processes of knowing (*pramana*), without the employment (*anupadaya*) of the senses, there can be no functioning of knowing processes as involved in perception, inference and the rest. The functioning of the senses is, again, not possible without a seat or locus of operation. Their seat of operation, which is the body, cannot again be mobilised or activated and brought into such engagement without a prior mistaken identification of the ego (*anadhyastatmabhavena*) with the body. In the absense of all these—that is, an ego to assume the phenomenal presentation of the self as 'I', this 'I' again being misidentified with the body and the senses, culminating in the self's own misidentity in a reverse taking of the process, the



unassociated (*asanga*), transcendent (*avisayi*) can never figure as *visayi* (phenomenal self), and *pramata* (empirical knower). And without there being a knowing subject, how can there be any knowing processes how, can there be the so called sources of knowledge—the *pramanas*? Sankara, then, concludes his first exposition reiterating and confirming the proposition with which he had started. Therefore, all the sources and means of knowledge, the ordinary *pramana* like perception etc., and the extraordinary *pramana*, such as, the revealed scriptures, insofar as these involve distinction of knower and known, have their object-matter all vitiated by *avidya*, by ignorance and falsity. What is worthy of special note is as against traditional orthodoxy and the later orthodoxy which vitiates the arguments not only of Sankara's opponents but vitiates and distempers the exposition and defence of many of Sankara's own classical interpreters and supporters also, Sankara impugns the *sastrapramana*, regarded infallible by many, on the very same general grounds. elsewhere and also lower down the passages, he, no doubt, makes a distinction between the extraordinary *sastrapramana* and the ordinary *pramanas*, and makes a little concession in favour<sup>7</sup> of the former but that consideration, as he himself reiterates, does not render it immune from the general censure. What a stout heart!

The second part of Sankara's exposition, roughly analogous to Kant's transcendental exposition<sup>8</sup> shows that without the opposition of there having been an *adhyasa*, certain obvious and generally accepted human usages and reactions cannot be properly understood or explained. While illustrating these, he begins with the most obvious and least debatable cases of *adhyasa*, and progressively, brings in, for cautious consideration, cases which are more subtle and are not so readily accepted as involving misrepresentation or *adhyasa*. Thus (1) we misattribute to ourselves and *mis-own* properties, which by common acceptance are external to us and not our own. We feel as if we are ourselves afflicted or at ease when a son or a wife or an person dear to us<sup>9</sup> is so (2) we also misattribute or *misown* properties which rightly belong not to us as conscious persons but to our bodies. Thus, we call ourselves plump or lean, strong or weak, beautiful or ugly. We are said to walk, wait or climb, when our body it is that performs all these exercises (3) We also misattribute or *misown* properties which belong to the external senses only. Thus, we describe ourselves as deaf or dumb, impotent or blind. (4) We also misattribute or misappropriate the functions which belong not to ourselves but to the internal sense (*antahkarana*). Thus, we say, I desire, resolve, doubt or ascertain, think, feel or will, then it is the internal sense which actually executes such functions. It should be noted that Descartes' 'Cogito', even Husserl's laboured rendering of the same concept, falls within Sankara's *atasmintadbuddhih*<sup>10</sup>. (5) Lastly, there is *misowning* by the ego of the conscious character which does not pertain to the ego or the intellect but to the true self. This happens through superimposition of the ego (*ahampratyayin*) on the transcendental witness thereof, the pure self-luminous consciousness and, then, in the reverse order, on account of superimposing the indeterminate pure consciousness, the universal witness *sarvasaksin*), now apparently limited and determinate through imposition of the ego, on the internal sense, the external senses, the body and all the rest (*antahkaranadisu*). Had not this happened, there could not be the mind-object, the senses, the bodies etc. Although not known as objects in the absence of a conventional subject<sup>11</sup> There could not be also the *ahampratyayipramata*, endowed with the body and the senses, both internal and external, and the *visayin*, the *sariraka*,—the self-ego-body complex.

In the concluding two sentences of the *Adhyasabhasya*, Sankara condemns this primal *adhyasa* of the ego on the true self, and of the self, thus delimited by the superimposition of the ego, on *antahkarana* and all the rest, as the root-cause of all evil (*anarthahetu*). The reason is : it is on account of this primal ignorance (*mulavidya*) that we have the phenomenal appearances of plural



subjects and objects as also the distinctions of *Pramata*, *prameva*, *pramana*; *Karta*, *Karmaphala*, *Karma*, *bhokta*, *bhogyam* and *bhoga*. All these are, at bottom, false appearances, although not known as such. He next claims that this world of false shows and their sustaining cause, the primal ignorance can be exposed in their true complexion by the *vidya* of *Atmaikatva* propagated by the Vedanta and that the fundamental tenet and import of the whole Vedanta literature, the Upanisads, is *as he advocates it to be*. Those two concluding sentences may be rendered as follows:

“All these dissertations on the Vedanta are being started in order to extirpate, root and branch, *prahanaya*) the cause of all evil, and to establish that true knowledge (*vidya*) consists in knowing the one-ness of the self. That such is the meaning of all the Vedanta texts, we shall demonstrate in this *sarirakamimamsa* (commentary on the sariraka sutras or Brahmasutras)”.

Further treatment of this primal *adhyasa* as also primal *avidya*, as Sankara himself has conceived, will be continued in the next chapter where we shall have a general discussion on Sankara's texts on *adhyasa*. Before we conclude, we indicate one point of very special note and it is this that the Vedanta of Sankara's conception does not generate *atmaikyavidya* or *atmaikatva*. Its purpose is to eliminate ignorance, to dispel the veil of darkness which hides the self-shining truth from us and stands in the way of self-realisation. It removes the hindrances and accomplishes there by a negative function, and in this regard, the Advaita Vedanta is a critique of all pseudo-*vidyas*—the *a-para vidya* of common acceptance.

#### References

1. Adhyasabhasya—last sentence
2. B. S. B. 1.1.1.—‘Atma ca Brahma’
3. The expression does not involve redundancy. Indian Philosophers take knowledge generically to include true knowledge as also false knowledge. To be false a mode of believing is to be a ‘knowledge’ at first, and then falsified.
4. ‘Brahmavidya sarvavidya pratishta. Mundaka Upanisad. 1.1.1
5. B. S. B. 2.1.14.—‘Na tu atmaikatvavyatirekenavasisyamano’ anyo artho’ sti’
6. B. S. B. 1.1.4. —‘Tattu samanvayat’.
7. Katha up. 1.2.12.
8. This has been one rendering of the word ‘naisargika’ cf. Bhamati— ‘svabhavikah anadih’
9. Adhyasabhasya—opening sentence.
10. What is meant is, Sankara did not construct or build up his Philosophy of the Vedanta through a reflection on the nature of illusory perception, he explains his Vedanta Philosophy with the help of the concept of *adhyasa*, *adhyasabhasya* functioning as an ‘introduction’, a preface to the understanding of the Advaita doctrine.
11. See Pears—The nature of Metaphysics, Ch. I. pp. 20-22.
12. The point may be made clear by making a distinction, even in the Vedanta context between what can be called an illusory appearance and a mere appearance (cf. Alexander—space, time and Deity P). As far as Advaita Vedanta is concerned, a ‘mere’ appearance consists in having an appearance as appearance, where as that appearance is to be regarded as illusory when the appearance first supplants the real and is next detected as *not* the real and so false in its claim.
13. A coined word to signify the fact of subject becoming an object becoming an object. See my article ‘The

concept of indeterminability' Ind. Phil. Congr. 1972.

14. B. S. B. 2.1.14.
15. Mundaka II, 1st part, Taittiriya-various sections, Atareya, Br. Aranyaka, Svetasvatara, etc.
16. 'Avangmanasogocara'. Yatovecanivartante aprapya manasa saha' Taittiriya 4th anuvak, Brahmanavalli, also 9th anuvak 'tasyamatam tasyamatam matam yasya naveda sah etc. Kena II
17. Russell—Enquiry into Meaning the Truth, Ch. 7.
18. The problem of knowledge, Ch. 2.
19. *Ibid.*
20. B. S. B. 1.1.1 na na ham asmiti'. B. S. B. 1.1.4. atmanahca pratyakhyatum asakyatvat, ya eva nirakarta tasyaiva atmatvat.
21. See Bhamati—Tikaprambha.
22. Adhyasabhasya—2nd sentence.
23. What is suggested is a development from mere cognitive to the affective and conative conative levels involves greater degeneration of the self—the passage from 'I think', I know, I ascertain, to 'I *feel* happy or miserable', 'I *will* this as an object of my desire' involves greater determination.
24. Adhyasabhasya—2nd sentence.
25. The expression does not mean 'personification' of ordinary use. It is calculated to mean making up of or rendering into a person'.
26. See my paper 'the concept of indeterminability' Pr. Ind. Phil. Congress 1972
27. The unrejectability emanates from witnessing consciousness (*saksi*), regarding it as a content. This takes the form of indubitability of 'I' in the mode 'I am'.
28. See Adhyasabhasya sentences 35 and 36.
29. Adhyasabhasya opening sentence and closing sentences.
30. Adhyasabhasya—'a-pratyaksepī hyakase valah talamalinatadi adhyasyanti'.
31. Cf Hussari—ideas ch.
32. Adhyasabhasya—Second sentence.
33. This transcendental ground is the witnessing consciousness (*saksi caitanya*).
34. Or even figurative
35. As Isvarasaksi and Jivasaksi.
36. Through a phenomenal mode of apparent determination of limitation.
37. Adhyasabhasya—14th line.
38. These modifications have been named Kama, sankalpa, vicikitsa, sraddha, a-sraddha, dhrti, a-dhrti etc., etc
39. An object of desire, for example, is a psychic content, yet it is taken as if it is external to the psychic figuration (*vritti*)
40. This 'outness' is relatedness of the content to the external senses. Cf. Kant's doctrine of space as *external* intuition since it externalises the 'given manifold.
41. Adhyasabhasya—Second sentence.

- 42 *Ibid.*— 22nd sentences as also 36th sentences.
- 43 *Ibid.* 37th sentence.
- 44 *Ibid.* the 37 sentence.
- 45 *Ibid.* the concluding sentence.
- 46 *Ibid.* 16th and 24th sentences.
- 47 *Ibid.* sentences – 3-11
48. In come editions 37 and in some more than 38. The Edition followed here is edited by Mr Pramathanath Tarkabhusan published from Calcutta, 1839 saka.
- 49 In some edition one sentence, heavy and cumbrous.
50. See my article-Sankara's concept of Adhyasa—a textual interpretation, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Volume III note July 1976.
- 51 These brackettings of the portions which are appositional are being done for easy understanding in English syntax.
- 52 Bracketting of appositional phrases has been avoided in the second sentence since it is less cumbrous and simpler in composition. In some edition of Sankara's text both sentences have been telescoped into one sentence. But this has been avoided since what is understandable in Sanskrit has been avoided since what is understandable in Sanskrit diction is not always understandable in English diction
- 53 See Bhamati and Pancapadika.
- 54 Cf. Vivaranaprameyasamgraha. pp. 125-26. (ed., by Tarkabhusan).
- 55 Cf. Bhamati and Pancapadika.
56. 'Br. Aranyak U 2 4.14, 'Uatra tu sarvamaitmanivabhu tatra kena kam pasyati, kena kam vijaniyat etc. etc.,
- 57 By 'sastras' Sankar means the *karmakanada* and the *jnanakund* of the revealed texts which are regarded by the schools of mimamsa and Vedanta as of unimpeachable authority. Sankara, it can be seen, do not dogmatise with them. He delimits the sphere of veracity of the two *kandas* according to their tenor and import. If independent reasoning has been condemned as *svaka tarka* it is because *srutyanugrihita tarka*, the reasoning involved in *sruti* has been found to be superior on merit. *sruti* also involve reasoning. This is forgotten by those who regard *srutis* and inference or reasoning as antithetical to each other. This is wrong.
58. Vidhis.
59. Pratishedhas.
- 60 The reference is to the Upanisads
- 61 Pramita is itself an *ajnanavrtti*, being a formation of the ego lighted up by pure consciousness
- 62 'With it' 'means' with the body' – '*dehana kascit vyapriyate*
- 63 'Vara' refers to four castes – Brahmin, Ksatra, Vais and Sudra
- 64 'Avastha' refers to stages of life, such as, Brahmacharya, Gachastha, Vanaprastha and Sannyasa.
- 65 'Vayah'—refers to the age. There is age restriction also as in a 'brahmin child should receive initiation (Upunayana) at the age of eight years'.
- 66 Kant's critique of Pure Reason—Transcendental Aesthetie
- 67 Transcendental Aesthetic—Transcendental Exposition.

- 68 This is a precise description in the Indian way and is no part of the text.
- 69 The expression is borrowed from modern psychology, it is not in the text.
- 70 'Antahkarana' as the name signifies stands for the 'inner sense'. The author of the Vedantaparibhasa following the *vivarana* tradition refuses to take it as sense.
- 71 The expression 'aseśa' means limitless, 'vṛttopaśara' is interpreted by Tarkabhūṣaṇa as modifications of *antahkarana*.
- 72 *Sarvalokapratiśakṣa* is to be related to *lokaprasiddha-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahara* and not to *naiṣargika-lukavyavahara*.
- 73 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason—Transcendental Aesthetic.
- 74 In traditional *parārthanumana* of the Nyaya school, the argument begins with a proposition (*pratijña*) and ends with *nigamana* which reiterates it as conclusion passing through *hetu*, *udaharana* and *upanaya* which are the mechanism of proof.
- 75 'Inference' in Indian Logic is never a formal syllogism operating by way of *implication* merely as in the West. The Epistemic conditions in addition to the constitutive conditions are vital for it. Cf. Johnson—Logic, Part II, p. 10.
- 76 This expression is borrowed from W. James. Cf. Essays in Radical Empiricism, Chs. 1 and 2.
- 77 The concession is: One acting as has been enjoined in the *śāstras* is called intelligent (*buddhipurvakaḥ*) and is credited with knowledge of somekind of the immortal soul not altogether remote.
- 78 Transcendental Aesthetic.
- 79 Bṛhadaranyaka says: It is not for a son or a wife that a son or a wife becomes dear to us, it is really for the self that a son or a wife becomes dear to us 2.4.5.
- 80 What is meant is that the entire realm of plural subjects and plural objects in their mutual relatedness and also distinction develops from this superimposition. Each item such as the ego, the mind, the senses, and the bodies figure in two configurations—subjective and objective at different levels of experience.

## Adhysabhasya: Adhyasa

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*Avidya* and *Adhyasa* are the cardinal issues of Sankara's *Adhyasabhasya*. These concepts are not easily distinguishable. They describe two sides or aspects of one and the same thing. What is *avidya* from a psychological and epistemic angle, is *adhyasa* from a logical and descriptive angle. These concepts are calculated to articulate a certain irrationality which permeates all our conventional knowledge and habitual practice. When talking about the two concepts together, we may at times take *avidya* as the cause and *adhyasa* as the effect. Sankara, for instance, in his opening sentences in the *Adhyasabhasya* describes *adhyasapy* as due to *avidya* (*mithya-jnanunimittah*), suggesting thereby, as if, *avidya* is the cause of *adhyasa*. Elsewhere, however, he equates the two when he says that *avidya* is another name for *adhyasa*<sup>1</sup>. The correct position seems to be to take them as describing two aspects of the same phenomenon. This phenomenon is the logical absurdity, irrationality, otherwise called indeterminability, which both characterises and causes experience of error or illusion—in which something *appears as what it is not, and is taken to be what it should not be taken to be*. In this chapter, we shall consider the meaning Sankara attaches to his concept '*adhyasa*'. The role this concept plays in his philosophy, or rather, in the philosophy of the Vedanta of his conception has been analysed already. The logical and epistemic meaning of the concept is a different issue all together.

There is *avidya* of different forms at different levels, so also there is *adhyasa* of different kinds at different levels. There are instances of *avidya* and *adhyasa* which are commonly admitted as such, and are directly experienced by all sometimes<sup>2</sup>—such as, seeing a snake in the rope, seeing a single object double, etc. There is no need for elaborate arguments or discussions to convince one that cases of illusion or error like the mentioned ones happen actually or that they are possible. There are, however, instances of *avidya* and *adhyasa*, of which we are likely to remain unconvinced even though the actuality and also the logical possibility of their incidence are elaborately explained to us. Mistaking the ego, the *antahkaranavrttis*, the body, the outer senses, and even what we expressly admit as external bodies and objects for the self is an instance of *avidya* and *adhyasa* of this sort. In spite of what Sankara has said in the *Adhyasabhasya*, in spite of his various modes of demonstration, one is likely to remain unconvinced that there has been really and *avidya* or *adhyasa* in the suggested case—any confusion of the self with not-self and *viceversa*. It is, indeed, difficult to believe that our experienced individuality (*ahamidam*) is only phenomenal or delusive, that all our *pramana-prameya-vyavaharas* are vitiated by falsity (*avidya*). The case of *naisargike adhyasa*,

that is, *adhyasa* which is not due to adventitious factors (*agantuka dosajanya*)<sup>4</sup> is like that, although it is open to everybody's observation<sup>5</sup>. It is difficult to believe that there is any *avidya* or that there has been any *adhyasa* in such a case.

But what does it prove?— Sankara will ask. A man under the spell of delusion (*avidya*) can never feel that he is really under such spell. This is the very characteristic of *avidya* and *adhyasa* that one cannot know and will not believe that one is in such a desperate condition until the well is lifted. We are in the throes of perennial *avidya* without our knowing. Had we clearly known about it, we would not have been under its spell. This peculiar condition Sankara attempts to bring out through his analysis of *adhyasa*. Our not-knowing that there exists a confusion as regards the true nature of our 'self' and that all our knowledge and day-to-day mode of living are based upon a fundamental confusion between self and not-self does not, and cannot, really establish that we are not, as a matter of fact, victims of that delusion and confusion. Confusion and errors *happen*, they are not made or manipulated, although in our conventional mode of speech we are said to *commit* errors or mistakes. They are not *consciously executed*, they all happen in spite of ourselves and without ourselves being conscious of them as happening. Unconsciousness, which is another name for ignorance or *avidya*, is a necessary ingredient of all states of illusion, hallucination, error and confusion. This, then, is a basic characteristic of *avidya* or *adhyasa*.

Be that as it may, our ignorance of being in a state of delusion may not be a decisive reason in support of the fact that we are not in it, but does this unmistakably prove that we are actually *in* it? In other words, our ignorance in respect of a state of illusion may not be an argument against its logical and even empirical possibility, and in support of its logical and empirical impossibility, but does it become an argument in support of its logical and empirical possibility? Sankara's demonstration in the body of the texts in his *Adhyasabhasya*<sup>6</sup> proves the *logical possibility* of there having been a perennial *adhyasa* in respect of self and not-self, a *naisargika adhyasa*, not, however, in the meaning the traditional commentators of the two schools, in their literal taking of the concept of *adhyasa* have understood it, that is, as putting one thing upon another but as an ignorant misidentification of one as the other, as happens in *avidya* of Sankara's conception, but it does not go to prove its actuality, does not establish that such an *adhyasa* is actually there. Wherefrom, then, do we secure that additional information? Sankara replies— not from anything related to *a-para vidya*, which can at most exhibit its own insufficiency, even its self-discrepancy, but cannot go beyond admitting the *logical possibility* of there being a state of cosmic delusion. An unbridged gap remains there between logical possibility and pronounced and incontestable actuality. This lacuna, this gap, is filled up by the Vedanta texts, the Upanisads. The Vedanta, according to Sankara, propagates *atmaikatya*, one-ness and absolute indivisibility of self and denounces all plural manifestations as shadow play of deceptive appearances. It is the Vedanta, then, which informs about the *actuality* of there having been a cosmic delusion. The *Sutrahridayam* of Sankara in its preface, that is, the *Adhyasabhasya*, established only the logical possibility of there having been an *adhyasa*, its actuality, the empirical facthood, as a point of information is conveyed by Sankara's *Sutrabhasya*, while the final and direct proof of that fact can come only by way of concrete realisation in *nididhyasana* and in the transcendence.

In the fore-going, the purport of Sankara's *Adhyasabhasya*, his preface to the *Sutrabhasya*, has been shown to consist in presenting to us that our conventional modes of understanding and behaving which run counter to the Vedantic truth of fact, *atmaikatya* have to be understood as vitiated by ignorance (*avidya*) and that such is the case may be *logically demonstrated*. This amounts to saying that the logical possibility of all *naisargika lokavyavahara* (including *laukika* and even *vaidika pramana-prameya-bhavadhara*) being vitiated by *avidya* and *adhyasa* can be established through a



critical consideration of the nature of such behaviour as also its theoretical grounds. What cannot be established by this logical consideration is that such has *actually been the case*, and for evidences in support of this latter conclusion was must look up to the Vedanta texts themselves as an indirect proof and to *nididhyasana* and consequent moment of self-realisation as a direct proof. One does not know an *adhyasa* or a state of *avidya* as 'that in term of concrete experience unless and until one is completely out of the woods. Could logic deliver that experience or were that experience or understanding already there as an established fact (*siddha visaya*), the inquiry the Vedanta Sutras urge upon us and the *sutrabhasya* of Sankara assiduously pursue, would have been redundant, so also would have been the fate of the Vedanta Vakyas of the Upanisads. They all would have been unnecessary and useless.

Sankara, according to this version, speaks of *logical possibility* of there having been a perennial *adhyasa*, permeating *naisargika lokavyavahara* in the *Adhyasabhasya*, although its having been an actual fact he seeks to establish in course of his commentary on the Brahmasutras. This, however, has not been the line of treatment of the traditional interpreters, particularly of the *vivarana* school. The traditional interpreters have dwelt at length on the *illogicality*, in the sense of logical *inadmissibility*, of *adhyasa* of self and not-self, granting, at the same time, its empirical, that is, actual fact-hood. This has been, according to them, the real ground for regarding the *adhyasa* of self and not-self as *anirvacaniya*, logically indeterminable. But, for something becoming *anirvacaniya*, its inherent self-discrepancy, that is, its illogicality is enough as a ground. It is then logically indefinable and indeterminable. It need not be also logically inadmissible as a possibility, that is, as something incapable of being there. If the perennial *adhyasa* permeating *naisargika lokavyavahara*—be incapable of being there, why is it there already? Why is sky illusion there, if it is logically impossible? Why, again, the common place illusions are there? Can the empirically possible, or the empirically actual, be there if it were logically impossible or inadmissible? Some confusion of vital issues seems to be present in this traditional analysis. Something may be, by nature, self-discrepant and so illogical and irrational. But, for that reason, it need not be taken as logically impossible or inadmissible. That the irrational, the illogical, is there, and that we must attempt to detect it as that and try to get out of it seems to be the basic stand of all the Vedanta. We submit, therefore, that the illogical and the logically inadmissible or impossible are two very different concepts and not the same. The illogical is the logically indeterminable—*anirvacaniya*. The logically impossible or inadmissible, however, is determinable on that very ground of determination. The logically impossible or inadmissible is not *anirvacaniya*.

Does Sankara himself in the opening lines of the *Adhyasabhasya* say that the *Adhyasa* of self and not-self is logically inadmissible or impossible and therefore, on the ground of its logical inadmissibility and in that very specific sense, it being contrary to reason (*yukativiruddha*), it should be treated as *anirvacaniya*—the logically indeterminable? Such an interpretation is a palpable mistake. Sankara, it can be seen in the text, has not concluded his statement by saying "*adhyasa mithyeti bhavitum yuktam*" (*adhyasa should be deemed as logically impossible*). He has, in fact, by using the connective '*tathapi*' (notwithstanding that) argued that what should not have been the case and should have, therefore, been logically impossible, has however, become an actual state of things due to *avidya* false knowledge (*mithya-jnana-nimittah*). This is not suggesting logical inadmissibility or logical impossibility of there being that *adhyasa*. Nor does this suggest straight way that the logically impossible has defacto, and automatically become empirically or existential possible. That would be utter nonsense. At most, the suggestion is that what *should have been logically impossible* and so inadmissible *has, on account of ignorance, misknowing and confusion, become*

possible and so no longer has remained the logically impossible or admissible under this new exigency. But what has been possible in this way is a creature of *avidya* or ignorance, and by virtue of that is *self-discrepant* and so illogical or irrational. It is this self-discrepant illogical which is logically indeterminable in any specific way. Its indeterminability (*anirvacanigate*) is not due to its logical inadmissibility *yukti-virodha* or not being *yuktisāhe* as the Vivaranaprāmeya samgraha puts it<sup>10</sup> or logical impossibility (*asambhāvata*), but due to its *avidyajanyata* (emergence as a result of mis-knowing). It is Avidya which gives rise to the self-discrepant, and it is the self-discrepant which is *anirvacaniya*. The self-discrepant is both logically possible and empirically possible under the new exigency. It is not logically impossible or inadmissible—we cannot, for instance, argue that the self cannot appear as not-self and not-self cannot appear as self even in a state of *avidya* or mis-knowing. But when this mis-known, misconceived, or misapprehended the resulting phenomenon, the distortion, becomes the illogical self-discrepant but neither the logically impossible or the logically inadmissible. That the *naisargika lokavyavahara* including and involving *naisargika pramāṇa prameyavyavahara* is illogical in the sense of being self-discrepant and not in the sense of the logically impossible or inadmissible Sankara undertakes to establish by logic.

The Vivarana prāmeya samgraha seems to be labouring under the confusion that the proposed *adhyasa* of self and not-self is *anirvacaniyan* by reason of its logical inadmissibility or unprovability (*yukti-virodha*) and, at the sometime, of its empirical facthood, that is, it being empirically evident. This is certainly an innovation which will appear more puzzling to an Western mind since it speaks of empirical possibility of the logically impossible. Sankara, of course, in the closing line of his dissertation on *adhyasa* and *avidya* speaks of the perennial *adhyasa* as *sarvalokapratyaksa*. But what he means there is not that all creatures perceive this *adhyasa* as such and understands it in that way, but only that this perennial *adhyasa* is open to everyone's gaze, everybody is victim of this illusion. This illusion is a directly presented context but is not apprehended or understood as that.

If the *adhyasa* or *avidya* underlying *naisargika lokavyavahara* were so very empirically evident as *adhyasa* or *avidya*, what would have been the relevant purpose of the Vedānta Sāstras, pray? So, this cannot be the meaning of what Sankara says in the *Adhyasabhasya*. Again, if Sankara had actually intended to say that the perennial *adhyasa* he spoke about was logically impossible and inadmissible, why, then, one may ask: did he speak about it at all? He should be, atleast, credited with knowing his own mind and intention. Lastly, it is not also understandable in what way the idea of logical inadmissibility of self-not-self *Adhyasa* can fit into Sankara's own statement—*evam aviruddhaḥ pratyagatmani apī anātmadhvasaḥ*.<sup>11</sup> Does he speak of logical inadmissibility or impossibility when he says that this *adhyasa* or the supposition of its being probable is *aviruddha*, that is, is not theoretically absurd?

It can be seen that the demonstration of logical inadmissibility (*yukti-virodha*) of *atma-anātma-adhyasa* by Vidyaranya<sup>12</sup>, in spite of logical astuteness and incredible analytic power of that illustrious person, has been an exercise in futility, since, in the first place, it has no relation with the text, and, secondly, it is contrary to Sankara's intention as expressed in the sentence quoted above. It can be seen that the Pancapadika, the Bhamati, the Pancapadikavivarana, the Ratnaprabha and the other principal tīkas of both the schools of the Advaita Vedānta take Sankara's expression '*mithva*' in '*mithvetya bhavitum yuktam*' not in the sense of *anirvacaniya* (indeterminable) but as an '*apahna*'<sup>13</sup> word suggesting absence, negation, or denial of the very possibility of *Adhyasa* on the ground of being contrary to reason. No one, therefore, has approved the line of treatment of Vidyaranya that the proposed *adhyasa* being contrary to reason, has to be accepted as *anirvacaniya*—'*Virudhyate hi ātmanātmadhvaso yuktibhirityevanirvacyarvam anukriyate*'. The Suggestion of the denial of the

possibility of *adhyasa*, as we have already, shown, has been countermanded by the last part of the sentences starting with the connective '*tathapi*'. The earning of the whole is that the apparently logically impossible has become a possibility, nay a fact, on account of *avidya* or *mithyajnana*. Neither logical impossibility nor inadmissibility has been further stressed in the text ? nor has it been made into the ground of the indeterminable. That indeterminability has been located in self-discrepancy vitiating the nature of the off-shoots of ignorance or *avidya*—such as, *ahamidam*, *mamedam*’, Vidyaranya has failed to distinguish between illogical in the sense of the self-discrepant and illogical in the sense of the logically indefensible and so impossible. The self-discrepant may be empirically given and later on analysed and detached as that, the logically indefensible and so impossible. The self-discrepant may be empirically given and later on analysed and detached as that; the logically inadmissible is the absurd—it is neither capable of being given in experience, nor can it be regarded as the indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*), since it is already determined as the logically impossible and absurd.

The crux of the entire series of mistakes committed by the traditional interpreters of both schools<sup>14</sup>, as we have already shown in the second chapter, can be found in their literal taking of *adhyasa* as superimposition of one fact upon another. Obviously, they have forgotten to take serious notice that there are no two facts in the Advaita, nor can there be two distincts such as, the self as the locus of superimposition and an already existed not-self, the fact to be superimposed. *Atma* and *Anatma* are not two distinct *existential substantives*. We, of course, take them as that, that is, as two distinct substantives. But this happens in *avidya* and in the post-*adhyasa* state, after an *anatma* has emerged in the *atma* and is posing for or pretending to be the very *atman* itself. In a descriptive statement and in course of an analytic treatment, we, of necessity, distinguish them and speak of them *as if* there are two independent and distinct things. The 'figure' of *adhyasa* is only incidental to our retrospective analysis of a state of *avidya*. The so called illicit superimposition is the work of *avidya*. It is not consciously manipulated. Nor is there any real combining of two<sup>15</sup> distincts together in the unconscious process called *avidya*. *Avidya* is simply making or rearing up of an 'other', a radically different, something which the given can never be, —out of the given real. It is a mechanism of estrangement. It is making an *anatma* of *atma* and then making an *atma* of that conjured *anatma*. Such is the way that *avidya* operates, that is its very nature, —as the nature of *vidya* is taking something *as it is* in itself and in essence. The traditional interpreters have all put the cart before the horse since instead of explaining the concept of *adhyasa* in term of the concept of *avidya*, they have interpreted *avidya* in term of, and as due to *adhyasa*. This goes against Sankara's *mithyajnananamittah satyanrte- mithanikrtya*<sup>16</sup>. To keep with in the spirit of the text, the figurative coupling of "Satya" and 'Anarta' should be taken to mean a state of metamorphosis of 'Satya' *as* *anarta* and thereafter, mistaking the 'anrta' as 'Satya'. Not a physical combination or coupling of two separate and independent bodies is meant. As participating in *naisargika lokavyavahara*, we are already under the spell of ignorance or *avidya*, and so the coupling as an accomplished fact is already there. So Vidyaranya simply wasted his time and energy by raising in the point *how* there could be the *adhyasa* of self and not-self under certain prefixed definitions<sup>17</sup> of the two concepts, and thereafter, discovering (or unfolding) that no logical account of its possibility can be given in that way, and that illicit superimposition presupposes *avidya*, draws the wrong conclusion *that* *adhyasa* is *anirvacaniya* on account of its logical inadmissibility. What is *anirvacaniya* in Sankara's meaning, as we shall show later on, is neither *adhyasa* as a process, nor *avidya* which is another name for this *adhyasa*, but the *adhyasa* in the sense of the end-product of the process or, what is the something, the nature of the *adhyasta* (distortion of reality), —the reason being its self-discrepancy and not logical inadmissibility. *Avidya* and in that sense, the perennial *adhyasa*, is inexplicable, is a mystery, but

all the same a very essential postulate of the Advaita metaphysics. This is not the *anirvacaniya* that Sankara means and speaks of. There are two concepts in this context—*anirvacya* and *anirvacaniya*. That is *anirvacya* which is inexplicable, and so a mystery. The *anirvacaniya* is the self-discrepant and so something which is neither this nor that. Avidya or primal ignorance is *anirvacya*, the inexplicable, but not the illogical or what is logically inadmissible. Adhyasa taken as the end-product of *avidya* or *adhyasa*, the perennial state of *adhyasa*, the *mithya* or the false is *anirvacaniya* on the ground of self discrepancy. Neither of these is the logically impossible or inadmissible.

Sankara's statement on the nature of Adhyasa, covers only eleven sentences. It will be found that these eleven sentences of Sankara's *Adhyasabhasya* are more eloquent than what the whole host of his *likakaras* have presented to us on his behalf. Sankara is, after all, his own best commentator. No body has ever written more beautiful, more suggestive and at the same time, more lucid Sanskrit prose than Acarya Sankara. Even then, it is very much to be regretted that there has not been, uptill now, any correct, faithful, and at the same time, meaningful rendering in English of these eleven sentences of Sankara. In rendering a philosophical piece, written in Sanskrit, into a foreign language, knowledge of the literal meaning of words used, even of syntax of language, is not enough. The context and the express intention of the author have to be carefully kept in view. Dr. Thibaut is guilty of mistranslating Sankara in many places'. His translation of Sankara's initial definition of *adhyasa* is an instance on the point. Misadventures in this field are too many to mention. But nothing can be gained by entering into fruitless controversies' on this point.

A textual rendering of Sankara's eleven sentences on *Adhyasa* may read as follow:

'What (what sort of an entity, is this *adhyasa*, pray? The reply is— it is the *apparent* presentation, in an alien locus, like one seen in the past (*paratra purvadrstavabhasah*), resembling a memory-image (*jmrirupa*)'. Some describe it as misattribution of the property of one to another different— *anyatra anyadharmadhyasah*, but some others speak of it as the error arising from non-cognition of difference between that where there is a super imposition and what is super imposed—*Yatra yadadhyasah tadvivekaagraha-nibandhanah bhramah*, some again, hold that it is imagining opposite character of the locus where anything is super imposed—*yatra yadadhyasah tasyaiva viparittadharmaiva-Kalpanam*. On all counts (*sarvathapi*), however, (*tu*), there is no deviation from any thing wrongly assuming the character of another thing—*anyasya anyadharmavabhasa tam na vyubhicarati*. There is experience of mankind in the same way,—that it is nacre which appears as silver (*rajatavat avabhasate*'), and also a single moon which appears as if it has a second (*ekascandrah sa ditiyavat*')

But how, again, can there be any superimposition of an object (*visaya*) and its characteristics on the apperceiving self (*pratyagatmani*) which is a non-object (*avisaya*)? Everybody, to be sure, superimposes another object (*visayantaram*) on an object which is situated in front (*purovasthite visaya*), and you yourself speak of the apperceiving self as not being an object at all insofar as it is inaccessible to the awareness, such as, of 'Thou' (This).

'The reply is— This (self) is not a non-object (*avisaya*) in every respect (*ekantena*), in being commonly apperceived as one's inner-self by everybody (*pratyagatmarasiddheh*) and being the content of the I- sense (*asmat-pratyayavisayatvat*), and also being immediately given, and being a direct content (*aparoksatvat*). Nor is there any such rule that superimposition of some other object is to take place (*visayantaramadhyasitvayam*) only upon an object which is situated in front (*purovasthite eva visaye*). The dullard, to be sure, superimpose bottom and duskiness upon the sky even though it is invisible (and so not given as an object) —*a-pratyaksepi hi akase valah talamalinatadi adhyasyanti*.

In the same way, the superimposition of not-self upon the apperceiving self also cannot be deemed impossible (contrary to fact) —*evam aviruddhaḥ pratyagatmani api anatmadhyāsaḥ*.

Prodigious efforts have been made by interpreters of the two schools—the *Bhāmati* and the *Tīvarāṇa*, to analyse in great depth and details what Sankara, according to them, intended to say in these sentences. While doing this, they seem not only to read the sentences and contemplate on their meanings, but also, to some extent atleast, seem to read their own thoughts in between Sankara's lines of thinking. Before presenting the version of the schools as to what Sankara has said in this context and why he has said so, we may do well to take an unorthodox general view of these eleven sentences as a whole, in order to keep in tact the threads of our discussion.

As the notion of *adhyāsa* is the most crucial for his entire exposition, Sankara seems to have been anxious to explain in as simple manner as possible what he means by *adhyāsa* in the context of *atmanatmanoritaretaradhyāsa* which has given rise to the irrational *naīśargika lokavyavahāra*, and also the *pramāṇa-pramēya-vyavahāra* or mankind, which is, as Sankara see it, vitiated by *avidyavadvīṣayātva*. So it seems that Sankara wanted to avoid all forms of controversy, and to create conditions for an ungrudging general acceptance of his view. He was not interested, in this context, to suggest anything wayward or controversial—anything unacceptable to an unsophisticated mind. The concept of *adhyāsa*, to be sure, was not to him an end in itself, but only a means to an end, and that end was to establish *atmaikatva* as the sole *vidyā* while all other claimants in the field were to be shown as various strains of *avidyā*. This being the case, Sankara cannot be supposed to have any urge for scholastic flourish while explaining the meaning of *adhyāsa*, while explaining its *modus operandi*, and also while explaining the possibility of '*atmanatmanoritaretar adhyāsa*' misidentification of self with, or as not-self).

In order to clarify what precisely he means when he says that our conventional knowledge and practice are all vitiated by *atmanatmanoritaretaradhyāsa*, he raises the point through *purvapakṣa* what *adhyāsa* in that context can mean. He defines or describes it in his own way. His statement here is undoubtedly abstruse and, at some points, quite baffling, and very few other than his followers in the two schools of Advaita Vedānta have ever been so far able to divine his meaning. But one who has cared to follow Sankara closely through these eleven sentences taken together is very likely to share the opinion that the Sankarite view of *adhyāsa* could not be put in any simpler way than Sankara has done, and yet retain the sense of '*adhyāsa*' as *unīrvacanīya*. This amounts to saying that the abstruse and involved character of Sankara's statement on the nature of *adhyāsa* follows from the very nature of the thing or fact, he wanted to describe. Sankara himself, it appears, was aware of the apparently uncouth nature of his statement in this context, and this may be the reason why he hastened to clarify his meaning by bringing in the statements of other Khyativadis for comparison with his own, and there after, to pin-point what transpires to be the common issue in all the descriptions—*anyasya anyadharmavabhasātā*—one appearing in the guise of properties belonging to some other. This is followed by two examples of common-place illusion—the nacre appearing as silver, and the single moon appearing double. In the nacre-silver illusion, one thing appears as another, and this latter, the appearance, has to be taken as a 'floating appearance, having no concrete mooring in the locus where it appears. This may be analogous to Brahman or self appearing as the given empirical order,—the subject appearing as the manifest order, the object. The other instance is analogous to one indivisible, non-dual self phenomenally appearing as plural selves. One moon appears as many due to defective refraction of light. One self appears as plural due to the limitations of the finite modes of *antahkaranavṛttis*.



Next, Sankara explains how there can be superimposition of the not-self on the all-pervading indeterminate self which is essentially unobjective (*avisaya*). Here there are two replies and answers which have to be taken a *two stages of the same answer*, or as the very *same answer*, given from two view points,—one relative and the other absolute. Sankara seems to be following here the *arundhati nyaya*<sup>19</sup> in order to bring home to his readers a point which, if presented in a clearcut or straight sample answer, might have been misleading, even baffling to man. The first reply is: though indeterminate and unobjective, yet under the exigency of an illusion, the self under goes apparent determination in term of the ego, and as such, becomes *objectively presented* as the content of I-sense, and also as immediately given which is instanced in everybody's feeling towards the inner-self as one's own self. The second reply is. To be *misrepresented as determinately given as an object*, it is not necessary, (there being no such rule), that something must be *actually* an object located in front, since the invisible, and therefore the ungiven 'sky', can be misjudged by the dullard as being invested with colour and shape and also as given in front, notwithstanding the fact that the sky itself is incapable of *being given* in these several ways. It is characteristic of an error or illusion that the thing represented in it must not be *as it appears*, but must be radically different. Such being the case, what improbability can be there that the self should appear as the not-self or that there can be superimposition of the not-self on the pure self due to ignorance?

Let us now turn to Sankara's definition (or description) of *adhyasa* in this preliminary exploration of ours. For better understanding, let us review the situation of a common place illusion, such as, seeing a snake in the rope. The first thing that can be said is that here a 'snake' is seen, and the rope is *not* seen. Had the rope also been seen, the snake could not have been seen. So, the seeing of the snake and the being of rope cannot coexist. Nor can there be alternate seeing of the snake and rope, if by seeing we mean a process involving belief in the real presence of an object which we appear to perceive. The second fact about the situation is that the correction of this experience of illusion renders the snake a rejected appearance and that it is only *after* the correction that we come to feel that we had seen a snake *in the rope*, or that *it was a rope* which had appeared as a snake, or that we mistook a rope for a snake—never earlier. When the illusion actually happened, and so long as its spell lasted, there was the seeing of one single object *with characters* and there was no seeing a *one thing* in the place of another, also seen at the same time, nor was there conscious transference of the characteristics of one thing to some other thing. All these are the various interpretations of the erstwhile illusion situation *after* the detection that it was an illusion-situation, that is, *after* its correction<sup>20</sup>. In plain non-technical way of speech, we say, either that a rope *had appeared* as a snake or that we *is took* a rope for the snake. It is this fact of one thing appearing as some other, or one thing being (mis)- taken as some other thing which we seek to *metaphorically* express as 'something being superimposed on some other thing which is different from it'. The relation obtaining between the superimposed and its locus is *not* similar to the relation involved in any judgmental predication, such as, predicating an adjectival character to a logical subject (whatever be the status or nature of this character and of that subject). While an illusion may be taken as a perceptual judgment in which a predicative character (snaky-form with other properties of the snake) is referred to a subject *appearing there in the locus* (not to rope) in a definite way, an *interpreted illusory experience* or its metaphorical description is no judgment of any kind<sup>21</sup>. *Adhyasa* or superimposition (illicit) is simply one way of describing it. In fact, it is a description peculiar to *anirvacanyakhyativadi* Sankara. Of course, Sankara regards the statements of all other '*khyativadis*' of his acquaintance as other variants of his own description, as he thinks also that those rival theorists should also recognise the indeterminable (*anirvacanya*) character of the fact of illusion and its content. This is evident from the way Sankara formulates the versions of all other schools. No other



school of 'Khyati' expressly regards an illusion as 'adhyasa' or interprets it in that way. The very concept has an Advaitic flavour about it. Even, then, an illusion looks like a veridical perception with an absolute truth claim and involves a unitary content, such as, 'his-silver' in course of the judgment 'this is silver'.

Now, if we take note of an illusion *after* it has been detected and known as such, what characteristics would we find there? Evidently, it then appears as *mistaking* something for something else, as investing the actually present object with characters it does not possess, as superimposing the false on the locus of the real, and so on. As a matter of fact, the phenomenon of illusion can be described in various other ways also but the Advaita Vedanta would like to regard it as 'adhyasa' or illicit superimposition to facilitate taking it as *anirvacaniya* the logically indeterminable. Taken in that way, in illusion as *adhyasa*, there is a content which is superimposed, a locus (the real) where it is superimposed, and there is, also to be an unconscious act or process which is called superimposition. But these divisions or distinctions are only incidental to the mode of describing the phenomenon of illusion in that way. An illusion, like any other given experience, happens, it is not actively manipulated. No given experience is a conscious manipulation.

What distinguishes an illusion or error from other given experiences is the subsequent sublation of its content through contradiction. While describing it, we take note of it and its content as they appear *after* this contradiction and sublation. We then came to feel that we had so far and so long as experience of the *merely apparent* and not of the real. We can give no reason to explain why such a thing occurred except that it was due to ignorance. The illusion itself as an experience, again, has to be described as ignorance (*avidya*) of the nature of the real. But this ignorance does not indicate mere absence of knowledge, that is, non-knowledge of the real content, it is also *wrong* knowledge, that is, *positive mis-knowing* insofar as it involves a distorted view of the real. It is thus nothing negative. It is the positive knowing of something in a distorted way, that is, as other than what, in fact, it is. This gives it an additional vicious character, and on account of that, it is to be condemned as false. The falsity of its content vitiates it. It has, therefore, a two-fold role, one before contradiction and detection as *error*, and another after such detection. This its dual role gives it certain peculiarities which are not determinable in a logical manner. It was a pre-sentative experience in so far as it seemed to involve a presentation, but now it appears not to have involved any presentation at all, since it figured what was not actually present and did not figure that which was really present. In short, it seemed to be a presentative experience without being really so, again, after detection, what it actually involved seems to be a representation of some sort, that is, past impression of an object now absent. But it cannot be taken as a memory of a previously experienced content, since the past context of this representation cannot be recalled and so it cannot be localised in the past. The illusory content is thus neither a presentation as it once seemed to be, nor again, a representation as it now appears to be. It neither belongs to the locus where it once floated, nor can it have a locus of its own in the context of past experience. Apparently<sup>22</sup>, therefore, it has to be taken as having been generated by unconscious traces of the previously experienced—*Samskarajanya*, since being a content which is not present in the given locus, it cannot be supposed to have been in actual contact with the sense-organs. But its linkage with previous experience is not manifest, and this stands in the way of its being looked upon as a memory-image. This, then, is the indeterminability of illusion both as an experience and as the content of such experience. If we are now to describe *adhyasa*, combining together the several oddities of this phenomenon, can we improve upon Sankara's description of it as something which resembles memory (*smritirupa*) in so far as it involves a content similar to one seen in the past (*purvadrstavyabhasa*) but which nonetheless, appears as a presentation in a foreign locus (*paratra*) the knowledge of which sublates it?

Sankara's classical interpreters of the two schools have taken great pains to elucidate and to elaborate upon Sankara's statements in connection with *adhyasa*. Their expositions have been undoubtedly very scholarly, often running into much intricate details. It is doubtful, however, if Sankara himself had an eye to all these details. Even supposing that their analysis has been in great depths, a lay interpreter is very likely to feel that in their scholastic excesses many of these later interpreters have possibly shot beyond the mark and have lost the wood in the trees. To keep the discussions within reasonable limits, we may split up Sankara's discussions on *Adhyasa* into three parts. These are (1) his statement or statements on the nature of *adhyasa*, (2) his comparison of his own view with the views of the rival schools in search of a common point of agreement, (3) The explanation he has given in support of the claim that (a) there has been *atmanatmanorita-retaradhyasa* in all *laukikavyavahara* as also in our conventional mode of knowing, and that (b) this contention need not be taken as essentially crude that is, a supposition which is on the very face of it impossible or absurd. In what follows, we shall compare relevant points of discussion of the Panca-padika, the Bhamati and the Ratnaprabha on these three issues by turns, and round out the discussions by a critical assessment at the end.

Sankara has explained what he means by *adhyasa* in three places, in three separate contexts in his *Adhyasabhasya*. He initially states it as *smrtirupah paratra purvadrtaavabhasah*. Next, by way of showing the point of general agreement among all rival views on the subject including his own, he restates it as *'anyasya anyadharmavahasata'*. Towards the end of his *Adhyasabhasya*, in order to bring out the affinity of the two basic concepts of his philosophy, such as, *avidya* and *adhyasa*, he, again, states it as *'a-tasmin tad buddhih'*. This variation in the mode of description, perhaps, shows that Sankara felt the necessity of bringing out the different aspects of the issue involved, now laying stress open one aspect, thereafter, on some other, his aim being to give a complete picture. It has been customary to take these statements of Sankara on the nature of *adhyasa* as definitions (*laksana*). His classical interpreters have accepted the statements in that sense, and have taken great pains to show how this or that definition of *adhyasa* given by Sankara free from the fallacies of too narrow (*avyapti*) and too wide (*ativyapti*) definitions. Some, again, like the author of the Ratnaprabha, following the lead of Sankara's second statement mentioned above, have formulated a new definition in a rigid technical form.<sup>23</sup> But even that attempted definition is an analytic description of *adhyastatvam* (the characteristic of being superimposed) and not of *adhyasa* which may mean either an illusory experience or an illusory content. We have, however, preferred to regard Sankara's varied statements on the nature of *adhyasa* as reflective descriptions. It may be hazardous to hold that Sankara himself was ever interested in formulating a scholastic definition of *adhyasa* in course of his statements. In that case, he would not have varied his mode of statement from place to place. It is true that Sankara himself, at the end of his first two statements on the nature of *adhyasa* and the connected explanation of super-imposition of *anatma* on *pratyagatma*, speaks as if he had already given a definition of *adhyasa* when he says *'tametameva, laksanam adhyasam panditah avidyeta manyante'*. But this need not be taken to mean that Sankara was interested in specifically presenting one of the two statements on *adhyasa*, or both together, as a logical definition or *laksana*. The expression *'etamevalaksanam adhyasam'* coming, as it does, at the end of his entire discussion on *adhyasa* need not be taken as referring to any particular statement on *adhyasa*. It can as well refer to the 'gist' of his entire discussion and mean simply *'adhyasa as thus interpreted and analysed'*. A close look into Sankara's three statements will show that his first statement, in conformity with the dual formation of the word *'adhyasa'* with the suffix *'than'* in *Karmavacya* and *bhavadavacya* is intended to cover indifferently the description of *adhyasa* as an experience and, again, as the content of that experience. His second statement, however, is more appropriately a statement on the nature

of *adhyasa* as content. His third statement, unmistakably, describes *adhyasa* as an experience,—a positive ignorance, otherwise called *avidya* or *ajnana* in the Advaitic terminology. *Adhyasa*, *avidya*, *ajnana*, being various names of the logically indeterminable—*anirvacaniya*, the insistence on regarding any of Sankara's statements as a logical definition of *adhyasa* does not seem to fit well in the texture of Advaita Vedanta. Moreover, a description of 'misapprehension' that is, state of *avidya* as *adhyasa* is a 'figurative' description and not a *de facto* putting of it. An illusion is never known as *adhyasa* as long as it endures, it is called *adhyasa* only in a reflective taking, after it has ceased to be there. A phenomenon which is never apprehended as it is when it occurs, but only as it is not and which is discoverable as it is only when it is no longer there and has already been sublated, is really indefinable.

Among Sankara's classical interpreters Vacaspati seems to emphasize equally on *adhyasa* as error-experience and *adhyasa* as the content of such experience. The Pancapadika seems to lay greater emphasis on the content-side, while the Ratnaprabha seems to consider the phenomenon from the side of the content alone. This their preference or choice is reflected in their selection of certain parts in Sankara's statement on the nature of *adhyasa* as central and other part or parts as subsidiary. According to Vacaspati, the expression '*avabhasa*' in Sankara's statement— (which means, indifferently, either a sublated knowledge or a sublated presentation content) shows the main characteristic of *adhyasa*. The accompanying expressions such as '*purvadrsta*', '*Paratra*' and '*smrtirupa*', according to this view, are used as qualifying or limiting adjuncts in order to show the peculiarity of the Advaita '*anirvacaniyakhya*'—view in distinction from the views of the rival schools. The word '*bhasa*', according to Vacaspati, may mean either an experience or the content of an experience. It may mean presentative experience or a presentation. '*Avabhasa*' should then mean '*avamatah bhasah*' i. e., a sublated presentative experience, or a sublated content, that is, a sublated presentation. Taken along with the adjunct '*purvadrsta*', the compounded expression '*purvadrstasya avabhasa*' can mean either an experience involving 'apparent presentation' of a content like one seen in the past, or an 'apparent presentation' like one seen in the past. This, then, is different from a *bonafide* past experience or the *bonafide* content of some past experience. This meaning is further corroborated by the edition of the adjunct, '*paratra*' which shows that, occurring as it does in a locus other than its or on this presentative experience as also its content cannot be genuine or true. It is a misrepresentation either as experience or as a content,—an illicit superimposition. The last adjunct '*smrtirupa*' explains how this oddity, this floating appearance and its experience can at all happen. '*Smrtirupa*' does not mean that this '*paratra purvadrstavyabhasa*' is memory-knowledge or a memory-image. It has the 'for' of *Smrti* insofar as like *smrti* (or *pratyabhijna*) it also seems to be, or is felt as *samskarajanya* (due to the unconscious traces of previous experience). But while *smrti* is knowledge of the past as past and its content has definite location in the past context, and while in *pratyabhijna* (recognition) the previously seen is identified in a present a locus, this '*paratra purvadrstavyabhasa*' is not localisable either in the past or in the present, although it looks like representation of some kind. Unlike *smrti* it cannot be accounted for as being due exclusively to traces of previous experience—'*samskaramatrayanya*', a simple revival any previous experience unlike *pratyabhijna*, which is a continuation of perception and memory, the additional causal factor, such as, sense-object contact does not operate in normal condition in its regard. Such additional circumstance operates through impediments which do not allow the present object to show itself but cover it up, forcing the mind, so to say, to fall back upon some improvised construction. Being partly conditioned by adventitious defects (*agantukadosa*), the 'apparent presentation', which is generated by *samskara*, becomes an ideal construction of some sort. This is its *smrtirupata*, its having the 'form' of memory-image. This also contributes to its indeterminableness—*anirvacaniyata*, its being nonidentifiable in any positive manner. A presentative experience or a presentation which forfeits

its claim as having been a presentative experience or a presentation, —a content *like* one seen in the past but appearing in the present and so in an alien locus, a something which after sublation, looks *like* a memory-image but is incapable of localisation in the past and cannot also be accommodated in the present context where it appears— is indeed the self-discrepant logically indeterminable

The Pancapadika takes Sankara's statement '*smrtirupa paratra purvadrstavyabhasah*' —as an excellent definition<sup>24</sup> of *adhyasa* insofar as, according to it, it not only accounts for the genesis of *adhyasa* but also suggests the means for its correction. The false arises, through impediments to right knowledge, as a content over and against that defective cognition. It is thus a mere appearance and nothing substantial. The Pancapadika gives an account of *adhyasa* as an *experience* indirectly by way of its analysis of the nature of *adhyasa* as a content of that experience. It regards the word '*paratra*' as the most crucial in Sankara's Statement, since it goes to indicate '*avabhasamanata*', that is, floating nature without mooring, of the content that appears in the alien context. The expression '*smrtirupa*' means 'that which *resembles* a memory-image but is not distinctly one such, insofar as it appears as a seeming '*presentation*' situated in front'<sup>25</sup>. The expression '*purvadrstavyabhasa*' is, according to the '*Pancapadika*', meant to account for the '*smrtirupa*' of *adhyasa* as a content. This content is not in immediate contact with the sense-organ. What is in direct contact (*sampryoga*) is the real which however does not appear but remains covered up or concealed. So, it is not possible for an apparent content to appear in an alien context if it had no connection whatsoever with previous experience of that object, even though it is not *that* object as revived in memory, since it is not '*given*' as a representation of that (*tathanaavabhasakatvat*<sup>26</sup>). The upshot of the Pancapadika account is that *adhyasa* as a floating appearance in a foreign locus is *like* a memory image being generated by previous experience of the *same* object<sup>27</sup>, although different from such memory-image, in so far as it is, as a presentation, given in front, and is characterised by '*This-ness*'. The main difference between the Bhamati account and the Pancapadika account seems to be that while on the former account, the apparent presentation which is *adhyasa* as content looks like some sort of a *construction* generated by past *samskara*, compounded by certain adventitious factors which negatively contribute to the non-presentation of the real object which none the less, becomes the locus of the presentation, on the latter account, the apparent content is a floating image in a foreign locus, apparently *given in front* as a '*this*', but generated by the past impressions of the *same* object. As the *Pancapadika* account is likely to be confused with the *akhyat* account according to which the *adhyasa* as content is the compounded form of the remembered and the perceived elements due to *smrtipramosa* (inarticulation or suppression of *smrti*), the *Pancapadika*, even at the outset, takes great pains to distinguish between the two renderings of *Adhyasa*, given by itself and by the (*akhyati*) view. The content of illusory experience, it argues, is not, *as such* the representation of a content previously experienced since it appears *as situated in front*. 'The knowledge (perceptual) of another object (*anyavisayaajnana*) when some *other* object is in direct contact (*anyasampryoga*) cannot be memory-knowledge but is *adhyasa* (*nasmtish kintu adhyasah*)'. it argues<sup>28</sup>.

The Ratnaprabha is more straight forward in its approach it accounts for *adhyasa*, as a content of *illusory experience*. The nature of the illusory content, according to it, is explained by the words '*paratra avabhasa*', while the remaining two words '*smrtirupa* and *purvadrsta*' are there as supporting adjectives in order to justify or account for that nature<sup>29</sup>. '*Avabhasa*' means '*appearance*' or apparent presentation, '*paratra*' means a locus which is unsuitable or improper (*ayogyam adbhikaranam*). The locus in question is characterised by the absolute negation (*atyantabhava*) of the appearing content which thus becomes an imposition (*aropa*) on it. To express the nature of a content which becomes an '*aropa*' (superimposition) in an alien locus, the Ratnaprabha formulates a new definition<sup>30</sup>, such

as, *ekavacchedena svasamsrjyamane svatyantabhavauti avabhasyatvam adhyastatvam*—which means ‘the superimposed is the apparent presensation which appears to relate itself to a shared (common) aspect of its locus which latter is characterised by its absolute negation.’ The common part or shared aspects is ‘being a given *sthū*’ (*idanta*). As the real object, the locus, is a give this’, so also is the appearance. They thus, share the aspect of location, the ‘this-ness’ common to both. But even though appearing in the locus and relating itself to ‘this’ aspect of the object, it is a content rejected by the locus which is thus characterised by the absolute negation or absence of the appearing content. This definition, says the Ratnaprabha, can serve as the common definition of all *adhyasas*, both beginningless and with a beginning<sup>11</sup>. The expression ‘*smrtirupa*’ means that which is like the remembered (*smaryamanasadrsa*) yet not the content of memory insofar as it is not localisable elsewhere (*na anyathakhyati*)<sup>12</sup>. The remaining adjective ‘*purvadrsta*’ explains why although no content of memory, it resembles it. Both the remembered and the superimposed are due to traces of previous experience (*smrtiyaropayoh samskarakanyatvat*)<sup>13</sup>. But while *smrti* is *samskarmatrajanya*, the superimposed has an extra causal condition, such as, certain adventitious defects<sup>14</sup>. The Ratnaprabha recommends taking of the expression ‘*smrtirupa*’ of Sankara in the sense of ‘*smaryamanasadrsa*’, if *adhyasa* is to mean the ‘content’ of illusion. The expression, again, is to mean ‘*smrtisadrsta*’, if the illusory experience is to be meant. In the former case, the entire statement is to mean *smaryamanasadrsa paratra purvadarsanat avabhasyate*, in the latter case, ‘*smrtisadrsta paratra purvadarsanat avabhasyah*’<sup>15</sup>. The *Pancapadika* also seems to indicate distinction in a similar way<sup>16</sup>.

MM Pramathanath Tarkabhusan points out<sup>17</sup> some special features of the Ratnaprabha interpretation. Sankara, himself, says Tarkabhusan, takes ‘*anyasya anyadharmaavabhasyata*—his second statement on *adhyasa*, as giving the most essential features as also the agreed points common to all rival opinions on the subject. This being the case, the Ratnaprabha is right, says Tarkabhusan, in taking ‘*paratra avabhasyata*’ as constituting the most essential part of Sankara’s own description, as against the Bhamati which regards ‘*avabhasyata* (or ‘*Purvadrstavaavabhasyata*’) and the *Pancapadika* which takes ‘*paratra*’ as the most significant part. The other point is that the definition of *adhyasa* formulated by the Ratnaprabha, such as, ‘*ekavacchedena svasamsrjyamane svatyantabhavavati avabhasyatvam*’ bears resemblance to the Upanisadic statement on ‘appearance, such as, ‘*na tha nanasti kincana*’—here there are no pluralities’. The apparent plural manifestations seem to relate to ‘this’ aspect of the ever-present all-comprehensive reality, Brahman, which is, none the less, the absolute negation of the plural appearances which latter are thus to be understood as floating appearances without any substance.

We may ask now if the phenomenon known as illusion or *adhyasa* could be explained in a much simpler fashion, if its so-called ‘central part’ could be so readily distinguished from other parts, why did Sankara, the author of a *bhasya* famous for its lucidity and depth<sup>18</sup>, frame such an involved sentence, as ‘*smrtirupah paratra purvadrstavaavabhasyata*’ to explain what he meant by *adhyasa*? Does his second statement ‘*anyasya anyadharma-avabhasyata*’<sup>19</sup> or his third statement, ‘*a-tasmin tad buddhi*’<sup>20</sup> express exactly the something or the same meaning in a more lucid way? It can be seen that his second and third statements only mean what they are designed to mean, nothing further. The second statement brings out only the point of common agreement among rival views. In illusion, ‘a thing seems to be invested with qualities or proprieties which belong to another, Thus, the world – appearance seems to be real, to be the reality or realities themselves,—the illusory silver appears to be ‘there’ and so real. Contrary-wise, Reality, which is Brahman, appears to be the world of pluralities,—the nacre, which is real, appears to be the silver, which is a floating appearance. Sankara’s second statement is thus a general description of all situations of error and illusion. It



does not explain, does not give a full, self-complete account of *adhyasa*. His third statement is intended to show that illusion involves *avidya*, that is, positive ignorance. It does not involve mere absence of knowledge such as 'I do not know' '*naham-janamiti*'. It is positive ignorance *a-tasmin tadbuddhi*'

'knowing or understanding a thing in a way which is rejected by its true nature', taking a thing to be what it is *not*, and never can be. This kind of mental condition, belief and attitude, prevails in misperception and wrong judgment. This third statement is intended to bring the two concepts, *adhyasa* and *avidya* together as representing two aspects of the very same phenomenon — '*avidyakhya adhyasah*'<sup>41</sup> that is, of *adhyasa*, the other name of which is *avidya*. But *smrtirupah paratra purvadrstavabhasa*' is intended to be more comprehensive and self-explanatory as a statement.

Not that the classical interpreters of Sankara are not aware of this. But their scholastic approach and emphasis on certain parts in preference to other parts of the statement stand in the way of understanding. The statement as a single whole of conception, and this seems to have blurred the issue. It may not be wrong to suggest that at the time of framing his statement on the nature of *adhyasa*, Sankara must have before his mind some instances of *adhyasa*, particularly of the not-self on the pure self as also of the self on the not-self, which he had undertaken to establish and elaborate in his *Adhyasabhasya*. The adequacy or otherwise of his several statements on the nature of *adhyasa* has to be judged in relation to this his main thesis. Not only this, Sankara's statements on the nature of *adhyasa* have also to be interpreted such wise that his principal issue — the *adhyasa* of not-self on the pure self and *vice versa* — which, according to him, is due to nothing else than *avidya* or *mithya-jnana*<sup>42</sup> and which involves coupling or commingling<sup>43</sup> of the real and the apparent (false), may be fully covered. It is doubtful if the classical interpreters of Sankara's *Bhasya* in their rendering of '*smrtirupah paratra purvadrstavabhasah*' have taken full note of this. Instances of common place errors, such as, 'suktirajai' or 'rope-snaks' seem to have been of their absorbing interest.

There are certain peculiarities in the alleged *Adhyasa* of not-self upon the pure self which are not met elsewhere, for instance, in the snake-rope or silver-nacre illusion for one thing the not-self is *not a separate fact*, a self-defined co-ordinate entity, it is the creation of the primal *avidya* presenting the self as other than itself. Such being the case, there can be no *separate* and no *previous* experience of it *by itself alone* in a different context, or on a different and earlier occasion (as is possible in nacre-silver illusion), so that the unconscious traces or *samskara* of that previous experience may be carried over in the situation where the self is first *miscognised*, — such past impression or *samskara* of the not-self playing the role of a causal condition of the resultant distortion. This seems to make somewhat beyond the mark the observation of the *Pancapadika* that an appearance or apparent presentation which is not in direct contact cannot emerge or figure in *adhyasa* if it is not generated by the *samskara* of the *same* or like object accruing in course of some previous veridical experience<sup>44</sup>. The peculiar nature of *atma-anatma adhyasa* seems to go against any real *samskarajanyata* (i.e. the idea of previous impression playing a determining role) of *adhyasa* which the *Pancapadika* and the *Ratnaprabha* seem to insist upon. The unavoidable dualism of a primitive self and an equally primitive not-self and the exigency of a mis-perceiver being they seem to lurk behind that supposition.

There is another anomology. The pure self of the Advaita Vedanta is no content (*visaya*) of cognition as itself. Where so ever it figures as a content, it figures as that in the resulting miscognition, that is, due to an illicit superimposition being there already. It is then cognised *as other than itself* and so, necessarily, *as the not-self*. So, if *adhyasa* is to be understood *literally* as 'mis-putting' of *one* thing upon *another*, both figuring as context (*visaya*), then, there can only be superimposition of the not-self upon another and a previous one, but no superimposition of the not-self on the self.



To put it otherwise, the pure self is incapable of being *truly* cognised *as a content* of knowledge, and all cognitions of it *as a content* are only cases of miscognitions, that is, cognising it *as not-self*. Such being the case, in the alleged *adhyasa* of not-self on the pure self which itself amounts to the cognition of the self as a not-self, where do you get an already readymade not-self and its previous impressions lying handy to function as '*samskara*', there being neither any objective experience of the self by itself and untarnished by *adhyasa*, nor a previous experience of not-self by itself? Perhaps an example will render the issue clearer. The sky is *always* perceived in the way of being *misperceived*. There is no genuine perceptual knowledge of the sky as it is in itself. The illustration of the sky is the one illustration in Sankara's exposition which is analogous to Brahman or the pure self. Now, when the dullard see or describe the sky as dusky or as having a cauldron-like shape, do they really labour under the impression of some *previous experience*? Of an all enveloping cauldron-shaped appearance by itself separately which they know to be a not-sky? Could they 'perceive' the sky in a different way in the given case or a not-sky which they are supposed to superimpose *now*, separately on an earlier occasion? This seems ludicrous. Where is the influence of previous experience there? *Avidya* does not appear to have any definite or fixed mechanism for its operation. *Samskara* of past experience may have causal efficacy where the *adhyasta* (superimposed) and its locus are capable of being cognised *separately* outside the situation of *adhyasa*. But where the case is such that the content or object perceived or known cannot be given as a content or object without some misfiguration, as in the case of the sky-perception, the *samskarajanyata* of *adhyasa* has no theoretic relevance. While bringing in the instance of the sky-illusion Sankara seems to have felt as much. This, then, necessitates the rendering of Sankara's first descriptive statement on *adhyasa* in a way which precludes real or actual (and not *apparent*) *samskarajanyata* or taking of Sankara's three statements on *adhyasa* as progressive clarification of the concept, —the last statement being his final statement and the first statement, being an 'involved' statement, aspects of which he clarifies by stages. That *adhyasa* involves '*a-tasmin tadbuddhi*', or that it is *avidya*, does not require emendation. But '*Anyasya anyadharmavabhasata*,' or the *tikakara*'s '*paratra paravabhasa*' smacks of dualism in some form, while, '*smrtirupah paratra purvadrstavabhasah*' seems to have been addressed primarily to the commoner who is apt to react readily to *adhyasa* being a '*representation*' of some sort (*smrtirupah*), somehow connected with previous experience of the same object (*purvadrstavisaya*). But, never the less, the statement has a subtle and artful linguistic reservation which even an academician is very likely to miss and it is this, that the '*smrtirupata*' and '*purvadrstata*' are both *apparent* (*vavabhasa*), and not genuine. When an *adhyasa* is got over, one *feels* towards the apparent presentation (now sublated) as a mode of representation somehow connected with one's previous experience or memory of the very same object. But, nevertheless, the fact is quite otherwise since this feeling that the representation is due to previous experience of the same or like object is incapable of being verified in concrete terms. Interpreted in this way, Sankara's first statement assumes a character which though laconic is deep and far-reaching, and covers the meaning of the other two statements. We, habitually, *do* react to an illusion-situation that it is such and such and its causal determinants are such and such. But everything about it is *avabhasa*, and the Bhamati has exhibited a rare insight in its acceptance of '*avabhasa*' as the most significant part in Sankara's statement.

We come now to the second issue. Sankara's intention or purpose behind citing 'other versions' of *adhyasa*, allegedly given by rival schools of the *Khyati*. There is wide difference of opinion among Sankara's classical interpreters as to the identity of the school or schools upholding the first and the third of these versions, while all agree in accepting the second version as the Akhyati view of the Prabhakaramimamsa. Thus, while the Bhamati takes the first of the rival versions as the view of the *atmukhyativadi* and *asatkhyativadi* Buddhists<sup>20</sup>, the Pancapadika and the Ratnaprabha take that

version as common to the *atmakhyativadi* Buddhists and the *anyathakhyativadi Naiyayikas*<sup>67</sup>. The third of the rival versions is understood by the Bhamati<sup>68</sup> as the *anyathakhyati* view of the *Naiyayikas*, while the Ratnaprabha expressly identifies that view as the view of the *usatkhayativadi Madhyamika Buddhists*<sup>69</sup>. There is also difference of opinion as regards Sankara's purpose in the mention of other version of *adhyasa* in the context. Vacaspati seems to think that by citing the rival views in a certain order of ascendancy and improvement and through critical review of them all, Sankara brings out in clear relief the aspect of *anirvacaniyata* or *adhyasa*, latent in all rival views in order to *strengthen*<sup>70</sup> his own *anirvacaniyakhyati* view of illusion. His purpose is then partly polemical and critical and partly conciliatory. But, according to the Pancapadika and the Ratnaprabha, *clarification* of his own view by showing its community with all other views as regards the essential feature of *adhyasa* is Sankara's only purpose here<sup>71</sup>. The aspect common to all rival versions, according to Sankara, is *anyasya anyadharmaavabhasta* which also characterises his own. The Pancapadika seeks to bring this out in each of the rival versions<sup>72</sup>. In the first of the rival views, it points out, there is misrepresentation of something either mental (as in the *atmakhyati*) or non-mental (as in the case of *anyathakhyati*) on an alien locus. In the second, the superimposed and the object on which it is superimposed, although distinct and different, wrongly appear (and is so misrepresented) as non-distinct and one. In the third, the object insofar as it assumes a character contrary to its own nature becomes a misrepresentation. The analysis presented by the Ratnaprabha is perhaps the simplest and most edifying<sup>73</sup>. It points out that, since the different views all converge upon one common factor, such as, '*paratra paravabhasa*' (Misappearance of something in an alien locus), the agreed conclusion of all the views on the subject is that, in illusion, something essentially false is grafted on the locus of the real. This, the Ratnaprabha continues, is successively illustrated in and through the versions of the different schools. Thus, the *anyathakhyati* view, in so far as it maintains that, in *adhyasa*, there is presentation in a foreign locus (*anyatha*) of the existential properties of an elsewhere (*adesantarastha*) object, takes *adhyasa* virtually as involving '*paratra paravabhasa*'. So also does the *atmakhyati* in admitting superimposition of the characteristic of psychosis (*buddhidharma*) on external locus. The *ukhyativadin* in so far as he admits erroneous behavioural reaction based on error of a specific sort (*visistabhrantah svikarat*) has to accept that there was '*paratra paravabhasa*'. The *anyavadin* also accepting the superimposed as having a character antithetical to that of the locus takes it as the absolutely false (*atyantasat*) appearing in an existential locus. This also comports to the view such as, '*paratra paravabhasa*'. So, the Ratnaprabha concludes, in all the varied accounts there is agreement (*samvadant*) in one respect<sup>74</sup>, such as, '*paratra paravabhasa*' (something different appearing in an alien locus).

Insofar as Sankara's main purpose in the *Adhyasabhasya* has been to introduce his readers to an unconventional new perspective, such as, looking upon all conventional knowledge and practice as vitiated by ignorance and falsity, it is very much doubtful if in the explication and clarification of his key-concept he had any zeal for polemics. Besides, he himself does not identify the school or schools holding the 'other views' mentioned by him<sup>75</sup>. These 'other views' are therefore, to be understood as other views which were current at that time. Identification of the schools or criticism of the views upheld by them was not to his purpose which was to build up some sort of a consensus of opinion in his favour. So it appears that the Pancapadika and the Ratnaprabha are more correct in their guess as regards Sankara's purpose and intention in this context, that is, clarification of what he intended to call '*adhyasa*' by bringing out the common point of all the views.

Disagreement is also noticed among the classical interpreters as to the significance and relevance of the two illustrations of *Adhyasa* cited by Sankara. The point of interest is—do we, at the moment

of illusion, cognised that it is a nacre which looks *like* silver or simply as 'This' is silver ? The difficulty is due to Sankara's mention of the *locus* in the illustrations, although in actual illusion-experience, the locus remains undiscovered and so unknown. The second difficulty has been due to Sankara's use of the affix 'vat' after 'rajat' and 'sadvitiya'. The Bhamati and its glossaries, the Kalpataru and the Parimala on the one hand, and the Pancapadika and its auxiliaries on the other, have showed great ingenuity to explain relevance of Sankara's usages. The Ratnaprabha account which is the least ingenious and *pedantic* seems to have been the correct account. Sankara's illustrations, according to it, express what men generally feel towards an *adhyasa*, *after* it has been detected and known as *adhyasa*— '*badhanantarakalinah ayam anubhavaḥ, tatpurvam sūktikatvajñānāyogāt*'<sup>17</sup> It is only *after* the illusion has been sublated and the real content in contact has been known that one feels that it *was* the nacre which appeared *as* silver (rajatavat). Before that, the nacre and its character remain unknown and cannot be spoken about. The affix 'vat' which, (according to all accounts), suggests *falsity* of the appearance —of silver or double moon, also indicates that the illustrations are of illusions *after* sublation, since no appearance is known as false before that. The Bhamati takes Sankara's second illustration as more appropriate to the Advaita standpoint since it shows plural manifestation of that which is singular while the first illustration, according to it, cites an instance of commonly known illusion (*lokaśiddha bhramah*). The Pancapadika and the Ratnaprabha both find the first illustration useful in the explanation — how the 'formless' consciousness can assume the form of 'I' or how it becomes 'I-consciousness'. The second illustration, according to all accounts, is analogous to one indivisible reality appearing dual or plural. We have taken the first illustration as analogous to brahman appearing as the given empirical world-order. In reply to the Bhamati, therefore, we can say that when Brahman or the self, which is the locus of the world-appearance, is known and the cosmic illusion is dispelled, the enlightened seer is likely to feel that *it is Brahman that appears* (appeared) as the manifest objective order just in the way that nacre appears as silver.

Next comes the main issue of *Adhyasabhasya* — how does Sankara explain the possibility of there being an *adhyasa* of not-self on the pure self? *Aśmanatmanorūpetaṛadhyasa* (mistaken sense of identity of self and not-self) has been postulated by him as the basic ignorance (*avidyā*) and this has been supposed to have vitiated all our *pramāṇa-pramēya-vyavahara*, both *vedic* and *laukika*<sup>18</sup> has The irrationality involved in all *naisargika lokavyavahara*<sup>19</sup> has also been sought to be explained on the basis of the self-same supposition. It becomes incumbent on him, therefore, to render the notion of that basic *adhyasa* theoretically justifiable and logically intelligible.

Sankara does not dodge the issue. But it should be noted that the *fact of adhyasa* itself involves certain illogicality—something appearing (or being taken) as *other than itself*. So how an illogicality is to be logically explained becomes an interesting point. The illogical which is *adhyasa* or *avidyā*, as Sankara subsequently<sup>20</sup> elaborates, is only *epistemic* and does not involve any material or metaphysical change in the nature of a thing, the real. It involves *misapprehension* or *misknowing* which does not affect or alter the *nature* of thing apprehended or known. So the question — how there can be any superimposition of not-self on the self is not a question about the self's *becoming*, materially, the not-self, or the not-self's becoming materially the self. The question is — how can any confusion of the not-self as the self be possible ? It may be replied — a confusion becomes possible not as a *fact of nature*, but epistemically, that is, as a *confusion*. But an answer like that will not be satisfying to a commoner who regards possibility or impossibility as an explanatory issue to settled in term of the notions of ground and consequent. Sankara felt as much — and so before demonstrating the *utter irrelevance of the question* at the end, he himself through the *purvapaksin* poses the question as to the theoretic possibility of there being an *adhyasa* of not-self on the pure self in all its unsavoury

details. His classical interpreters of both the schools seem to have been misguided by the form of the question. So they have read through Sankara's replies a causal explanation of an event or happening, although by general admission, this *adhyasa* of not-self on the pure-self is not an event in time but is *anadi* (without a beginning)<sup>41</sup>. As a result, they have attempted to work out an elaborate logical defence of Sankara's explanation on causal lines to the utter detriment of the Advaitic position unnoticed by them. In this issue we shall return at the end.

The objection that Sankara poses through the *purvapaksa* here reflects the view-point of the commoner who takes a reflective figurative description of a phenomenon as identical in all essentials with the phenomenon itself. The concept of *avidya* or *ajnana* is not explicit in itself. We understand it and also express this understanding of it as *a-tasmin tadbuddhi* — mis-knowledge of a content in a situation where it does not hold. To make it more explicit we describe it as '*paratra paravabhasa*' — misappearance or mis-cognition of something in an alien context — a context which is characterised by its absolute negation. What is miscognition (*avidya*) or misappearance (*avabhasa*) we, next, more graphically put or describe as an '*aropa*' or '*adhyasa*', that is, a superimposition, a *mis* - application, or a *mis* - presentation. It can be seen, the agent or the subject does not have any active role in this '*aropa*' or illusion. He, unknowingly, falls a prey to a state of delusion, he does not actively or consciously engineer it. Had it been a deliberately 'caused' affair, he would have, lying handy before him, *two* entities or objects, one of which he would have imposed on another. But in mis-perception or mis - understanding nothing happens like that. The real is *not* the *visaya* or the object revealed there, or 'given' in consciousness. What is not revealed or given in consciousness cannot be described as an object or *visaya* pertaining to that situation. The real, actually, remains the *avisaya* insofar as it *does not figure* as the object-matter of judgment. We do not judge 'the rope is a snake', but only in the form 'this a snake', 'a snake', or '*this is a snake*,' or '*there's a snake*'. Had the real (the rope) actually been given, and were it made into the *visaya*, the miscognition could not have happened and the 'snake-appearance' would not have appeared at all and would not at all appear to have been 'given'. The real and the apparent are incapable of being given together or simultaneously. The peculiarity of error-situation then is . what *should have been given* is not 'given' at the moment, and what is not there, and so, *cannot be given*, appears to have been 'given' all the same. The illusory appearance is, therefore, a *creation* of the error-situation<sup>42</sup>. It is in and through the error-experience. It does not have any past history, is not any 'else-where' or 'else-when' fact — it is a fact which is a 'no-fact', having no mooring anywhere outside the error-experience. Such being the case, in error or illusion or in *avidya* and *ajnana*, there is actually no superimposition (*adhyasa* or *a-ropa*) of one thing upon another thing — if for no other reason, at least for this reason that one of the parties, the locus, remains concealed and so ungiven as '*out there*' *purovasthita*), and the other, the content which is *to be* superimposed (*aropa*) has no being or location *prior* to the so called *aropa* — having taken place already being essentially a *creature of this aropa*, which thus cannot be called an *aropa*.

It stands to reason, therefore, that in the suggested *atmanatmanoritaretaradhyasa*, the '*anatma*' does not lie handy there already in order to be superimposed, —being itself a creation, a projection of *avidya*. Nor does the pure self require to be given as an object out there (*purovasthita visaya*) in order that a mis-cognition can take place. It is only in a *post-mortem* analysis, in a reflective description or understanding of a state of illusion, that we seem to feel that there *has been* imposition of one fact upon an alien locus -*paratra paravabhasa*. Are we, here, justified in asking . *how* this imposition of one thing upon something was possible? Are we called upon to explain the logical possibility of a state of affairs which *has already taken place* and of which our reflective description is an inept figurative presentation<sup>43</sup>? Is it not true that there can never be a '*paratra paravabhasa*'

had the locus and the content been both given simultaneously, the former as a *purvasthita visaya* and the latter as an existent something lying handy to be superimposed? So, where is the demand for a causal explanation of this so called *adhyasa* which is only a 'mode' of understanding or a 'figure of speech', where is the necessity of a logical explanation of the illogical which has already taken place, or which is already there, and which we are seeking to describe in commonly intelligible rhetoric and usage"? There can be no doubt that the classical interpreters of Sankara, in spite of their great erudition, have singularly failed to notice this point, and his has resulted in misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Sankara's intention by all of them in this most crucial section of the Adhyasabhasya.

To expose the utter irrelevance of the point raised by the *purvapaksa*, to show how far removed from proper understanding of the problem is this commoner's view-point, let us ask. Do we really superimpose some other object (*visayanntaram*) on an object which is situated in front (*purvasthita eva visaya*)? Do we superimpose the silver (which is already there) or the snake (roaming in the jungle as our Naiyayika friends would say) on the nacre or the rope which is situated in front of us and is in clear view as a given object in front? There is no such fool who is capable of such an extraordinary act. Had the nacre or rope been *known* and in that sense 'given' as an object in front, and had the silver or snake been already there instead of being the creation of ignorant fancy, there would not have happened the mis-cognition or illicit superimposition. In the silver-nacre or snake-rope illusion, we do not have a mere superimposition but an *illicit* or illegitimate one. And this is an *antecedent fact* which did not involve our active and conscious doing in any way. We become aware of the illogical as *having already taken place*, after it is already over, and then and thereafter, we discover and analyse its illogicality and describe it in figures readily intelligible to the commoner. So there is no call for accepting the figurative description, which is helpful to the understanding of the common people, as a basic fact or fundamental issue. Sankara wanted to expose the frivolity of a literal acceptance and interpretation of his figurative putting of *avidya* as *adhyasa* of one thing upon another in course of his two replies as to the 'possibility' of *adhyasa* of not-self on the pure self". In the first reply, all that he really suggested was that what is *avidya* may *seemingly* appear as a *visaya* when miscompounded in *avidya* and *adhyasa*. In his second reply, he put the thing in the reverse order; for anything to be *seemingly* given in front and also as a *visaya*, it is not at all necessary either that it should be actually situated in front, or 'given' as the direct object, because in actual illusion and mis-cognition, the not-given may be mistaken as having been given in front as happens in the misperception of the sky as a coloured surface with a bottom. There was, therefore, no call either for a logical or for a causal explanation of an uncaused eternal illogicality such as is involved in *atmanamanoritaretaradhyasa*. But his classical interpreters thought otherwise.

A mis-cognition, such as, 'this is silver' where there is no silver, but where there is nacre, is looked upon, or is reflectively described, as perceiving the nacre as silver, or as *superimposing* 'silver' on the nacre, which later is the real object situated in front, although not known as that during the misperception or illusion. All known and detected cases of illusion or mis-cognition can be similarly construed as a case of '*anyasya anyadharmavabhasata*', '*paratra paravabhasa*' or simply as '*purvasthita eva visaye visayanntaradhyasa*' that is, superimposition of some other object on the object which is *really* situated in front. But the suggested superimposition, so the objection is posed, of not-self on the pure self, seems not to answer this description at all. The reason is, so the objection runs, the pure self which is to be the locus of this superimposition, is, by Sankara's own admission, not a *visaya* or object at all, being very much remote from what may be cognised as 'Thou' or 'This' (*usmatpratyayapeta*), that is, what may be cognised as a given object. Moreover, the pure self, insofar



as it is not an object, cannot also be an object 'given in front' (*purovasthita*). So, the argument concludes, the supposition of a superimposition of not-self on the pure-self, on Sankara's own formulation of the problem, looks absurd. The pure self is, on all counts, incapable of figuring as the locus of the alleged superimposition of not-self. This seems to be a patent case of the *hetvabhāsa* called 'asrayasiddhi' —the fallacy of inadmissible locus. Any attempt to avoid this fallacy would necessitate proving the pure self as a valid or *defacto* locus, and that, again, of a superimposition *ab extra*. But this would vitiate the fundamental standpoint of the Advaita, according to which, there can be no two things —no pluralities anywhere,— the self or Brahman being everything that could be there. Can the not-self be a collateral fact, additional or external to the self? Can the pure self be the locus *defacto* of a superimposition *ab extra*? It is, indeed, doubtful if the classical interpreters were alive to these very unsavoury issues which lurk behind the objection posed by Sankara himself through *purvapakṣa* against his own position. Why did Sankara raise such problems if he did not want to show that the whole issue —the issue of the superimposition of not-self on the pure self, and for that matter, of any alleged superimposition,—has to be understood in a more rational way, that is, as a mere figurative description of a situation which cannot be literally reconstructed in terms of alleged superimposition but which needs to be accepted as a state of affair, wrought by *avidyā*, antecedent to such reflective, post-mortem, figurative understanding of it. Sankara's replies have been very brief, and to the point, but his classical commentators were all misled by reason of their unwieldy erudition and sophistry<sup>40</sup>. What, in plain terms, do Sankara's two replies amount to?

The implication is the following. Now that an illusion or misapprehension, as and when it is current, is a superimposition of any sort. It is as simple a cognitive fact as is a true cognition. But when an illusion is *sublated* and is reflectively viewed, it looks like a superimposition of a foreign content (*vivartanurūpam*) on a real object situated in front. This real object was *not given as itself, nor by itself in front when* the illusion actually took place. It was neither given as itself, nor was it known as itself in that situation. As reflectively viewed, however, an antecedent state of illusion seems to have involved super-imposition of a foreign content upon a real which, under certain *unnatural and extraneous limitations incidental* to misapprehension, was given as an object in front although, *as itself or by itself* it was neither given nor known at that moment. This object, then, under the extraneous limitation or *upādhi* incidental to illusion, figured as the locus of superimposition of a foreign content or character and locus of superimposition of a foreign content or character and as the logical subject of the resulting predication. This is all that *adhyāsa* in the sense of a superimposition signifies. That being the case, the suggested case of superimposition of not-self on the pure self shows no disparity or difference. Here also, under the extraneous limitation of the ego, *incidental to misapprehension*, the pure self which, *as such* is *avisaya*, a non-object, appears (or is taken up) as an object (*visaya*), as it were directly presented, and so, as 'out there' (*Purovasthita*), being the content of 'I-sense' and also as the apperceived self in all human consciousness. This, that is the self, thus improvised under the extraneous limitation of the ego, incidental to a situation of *avidyā* which precedes, then, becomes the fit and proper locus of superimposition (attribution) of such commonly recognised items of the not-self as the body, the mind, the sense-organs, etc., in the same way that a nacre, at some distance and under glistening sun-rays, becomes the locus of the silver-appearance, and the rope in dim light, becomes the locus of the snake-appearance. If you argue that this is no case of director straight-cut superimposition of not-self upon the self *already rendered other than itself*, that is, a not-self, under improvised and adventitious conditions *incidental to a pre-existent state of misapprehension (avidyā)*. Sankara might retort, where is direct and at the same time, *ill...* superimposition *deliberately* executed anywhere in the world? Is silver or snake ever superimposed on nacre or rope without extraneous conditions being there and except under



circumstances of a mis-cognition or misapprehension ? Is not miscognition, if not an antecedent condition of, at least collateral with the alleged illicit superimposition ? The superimposition or *adhyasa* under discussion is not a self-explanatory concept. It will be impossible, if it is to be legitimate. Only as illegitimate and illicit, it can be possible. But this is dependent on there being *Avidya* or *mithya-jnana*<sup>21</sup> determining it. This *avidya* necessitates presentation of the would-be miscognised under conditions foreign to its nature and so extraneous to itself. The superimposition of silver upon nacre becomes possible under adventitious conditions working it up as *other than itself* and concealing its true nature. The superimposition of not-self (the commonly recognised items of not-self) on the pure self (*pratyagatma*) similarly becomes possible under conditions which conceal its true nature and work it up as *paragatma*, an objective 'this self' under extraneous limitation of the ego— an other than the pure self. So where is disparity between the two cases calling for an extraordinary explanation in the latter case ?

Again, what kind of explanation of nacre-silver illusion or *adhyasa* can one meet in the supposition that everybody superimposes some other content (*visayanantara*) on an object located in front (*puravasthite visaye*) ? Does this explain *how* nacre-silver illusion take place or does it simply describe, and that also figuratively, the nacre-silver illusion-situation after it has been detected and sublated ? Evidently, the latter, this description amounts to suggesting that it is the *misperceived* nacre or rope – the nacre or the rope already turned into entities other than themselves due to the conditions of misperception already obtaining there, which become the seat or locus of silver and its costliness, or of snake and its frightful appearance. Does this explain *how* misperception happens or does it merely state what happens in misperception and due to it, presupposing the very fact of misperception as an incident ? There is thus no explanatory cone or stance in the issue raised by the *purvapakra*, although the classical commentators were misled by the 'form' of the question. Closely examined, the issue boils down to this that the superimposed, that is, the already miscognised, becomes the seat of further superimposition and miscognition— the not-nacre or the not-rope of other properties of silver (not-nacre) or of snake (not-rope) – the not-self of all other items of the not-self. And the determining conditions of all these aberrations is ignorance, otherwise called *avidya* which breaks all normal rules and abides by none. Sankara, it can be seen, in the body of his first reply, has not given an explanatory account of the so called superimposition (*adhyasa*) of not-self on the pure unobjective self which, to be sure, is the self *as itself*. Instead, he shows how the essentially unobjective self under extraneous limitation of the ego, limitation wrought by *avidya*, can phenomenally be taken as objective and as the locus of further superimposition of commonly recognised items of the not-self. To satisfy the unsophisticated he only shows that there is no disparity or difference between the two case—the nacre-silver illusion and self-not self miscognition when figuratively interpreted as superimposition of one content upon another under conditions of ignorance as both depend on adventitious, or extraneous conditions (*Upadhi*). Sankara shows himself as Sankara in his second reply, misconstrued by the classical commentators as a mere appendage or a supporting answer. There he overrules the explanatory point in the issue raised. In *illicit* superimposition which is the same as miscognition (*avidya*) or ignorance (*ajnana*) he argues, there can be no such rule that anything to be miscognised should be as itself—should be directly presented as an object situated in front in order to be miscognised *as that* and in order to be the locus of *illusory* superimposition of any description. The implication is that miscognition or illusory superimposition is possible only when something is apprehended as what it is essentially not. To be miscognised as an object it should be a non-object, to be miscognised as out there and directly presented, it should be by its very nature incapable of being out there and directly presented. *Avidya* or *adhyasa* necessitates violation of all normal rules of happening. Misrepresentation involves distortion and never presents a thing as it is in itself. When the sky is misperceived as a huge cauldron-shaped covering with dusky colour, is the sky the proper

object in that configuration ? Is it at all given as an object there ? Is it really given in front although seemingly perceived as that ? lastly, has the sky any colour or shape ?

Surprisingly, among the classical *nikas*, the Bhamati is the least edifying in this context. It enters into needless discussions to score a point, such as, the *Avisayatva* (non-objectivity) of the pure self which is not at all the point at issue or the bone of contention. Sankara has himself made *avisayatva* of the self his basic contention for distinguishing not-self from it even in the opening line of the *Adhyasahhasya*, and now the *purvapaksa*, accepting that view implicitly, asks how that which is admittedly an *avisaya* can figure as *visaya*, —a given objectivity in fulfillment of the condition of *adhyasa* which apparently requires as the locus of superimposition an object or *Visaya* situated in front. So, how that which is *Avisaya* can, again, be taken up as a *purvasthita visaya* is the real point of contention. Trying to interpret this figuring of the pure self as an apparent object and as that, as the locus of a superimposition, *which is to happen a new and ab extra*, Vacaspati, like all other classical interpreters, lands himself in a quagmire with no means of escape. He confuses between the reflective standpoint in which *adhyasa* looks as a superimposition and the original situation of *adhyasa* in which there is unconscious misapprehension of something as other than itself but no superimposition *ab extra*. Vacaspati takes Sankara's two replies as separate explanatory accounts of two types of *adhyas* — an *adhyasa* of which the locus is not directly given. Sankara is credited with over-doing the task at hand by explaining the possibility not only of *aparoksa adhyasa* but also of *paroksa adhyasa*, there —by showing his overbearingness (*praudhavadita*). To say the least, this is a palpable mistake and a misinterpretation. The figurative description of a miscognition as a 'superimposition of a foreign content on a given object in front' being incidental to a posterior reflective view of a state of affairs which went before and is an antecedent circumstance, there is really no demand for a causal account of that state of affairs or circumstance. The 'figure' of superimposition (*adhyasa*) is not a literal expression any actual happening or event. It is only a mode of pictorial description, a figurative rendering of an antecedent state of miscognition of something as other than itself. To take this figurative description as a possible event or happening in the realm of facts would be a mistake. Now, let us ask, can there be any superimposition of a foreign content or character on a real object given in front ? If the real object is actually given in front, and known as that, and if the content to be superimposed is foreign content, and also known as that, you can find no such fool anywhere who would volunteer to accomplish the feat of superimposition. There is, however, one way in which an apparent superimposition can be possible. This can become possible in a state of utter ignorance, in an unconscious and unmotivated state of error or misapprehension in which the real object is neither known nor given in front as the object proper, the content imposed is not suspected as a foreign content, and there is no superimposition, *conscious* and *deliberate*, of such a content. But this means only that the situation figuratively described as superimposition becomes possible in a state of ignorance and the resultant state of miscognition when the superimposition is not known at all as that and also as having taken place. But this over-rules the very conditions of superimposition stipulated in the argument of the *purvapaksa*.

Neither Vacaspati nor any other classical interpreter appears to have seen this point which is Sankara's own. They, therefore, undertake to show how superimposition as an actual event of imposing a foreign content *ab extra* on an object given in front may be regarded as possible even in the case of *atma* and *anatma* on Sankara's own version. In doing this they have put the cart before the horse since there is no *anatma* lying handy to be superimposed, the *anatma* being itself the creature of that superimposition or *adhyasa*. They also do not notice the metaphysical dualism that lurks in their attempted proof. Vacaspati interprets Sankara to mean that although the pure self is an *avisaya* as

itself, it becomes an apparent *visaya* in being delimited and determined by the intellect, the mind, the senses, etc., that is, insofar as it phenomenally becomes the *Jiva*, *Jantu*, *Ksetrajna* and so on. This delimited self, insofar as it is an apparent object of 'I-sense' and is direct content on account of its own self-revealing nature (*aparoksa*), can, according to him, become the locus of superimposition of not-self, such as, the body etc. How with all these Vacaspati builds up the case of a *purovasthita visaya* (an object given in front) also, he does not explain, even, then, Vacaspati takes Sankara's first reply as an *explanation* of *aparoksa bhrama* and interprets the second reply as an *explanation* of *paroksa bhrama*, and Sankara is credited with *explaining the possibility* of not only *aparoksa bhrama* but also the possibility of there being a *paroksa bhrama* in a bid to display his ingenuity (*prudhavadita*,) although uncalled for. Apparently, Vacaspati does not attach any importance to the condition of *purovasthitatva* posed by Sankara himself through *purvapaksa* since a *paroksa bhrama* on the alleged demonstration of Sankara was equally possible. But is Sankara's illustration of the sky-illusion a case of *paroksa bhrama*? Do we not seem to be perceiving the sky when we take it as coloured or as cauldron-shaped in appearance? Both the *Pancapadika* and the *Ratnaprabha* disagree with Vacaspati on this point. They take the case of sky-illusion as an instance of *aparoksa bhrama* even though the sky is incapable of being in direct sense-contact. They defend their position with the help of a certain innovated and ingenious idea that even the sky is capable of being really perceived, and therefore, capable of being a direct content even though it is *invisible* by reason of its inaccessibility to contact of the visual sense (*aksavyaparamany tarena api aparokse*)<sup>72</sup>. What inspired this highly laboured account which conflicts with Sankara's own '*aparyaksapi akase*' is possibly their opposition to the concept of *paroksa bhrama* – a quite reasonable stand, but the truth is, neither Vacaspati who defends the concept of *paroksa bhrama* nor the Vivarana school have been able to divine Sankara's real intention and meaning.

Misunderstanding Sankara's exposition in the text as an *explanation of the possibility* of an *adhyasa* of not-self upon the self, – an event to be wrought out a new, and mistaking Sankara's first statement for an explanation of that possibility, vacaspati, like all the rest, gets involved in a circularity and to escape that, wilfully, lands in an infinite regress. The apparent *visayatva* of the pure self through determination in terms of ego, intellect etc, being itself a consequence of *adhyasa*, cannot be taken as a condition of and prior to self-not-self *adhyasa* in the suggested case. This apparent *visayatva* and the apparent determination are themselves to be considered as consequences of an antecedent *adhyasa*. Here, therefore, there is a circularity. The suggested *adhyasa* of not-self on the self in which the self requires to be given as an apparent object in front is dependent on an antecedent *adhyasa* which answer for apparent objectivity and given-ness of the self, and this in its turn depends on an earlier *adhyasa* by which the condition of *adhyasa* such as, *purovasthita visayat* of the self is fulfilled, and so on *ad infinitum*. How this circularity drawn out in an infinite process on the analogy of the stock example of the seed and the sprout (*vyankuravat*) helps – solution of the problem and explains the concept of *anadi adhyasa* is best understood by Vacaspati, Padmapada and all the rest. To us, this is no explanation and an infinite regress cannot be made into a valid logical argument by any unconvincing demonstration its sheer inevitability. The logical difficulty that the classical commentators have faced here is of their own making. A descriptive passage has been misunderstood by them as an explanatory passage. Sankara was not explaining how *purovasthita visayatva* can be a causal determinant of self-not-self *adhyasa* or of any *adhyasa* on earth. He was only interested in showing that in *atma-anatma adhyasa* also the so called locus of superimposition is misrepresented under extraneous and adventitious factors as the nacre on the rope is misrepresented under adventitious factors conducive to our taking of them as other than themselves. The difficulty that Vacaspati and others face here is due to their misconstruction of an explanatory account where there is none such.

Sankara only wanted to show the parity between his suggested *adhyasa* of not-self upon the pure self and any other ordinary illusion by showing that in both cases a thing appears as other than itself and is mistaken as what it is not, and that when reflectively taken, both are *figuratively describable* as a superimposition of a foreign content upon the locus of the real *seemingly* given in front. But actually under the extraneous determinations which are incidental to a state of misapprehension the real, the locus, is never given *as itself* and in front but only as determined by the emergent conditions of that misapprehension and therefore, *as other than itself*. This, then, is a direct repudiation of the contention<sup>2</sup> Of the unenlightened *purvapaksa* that in any illusion the so called locus is ever presented as it is and as the object given in front or in direct sense-contact. Its non-presentation as it is in itself and also in front is rather a pre-condition of any *adhyasa* as illusion in its regard.

The Ratnaprabha account is more lucid and clear-cut but in so far as it also seeks to present an explanatory account in terms of Sankara's first reply which, according to it, is the main reply, in invites the self-same logical difficulty of circularity and seeks to escape it in the way Vacaspati did. The specialities of Ratnaprabha account are the following (1) according to it, Sankara's second reply is not itself any explanatory account of *adhyasa*, of the so called *paroksa adhyasa* of Vacaspati's conception. The second reply, according to the Ratnaprabha only rules out '*purovasthitatva* of the *visaya*' – which the Ratnaprabha interprets as '*indriyagrahyatva*' (being given in sense-contact) – as any requisite condition of even '*aparoksa bhrama*'. The necessary any sufficient conditions of *adhyasa*, according to the Ratnaprabha, therefore, are '*aparoksatva*' and *visayatva* and not '*indriyagrahyatva*' or '*purovasthitatva*' also. (2) The sky-illusion of Sankara's second reply is interpreted as a case of *aparoksa adhyasa*. The sky is directly given, although it is not there given in sense-contact. It is the co-appearance of the '*aropaniya*' (locus) and the '*aropya*' (the superimposed) in the same knowing process which determines *adhyasa* and not also the '*purovasthitatva*' or '*indriyagrahyatva*' of the locus. The upshot of the Ratnaprabha account is, then, that, although in the beginning, Sankara, through the *purvapaksa*, posed both '*visayatva*' and '*purovasthitatva*' of the locus as the necessary conditions of the possibility of an *adhyasa*, in the second part of his reply, he has ruled out '*purovasthitatva*' as a condition in order to make his explanatory account of *adhyasa* in the first part, in term of '*aparoksatva*' and '*visayatva*' of the locus, self complete and conclusive.

The Pancapadika account does not materially differ. According to the Pancapadika also, Sankara's first reply gives an *explanatory account* of the *possibility* of superimposition of not-self upon the pure self, and is, therefore, the more important part of Sankara's statements, while the second reply, by way of showing self-completeness of the first, denies relevance of '*purovasthitatva*' of the locus even in '*aparoksa bhrama*'. '*Purovasthitatva*' is taken by the Pancapadika to mean '*akṣi samprayogita*'<sup>3</sup> (contact with the visual sense). Sankara's illustration of the sky-illusion, according to it, shows the case of direct misperception of the sky as having certain colour and shape, since the sky may as well be shown as a direct content even though not in contact with the visual sense (*uksavyaparamantarena api aparokse akase*). The Pancapadika takes great pains to explain the circumstance under which the self, the *Visayi*, and so a non-object (*avisaya*) may become an apparent object, the *Visaya*<sup>4</sup>. The pure self, thus it elaborates, being of unitary and undistinguished nature (*tekarasa*) cannot, of course, be understood to involve any distinction, even internal, between '*anidam*', that is, *avisaya* in one part and '*idam*' or *visaya* in another part<sup>5</sup>. So, the Pancapadika, explores the exigency under which such apparent distinction can take place. It envisages this circumstance in the apparent determination of the pure self by *ahamkara* which then deputises for the pure self. This *ahamkara*, so the Pancapadika assures, is capable of being taken in two ways<sup>6</sup> – by internal (*pratyak*) reference as '*anidam*' and by outer (*parak*) reference as '*idam*', that is, as a given objective mode

(*visaya*) What is the polar opposite of '*visaya*' (*yusmatpratyayapeta*) and so the '*avisaya visayi*' (non-objective subject) is the pure self itself reflected in the '*anidam*' or internal aspect of *ahamkara*. This is also '*asmat-pratyaya gocara*', although not '*asmatpratyayavisaya*'. But the '*idam*' – aspect of '*ahamkara*', reflected by the light of the pure self, although '*yusmatpratyayapeta*' insofar as it is not felt as an 'other' of the self and is not also distinguished from it, becomes the object (*visaya*) of the 'I-sense' – that is, becomes '*asmatpratyayavisaya*'. This, according to the Pancapadika, is capable of figuring as the required locus of the superimposition of not-self as it fulfil two of the conditions, *visayatva* and *aparoksatva*<sup>7</sup>, which taken together constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of *adhyasa*, the other condition such as, '*paravasthitatva*' of the locus having been ruled out as a condition in the later part of Sankara's statement. But at the end of all these intellectual exercises, the Pancapadika also faces the same circularity in explanation, since the apparent determination of the pure self by '*ahamkara*' has to be explained in term of a prior *adhyasa*. It seeks to escape that circularity in the same unconvincing traditional<sup>8</sup> way

MM. Pramathanath Tarkabhusan<sup>9</sup>, following the trail of the Vivarana account, takes Sankara's first reply as a proof of the alleged *atma-anatma adhyasa* and the second reply as demonstrating that the condition, such as, *paravasthitatva* of the locus stipulated in the argument of the *purvapaksa*, is vitiated by the logical fallacy, technically called '*Savyabhi cara hetu*'. To say the least, this does not show any insight into Sankara's meaning in the passages and their purpose. This, on the other hand, is a scholastic elaboration and defence of a mistake committed by the tradition particularly by the Vivarana school. Blind adherence to a traditional exposition, instead of an independent scrutiny of the original upon which such exposition is based, has not infrequently stood in the way of correct appreciation of a point made by the original thinker, and Tarkabhusan's interpretation is vitiated by the same defect.

Does not Sankara, in the very opening passage of the Adhyasabhasya, of gross logical absurdity of a superimposition where the parties involved are polar opposites? Does he not mean there that any superimposition in such a case has to be regarded as illicit and as due to *mithya-jnana* or *avidya*? Does he not make this *avidya* or *mithya-pratyaya* the basical concept of explain how things which are radically disparate may be misidentified or confused on account of this<sup>10</sup>? Does he not elaborate subsequently that it is the very nature of this error, confusion, or *avidya*, to take a thing as other than itself – *atasmin tadbuddhi*? Is not this sequence – a thing being apprehended as other than itself – a sequence of *avidya* or error? Is not this *avidya* illogical? Is so, where is the demand for a logical explanation of the illogical? Then, again, is not the suggested *atma-anatma adhyasa*, by Sankara's own admission, *anadi*<sup>11</sup>, that is, having no beginning? Can that which has no beginning, that which is not characterised by prior non-existence (*pragabhava*) be an event in time – a '*karya*' or effect technically speaking? Is not an effect defined as that which is counterpositive of its prior absence – *pragabhavapratiyogi*? To be sure, there are illusions and errors which are happenings or events in time, such as, the nacre-silver, or rope-snake illusions. But *atma-anatma adhyasa* is an already given fact of phenomenal experience – no one can trace its absolute beginning and so it is called *anadi* and also *naisargika* (perennial). Why is, then, the ludicrous attempt to explain it as something which *has happened in time*, or which is due to us, due to our superimposing a 'not-self' on the pure self? What are we or our ignorance if not the part and parcel of the prevalent cosmic process? Where is a 'not-self' to be located outside. This cosmic process and outside the perennial *avidya* or ignorance which envelops us? It is by reflection only that we discover ourselves but that also as ingredients of the cosmic process which is not of our own making. What is *naisargika adhyasa* except this cosmic process misread and mis-understood as the ultimate Reality?



Even the errors which are events in time do not arise by our superimposing one content upon another. Superimposition of an alien content upon a given locus is only a figurative mode of describing the situation in which something is miscognised as something else. This something is not, therefore, any fact given in advance to be superimposed on the fact miscognised. It is the very product of the miscognition which precedes it. It is definitely a mistake to suppose that the nacre-silver or rope-snake is any silver or snake, existent or subsistent, having any habitate outside the error-experience. The so called locus or *adhikarana* also is nothing other than the miscognised fact which although there is not known either as being there or as it is in itself and this is, after the error or illusion is got over, taken up as the locus of the illusory appearance to meet the exigency of the figurative description, such as, superimposition.

Tarkabhusan also failed to see that if the apparent figuring of the pure self as an immediate object *through extraneous determination* (which is incidental to prior *adhyasa*) enables it to become the requisite locus of an *Adhyasa*, this does not establish it as apprior condition of *adhyasa*. Sankara also does not mean that it does. This necessitated the second part of Sankara's statement which shows that a phenomenon such as *adhyasa* interpreted as misperception or mis-cognition abides by no such rule as has been stipulated by the *purvapaksin*. Misperception of the sky as coloured and cauldron-shaped is a perennial illusion and cognising the not-self as the self or the self as the not-self is likewise. The sky-illusion is a fact of experience, although the sky is never given as the object there, nor as '*purovasthita*' since it is all enveloping and invisible. For the invisible object to be misperceived as a coloured surface, there is no logical demand for the fulfillment of any conditions. What is necessary is simply the understanding of the appearance as a deceptive appearance, and *as due to ignorance*. In the earlier statement, Sankara exhibits '*aparaksa vista*' and so, apparent '*purovasthitatva*' (direct presentedness to consciousness) of the self as *post-adhyasa* fact, as the resultant issue of an extraneous determination by ego due to *adhyasa*, and thereby, the purports to point out that the '*purovasthita visayatva*' of the locus is an issue connected with back-reading of *adhyasa* and is not really a prior condition. This suggestion is next corroborated by the citation of the sky-illusion in which ignorant misapprehension is shown as not dependent on the condition of '*visayatva*' (givenness) or '*purovasthitatva*' (presentedness in front) of the locus. We can significantly talk about a 'locus' of illusion only in reflection, and after detection of an illusion, not when the illusion is still there. The suggestion of the classical interpreters that there can be no illusion or *Bhrama* without a locus (*adhikarana*) is relevant only in the context of a detected or exposed illusion and in a reflective statement about it when it is no more there.

It can be seen, therefore, that there cannot be a rational demand for explanation as to how a misconception, miscognition, *Adhyasa* takes place. *Adhyasa* or *Avidya*, in respect to a subject-matter, may happen in time, or may be there beginninglessly but, in neither case, it is deliberately caused or consciously manipulated. The individual falls a victim to it. That he was under the spell of an *Adhyasa* or miscognition can be known only when he recovers from it, not earlier. It is, then, that the individual comes to feel, not that he had superimposed but that there was a superimposition of a foreign content (*visayantara*) on the real which was there, may be in front also, but unrepresented as itself as it was determined by certain extraneous circumstances, these circumstances vitiated the whole process and gave rise to '*a-tasmim tadbuddhi*'. The individual was a victim of these circumstances and not the author.

## References

1. *Adhyasabhasya*—Second sentence '*mithyajnananimittat Satyanrte mithunakrtya*'. etc.



- 2 "Avidyakhyaṁ atmanatmanoritarēṇa radhyasam puraskṛtya. " "Tamataṁcvam lakṣanakamadhyasam panditah avidyēti manyante ... " –Adhyasabhyasam panditah avidyēti manyante " –Adhyasabhasya 16th and 14th sentences.
- 3 Adhyasabhasya 7th sentence – 'tatta ca loka anubhavaḥ' etc.
- 4 Cf. Bhamati
- 5 Adhyasabhasya 36th line 'Sarvalokaprativakṣa'
- 6 This has been the line followed by Sriharsa's dialectic in *Khandanakhandanakhyā*.
- 7 See Vivaranapramayasamgraha – ' Anirvacanīya vadinam āsmakam adhyasasya avastutvayuktivirodhayoristatvat. Virudhyate hi atmanatmadhyas yuktibhūtiyevanirvacyatvam angikriyate'
- 8 " anyasya anyadharmakalpāna anirvacanīyati.....' sarvatantrasiddham" – Bhamati
- 9 See Adhyasabhasya
- 10 Vivaranaprameya samgraha, p. 120 (Bengali Edition).
- 11 Adhyasabhasya, 15th sentence
- 12 See vivarana prameya samgraha, pp. 73-120 (Bengali Edition).
13. Pancapadika – " , mithyēti bhavitum yuktam abhava eva adhyasasya yukta ityarthah" pp 4 Bhamati " adhyasam api nivarīyati iti ? Ratnaprabha " , nāsti iti bhavitum yuktam" Pancapadikavivarana – " abhava eva adhyasasya yuktaḥ. " p 10.
- 14 It can be seen that in their accounts of Adhyasa they have started with the idea the *atma-anatma-adhyasa* is interlocking two distincts simply because Sankara in his exposition unavoidably begins his sentence like that, and not mistaking one as the other
- 15 See Adhyasabhasya 2nd sentence.
16. Vivarana prameya samgraha, pp 73-120 (Bengali Edition).
- 17 His rendering of the opening sentences of Adhyasabhasya, there after of Sankara's definition of Adhyasa, are only some of the instances. His footnote relating to this definition shows that he did not have necessary grounding to interpret Sankara's definition. He seems to have confused Sankara's view with *Akhyativada*.
- 18 Smṛtirupa – is taken to mean either 'smṛtisadrśa' or 'smāryamanasadrśa', and not as 'smṛti' What resembles smṛti cannot be taken to mean 'being identical with memory'?
- 19 Arundhatinyaya – To locate the tiny speck of light situated beside one of the stars in the URSAMAGOR called in the Hindus mythology 'Saptarsi' (seven sages) one has to locate the constellation first, then the bigger looking star and finally, the tiny speck called 'Arundhati'
- 20 Of the classical interpreters, the author of the Ratnaprabha seems to clearly notice this when he takes Sankara's two illustrations, not as illustrations of *Adhyasa* when still in force, but of *adhyasa* after it has been discovered and so after it has been got over Sankara himself adheres to this version This is clear from his use of 'Bā' in both illustrations such as *rajatavat, sadvīṇīyavat* In illusion, still in force, there is the feeling 'This is silver' and not 'X' is appearing like silver' *rajatavat avabhasati*.
- 21 'Idam rajatam' This is silver (where the thing is actually a nacre) is a perceptual judgment, but 'sukṭika rajatavat avabhasate' 'nacre misappears as silver' is no perceptual judgment. It is a reflective statement about the false character of a previous judgment.
- 22 We have put it as 'apparently' to cover the case of 'naisargika adhyasa' that Sankara speaks of as timeless. As different from the traditional commentators we do not take this 'adhyasa' as an event in time (*janva*) and so 'samskarajanya', although we seem to understand it in that way

- 23 Ekavacchedena samsrjyamane svatyanatabhavavati avabhasyatvam' Ratnaprabha-  
Adhyasabhasyatatparyam.
- 24 Pancapadika, p. 11- (*anavadyam laksanam*)
- 25 *Op cit* p. 7 'napunah smaryate eva spastam purovasihita tvavaanatanat'
- 26 *Ibid*
- 27 *Ibid.* nahi asamprayuktavabhasinah purva pravrttitadvisaya-pramanadvaya-samrutthatamantarena  
samudbhavah sambhavati'
- 28 Pancapadika, p. 8.
- 29 Ratnaprabha 'Ata paratra avabhasa iti laksanam, tistam padadvayam tad upapadanartham'  
Adhyasabhasyatatparyam.' -
- 30 *Ibid*
- 31 *Idam ca sadyanadyadhyasa-sadharanam laksanam* The Pancapadika definition, insisting as it does,  
*purva pravrtta-tadvisaya pramanadvayasamutthartvam* seems not to cover 'anadi adhyasa' unless this  
*anaditva* is misconceived as a beginningless rotating process – a mistake common to all classical  
accounts, since it fails to escape dualism.
- 32 *Ibid*
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 *Do-sasamprayogajanyatvasya api vivaksitatvana sanskaramatra- janyatvabhavat'*
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 Pancapadika, p. 7. Vidyaranya has shown the distinction more elaborately *cf* *vivarana pramaya samgraha*,  
pp 133-44. (Bengali Edition).
- 37 See Vedantadarsana Ed. by Tarkabhusan, pp. 108-09.
- 38 *Cf* Vacaspati's felicitation of Sankara in the beginning of his Tika.
- 39 Adhyasabhasya— 'Sarvathapi tu anyasya anyadharmavabhasanti na vyabhicarati'
- 40 Adhyasabhasya— 'Adhyaso name a-tasmin tadbuddhiriti avocamah'
41. Adhyasabhasya— 'tamatamanavidyakhyaatmanatmanoritare tara-dhyasam puruskrtya, etc.'
- 42 Adhyasabhasya— 'mithyajnananimittat'
- 43 *Ibid.*, — 'mithunkrtiya'
- 44 Pancapadika — 'na hi asamprayuktavabhasinah purvapravrtta-tadvisaya pramanadvayasamuttkitanun  
tarena samudbhavah sambhavati', p.7.
- 45 See Ratnaprabha and Pancapadika.
- 46 See Bhamati
- 47 Pancapadika p. 11, see Ratnaprabha Adhyasabhasya tatparyam
- 48 See Bhamati
- 49 Ratnaprabha— Adhyasabhasya Tatparyam.
- 50 'Anirvacansyatam dradhayitum' See also the successive criticisms of the *atmakhyati*, and other views.
- 51 Pancapadika, p. 11 'matataram upanasyati svamataparissuddhaye'

- 52 Pancapadika, p. 12.
- 53 Adhyasabhasya Tatparyam.
- 54 Ratnaprabha- "Etesu matesu paratraparavabhasalakshanam samvadam"
- 55 M. M. Prumathanath Tarkabhusan has lamented how Sankara himself would have identified the other versions has remained an unsettled point of inquiry. In reply, it can be said that Sankara did not want that the views should be closely identified since his purpose was fully served without identification and his purpose was not polemical. See Vedanta Darshan Ed. by Tarkabhysan, p. 156
- 57 Adhyasabhasyatatparyam.
- 58 Adhyasabhasya
59. Op. cit
60. Op. cit. '....avidyoti manyante      tatratvam sati yatra yadadhyasastatkritena dasena gunen va anumatrenapi na sa samvadyate'
- 61 The classical commentaries, however, take this 'beginninglessness' as eternally continuing in a rotatory process. They do not find any contradiction in the idea of 'anaditva' and 'janyatva' cf. *Vivaranaprayasamgraha* particularly. 'Karyasyadhyasasya anaditvam ayuktam iti cet matvam.
62. Vacaspati seems to support this rendering. 'Tadenena kramena adhyastam toyam paramarthatoyamiva, ataeva purvadristamiva. Tattieratatu na toyam, na ca purvadristam, kintu anrtam anirvacyam' Bhamati.
- 63 Vidyananya seems to have tried his hand in milking the he-goat. The subsequent failure did not lead him to the conclusion that the milking operation as itself unwarranted by the nature of the case, it only yielded the wrong conclusion that the he-goat could give milk in an *anirvacaniya* way cf. *Vivaranaprameya samgraha*.
- 64 This remarks apply to Vidyananya's presentation of the case.
- 65 This has been elaborately treated in Chapter V.
- 66 Sankara's own description- 'something assuming the character of some other object'
- 67 The Vivarana and Ratnaprabha description - 'Misappearance of a content in a foreign locus'
68. Sankara's own presentation through *purvapaksa*. See Adhyasa.
- 69 See Chapter V for a conclusive evidence in support of this observation.
- 70 The Pancapadika is evidently mistaken if it holds that the nacre or the real as itself is in immediate contact (*samprayukta*).
- 71 Cf. Sankara's 'mithya-jnana-nimittah' Adhyasabhasya-opening sentence
- 72 Pancapadika, pp 29-30. see also Ratnaprabha - 'siddhante alokakarsacaksusa vrttyabhivyaktia - saksividyantvam nabhasi it jneyam' This is imagination running riot.
- 73 Pancapadika, pp. 29-30.
- 74 Pancapadika, pp. 17-29.
- 75 *Ibid.*, pp. 17 also pp. 24
76. *Ibid.* pp. 17
- 77 Op. cit. pp. 17-18 and 29
- 78 Op. cit. pp. 24
- 79 Vedanta Darshan- Ed. by Tarkabhusan. p. 213.

## The Anirvacaniya and Reality

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Realisation of indivisible one-ness of the self (*atmaikatva*) as the ultimate truth of fact (*vidya*) is the only means of liberation from the bondage of life and its attendant miseries. That the Vedanta, as embodied in the Upanisads, propagates this as the truth Sankara undertakes to maintain and defend in course of his commentary on the Brahmasutras<sup>1</sup>. If the ultimate truth of fact does not seem at all evident, the reason is : we all labour under the spell of perennial *avidya* or ignorance which permeates all our conventional sources of knowledge and modes of behaviour<sup>2</sup>. But is it evident that our conventional knowing and understanding of the express order, as also our practical reactions in respect of it, is so vitiated ? It is not so evident, admittedly. But that does not prove that it cannot be, in fact, so vitiated. It is the very characteristic of the type of ignorance or *avidya* that Sankara speaks of, that one cannot know or realise one's actual condition so long as this *avidya* endures. The possibility of there having been such a condition or state of ignorance cannot, therefore, be excluded. That *actually* we are under the spell of ignorance and misconception follows partly from our inability to accept *atmaikatva* as the truth of fact, and partly from the declaration of the Upanisads that this our inability or natural handicap is due to our unsuspecting adherence to certain 'conditioned' way of living as absolute and final.

There is a clash, Sankara feels, between the testimony of our given habitual experience and the testimony of the Vedanta texts, the Upanisads, upholding *atmaikatva* (indivisible one-ness of the self) as the ultimate truth of fact. Where two testimonies, involving absolute claim to truth, clash with each other, but both seem to have some logical support, it is not possible to reject any of the them outright as absurd, more particularly, because the grounds of these conflicting beliefs are not the same. The revealed testimony of the Vedanta texts, however, seems to enjoy comparatively greater strength and persuasiveness in one important respect. It is this that besides explaining itself as having emanated from a detached, 'de-conditioned', and therefore, from a transcendental view-point, it explains also how the other way of *seeing* things can, as a matter of fact, be also possible and *has been possible*<sup>3</sup>. It, therefore, is more catholic and accommodating, and does not simply explain away the other view-point as absurd of *axat* like the hare's horn. It explains the other as *relative* to an ordinary 'conditioned', and so, to an unenlightened layman's conventional (*Vyavaharika*) mode of knowing and understanding. But, then, this other view-point is neither absolute nor ultimate,— it holds, this conventional mode of knowing and behaving, it argues, may be *revised* and even superseded and transcended. The other rival testimony — the testimony of the conventional perceptual experience, however, can neither accommodate the other, the revealed testimony even as a theoretic possibility,

nor can it resolve its own inherent contradictions. It can only keep its ground and defend itself by an improvised armour of scepticism – a scepticism which, as Wittgenstein has observed in our times, 'is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless'. The Upanisads resolve the opposition between their own testimony and the testimony of our ordinary gives and habitual experience by regarding the one as *vidya* and the other as *avidya*. It was, however, left to Sankara to specify the nature of this *avidya* and to unfold the hidden depths of its meaning by means of logical elaboration of the 'epistemic' in his concept of *adhyasa*. This, *adhyasa*, however, was a *figurative* and picturesque presentation of a state of illusion as is commonly understood. To guard against possible misinterpretation of his concept by a commoner who might take it literally to mean a subject's personal act of putting or grafting anything upon another *ab extra*, he did not spare any effort. But as we have shown earlier and will also reiterate now in a new way, in spite of all that Sankara put forth as correctives, not to speak of an unintelligent commoner, even his most renowned classical interpreters seem to have completely misunderstood him. By *adhyasa*, which means literally an illicit superimposition, what Sankara wanted to convey is mistaking a thing for what it is *not*, or misknowing it as other than what it is – *a-tasmin tadbuddhi*?

This miscognition or illusion, otherwise called Mithyapratyaya (false knowledge), is an irrational state of the mind. It is by nature, illegitimate and a such does not abide by any rule of logic or by any normal law of natural causation. In its regard, therefore, there can be no demand for a causal explanation, no urge for settling how and under what conditions it happens. In a sense, it is unpredictable. It happens when it happens and many not happen even though all circumstances known to be relevant for its occurrence are given or are present. Then, again Sankara had no interest in the general problem of illusion. His interest lay in explaining our conventional knowledge of ourselves as also of Reality – which stands in the way of realisation of the Vedantic truth as truth absolute – as a case of perennial illusion. This illusion for onething, is a given state of affairs without a beginning. We are in it, we cannot, therefore, be supposed to have contributed towards its development in an active way. The nearest analogy of this perennial illusion is the sky-illusion<sup>4</sup>. The dull observer miscognises the sky in term of certain shape and colour. He does not know the real sky which is not at all given. What is given is the appearance of the sky which, is the process of *misperceiving*, the dull observer illicitly superimposes on the real sky. As a result, he knows, in the sense of misknowing, that the sky is such and such. In this, the sky is not in the least affected, –only the observer shows his ignorance. His superimposition of form and colour on the sky also makes no sense. The sky which is invisible does not present itself to him as a visible locus to receive the imposition. His whole manoeuvre then boils down to his misknowing the sky as what it is not our conventional knowledge of the self which is, as itself, not an objective presentation but is yet the one unitary Reality, has, according to Sankara, to be understood in the same way. The general nature of this illusion, involved in our conventional knowledge and behaviour, Sankara expresses in term of his suggested '*atma-anatma-adhyasa*'. It is definitely a mistake to limit this '*atma-anatma-adhyasa*' simply to miscognition of the self as a bodied subject with mind and the sense-organs. That may be the most important and even the central aspect of this perennial illusion, and the one of our primary concern. But the Vedanta metaphysics, as adumbrated in the entire body of Upanisadic sayings, requires taking of this *adhyasa* in the larger perspective in which the entire manifest order of plural appearances has to be viewed as illusory appearances of the one Reality in multiple forms and designations. The traditional interpreters, failing to correlate Sankara's statements in the *Adhyasabhasya* with the general metaphysics projected in his *sutrabhasya*, as also with the Upanisadic texts, which form its background, seem to have limited *atma-anatma-adhyasa* merely to the individual's wrong notion about himself. Although they have taken the self, in this *adhyasa* or illicit superimposition, as standing

for the unobjective self-shining spirit, one and indivisible— that is, as the Advaita Vedanta self, regarded as the transcendental subject, they have taken the not-self (*anatma*) in a very limited sense to stand for the body, the mind and the sense-organs', or even for such empirical modes as *Karttrva*, *bhoktrva*, *raga*, *dosa*, etc.<sup>1</sup> They have failed to notice that this their rendering of the concept of *anatma* does not serve the purpose of explaining the entire realm of objective manifestation as an appearance, which is commonly mistaken for the Reality itself. The 'Reality' of the Advaita Vedanta is not simply described as the *Atman*, the one absolute self, but this *Atman* has, again been conceived as the whole Reality – *Brahman*. It becomes necessary, therefore, to show in what way the entire realm of plural subjects as also objects may be shown as illusory appearances of the one Real, and in that sense, as illicit superimposition upon it.

It may be contended Does not Sankara himself, in the later half of his *Adhyasabhasya*, speak of super imposition of caste, stage of life, age etc. on the self? Does he not also illustrate how external relations, bodily states, sensory functions and mental states are all superimposed on it<sup>2</sup>? Does he not say all about these in the very same context of *atma-anatma-adhyasa*? What impropriety can, therefore, be there in maintaining that these are *all* the items of *anatma* (not-self) if Sankara's meaning? The reply is, the items specified, all belong to Sankara's category of *anatma*, only that category is *not* limited to those items. Whatever is dependently revealed is *jada* and what ever is *jada* is *anatma*, the radical opposite of the self-revealing (*cidatma*). To put otherwise, whatever is a *visaya*, an objectively given 'this' is *anatma*, and *atma* of Sankara's conception is the *avisaya visayi* (unobjective subject). Sankara has taken the concepts in that way in the very opening line of the *Adhyasabhasya*. He has, again, reiterated that view in his summary statement at the end of the passages which deal with the specific items of *anatma* cited above. On this part also, while talking of *adhyasa* (illicit superimposition) and using expressions like '*adhyasyati*' (superimposes), '*adhyasya*' (having superimposed), he self it necessary to advise against literal rendering of those expression, since the beginningless *atma-anatma-adhyasa* must not be understood as the *result* of any human manipulation, an *event in time*. So he put *Adhyasa namu a-tasmin tadhuddhi ityavocama*—superimposition, to be sure, is knowing a thing to be what it is not'. The self, in this context, has been described as the universal witness (*sarvasaksin*) of all phenomenal presentation<sup>3</sup> and these latter are said to have been illicitly superimposed upon it *when in fact, we confound it* with the phenomenal presentations, vesting these latter with that unrejectedness which pertains to the former alone.

Can this entire realm of *anatma*, the totality of objective appearances, be explained in term of the so called beginninglessly preceding subjective impositions, all illicit, of the human minds upon the lone reality, as the traditional interpreter of both the schools of Advaita Vedanta wanted us to believe<sup>4</sup>? Even if, the *anatma* Sankara speaks of be taken to stand for the psycho-physical complexes which make up the empirical human agents, can a theoretical totality of such agents and their collateral experiences of phenomena objectivities be explained in term of the finite agents' own superimpositions in a beginningless process of limitless regression<sup>5</sup>? Even if it were possible to explain the enigma in that way, the root of the world-appearance would lie in the human agents and *not* in the transcendental Reality which would remain for ever undiscovered and unknown, the human agents all remaining unmatched in the beginningless throes of ignorance of their own manipulation. To allow this conception a theoretic foundation we shall have then to admit two reals—the transcendental real upon which the superimpositions accumulate and the human agents who cause the superimpositions. How can it than be said that the transcendental reality is the '*self*' of all, that it is all that is there? The analogies of the nacre-silver and rope-snake illusions, wrongly interpreted as involving *literal* superimposition of one content upon another from outside by the human agent, appear to give a misleading version of *Adhyasa* of Sankara's meaning.



Sankara's classical commentators, all of them, subscribed to the wrong idea that (1) *adhyasa* of Sankara's meaning involves, *literally*, a subjective act of superimposition of one content upon another, which is radically different, and (2) that Sankara was interested in showing how this *atma-anatma-adhyasa*, which, according to him, lay at the basis of over ignorant conventional behaviour and usage, could also be demonstrated as an instance of adventitious superimposition (taken literally) of *anatma* upon the *atma* by a human agent. In this, as we have already pointed out, they did not notice the essential link between the two concepts, *avidya* and *adhyasa* in Sankara's presentation, did not notice that the two concepts were interchangeable<sup>14</sup>, although, in common speech, we express as if *avidya* the cause of *adhyasa*. Had they noticed this, then, since *avidya* symbolises a principle of irrationality they could readily follow that there could be no logical demand for explaining how *atma-anatma-adhyasa* at all happens and so, the point raised by the *purvapaksa* was not relevant at all. In stead, they all misunderstood the question, raised through *purvapaksa* by Sankara himself, as a legitimate question, calling for a real answer. They did not even notice that Sankara did not actually give any answer conforming to the requirements of the question. He, on the other hand, in the body of his two replies demonstrated utter irrelevance of the point raised by *purvapaksa*. The irrelevant point raised through *purvapaksa* was intended to be a certain point of clarification in respect of a possible misconception which a casual reading of the two instances of common-place illusions cited by him as illustrations of *adhyasa* was likely to foster regarding the nature of *adhyasa* of his meaning. To circumvent that possibility he had already provided correctives in the body of the illustrations by his use of the affix 'vat'. But he wanted to be doubly sure. His classical commentators in their absorbing preoccupation with the parts failed to take a clear view of the whole, and as a result they could not correctly follow the drift of Sankara's argument in this section.

For a final disposal of the misgiving that our summary rejection of the classical interpretation in respect of Sankara's *adhyasa* may give rise to, let us briefly review Sankara's entire text in this section. The traditionalists seem to have failed to note that the texts, beginning with '*Aha Ko' yam adhyasa nameti*' and ending with '*evamaviruddhah pratyagatmani apt anatmadhyasah*' constitute one connected whole of Sankara's explanation of '*naisargika adhyasa*', introduced in the opening lines of the *Adhyasabhasya*. He had spoken of a perennial *adhyasa* of self and not-self *due to avidya* or *mithya jnana*, vitiating all our conventional knowledge and behaviour. It, then, devolved upon him to explain in what sense he regards this as an *adhyasa*. This explanation was no easy matter. The state of miscognition or illusion described by the concept is a state of immediate misapprehension involving a simple content. It is not understood as a miscognition so long as it endures. The understanding of it as a miscognition of a thing as *what it is not* requires shuffling to a reflective standpoint in which an antecedent state of miscognition is reviewed and analysed in graphic terms. This is unavoidable to make something intelligible to others. But this involves presenting a concept in terms of a commonly intelligible content. So Sankara begins with a cryptic statement, such as, '*smrtirupah paratra purvadrstavabhasah*' which presents all relevant features of a state of miscognition, when it is reflectively reviewed and analysed by us, in a nut-shell. This statement had quite a number of ramifications which it was not easy to muster. So he progressively unfolded his meaning, stage by stage, till he finally illustrated this meaning in term of his illustration of the sky-illusion in order to show that what he called *adhyasa* was the same as *avidya* as the wise people take it — '*tametamera-laksanakamadhyasam panditah avidhyeti mamvante*'<sup>15</sup>. Let us now consider the several stages of Sankara's clarification of the issue.

The first step in the clarification can be noticed in the alternative presentation of the current as descriptions of the phenomenon of illusion — which, however, as originally sponsored by the rival

schools, do not include or involve the expression *adhyasa* as an integral part. The appropriateness of the use of that expression in every classical description is brought out by showing that the idea that illusion involves '*anyasya anyadharmanavabhasata*' is not repugnant to any of the current views on the subject. It should be noted here that the word *avabhasa* (meaning misknowing something as what it is not), of the earlier statement is retained as it is in '*avabhasata*' of the later statement. For further clarification some instances of commonly known illusions are cited. But in these illustrations also the word '*avabhasa*' in some form is incorporated so that they may have the 'look' of illustrations of miscognition. But illustrations of illusions can only be illustration of *detected* illusions and also as these are commonly taken to be, — when there is no more any live illusion. A live illusion cannot *as such* be illustrated. So the two illustrations, cited by him had limitations of their own. Sankara feared that his unintelligent readers or listeners might understand his expression '*adhyasa*' literally to mean physical superimposition of one 'thing' upon another. So, as a corrective, he appended the affix '*vat*' to '*rajat*' and '*dvitiya*' to stress the point that there was no question of grafting one thing upon another, all that there happens is a thing *misappearing* like what it is not, or being miscognised as other than it is. He also retains the expression '*avabhasa*' bodily in the illustration '*suktika hi rajatavat avabhasata*' and retains its meaning in the phrasing of the second instance in the form '*sa-dvitiyavat iti*'. But, in spite of all the precaution he had taken to keep his concept within the limits of correct understanding, his illustrations, which illustrated cases of *detected*, *exposed* and *sublated* states of illusion, had created grounds for a new kind of misunderstanding.

The illustration, such as, 'it is nacre which misappears as silver' (*suktika hi rajatavat avabhasante*) when rendered in term of the grammatical expression '*adhyasa*' will read either as 'there is illicit superimposition of silver upon nacre' (*tatra suktikayam rajatasya adhyasa*) or as 'one superimposes silver on nacre' (*suktikayam rajatam adhyasyati*). In whatever way the illustration cited is understood, it has to be borne in mind that this illustration is *not* a *defacto* illusion-judgment, —it is, in fact, our conventional way of *interpreting* a *detected* and *sublated* illusion. In *actual* or *live* illusion, the locus or the real object such as, nacre remains concealed and unknown. This very fact, that is, 'ungiven-ness' or concealment of the real — the locus, is an indispensable condition of there being an illusion or misapprehension about it. Were it 'given' or presented as something out there in front (*purovasthita*), there could not be any illusion about it. A *de facto* illusion-judgment, therefore, is of the form '*this silver*' or '*this is silver*' and not of the form '*it is nacre which has misappeared as silver*'. It is this retrospective assessment of a by-gone illusion which contains the misleading suggestion that, in illusion proper, a foreign content (*visayantara*) is superimposed on a presented reality, that is, on an object actually given in front (*purovasthite visaye*). Sankara, could see that, notwithstanding his use of the corrective '*vat*' in the illustrations, and also his judicious incorporation of the expression '*avabhasante*' to suggest that the illustrations used are reflective assessments of by-gone illusions already sublated, the dullard (*vatah*) among his readers were likely to get confused and were likely to follow the wrong clue that '*adhyasa*' of Sankara's meaning is the illicit superimposition of a foreign content (*visayantara*), already lying handy, on the real, which is given as an object situated in front (*purovasthite visaye*). Such an unintelligent commoner was prone to misunderstand and misinterpret the illusions of nacre-silver and double moons as a human subjects' illicit acts of superimposition of some foreign contents on the real objects given in front. He might also overlook that illusions are not deliberately manipulated. He also might not understand that an illusion does not involve even a non-deliberate unconscious putting of one thing upon another, that it is simply misapprehension or misrepresentation of something as other than itself, and that the 'figure' of *adhyasa*, as introduced by Sankara, was intended to describe an illusion in a pictorial way. In any case, the figure of '*adhyasa*' describes a by-gone state of illusion. It is a mode of reflective

interpretation of a state of *avidya* or misknowing which has already happened, and *is not an explanation of how it happened*. So, there can be no sense in suggesting that in order that an *adhyasa* in sense of a live illusion or miscognition may take place, the real should be presented as an object situated in front so that a foreign content can be superimposed upon it. Yet, this is exactly what the *purvapaksa* in Sankara's text is designed to suggest. Sankara's intention is very clear. He wanted to show that the issue raised had no relevance and that an illusion in the sense of *adhyasa* of his meaning was not to be explained or accounted for in that way. An '*adhyasa*' does not become an illicit development by reason of superimposition of a foreign content on a presented locus to which it does not belong, as even the *Pancapadika* seems to have understood<sup>17</sup>, an *adhyasa*, on the other hand, is a figurative putting of an irrational development that is already, there, and it is due to that irrational development, a state of error, *avidya* or *mithyajnana*, that a misknowing of something as other than itself, (which is the same a illicit superimposition of one thing upon another) can be understood.

Let us briefly review the issues of absolute irrelevance which Sankara artfully puts forward through the contrivance of *purvapaksa* and his curt replies to them. Thus, the lay *purvapaksa* argues: 'in an illusion, such as, misperceiving a nacre as silver, we seem to superimpose silver, which is quite other than the presented object (*visayanantara*), upon nacre, the real object given in front (*purvasthita visaya*), but in the suggested *atma-anatma-adhyasa*, *atma* which was to be the locus in this case, cannot be supposed to be given as an 'object in front', since, by Sankara's own admission '*atma*' is incapable of being presented as an object *as itself*'. There are two important points the contender here misses. (a) The case of *known* illusion he is bringing forth for comparison is that of a detected and sublated illusion, and as such the features of this detected illusion have no relevance for the undetected *live* illusion which went before, and which cannot be *accounted for* in terms of these features misconstrued as conditions of *adhyasa*. (b) The objector also misses to note if, in the cited case of illusion, the nacre, *as it is in itself* is ever given either as a presented object (*visaya*) or as situated in front (*purvasthita*), as and when the illusion occurs. The truth is — were the nacre given *as itself* and as the object in front, it would have been perceived as that, and there would not have arisen any misperception of it as silver. It might have been there since it is subsequently found to be there when the illusion is sublated, but, all the same, it could not have been presented *as itself* or as the object-in-front, when illusion actually took place. The 'known' presents of the so called locus or its 'given-ness' *as it is in itself* is, therefore, no determining condition of illusion. In fact, it would be a counter-determinant. In order that a nacre might be misperceived as silver, it is necessary that it should *not* be presented *as itself*, but should be, on the contrary, compounded with such adventitious factors and circumstances that its real nature, that it, it as itself, might remain concealed and so ungiven, and a distorted appearance might be actually given in its place which then could be misinterpreted as real silver. Sankara's first reply throws light upon this mistake in the *purvapaksa*'s assumption. In the nacre-silver illusion, what is really given is a distorted image of the nacre under adventitious conditioning which shuts it out and projects the silver-appearance. In the proposed *atma-anatma-adhyasa*, therefore, the given contenthood (*visayatva*) or situatedness — in-front (*purvasthitatva*) of the self as itself cannot be legitimately demanded as a prerequisite. What can be demanded is its apparent contenthood and situatedness — in front under adventitious conditioning giving rise to a distorted appearance which can next be taken as the real self<sup>18</sup>. This then becomes an *Adhyasa* of not-self on the true self — which means taking the self as not-self or taking the not-self as the self. This point, the necessary 'ungiveness' of the real as it is in itself as an essential prerequisite of *Adhyasa* or illusion is brought out more clearly and conclusively in Sankara's second reply<sup>20</sup>. It became necessary, however, to bring in a new illustration — that of sky-illusion. The Reason is not far to seek. In nacre-silver illusion, which is an event in time and is also limited in duration,

although during the actual occurrence of this illusion the nacre as itself is never given as an object in front and what is given in front is its distorted appearance under adventitious circumstances, yet that nacre as itself is, again, presented as an object in front when the previous illusion is sublated. So, the nacre sometimes remains concealed and ungiven under the form of the distorted appearance of silver and is, again, sometimes known as given in itself. In fact, it is this given-ness of nacre under normal conditions which misled the *purvapaksa* into supposing that in illusion also (which is an abnormal situation) the nacre as itself remains given in front and an alien content such as the illusory silver is grafted upon it. It is to avoid risk of misunderstanding of this kind that Sankara introduces a new illustration where the illusion is not ordinarily sublated and the 'real' of which is never given as a direct content in front although it is ever misperceived and also misthought in that way. Also, the adventitious conditions under which the sky is given as a mere appearance are not known as adventitious and distinguishable.

There is also another reason which guided Sankara to this illustration. The *atma-anatma-adhyasa* he was seeking to elaborate is a case of perennial *adhyasa* with no known beginning in time. The sky-illusion closely resembles it. In both cases, the real is never given as a direct content. Neither of the two can be taken as an event in time (*janya*). Neither of them, can again, be looked upon as a human manipulation on a reality already known. The sky-illusion is not limited to one individual's misperception, it is something common and general. So also is the *naisargika adhyasa* of not-self on the self. It is the very nature of *atma-anatma-adhyasa* that the not-self is apprehended as the self, a mere appearance of the absolute reality is misjudged as that absolute reality. It is also the nature of sky-illusion that a mere appearance of the sky, the not-sky, is apprehended as the sky itself. The 'given-ness' of the locus, the real, as an object in front is then no condition of misperception of nacre nor is it a condition of illusion or *adhyasa* of any description what so ever. So, we find Sankara concluding—'na ca ayam asti', *niyamah purovasthite eva visaye visayanantaram adhyasitavyam* — there is no such rule that in order that there may be an illusion a foreign content is to be superimposed on an object given in front.

If the above be the correct rendering of Sankara's statements in the context, where do our classical commentators stand? It is clear that they could not understand Sankara's real purpose in raising issues which he considered irrelevant through the device of the *purvapaksa*. He wanted to emphasize that an illustration of an illusion which has to be the illustration of a known and detected illusion and which is commonly understood in a certain pattern of presentation should not be misread as illustrating a *live* illusion. This is brought home to us by showing that a *live* illusion cannot be explained in terms of conditions stipulated on the basis of the examples of detected and sublated illusions. Both schools of Sankara's interpreters (1) misread Sankara's *adhyasa* as an illicit superimposition literally, (2) both the schools understood Sankara as answering and accommodating the points raised in the *purvapaksa's* question, (3) both the schools, again, attempted to give a logical and explanatory account of the irrational which is *adhyasa*, (4) both the schools, also, took *adhyasa* as a case of human manipulation and so, even the *naisargika adhyasa* of Sankara's conception was taken as *caused* or engendered (*janya*) and the *anaditva* (beginninglessness) of *atma-anatma-adhyasa* was sought to be explained in term of a limitless series of regressive *adhyasa*, each of which was a consequence of an earlier fixation. Nothing can be gained by drawing up a completed list of these aberrations. It will be enough to say that they completely misunderstood the nature of an *adhyasa* of Sankara's meaning as they misunderstood also the perennial *atma-anatma-adhyasa* that Sankara accepted as forming the basis of *naisargika lokavyavahara*. One would be feeling amused at Vidyanaraya's attempt to demonstrate *anirvacanīyata* (indeterminability) of *adhyasa* of self and not-

self on the ground of logical impossibility coupled with empirical given-ness or actuality – starting initially with the wrong premise that *adhyasa* is physically herding together of two incompatibles<sup>21</sup>. His defence of *anaditva* of *adhyasa* even though *janya*, that is, even though an event in time, is really astounding<sup>22</sup>. There have been quite a lot of parasitical fads foisted upon Sankara's Advaita by these commentators. They had to put up ingenious construction in defence of Sankara's basic ideas, failing to grasp their correct import. We shall not enter into any discussion on them at this stage.

In spite of all that we have said, our rendering of the portion of *Adhyasabhasya* beginning with, the question: *Katham punah pratyagatmani avisaye adhyaso visaya- taddharmanam* to the end of Sankara's two replies may be regarded as far-fetched and not conforming to the words used in the text. So, let us review this portion more pointedly. What is suggested in the question is that *adhyasa* as an illusory superimposition requires an objective locus, and this objective locus is invariably given in front and in direct contact, and upon this some other, and so, an alien content is then superimposed. Does this not show that the *purvapaksa* was arguing, taking his stand upon the cited illustrations of *adhyasa* and that he was of the idea that in a case like nacre-silver illusion, one superimposes 'silver' on the 'nacre' which is given as an objective locus in immediate contact and in front? If so, is not this rendering of nacre-silver illusion a palpable mistaken? Had nacre been actually given, and also in direct contact in front, how could there be any mistake about it and an illusory superimposition? Evidently, an *adhyasa* as illicit superimposition as one thing *misappearing* as another (*anyasya anyadharmanabhasata*)<sup>23</sup>, cannot be explained in that way. Now let us look to Sankara's replies in a connected way as one whole – in spite of taking them separately. The contender (*purvapaksa*) apparently demanded fulfillment of the condition of given-ness *as itself* – *saksat visayatva* as also given-ness in front (*purovasthitva*) of the pure self which was to be locus of superimposition (which was to *misappear* as not-self). Does Sankara's reply that the pure self may be *in one way*, and so indirectly regarded as a *visaya* (object) as well, and that this is when it is taken through the conditioning of the ego<sup>24</sup> (first reply), and again that direct presentedness of the locus is not a condition of illicit superimposition<sup>25</sup> (second reply) – actually meet the points raised by the *purvapaksa*? Does this not, on the contrary, suggest that *adhyasa* as misappearance of something as something else (*anyasya anyadharmanabhasata*) requires that what is to be confounded or misknown must *not be given as it is in itself in front* but always under some adventitious conditioning so that its true nature may remain concealed, and it may be distorted into an appearance, which can then be misconstrued as the real, given in front? Do not then his replies suggest that the contender was arguing from a wrong point of view and that *adhyasa* as misapprehension of something as something else, or misappearance of a content radically different from its true self, has for its prerequisite 'given-ness' of the fact in question only *under adventitious conditions* so that an appearance may be projected in order to be subsequently misconstrued, – and not 'given-ness' of the fact *as it is* in immediate contact, or in front? Is not nacre or rope given under adventitious conditions and not *as themselves*), and is not the distorted appearance of nacre or rope it is, that is misconstrued as real silver or real snake? Or are you really mad that you would go forward to superimpose 'silver' or 'snake' upon a nacre or a rope, given *as themselves* in front? The *purvapaksa*'s version then does not explain illusion or *adhyasa*.

Is it not really astounding that the classical interpreters, scholars as they were of incredible depth and erudition, should have failed to notice that the real requires to be given under adventitious conditions as a distorted appearance in order that there may be a misapprehension or *adhyasa* at all, and that this misapprehension of *adhyasa* consists in taking this distorted appearance, *not as a*



distorted appearance, but as the very real itself? And what is superimposition? Is it not another name for supplanting the truly real by the fancied real is it not regarding the latter as the real in lieu of the former, which is the *de facto* real? Superimposition cannot be holding the real and the unreal side by side, nor can it be herding them together. The expression '*mithunikṛtya*' or Sankara<sup>27</sup> should not be taken in the physical sense of coupling. It means condouning one with the other or confounding one as the other -*itaretaradhyasa*<sup>28</sup> - misidentification.

That a distortion of the real as a mere appearance is to be there so that there may be a misapprehension or *adhyasa* through wrong interpretation is undoubtedly a momentous discovery of Sankara and this is the most vital thing brought out in his first replying to the *purvapaksa*<sup>29</sup>. Even an illusion or *adhyasa* is not a wholly arbitrary development. An illusion is not a hallucination. An *adhyasa* is not an unrestrained fancy. It has some grounding in the real in some way. The real is sometimes given *not as itself but as an appearance*. Why it is given in that way is not always explicable. We know how a nacre may be given as a silver-appearance, how a rope may be given as a snake-appearance sometimes. The conditions of given-ness of these 'mere appearances' are known as we have direct experience of nacre or rope independently. But why the sky should be presented as a blue canopy which is its 'mere appearance' is not ordinarily known to us, and we do not have a direct knowledge of the sky as itself and independently, although Padmapada and his followers in display of their wayward (uncalled for) ingenuity think otherwise<sup>30</sup>. We do not also know how and why the self-shining, self-complete, reality displays itself in the mere appearance' or multiple subjects and objects<sup>31</sup>. We do not know why to be *objectively given*, it should allow itself to degenerate into the manifest cosmic pluralities. Yet, such is a necessary part of the game. The cosmic plurality - in essence, a distorted appearance - has to be projected there so that, on the next, this may be misconstrued as the true Reality and *as thus misconstrued* may be an illicit superimposition, an *adhyasa* on Reality which remains hidden under its cosmic veil<sup>32</sup>. Is this not real Sankara, - the interpreter of the Advaita Vedanta doctrine of the Upanisads? But who is that misconstrues, who is that superimposes? That is, another aspect of the world-game. But there is not only *misconstruing*, there is *re-discovery* as well. That is also there in the cosmic arrangement, -in the cosmic planning. But why? Do not push a question beyond the bounds of all legitimacy.

If the need for emergence of a distorted appearance through adventitious conditioning be one side of Sankara's discovery, the otherside is the fact that it is simple *misconstruing* this distorted appearance, a 'mere appearance' at the origin, *as the real* - which is all that an illusion or *adhyasa* involves. In other words, in illusion, there is no free or absolute construction out of nothing as it were, there is, to the contrary, a misinterpretation of a 'given' appearance-not as a 'mere appearance' -but as the real. This possibly distinguishes Sankara's position from that of the classical Buddhists. It is not a psychosis, a mental state, or an internal fact which, in illusion or *adhyasa*, is apprehended as a given external reality. This also distinguishes Sankara's position from that of the *akṣatrvadi* and *anyathakṣatrvadi*. This misconstrued real which is the illusory is not the compounded form of a presentation and a representation, there being no such representation in the picture, near is it the given real of some other context, since the illusory appearance is not the real of any time or place whatsoever. Nor is the illusory an absolute naught taken as a fact. It may persist and continue to be a 'mere appearance' even when misinterpretation in its regard, that is, mistaking it as the real, is got over. It can be seen that the *anirvacanīya*, the neither real nor unreal of the Advaita Vedanta, is this 'mere appearance' and *not* the illusory *as such*. We shall leave this off for consideration at present to avoid unnecessary misgiving.



Admittedly, it was not an easy thing for a theorist, even of Sankara's eminence, to express through the figures and modes of conventional language the type of thing Sankara meant by the perennial ignorance or *avidya* which shuts us out from *vidya*, that is, right knowledge of Reality as itself. This right knowledge, the truth of fact, was to be recognised as *atmaikatva* (transcendental one-ness of the self). An appreciation of a truth of this kind demands a *reductio* and *absurdum* of the other truth, the conventional belief that not only the plural selves that do appear but also the several worlds of objective presentation which are their collateral manifestations are all real. *Atma ca Brahma* – the one self spoken of by the Upanisads is not only the real self but it is also *all* the reality. The given totality of plural subjects and things will, therefore, have to be taken as only *phenomenal appearances* of the true Reality. We, ourselves, the finite knowers and empirical subjects, are also integral parts of this appearance. It will not do to say that this world-appearance *does not actually appear*, that is, not there even as an appearance. Sankara's Advaitism is not committed to the admission of such an absurdity. All the same, this Advaitism does not admit that what thus appears is *real*. What appears, does, as a matter of fact, so appear, and there can be no questioning of it thus far. But what appears is not to be taken, not to be understood, as the real, –it is just an appearance. *Ajnana* or *avidya*<sup>31</sup> does not consist in regarding the appearance as appearance. In fact, this would be a kind of *vidya*, right knowledge, since it is knowing an appearance as an appearance and is not what Sankara describes as '*a-tasmin tadbuddhi*' –knowing a thing as what it is *not*. *Ajnana* or *avidya* consists in regarding the appearance as the Reality itself. This is '*a-tasmin tadbuddhi*' and this is the *Adhyasa*, the illicit superimposition that Sankara speaks of.

Will it be an illusion if we know and believe that the silver-appearance of the nacre is a 'mere appearance' only and what is really there, is the nacre, and none other than it? Evidently, not. No ignorance or *avidya* is involved in knowing the plural appearances as appearances only – on the very same line of argument. So, *avidya* or *ajnana*, can be supposed to be involved in taking the silver-appearance as *real silver* (and this is exactly what is really meant by saying that a nacre is taken for silver) as also in taking the varied appearances of the one reality as *that reality*. It is this sort of mistaking of one thing for another that Sankara wanted to convey by his rhetorical figure '*adhyasa*', illicit superimposition. There can be no better and more suggestive description of this phenomenon, provided it is rightly understood. And this has been the crux of the entire problem, and misunderstanding of this one pivotal concept has given rise to series of misunderstanding of the fundamental issues of Sankara's Vedanta. The most grievous part of it – Sankara's accredited exponents, his classical commentators, have fundamentally misunderstood Sankara. As a result, Sankara's Advaitism has been misrepresented as a form of illusionism in which Reality is one without a second and all else is not even mere appearance but is plainly illusory. It will be our endeavour next to show that such a drastic conclusion is not borne out by Sankara's texts.

The genesis of the mistake can be traced to the fundamentally wrong interpretation of *adhyasa* as an imposition of a content *ab extra*. While, according to Sankara, an *adhyasa* is just another name for *avidya* and while it is just mis-knowing a thing as what it is not (*a-tasmin tadbuddhi*), and while this misknowing has only been figuratively described as an illicit superimposition, and lastly, while this illicit superimposition has been indicated by Sankara himself as *due to mithya-jnana*, the classical commentators have all put the cart before the horse. We have already urged this point repeatedly on account of its prime importance. The flaw lies in the attempted causal explanation of *adhyasa*, which is only a figurative putting of *avidya* or ignorance. Thus instead of regarding the illusion of silver as mistaking a situational *misappearance* or distortion of nacre (to a perceiver who is also a part of that situation) as real silver, an attempt has been made to give to out as the

resultant product of an erroneous and arbitrary act of superimposition of silver, an alien content upon a nacre. It is not seen that this silver is not any silver, past or present, but simply a silver-appearance miscognised as real silver and that this silver appearance is nothing but the *nacre appearing as silver* in the complex situation of mal-presentation. It is not also seen that this silver-appearance may continue to appear, although we may not believe it to be real any more, and this, means the same thing, *even though we do not illicitly superimpose it on the real any longer*. That a miscognition or illusion is *due to aropa*, in other words, that *mithya-jnana* is *aropa-janya*, is a fundamental error of interpretation which the Vivarana school in particular has harboured. Coming to interpret *atma-anatma-adhyasa* on the very same line as *aropa-janya*, the school has rendered the Sankarite concept of *anadi-naisargika-adhyasa* absolutely unmeaning. It is strange that Vacaspati, who exhibits superb insight in his interpretation of *purvadrstavyabhava* of Sankara as a floating appearance without any habitat in so far as it is an *avabhava* of *purvadrsta* and not anything *purvadrsta*<sup>44</sup> (as the Pancapadika wrongly holds), commits the same mistake. Evidently, all of them were misguided by the question raised by the *purvapaksa* which they understood as a relevant question.

This conception of *adhyasa* as *aropa* has led to disastrous consequences. The academic impropriety of the notion we have already considered at length. We may briefly sum up some of our findings. It exposes Advaitism to a dualism between reality and its appearance and this appearance in order to appear requires an imposition from without. Side by side this dualism there will be another—the dualism between Reality and the finite human agent who is to superimpose appearance in utter foliations or ignorance. This also necessitates taking of the *naisargika atma-anatma-adhyasa* as *janya*, an event in time, and the two classical schools, as we have seen, have been driven into the acceptance of a beginninglessly rotating process of successive *adhyasa* in their futile attempt to cover up the *anadi adhyasa* that Sankara speaks of.

The question of academic propriety apart, certain more disastrous consequences seem to have followed from the traditional account of *adhyasa* as a human manipulation or imposition, can it be that the nacre or the rope, under certain adventitious conditions, *do not at times merely appear* as something looking like silver or snake *without this appearance being actually believed* as real silver or real snake? It may be that our knowledge of such appearances as *mere* appearances in such cases is dependent on our knowledge of the given objects as being *really* a piece of nacre or rope. But the fact stands out that there is a real difference between a 'mere' appearance and an *illusory* appearance, and to be an appearance does not always mean to be an illusory appearance. An illusory appearance has to be delusive. It has to be taken for the real in order to be illusory. The fact of something *merely appearing* as some other, and its being *mistaken* for that other seems to need a clear distinction. The latter, the mistaken identity of one thing with another—which is radically different, seems to be in some way dependent on the former that is, something 'merely appearing' as something else due to adventitious circumstances. Had there been no appearance at all as 'mere appearance', there could not possibly be any illusory appearance. This is not suggesting that everywhere a 'mere appearance' and an 'illusory' appearance are to be, necessarily, successive developments. Such may not be the case. But as correction of error and illusion in some cases also shows, something may still linger, or hang on, even though the real of the situation is known and the illusion or error is got over. This goes to show that the *totality* of circumstances determining an illusion or illusory appearance cannot be explained in term of subjective manipulation—which alone could be regarded as the subject's own illicit superimposition in the case. To take the case of sky-illusion: the dusky dome-like appearance of the invisible sky may be due to the shadow cast by our globe on the transparent vacuous medium which is the sky we know. But can it be maintained that we, the human perceives, superimpose that shadow? Our activity or agency is limited only to misinterpretation.

The point we are driving at is — can the manifest order of all phenomenal subjects and objects be regarded as *simply illusory* and can this be the version of Sankara Vedanta as we have in the *sutrabhasya*? Can this, again, be the correct version of the truth that the Upanisads, according to Sankara, embody? To be more direct and also more exacting, Are the world-pluralities simply *our impositions* on Reality, are they all our free constructions, and does the Upanisadic saying 'here there is no plurality' — *neha nanasti kinacana* — really suggest that the pluralities cannot be mere appearances but are all *illusory*? Sankara, no doubt, says that our conventional behaviour *naisargika loka-vyavahara* as also all our conventional knowledge, involving dualism of knower and known (*pramana-prameya-vyavahara*), is vitiated by ignorance or *avidya*. But does this really imply that, according to Sankara, the given order of plural appearances,— of the many subjects and objects,— even as an appearance is necessarily an illusory appearance? Are these simply conjured up by us through our ignorant fancies and superimposed on Reality? What are we then? The makers of all these worlds? A very creditable fact no doubt, but are we not ourselves parts of this appearance, and are we not ourselves, therefore, illusory? Can an illusory imposition by the illusory become, or remain, an illusory superimposition? Again, wherefrom do we manufacture the plural appearances we superimpose? From no where? Is Sankara guilty of suggesting all these absurdities? Does not this expose the system to a metaphysical dualism between Reality and ourselves? The media of illicit superimposition by misinterpreting that is,—the mechanism of distortion of Reality into its mere appearances as also the so called plural illusory appearances as themselves will have to be all somehow accommodated in the structure and constitution of Reality to escape dualism. But how is that possible in this kind of rendering of Sankara?

The fact is — neither Sankara nor the Upanisads can be supposed to have held that all the plural manifestations are *our impositions* on Reality and that all these are *simply illusory*. What is illusory is that *there are, in fact, plural realities*, or that Reality is plural, simply because *it appears as plural*. The world-pluralities are *mere appearances*, and it is only when we take them as *real* themselves, that we make them illusory appearances, since this taking of them as *real* means ignorance of the truly real which merely *appears as there*. The Real's *appearing* as many, and being *mistaken* as that many, need to be clearly distinguished one from the other. On the ultimate analysis, it will be shown that even these are two *vibhavas* (aspects or postures) of Reality, since there is, and can be, *only one reality* comprehending and encompassing everything that there appears, — either as mere appearances or as illusory appearances. Nothing stands out against or in distinction from, the one Reality. The plural are, in one phase, its *mere appearances*, and in another phase, its illusory appearances. What is denied in the system is not that there are plural 'appearances' or that Reality *appears as a 'many'*, what the Upanisads have denied and Sankara himself also denies is that Reality itself is, therefore, many, since this means the same thing as saying that the many, the plural, are as *themselves* real. This important, nay, one of the most vital themes of the Vedanta of Sankara's meaning gets completely lost once we adhere to the fundamentally wrong view that the plural appearances even as appearances are due to our impositions, that they are all subjective and products of our ignorance. The truth is that these appearances are coeval with us (and we ourselves are included in the totality of these plural (appearances)), and it is only the regarding of the pluralities, including ourselves, as *real* and as *existing* (*sat* or '*asti*') which renders these all (including ourselves) *into* illusory appearances.

And does not Sankara mean exactly the same when he says that it is our conventional modes of knowledge and understanding, and our conventional modes of behaviour based upon them which are vitiated by ignorance and illicit superimposition? In our conventional knowledge and behaviour,

we do not take the world appearances (in clouding ourselves) as *mere* appearances which they actually are. We take them as substantive entities, nay, as the Reality itself? We do not know of any other reality, the world of cosmic appearances becomes *all* the reality to us. This is ignorance or *avidya*. This is what is called knowing a thing as other than itself. This is read as illicit superimposition or *adhyasa* in so far as it involves supplanting Reality by its appearances, considered *not* as appearances but as the Reality itself in the form of an artificial aggregate, a nominal totality, of partly related and partly unrelated constituents. This is taking the silver-appearance as real silver, and not-knowing the nacre of which the silver-appearance is undoubtedly a 'given appearance' under adventitious factors and conditions. The adventitious conditions, there, are *determinates* (*avacchedaka*) of silver-appearance, but are only *limiting factors* (*upadhi*) in respect of nacre. An illusion or misrecognition, then, requires *three* things and not *two* as is generally maintained. There is to be (1) *avarana* (covering up) of the real, (2) *viksepa* (projection) of the appearance, and (3) *adhyasa* (superimposition) of the appearance upon the real in the sense of taking the appearance as the reality itself. And this is *anatmi-karana* of reality – taking reality as *other than itself*. In the context of Sankara's Reality, this is taking the worked-appearance as the reality itself. This kind of taking renders it into a false appearance. But it is definitely wrong to take the world-appearance of plural subjects and objects *as such*, that is, as 'mere appearance' also as false. It is definitely wrong also to hold that it is Sankara's own view or the view maintained in the Upanisads that Brahman *does not even appear* as the world of plural appearances. If that were the fact, whence is the world-appearance? It will not do to say that it is due to our superimposition, since we ourselves are parts of this world appearance. This is also a case of putting the cart before the horse. Had not the world appearance been there *in some way*, how could there be any illicit superimposition?

But has it not been maintained earlier<sup>14</sup> in our analysis of the notion of *adhyasa* the the *anatma* (not-self) cannot be supposed to lie handy and readymade in order to be superimposed *ab extra*? Has it not been maintained that the *anatma* (not-self) is a product of antecedent state of illusion and the 'figure' of *adhyasa* or superimposition is only a elaboration which? Is there, then, no contradiction involved in the above supposition that the world-appearance should be there in *some way* in order to be superimposed illicitly? A closer view of the statue of a *mere* appearance becomes necessary in this context. It is not the silver-appearance which is really the *other* of nacre, the (not-nacre). But it is the *real* silver it is taken to be in ignorance, which is the 'not-nacre'. Is not silver-appearance the very appearance of nacre under adventitious conditions? It may not be nacre as itself. But, all the same, it is not also the 'absolute other' of nacre the, not-nacre? In fact, it is neither nacre nor 'other than nacre' or 'not-nacre', while the real silver it is taken to be in illusion or misrecognition is that absolute other, the 'not-nacre'. It is this 'not-nacre', that is, the *silver-appearance taken as real silver* (not the 'mere' appearance of silver) which we had claimed as incapable of lying handy any where *before* illusion and so, *before* the figurative superimposition, – in order that it, might be superimposed *ab extra* any by reason of that superimposition, rendered into an illicit, illusory context. It can be seen therefore, that prior to illusion, that is, prior to misinterpretation of a silver-appearance *as real silver* there cannot be the 'not-nacre', – a seemingly coeval reality. The silver-appearance, which is the result of adventitious conditioning of nacre, and is a 'mere' appearance so far, is *not* that 'not-nacre', if for no other reason, at least for this reason that silver-appearance is what the nacre appears to be under adventitious conditions. The adventitious conditions which are *objective* determinants of an appearance as a 'mere' appearance need to be distinguished from the subjective misinterpretation which construe it not as an appearance but as a given reality (which is the absolute other of the real is itself). The traditional interpreters, we have argued, did not take *adhyas* as an illicit superimposition in the 'intended' figurative sense. They took it literally, being

misled by the verbal form of the expression as also by the 'form' of the question raised artfully by Sankara himself through the device of a *purvapaksa* with a view to bringing out a point of clarification. In nacre-silver illusion, there is no literal superimposition of silver on nacre, and the illusion or mis-cognition is not the *result* of such imposition understood as illegitimate. The silver there is no real silver and cannot, therefore, lie handy for superimposition. It is the illusory silver which has no natural habitat anywhere. In order that it may be there, there must be the illusion already there, that is, there must have taken place a mis-interpretation of the given silver appearance as *real silver*. This illusion, in essence, turns out to be supplanting the nacre by a seemingly real silver and this is all that Sankara means by his 'illicit superimposition' (*adhyasa*) of silver upon nacre.

In *atma-anatma-adhyasa*, is no real entity any more that the illusory silver mistaken as real silver is a real entity. It does not lie handy to be superimposed and the illusion or *avidya* is *not* a product or result of that illicit superimposition. That would be putting the cart before the horse. The *anatma*, in individual reference, is the psycho-physical appearance misinterpreted as the real subject or self. This psycho-physical body etc. is the result of a mysterious adventitious conditioning just as the sky-appearance is the result of an unknown conditioning. And this happens to be misinterpreted as the real self and so superimposed on the real *Atma* in the someway that sky-appearance is misinterpreted as the real sky or is superimposed on the real sky. How the universal self which cannot be a given appearance as itself and is out and out *unobjective* (*avisaya*) comes to be given thus in phenomenal form through adventitious self conditioning is unknown. But all the same, it cannot be doubted that it has been given thus phenomenally in the appearance consisting of the psycho-physical complex anymore there we can doubt that the sky has been given in its delimited dome-like appearance. Now, if we regard this appearance only as an appearance, there is no illusion or *adhyasa*. Illusion crops up only if we regard the psycho-physical appearance as real substantively, only if we regard the delimited dome-like appearance as anything real substantively. What does this regarding the physical or dome-like appearance as real involve? Undoubtedly, this involves regarding these appearances as the real self and the real sky and so superimposing what is substantially not-self (*anatma*) and not-sky on the true self and the true sky, — although *referentially*, since neither of these is ever given as a direct object, or a presented locus.

But, it may be contended, is there no real disparity between nacre-silver illusion and *atma-anatma-adhyasa*? In one case, illusion consists in misinterpreting a given silver-appearance as real silver, while in the other case, it seems to consist in misinterpreting a phenomenal 'self-appearance' as the real self and not in misinterpreting a not-self appearance (*anatma-bhava*) as real not-self (*anatma*). In reply, we may put is not silver-appearance, in one sense, same as, *a-sukti* (not nacre) appearance, and the fancied real silver the very same as fancied real *a-sukti* (not nacre)? Can we not also regard phenomenal self-appearance as in essence, an *anatma*-appearance, that is, *anatma* in the form of an appearance, and the illusion or illicit superimposition of *anatma* upon *atma* simply consisting in regarding that *anatma*-appearance not as an appearance but as real? It can be seen that the '*anatma*' of the Vedanta is no specific object or entity like silver. Nor is *atman* a specific content like nacre (*sukti*). The analogy of nacre-silver illusion breaks down at this point and so Sankara brings in a new analogy, the sky-illusion, which may be regarded also as sky-not-sky *adhyasa* in the same way that what is virtually the self-illusion or *atman-adhyasa* is also regarded as self-not-self or *atma-anatma-adhyasa*. Even in these *adhyasas*, there are two stages which should be clearly kept in view. (a) The stage of apparent given-ness which although spoken of as 'apparent givenness of the sky or the *Atma* in the absence of our knowledge of any other referable entity in both cases, is really the given-ness of the not-sky or not-self appearance. (b) The misjudging of the given appearance



as *real*, which involves real *adhyasa* in so far as this misjudged not-sky appearance or not-self appearance as *real* becomes an imposition on the sky or *atma*, without affecting either of them materially. It can be seen that neither the sky or the Vedantic self is capable of being given as itself. They can only be given by way of an appearance. Such an appearance in respect of the self, although a not-self appearance or *anatma*-appearance is, in conventional language, spoken of as an 'appearance of the self' in the same way as 'the dome-like appearance' which is really a 'not-sky, appearance' is conventionally referred to as an 'appearance of the sky'. The superimposition or *adhyasa* of the not-self (*anatma*) on the self or the not-sky (*anakasa*) on the sky (*akasa*) means simply regarding these appearances, *not as appearances, but as real*. It can be seen also that '*atma*' and '*anatma*' are metaphysical categories unlike the empirical concepts, such as, '*sukti*' and '*rajata*'. '*Sukti*' and '*rajata*' are also *both* existents in other contexts. Not so the Vedantic '*atma*' and '*anatma*'. Just as the sky we know (in term of its appearance) is not existentially real so also the self we know conventionally is not existentially real. The sky and the self, conventionally known, are really *anakasa* and *anatma*. As themselves, these are *mere appearances* and when superimposed on the sky or *atman* or identified with them these are illusory appearances. These do not have any distinct habitat of their own.

We come now to the main point of our discussion in this chapter, the distinction between a mere appearance and the illusory is very vital for Sankara Vedanta, although this has been very often confused. The illusory is sometimes described as illusory appearance also. But it should be noted that as and when the illusory is illusory it remains delusive, and is mistaken for the real, and so it is *not* then regarded either as illusory or as an appearance. The description of something as an 'illusory' appearance is incidental to the *detection* of the illusory as illusory and the consequent sublation. What is this then that is described as or is referred to as an 'illusory appearance'? Let us ask. The patent reply has been that it is the *previously* felt or perceived real which is no longer so felt or perceived. But what is this which was once so felt or perceived and is not so felt or perceived now? It will not be correct *this time* to say that it is the illusory, rather we should say it is that which *was* the illusory. Next, we may say, what is that which became the illusory? The answer this time should be that it is the 'mere appearance' which became illusory in being misinterpreted as the real. After sublation of the illusory (the fancied real), this mere appearance may not hold out as an *appearance* still, but since an illusion is different from a hallucination, it cannot be debated that there *was* really something given as an appearance which *became* the illusory in being subjectively interpreted as the real. There are, thus, two issues which come to light (a) a 'given' appearance as a 'mere appearance', and (2) the subjective misinterpretation which renders it as the illusory (fancied real). These two phases have to be distinguished. The conditions which make, or give rise to, an appearance (mere appearance) and the conditions which determine, or give rise to the illusory are not exactly the same. The illusory is dependent on subjective interpretation, a vicious interpretation, so to say, of the given appearance which does not take note of it as an *appearance*. A given appearance, no doubt, in order to be 'given', requires to appear to a perceiver, requires to be presented through some subjective media, and so some subjective factor is involved there also. But this factor is barely receptive there, and not constructive or constitutive—, being itself a part of the given setting of objective presentation. It assumes a substantive role or itself subsequently when it changes its role into that of an interpreter, the subject. Alongwith its own 'assumed substantivity' it imposes substantivity to the given appearance, changing it into the substantive real. This explains our taking of the world of objective appearance, the plural objects and subjects as real as ourselves.



Even in the analysis of ordinary illusions, such as, mistaking a nacre as (illicit superimposition of silver on nacre) the same two phases may be noticed. There is, at first, the silver-appearance as a given 'mere appearance', and, then, there is subjective interpretation of it as real silver. There is transition of the subjective factor from mere receptivity to active construction or judgmental interpretation. It is for this reason that one can say that a mere appearance is dependent on conditions *pre-eminently* objective, while the illusory needs compounding of those objective conditions with the subjective, the latter assuming a determining, an action judgmental role. The traditionally recognised *avarana* and *viksepa* seems to be the conditions of 'mere' appearance'. They are also *necessary* conditions of the illusory but cannot by themselves alone constitute its *sufficient* conditions. The illusory involves taking of the appearance as real and so superimposing this new real on the real itself and this is *adhyasa*, as figuratively understood. It can also be seen that by correction of an illusion or error and the consequent suspension or withdrawal of *adhyasa* as figuratively understood, an appearance is not *always* eliminated. Elimination of an appearance is dependent on the removal of the adventitious conditions of its given-ness all together and these include the total objective conditions of its presentation in which the subject's own receptivity also figures. And in a case where the simple fact of 'given-ness' as a content' is a mark of an appearance, as in the case of the sky or the transcendental self, to get over appearance one has to get over this given-ness' and the subject-object relation which is its foundation. We are now as yet concerned with that theoretic possibility.

We are, at this stage, concerned with setting upon what it is that is describable as a 'mere' appearance, and what it is that is an 'illusory' appearance in the context of the Advaita philosophy of Sankara. We shall, here, hazard the opinion that, rightly analysed and understood, the 'mere' appearance and the 'illusory' appearance are 'functional descriptions' of the very same entity in two divergent contexts of reference. As we have already explained, it is the 'mere' appearance which, in being misinterpreted as real, becomes the illusory. This illusory, again, when it is detected as illusory, that is, as 'not-being- the -real-it-pretended- to be ' is taken to be an 'illusory appearance'. In this development, the appearance, forswearing its claim to be real, shows itself as other than the real (*sadvilaksana*). But by the rejection of its claim to be real it is not eliminated as a content, a 'given' fact of some nature. It is then recognised as a 'mere appearance' if it still persists, or if it is even remembered as a content which seemed to have been there. This recognition is taking it quite other than an absolute naught (*asadvilaksana*). It is by combining the two roles of this appearance as a 'mere appearance' and as the 'illusory appearance' that we get the *anirvacanīya* (the indeterminable) –the *sadasadvilaksana* (the neither real nor unreal) of the Advaita Vedānta. It is true that orthodox interpreters have very often regarded the illusory or the false (*mithya*) as the *anirvacanīya*, the *sadasadvilaksana* of the Vedānta. That description is not inept but been there, it can be seen, the description ultimately veers round the 'appearance' which is 'mere appearance', the 'illusory' and, again, the 'illusory' appearance in different configuration. In being taken as *real*, it becomes the, illusory, in being detected as not real, it becomes the 'illusory' appearance, and lastly, in being recognised as other than the unreal also – insofar as it was *once* given and made out as the real (in illusion), and cannot even now be rejected as an absolute 'nothing', it holds on as a 'mere' appearance. There may be an alternative mode of describing the very same phenomenon. It is the 'given' appearance which in misrecognition *turns out* as the 'illusory' insofar as it poses to be the real, it, again, *turns out* to be an 'illusory' appearance when its pretension to be the real stands exposed, but it still continues to be regarded in the light of its past history, and finally, when it is dissociated completely from that past history and is brought into its relationship to the real, it is called the 'mere' appearance, being a distortion of the real under the adventitious set of objective

circumstances including the percipient's receptivity which all contribute towards its presentation of projection. The traditional account seems not to have given sufficient attention to this 'given' appearance which is the objective basis of the illusory and stands in between the real and the illusory. It is the 'appearance', then, as a given 'something while plays shifting roles in diverse contexts, and it is this which is the true '*anirvacaniya*' of Sankara Vedanta.

To understand how the true Reality is lost sight of in our conventional *pramana-prameya-vyavahara*, both *vaidika* and *laukika*, and also how the identity of all in one pure indeterminate self gets lost in the multiple formations of finite subjects and objects – all posing as substantive reals, the concept of *adhyasa*, or *avidya*, or *mithyajnana* is indispensable but not enough or sufficient. Illusion or *adhyasa* being essentially misjudging a 'mere' appearance as the real itself, a cosmic illusion involving misjudging of all plural forms of subjects and objects as real themselves requires and presupposes the empirical 'given-ness' of these pluralities as parts of a cosmic 'mere' appearance'. Neither the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara nor the Upanisads themselves shirk from admission of the 'given-ness' of the pluralities as 'mere' appearances. This, in fact, is the *anirvacaniya* of the Vedanta, – the floating appearance with a shifting role – which, although a 'mere' appearance, turns out as the real itself in misknowing, and cannot be metaphysically accepted as either real or as absolutely the unreal. So, it is described as matter real, since its parading as real (in miscognition) is liable to be sublated, not again the unreal, since, before illusion and also after detection of that illusion as an illusion, it has to be accommodated as an 'appearance' of some kind – that is, an appearance which proved to be illusory, so an 'illusory' appearance, not real, and which was, in fact, a 'mere' appearance' before it was misconstrued as the real, and was not, therefore, absolutely unreal. We are aware that in the Vedantic tradition the *anirvacaniya* has been frequently interpreted somewhat differently. Losing sight of the fact of 'mere' appearance, discussed by us, standing in between the Real and the False, any have taken up the latter, the false, as the *anirvacaniya* in so far as it can be neither real because it is sublated, nor unreal since it was, in some way, 'given' in experience—an absolute naught like a hare's horn being incapable of being given in experience in this way. We leave it to our readers to judge which of the two explanations is better—whether the latter version when logically pressed would not fall back upon the former, that is, the version maintained by us. The 'perceivedness' of the illusory can be better explained in term of misinterpretation of a 'given' appearance, a 'mere' appearance. Then in term of 'given-ness' of what is 'constructed', since any act of construction seems to be repellant to the concept of 'given-ness'. It can be seen that the Upanisadic here there is no plurality' (*neha nanasti kincana*) really means not that the empirically given pluralities are all absolute nothing but simply that they are 'mere' appearances only mere projections, not substantively real.

Two things still remain unintelligible. (1) how the 'mere' appearance of the plural forms of phenomenal subjects and objects become possible, if Reality is absolutely transcendent of these formations which are to be accepted as its *vivarta* (apparent modifications) and not *parinams* (real modifications)? The other is – supposing that there are certain 'given' mere-appearances, how is the transition from their states as 'mere' appearances to the misconceived substantive reals explained in the absence of an outside factor kneading the former into the latter? The classical interpreters did not see this point and did not bother with its solution. They have contented themselves by regarding all developments of error and illusion as simple human misadventure with the real. In this, they have overlooked two things. The totality of objective appearances, of which, the human agents form an integral part, cannot be explained exclusively in term of human conditions. Nor can the human agents enjoy any commission to construe or misconstrue reality or its appearances in any way they

please. All developments, even the most erratic and eerie have to be viewed as developments, *in some way*, within Reality, – as there cannot be any outside factor or external agents in Advaita metaphysics, and as the Advaita Reality cannot be understood as an object' in relation to the human subject, manipulating or maneuvering it as he likes. The thesis which the Upanisads have upheld and which the Advaita Vedanta had attempted to logically defend in this connection is that it is reality, which, though unobjective *as itself*, somehow through apparent self-conditioning, given itself *apparently* in the objective appearances. This is one phase. In the next, this objective appearance of plural subjects and objects, in accordance with certain immanent law of its own with composition, assumes or *acquires* certain reality or unrejectedness of its own with the result that the plural subjects and objects turn into substantive reals. This is the second phase—the *naisargika adhyasa*. These phases taken together can be metaphorically described as *apparent becoming* and self-forgetting of reality in phenomenal multiplicities. In addition to those two phases, there is to be admitted a third, that of apparent *self-finding* of reality by an inward and retrospective movement. This happens when a finite subject comes to realise that the individuated form which he so long regarded as his true self is not so, and the cosmic plurality to which he belonged is not also real as it was once believed to be, that all these are 'mere' appearances' which became delusive and so were illusory appearances, and that the identity of all these including himself can be traced back to the pure spirit which phenomenally parades itself as many, propelled by no other necessity than self-delight (*lila*). It is the concrete fulfillment of this third phase which constitutes the verification-process of the entire body of postulations, which, without *de facto* possibility of the third phase, could be looked upon as all fanciful conjectures. All the three phases, collectively, belong to the realm of appearance. The *Brahmasutras* are otherwise called the *sarirakasutras* in which the phenomena appearances have been looked upon as the *sarira*, the body, the outer covering of the *sariraka*, the self. We felt it necessary to deviate from the traditional interpretation of the concept 'sariraka' as meaning *Jiva* or *Jivatma*. Both the Pancapadika and the Bhamati take it in that meaning. Our justification is that 'sariraka mimamsa' is also called *Brahmamimamsa*. Moreover, the '*Jiva*' is never the subject-matter of the Upanisads or Brahmasutras. The conception of world-appearance as the body of Brahman may be foreign to the classical commentators who have preference for the literal meaning of the word '*sarira*'. But the etymological formation of the word '*sariraka*' (*sarirameva sariraka*) seems to justify taking of the expression in a figurative meaning. The cosmic plurality is the apparent blow the spirit. Both the Pancapa – dika and the Bhamati take the expression 'sariraka mimamsa' in the sense of the treatise which establishes unity of 'Tvam' with 'Tat', of *Jivatma* with Paramatmi. There can be no objection to that meaning. Even the word 'sariraka' as new in the context of Vedanta Sutras seems to have the meaning proposed by us. The Sutras deal with the pathways to the discovery of this Sariraka, the self. And this means realisation of the one self as the self and substance of all-*atmarkatva*. realisation that the *sarira* has its substance in the *sariraka*.

The process of apparent self-losing of reality, of the one, in phenomenal multiplicities is described in two ways. Looked at from the side the unitary real it is called *mulaavidya*. Regarded from the standpoint of the multiplicities themselves, specially the finite subjects, its called *tulavidya*, *ajnana* or *adhyasa*, because in them what was initially, as it were, a game of self-delight, turns into a serious affair of life under the spell of cosmic delusion, with the result that the delusion or illusion itself becomes a *constitutive* factor determining the cosmic pluralities as the 'illusorily real' substantives (products of illusion). In the former context, *avidya* is described metaphorically as a form of *vilasa* (self-enjoyment) but in the latter context, it is regarded the root-evil (*anartha-hetu*). The entire cosmic manifestation seems to have been conceived as a 'mere appearance' degenerating into an illusion and illusory appearance. It is called *Maya*, possibly, on account of its being a mere

show (as different from a real act of creation) which is, towards its results or consequences, as deceptive as a magic show. *Lila, avidya-vilas, maya, adhyasa* seem all to be descriptive metaphors used to render intelligible a state- of- affair which, on the one hand, cannot, be, debated as to its being a state of affair, but which is, on the other hand, as to its cause or reason, simply inexplicable (*anirvacya*). In Davaita literature, the two expressions '*anirvacya*' and '*anirvacanīya*' are very often used synonymously. But the expression '*anirvacya*', etymologically, may be taken to mean the inexplicable that is unspeakable\*. The ground or necessity underlying the cosmic show is *anirvacya*. The word '*anirvacanīya*' on the other hand, is more appropriate as a description of the nature of an appearance which as we have already noted, has a shifting role between a 'mere' appearance and the illusory and cannot be identified as either real or unreal and has, therefore, to be taken as 'neither real nor unreal'. That which, at one stage, becomes the illusory by posing to be real cannot be taken as the real, again that which after detection is relegated to the status of a 'mere' appearance', that is as that which once appeared or still persists (in some cases) cannot also be, straight way, repudiated as an absolute nothing, the unreal.

What distinguishes Sankara from the rival interpreters of the *Brahmasutras* is this his conception of cosmic plurality as an appearance which is inexplicable of cosmic plurality as an appearance which is inexplicable (*anirvacya*) as to why or how it is there at all, and also indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) as to its logical nature or status since it is neither real nor unreal but all the same cannot be doubted or dismissed as to its somehow holding on as an appearance. This is the very essence of the Sankarite conception of the 'given' empirical order as a *vivarta* (apparent modification) of reality and not its (*parinama*) (real modification). The rival commentators of the *Brahmasutras* have all disagreed with Sankara on this points, that is, the status to be admitted in respect of the so called '*śarīra*' of the *śarīraka*. The inexplicable indeterminable (*anirvacya anirvacanīya*) of Sankara is rather a category of thought than a category of existence. Since, there is nothing outside the one reality, any 'regarding' or 'viewing' of Reality is, on the ultimate analysis, 'self-regarding' or 'self-viewing'. This 'viewing' or 'regarding', then, cannot mean there being any difference whatsoever in the nature of Reality itself, any *real* change or alteration. Sankara, it seems, thought it necessary to justify the Upanisadic view of Reality as undifferentiated pure consciousness (*cit*) by showing in what way the empirically given plural reals can all be explained away as an illusory appearance which, as illusory, cannot be the real, and again, as a given or felt presence, — as an appearance, cannot also be disposed of as unreal or *asat*. This appearance, *as a matter of fact*\*, does appear and also it does parade as the Real itself. So *why* this appearance at all appears, and *why* does it, again, parade as the Real itself, is no legitimate question any more there way the sky-appearance is there and looks as the sky. It is so and that is all the answer. That the cosmic plurality is an illusory appearance is not maintained on *a priori* grounds. The cosmic plurality *proves itself* to be so and this constitutes the justification of the analogy of common-place illusion or *adhyasa* — with this difference that the commonly experienced illusions are all events in time, and so *janya* while the cosmic illusion is a perennial feature of reality and is therefore *anadi* (beginningless) and *a-janya* (not an event in time). It should be borne in mind that the concept of *nausargika adhyasa* and the concept of *samsara* (cycle of existence) are not the same and it would be a mistake to confound one with the other. The nature of 'samsara' will be explained in proper context.

It may be convenient for our purpose to regard the system of objective appearances as the *posed* 'other-than-itself' of reality, the illusory as the *confounded* 'other than-itself as itself', 'and the self-identity or self-finding as the *breaking up* of the confusion of the other-than-itself as itself'. This apparent selflosing and self-finding may be best understood in term of the metaphorical ascription

of *avidyavilasa* or cosmic play in its several stages. For a complete understanding of Reality, both Sankara and the Upanisads maintain, the understanding of Reality as itself which is called *vidya* is not enough. To avoid possible misunderstanding and confusion it is also necessary to explore the nature of *avidya* as it is (*tattvatah*) in its several dimensions. This latter understanding, that is, understanding the nature of *avidya* opens the gate the other kind of understanding (*vidya*) and there is no short-skrift<sup>14</sup>

The speciality of Sankara Vedanta seems to be that 'Reality' and 'Appearance' need not be looked upon as *a priori* postulates of the system<sup>15</sup>. In fact, these can be as well looked upon as the conclusions of an 'in-depth' inquiry. Truth is hidden in the innermost depths or recesses of the cave<sup>16</sup>. We the seekers of *vidya*, all belong to the realm of appearance what we are immediately confronted with is this outer-shell of appearance, so to say. We take it instinctively as the only real that can be there. When this sort of taking the real is exposed as ignorant, and its content as false, we may fall back upon the position that we had so long accepted 'mere appearances' as the real. But we cannot maintain that we did not, as a matter of fact, actually confound the appearances with the real (in the sense of taking the appearances *not* as appearances but *as real*). This discovery of the previously accepted real as false (not real) together with the discovery of it as a mere appearance (not unreal) which illusorily posed as the real becomes the discovery of it as the *anirvacantiya*, the neither real nor unreal. For the realisation of *self-identity*, which can be metaphorically described as the self finding of Reality even this 'mere' appearance' has to be rejected, has to be put off as 'what did not, as it were, take place'. To express otherwise, in the state of self-identity, no appearance holds on<sup>17</sup>. This development of the appearance, not simply as the rejected 'reality-pretender' but even as the rejected 'mere appearance' may be called '*tucchata*' of appearance. Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, in his own inimitable way, has brought to clear light the several phases of the cosmic appearance as *Vastavi*, *anirvacantiya* and *tucchata*<sup>18</sup> which need not be looked upon as 'innovations'<sup>19</sup> without logical support from Sankara's texts.

The rival commentators of the *Brahmasutras* seem not to have dispassionately considered the logical point underlying Sankara's espousal of the concept of *anirvacantiya* as a clue to establishing full intelligibility of the Upanisadic concept of Brahman as absolute existence, pure consciousness and freedom which is at once the self (*Atman*) or self-identity of the phenomenal plurality. In their ardour for rejection of *mayavada*, they started with dual formulations of the concepts of the real and the self in finite and in absolute terms and thereafter, looked for improvising a construction which could accommodate both in 'whole-and-part' relation. In doing this they have unreservedly drawn upon their sectarian beliefs and the popular notions which are all rampant in the various *puranas*. It would be interesting to see how they could defend themselves had they limited their interpretations within the four-walls of the principal Upanisads. That Sankara's Vedanta is also the Vedanta of the Upanisads and that his interpretation of the *Brahmasutras* is borne out by the crucial passages of the Principal Upanisads will be shown in the next chapter.

That the cosmic multiplicities, inspite of their 'given-ness' in experience, and in spite of their 'felt reality', cannot be accepted as real is an anathema to all dualists, Eastern or Western. It is also shocking to commonsense. The Advaita of Sankara does not dispute that such is the normal reaction of mankind. But truth is all times stranger than fiction, the above reaction is the normal reaction of the ignorant and nothing can be established as a truth on the ground of aversion of popular belief towards its contrary. The concept of the indeterminable of the empirical plurality as neither real nor unreal - seems, in a sense, to accommodate this popular feeling also. Our instinctive acceptan



of the cosmic multiplicities is never questioned. What is questioned is the finality, the unrevisability of that instinctive belief. An absolute truth-claim is common to both true knowledge and illusion. What distinguishes them is unrejectability, otherwise called uncontradictedness (*avādhitatva*) of the former. The Upanisads take Reality in two ways – progressively as *outgoing* and regressively as *self-finding*. The first can be traced to the conception of Reality as *Brahman*, the second to the conception of Reality as *Atman*. *Brahman becomes all* and all is, again, consciously realisable as the one in pure self-identity, – *Brahman being the self of all*. It is this second conception which corrodes apparent stubbornness of the plural reals, breaks through their resistances, and reduces them progressively to illusory appearances, mere appearances and rejected appearances. So, even in their phenomenal posture, the cosmic multiplicities have to be taken as neither real nor unreal. In absolute self-identity or pure one-ness of being, the multiple does not even appear, and so, no description becomes necessary or relevant. The rival commentators did not take serious notice of the transcendental phase, spoken of in the Upanisads, the phase of self-realisation. When all becomes the one self *Yatra the sarvamatmaivabhut*<sup>44</sup>. As Sankara sees it, the very first *sutra* of Badarayana – '*Athata*' *Brahmajijnasa*' cannot have any meaning or purpose if *Brahman* was not *Atman*, if self-realisation itself did not constitute liberation from bondage of life.

The unity or 'non-other-ness' (*ananyatva*)<sup>45</sup> spoken of is the realisable unity or non-other-ness of the cosmic multiplicities with *Brahman*, and not all-pervasive unity of *Brahman* in relation to the cosmic multiplicities alone. The different formulations of *bheda-bheda* as also the *svagatabheda* of Ramanuja can provide theoretic justification of the latter form of unity in their several ways but not of the former unity also. The Advaita of Sankara achieves this by showing the reducibility of the cosmic plurality by way of absolute self-identity. This necessitates regarding, that is, viewing the cosmic pluralities as *apparent* and as *illusory*. It is not intelligible why, in the face of unequivocal statements of Sankara to the effect that the world (the manifest order of pluralities) is illusory and false (*mithya*) and that it is indeterminable either as *sat* (real) or as *asat* (unreal). Professor Radhakrishnan should insist that 'unreal the world is, illusory it is not'<sup>46</sup>. Is this not 'de-valuation' of the world to a still greater degree and placing it on a par with the square-circle or hare's horn<sup>47</sup>? How is the *sadasadvilaksana* (that which is remote from both real and unreal) to be regarded as unreal?

A distinguished American professor in a recent paper<sup>48</sup> expressed his surprise how man, the finite subject, who both *identified* and *interprets* *Brahman* and *Maya* could be regarded as himself belonging to the illusory world of *Maya*, and so illusory. The point he considered puzzling seems to be – how could *Brahman* and *Maya* be considered real, or right descriptions of actual states-of-affair when the agent identifying or describing them is illusory and part of the delusive process? Contrariwise, if *Brahman* and *Maya* be descriptions of real states-of-affair, does it not follow that the human agent who is the source of these descriptions is also real? Now, there could be some justification for this feeling of puzzlement if man, the finite subject, could be regarded as an 'outside' fact or centre of reference in the system. But where man's discovery about himself and about the order to which he ordinarily belongs is, in a real sense, *Brahman's* discovery about a particular phase or posture of His own self, the puzzlement seems to disappear. The *Jiva* and *Brahman* are not two substantive facts juxtaposed against each other. Nor are they related as subject and object in the system. Had the Advaita Vedanta started with this dualism of subject and object, it could not, in its account of reality overcome representationism or even subjectivism. But where there is one reality feeling itself in its different postures, – playfully losing itself in an apparent bid to become a 'many' and, again, reviving or resorting its oneness in the reductive 'non-otherness' or identity of the many with itself, there seems to be no scope for puzzlement. The *Maya* order is the order of apparent self-



losing of Brahman is cosmic plurality. This self-losing is proved to be apparent and the order of *Maya* itself apparent by the self-finding of the *Jiva* in *Brahman* which is an apparent self-finding of *Brahman* itself. The possibility of release or liberation through absolute self-identity with *Brahman* or in *Brahman* establishes the phenomenality or *anirvacaniyata* of cosmic development into plural manifestations. The latter end-*Brahman* being the self of all, really proves the former end-*Brahman* apparently becoming the many, and there being nothing other than Brahman at any stage.

It will be interesting to consider the relevance of Ramanuja's criticisms *vis-à-vis* Sankara's concept of the indeterminable as analysed above. As an ambiguous formulation of the concept sometimes as an adventitious defect, sometimes as ignorance (*ajñāna*) in the post-Sankara Advaita literature seems to have invited some of these criticisms, it will be better to present Sankara's concept of the *anirvacaniya* in a clear-cut fashion at the outset. (1) Sankara's *anirvacaniya*, as we have noted, relates to his entire doctrine of appearance, - the cosmic many, the 'mere' appearance, turning into a deceptive appearance and illusion and this deceptive appearance, again, in being exposed as *illusory appearances* reverting to the status of a 'mere' appearance. (2) This being again, an eternal feature<sup>49</sup> of Reality, - beginningless and uncaused (*ajanya*)-which is not engineered by any external agency or imposed from without. (3) The apparent self-losing and self-finding being twin aspects of the free-play (*līla*)<sup>50</sup> of Brahman—and nothing external or accidental. That this is Sankara's version of the *anirvacaniya* and also that this is endorsed by the Principal Upanisads will be elaborately shown in our interpretation of the *sūtrabhāṣya*.

Ramanuja's objections are based on certain presuppositions which are wrong. Unfortunately, the orthodox school of Sankara's interpreters, atleast partly, lent support to this a pre-suppositions. The analogy of the common-place illusions, such as, nacre-silver, rope-snake illusions, have been pressed too far, and beyond admissible limits. These illusion are all bent in time, and determined by certain extraneous accidental factors as there are, these are in a definite sense, caused or *janya*. The *ātma-anātma-adhyāsa*, or Brahman's appearing as the cosmic pluralities, is not conceived as an event in time, nor it conceived as having been regulated by any extraneous factors. The exigency, if we can at all call it by that name, is self-initiated play of self-delight. It was wrong on the part of the traditional interpreters to account for this perennial *adhyāsa* in term of cycles of ignorant impositions by the finite subjects in an endless regressive series, each of which is *janya* and an event in time. This is taking an external view of the cosmic illusion on the analogy of the nacre-silver illusion in which the nacre is an external object in relation to the percipient. That *janya* illusion is explained as *agantuka doṣa-janya* (caused by adventitious impediments and defects). But, although the logical nature of a *janya* and an 'anadi' *adhyāsa* is the same the illusory fixation in both being neither real nor unreal and the illusion is an experience being positive ignorance *bhavarūpa-ajñāna*, there are certain remarkable differences in the two *adhyāsas*, besides the *janyatva* of the one and *anaditva* of the other. These are (1) the real in the case of cosmic illusion is to 'object' in relation to the finite subject, nor external to it, (2) we cannot sensibly speak about any 'doṣa' (defect) or any objective impediment working as *avarana* in this case as in the other case. The *modus operandi* of the twin phases of self-play, such as, self-concealment and self-finding, is admitted in the system as a mystery and inexplicable *anirvacya*. The *de facto* possibility of the two phases has to be admitted on the ground of the possibility of self-realisation in absolute self-identity and is so, indirectly proved by that. It is not also a fact that the rival schools of the Vedānta do not ascribe to the lord even greater capacity for mystery, greater power, wisdom and self-will. Now, let us turn to Ramanuja's criticisms.

Ramanuja takes the Advaitic Brahman as a *irvivesa svayam prakasa-vastu*<sup>31</sup> (self-revealing objective fact without determinations or distinctions). This interpretation of Brahman as an objective reality related to a subject is a mistake<sup>32</sup>. Next, following the trail of the orthodox interpreters of Sankara, he takes the cosmic multiplicities as *Kalpa* (imaginary constructions), resulting from some adventitious defect (*dosa-janya*), this defect being of the *ajnana* (ignorance) which conceals the true nature of Brahman and projection the illusory cosmic multiplicities. This rendering of Sankara is also not correct. The cosmic multiple appearances, as we have already shown, are not fabrications or imaginary constructions in themselves or as appearances. Fabrication of them is the result of a *mis-construction* which is a different phase of the game of self-delight. The two phases of *avidya-vilasa* (game of *avidya*) have to be distinguished – the second phase alone being deceptive, and that, too, owing to misknowledge or wrong judgment which is also a necessary part of the play to enable the play to look like a real affair of living and not as a play. The essence of a game in self-delight lies in having it played as a serious affair of life, – although a game. Otherwise, there could not be any self-delight, not also any earnestness in the game.

Now, to take Ramanuja's objections, one by one. The charge of inadmissibility of the locus (*asrayanupatatti*)<sup>33</sup> rests on the wrong notion of Brahman being the locus of cosmic appearances. In the same way as nacre is supposed to be the locus of silver-appearance. This is only a popular way of putting thesis. But, even when put in that way, it can be seen that an illusory appearance is a floating appearance and a demand for an *asraya* (locus) or *adhikarana*, in the true sense, in its regard is not a legitimate demand. As for the cosmic appearance of multiple subjects and objects, regarded as a misecognition (*ajnana-vrthi*), it can be seen that in the Advaita context this is a so to say, a (playful) development, not a genuine form of activity. This cannot then militate against the *svarupa* (real nature) of reality<sup>34</sup> conceived as *Satyam, jnana, anantam* insofar as this is not regarded as a real development but only as apparent or playful. So neither the charge of *virodha* (repellence) on the part of Brahman nor that of *prakasa-nasa* or *vinasa*<sup>35</sup> (eclipse of self-revealing nature or its destruction) seems to be sustainable in the Advaita fixation of *avidya-vilasa*, or even *ajnana*, which latter is admitted both by proponent and opponent as synchronous with apparent *jiva*-hood of Brahman. Then again, *avidya* or *ajnana* of the phenomenal individual (*jiva*), it can be seen, has to be taken not so much as absence of knowledge of Brahman as a positive misconception of phenomenal individuality as not phenomenal but real. This ignorance being the essential characteristic of phenomenal individuality may be as well regarded as collateral with it.

Ramanuja's second objection if calculated to demonstrate inadmissibility of the nature of cosmic multiplicities as false appearances. This may be technically called '*svarupasiddhi*'<sup>36</sup> of cosmic appearances as false appearances. On the analogy of illusory silver-appearance which is admitted by the Advaitists as due to certain adventitious defects (*lagantuka-dosa-janya*), Ramanuja calls for an explanation of the nature of the defect (*dosa*) which may be supposed to have given rise to the so called plural false appearances. If this defect (*dosa*), which causes distortion into the false plural appearance is itself real (*paramarthika*), so runs the argument, it is then the very nature or reality itself (*Brahma-svarupa*) and is eternal (*nitya*) and there can be no cessation of it (*nirmoksa*) and so no 'falsification' of the false (which cannot there be regarded as false). If, on the other hand, this defect, which causes distortion is itself unreal (*a-paramarthika*), it must have some other defect as its ground (*muladosantara*) and that, again, another and so on *ad infinitum*<sup>37</sup>. So, here also, the nature of the false remains unestablished. The reply to this objection is that *avidya* as the ground of cosmic appearances is not to be taken in the way the adventitious defects are taken as the ground of silver appearance, that the analogy of common-place illusion which is an event in time and is extraneously

determined, breaks down here where Avidya is *self-initiated* and *not defect-oriented*, and is *anadi* beginningless<sup>12</sup>

Ramanuja's third objection centres round the Sankarite conception of the world-appearance as indeterminable in term of either *sat* (real) or *asat* (unreal) – *anirvacanivata nupapatti*. His objection in this context is more of the nature of a caricature than anything else. Thus, he says that the indeterminableness (*anirvacanivata*) is due to there being absolutely no proof (*pramana-sunyatvena*)<sup>13</sup>. All objects (*sarvam vastujalam*) are to be accepted on grounds of our knowledge of them (*prativivasthapyam*), and our knowledge is of the form of the existent nor of the non-existent (*sadasadakara*) and there can be no greater absurdity than holding that there is knowledge of the neither real nor unreal<sup>14</sup>. Ramanuja, here, seems not to take cognisance of a case where a previous belief is *falsified* and its content can neither be accommodated as real nor again, as an absolute nothing. His other objections, such as, *pramananupapatti* (repugnance to all *pramanas*) *tirodhananupapatti* (non-admissibility of covering up the self-luminous), *nivartakanupapatti* (non-admissibility of a remover of Avidya) and *nivrttanupapatti* (inadmissibility of cessation of Avidya on the part of the Jiva) are all based upon his 'special' view of the nature of knowledge as also of *Brahma-jnana* (knowledge of Brahman, the Reality). It will be advisable to put off consideration of these issues at this place. Sankara's line of defence seems to be (1) the Real, the Brahman and the *Avidya*-fixation is, *as a matter of fact*, as he has taken these to be, and that he is well supported both by the *sutras* and by the Upanisads themselves. (2) Knowledge of Brahman is not knowledge in the conventional meaning of that concept – not any knowledge of an object-matter; it is self-realisation through realisation of self-identity (*atmarkarva*). We shall take up this issue in connection with our interpretation of the Sankara's commentary on the relevant *sutras* beginning with the first *sutra*.

## References

1. Adhyasabhasya last sentence – 'Yatha cayamarthah sarvesam vedantianam, tatha vayamasyan suriraknmimamsayam pradarsayi syamah'
2. Adhyasabhasya—The opening and the closing sentences.
3. 'Yatra hi dvitamiva bhavati taditara itaram – vijanati, Yatra va asya sarvamatmaivabhut – tat kena kam vijaniyati' Br. Ar. 2.4.14. 'dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma yadybrahmayido vadanti-para caivapara ca' Mund. 1.1.4 'Dve aksare brahmapre tyante vidyavidye nunte yatra gudhe ...' Svetasvatara 3.1. Passages showing two rival ways of knowing are really countless in number
4. Tractatus 6.51 and 6.52
5. See Adhyasabhasya.
6. *Ibid.*
7. See the Bhamati
8. See Pancapadika and the vivarana prameya samgraha.
9. Adhyasabhasya – 'atmani varnasramavayo' vasthadivi-sasadyasamasritya pravarthante'
10. *Ibid.*
11. 'Evamahampratyayinam asisa-svapracarasaksini pratyagatmasi adhyasya, etc. Adhyasabhasya.
12. See The Bhamati, the Pancapadika and the vivaranaprameya
13. See the Pancapadika and other works of the vivarana school and also the Bhamati
14. Adhyasabhasya— 'Tametamavidyakhyam atmanatmanontare— taradhyam puraskritya etc

- 15 Adhyasabhasya.
- 16 See Adhtasabhasya.
- 17 Pancapadika— 'paratretykte arthantarasya avabhasamanata siddha (-p. 6 )
- 18 Adhyasabhasya.
- 19 *Ibid*
- 20 Adhyasabhasya.
- 21 *Ibid*
- 22 Cf Vivarana prameya samgraha—vidyaranya starts with different formulations of 'atma' and 'anatma' and shows how intermingling of two incompatibles could not be rendered logically intelligible (*vyuktiraha*). This is wrong way of putting Sankara's *mithati bhavitum yuktam* where the expression '*mithya*' being an *apahvara vacana* does not suggest illogicality but *de facto* impossibility. But vidyaranya takes it to mean illogicality of the empirically, and so *de facto* possible and so *anirvacaniya*. This is supported neither by the Bhamati or by the Pancapadika.
- 23 'Karyasyadhyasasyanaditramasyuktamiti ca, matvam'— Vivaranaprameya.
- 24 Adhyasabhasya.
- 25 *Ibid*
- 26 *Ibid*
- 27 Opening sentence of Adhyasabhasya.
- 28 *Ibid*
- 29 See Adhyasabhasya — 'Na loval ayam ekahtena avisaya, asmatpratityavishayatvat etc'. This shows not only presentedness under adventitious conditions but also presentedness as an 'appearance' which is next mistaken for the real self
- 30 It is amusing to go through the absolutely uncalled for ingenious demonstration of the vivarana school to prove perceptibility of the sky even though inaccessible to the visual sense cf Padmapada's commitment to the myth Pancapadika p. 30 'Yatha akasasya aksavyaparamantarena api aparoksaata tatha darsayisyamah.'
- 31 This is regarded as inexplicable-anirvacya
- 32 Cf 'Hiranmayenapatrena sniyasuapitum mukham' Isa. Ek devah sarvabhutesu gudha sarvavyapi sarvasyantaratma' etc. Svetasvatara 6.11
- 33 There seems to be a clear distinction between two phases of *avidya*.— Mulavidya which is equivalent to Maya and Tulavidya which is equivalent to ajnana (ignorance). The first is at the basis of that cosmic whole as mere appearance, the second at the basis of that cosmic appearance as also the several parts of it as the very real itself. Avidya which is being discussed is the Tulavidya, the other name of which is *jnana involving adhyasa*.
- 34 cf Bhamati — *adhvastam toyam paramarthatoyamiva, ataeva purvadristamiva. Tatvatastu na toyam, na ca purvadristam, kim tu anrtam anirvacyam*
- 35 See Chapter IV particularly
- 36 The word *anirvacya* seems to have been formed by addition of the suffix *nyat* to the root '*vac*', under the rule '*vaco*' sabda-samjnayam'
- 37 *svabhavats deva ekah svamavrtot*' svetasvatara. 6.10.
- 38 Andham tamah pravisiṁti ye avidyamupasate. tato bhuyah iva the tamah ya a vidyayam retah. .Vidyam cavidyam ca yastatvedo-bhayaṁ saha, avidyaya mrtum tirtva vidyayamrtamasnute' ISa 9-11, Br 4.4.10 Mantr 7.9

- 39 That Reality is as described in the system and also as described in the Upanisads and the appearance is on it has been taken in the system, the anirvacaniya, in the specific sense that Sankara takes it, has been worked out as the culminating result of the process of the process of self-realisation. Logic also demonstrates the *reductio ad absurdum* of the realm of appearance.
40. Katha. I 2.12.
- 41 This is brought to clear relief in the Advaitic interpretation of 'Tat Tvam asi' in which all adjuncts and determinations have to be shelved aside in realisation of absolute identity.
42. Sankara's doctrine of Maya. Studies in Philosophy VII. I
- 43 Editor's introduction to Vol. I (Studies in Philosophy) p. xiii.
- 44 Br. Aranyaka 4.5.15.
- 45 B. S. 2.1.14
46. Hist. Ind. Phil. Vol. II, p. 583
- 47 See my paper 'The concept of Indeterminability' Ind. Phil. Congress 46th Session 1972, p. 100.
- 48 Prof. Troy Organ – Visvabharati Journal of Philosophy, Vol. No. II
- 49 Towards the end of his Adhyasabhasya Sankara describes this Avidya as both 'anadi' and 'ananta' – that is, beginningless and endless. But the latter expression 'ananta' is taken to mean that which is *theoretically interminable* in the absence of right knowledge of the self. Otherwise the prescription for its elimination in '*asyanarikahetah prahanaya*' would make no sense. cf. Adhyasabhasya—concluding lines.
- 50 B. S. 2.1.33
- 51 Cf. *invisese svayamprakasa vastuni vastuni dosaparikalpitaniseshitavyadyananta vikalpam sarvam jagat'* sreebhasya -95 section
- 52 It is true that Sankara in his commentary (sutras 1 and 4) at times refers to Brahman as *bhuta-vastu* as different from *bhava-vistaya* and claims the *jnana-kanda* of the revealed texts, that is, the Upanisads, to be *vastupara-vedabhaga* but those usages are incidental to conventional modes of speech. *Bhuta-vastuvistaya* or *vastutantrata* of jnana, similarly, is only a conventional linguistic usage.
53. Sree Bhasya. 95-96 (section).
54. *Ibid*
55. *Ibid*
56. Sree Bhasya. Sec. 97
- 57 \* *Kalpanikatvena muladosantam peksaya anavastha syat'* Sree Bhasya
- 58 There seems to be a basic difference between a thing getting distorted through an external medium and an intelligent subject assuming a certain posture playfully for existence of self-delight. A distorted appearance even to appear and also to be known requires an external agent. In a situation where one and the same Reality functions as subject as also object the need for a distortion by an external medium or defect does not arise. How this view can fit into the context of *nirguna* Brahma will be explained in a subsequent chapter
- 59 \* *pramahasunyatvena anirvacaniyataiva syat'* Sree Bhasya. Section 98.
- 60 *Ibid*

# 6

## Reality as the Self

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The first *sutra* of Badarayana is in articulation of the Upanisadic view that an inquiry into the nature of Brahman, the one Reality, is the only means to release from bondage of life. This is necessarily the case, so Sankara – the Upanisads themselves uphold the view. But while all the other schools of the Vedanta take this to mean that *Brahman* is the one absolute self among a host of other selves – all dependent on Him, Sankara understands this to mean that *Brahman* is the *Atman* of all that appears – the *absolute self-identity* of all and everything. This, in point of fact, means, firstly, that all is one self-consciously, that is, *Brahman* realises unity of His being in a self-conscious way, and is not simply a unity or a system of *objectivities* of any description, and secondly, that the cosmic pluralities, including the plural empirical individuals (*jivas*), do not have any separate identity of their own, – *Brahman* being the Self of all. This is indivisible one-ness of the self – *atmaikatva*. This is the truth of fact – *vidya*. Non-realisation of this truth – which means for the Advaita Vedanta, realisation of identity in a radically different way, that is, as separate, individual and plural selves, is *avidya* and bondage, while realisation of this truth is *vidya* which secures release from bondage. But non-realisation of this truth is as much a fact of life as is the truth-realisation. Both *avidya* and *vidya* are modes of conscious existence, although phenomenal. So also is bondage with its attendant, suffering on the one hand, and release in the enjoyment of freedom on the other. All these are phenomenal. But the phenomenal is no isolated development. It has its root in the transcendental. The phenomenal development has to be conceived as the free-play (*lila*) of self-delight of *Brahman*, the Reality. That the development is playful, and is not real or actual involving material hangings, is realised in the possibility of transition from *avidya* and bondage to *vidya* and release in the possibility of realisation of the self-identity of the phenomenal in the transcendental. The link, the essential identity of the two – the phenomenal and the transcendental, is further corroborated in the realisation that self-transcendence on the part of the phenomenal does not involve getting at (*prapti*) anything *new* and novel but is a simple overcoming of an apparent self-forgetting in an equally apparent self-finding. Where this self-forgetting is forgetting of *brahmanhood* and self-finding is conscious realisation of that *brahmanhood* by way of absolute self-identity, Brahman cannot be looked upon as a *neutral* reality, farthest removed and distant, but only as the inner-most essence and substance of everything, that is, as the *true self* of all.

How can an inquiry into the nature of *Brahman* – *Brahma-jijnasa*, be a means to release from bondage and suffering, if *Brahman* is not the true self of the seeker, and if bondage is not understood as a state of ignorance of that true self-identity? Sankara seems to have felt. The relevance, not



only of Badarayana's first *sutra*, but of the entire Vedanta and the *Vedantasutras*, Sankara seems to have discovered in this way. This prompted him to declare at the end of the *Adhyasabhasya* that absolute and indivisible one-ness of the self (*atmakatva*) was the one theme that the entire Vedanta propagated and that his aim and purpose would be to defend this argument in course of his *sutrabhasya*. The rival commentators of the *Brahmasutras*, as can be seen, have not regarded Badarayana's first *sutra* in this way. Not that they were unaware of the fact that the Upanisads themselves had at places described *Brahman* as *Atman*. But they did not think that the meaning was that *Brahman* was the one and the absolute identity of cosmic plurality of subjects and objects so much so that knowledge of *Brahman* could be regarded as the same as self-knowledge. Ramanuja, for instance, accepts guidance of the etymological meaning of the word 'Brahman' and interprets it to signify that Supreme Person (*Purusottama*), who is essentially free from all defects and imperfections (*nirasta-nikhiladosa*) who is the abode of infinite number of good qualities (*asamkhyevakaly-anugunaganah*) and who is boundless and unlimited in pervasion (*anuvadhikatlayah*). Such, so Ramanuja contends, is the principal and direct meaning (*mukhya'rth*) of the word, and therefore, the expression 'Brahman' in the *sutra*, means the Supreme Person and this Person is the object of quest of all those who are afflicted by the three-fold sufferings'. This conception of absolute Reality as the Supreme Person, *Purusottama*, involving as this does distinction from other persons-finite and relative, is characteristic of the Gita, but not so much of the principal Upanisads. Sankara, it can be seen, leaves the meaning of the word '*Brahman*' to be decided by the Vedanta *sutras* and the Upanisads themselves'. But he makes out an important philosophical point when he expresses that it is as the self of all and everything (*sarvasyatmatvat ca*) that *Brahman* as a concept enjoys an absolute unrejectability'. Sankara seems to have taken the view that the Upanisads themselves made a '*Philosophical use*' of the concept '*atman*' when describing *Brahman* as *Atman* or describing *Atman* as *Brahman* rather than a superficial descriptive use. What is meant is that by describing *Brahman* as *Atman* the Upanisads were not so much interested in suggesting that *Brahman* is a self-conscious person, a thinking being so to say, as in suggesting that *Brahman*, is the unity, the essential identity and in that sense, the 'self' of all that is there. The 'self' or '*atman*', in the context, is a principle of unification and identity rather than a purely existential qualitative concept. Any way, Sankara, we may argue, would not have considered *Brahman* as a proper object of inquiry for the purpose of liberation if such inquiry did not really mean an inquiry as to the true self of the individuals, since it is only under such condition that knowledge of *Brahman* could itself serve the purpose of a desired end. No knowledge of an *objective* fact or entity, however, grand and edifying, can have any direct bearing upon, or relevance for, release from bondage – the purpose put forth by the word '*atma*' in the *sutra*. Evidently, as far as its wording goes, the first *sutra* does not stress the need of worshipping or prayer' as a means of liberation. If the stress is for illumination, for gaining enlightenment or knowledge of any kind, that knowledge would remain a merely intellectual affair without any important bearing upon liberation if the object to be known is not one with the true self of the individual.

The Vedanta is looked upon as *moksa sastra*. *Moksa*, or release from bondage of life, is considered as the supreme end of human striving (*parama purusartha*). In what way, one may ask, may the *Vedanta sastra*, the Upanisads, be conceived as conducive to that supreme end? Sankara's reply would be – in so far as the Vedanta establishes absolute identity and one-ness of whatever seems to be there, in so far as Reality or *Brahman* is also *Atman*, that is, the true self of all, –the plural manifestations being all seeming and nothing substantial. Only in this way can knowledge of Reality become a mode of realisation of self-identity in *Brahman* and this realisation of identity called *brahmavagati* can turn out to be the supreme end'. Sankara has good reason for holding this view

about liberation. The root cause of bondage is our mistaken sense of identity with the phenomenal, combined with mistaken sense of reality in the phenomenal. The cycle of existence through birth, death and rebirth in ceaseless rotation which is called *samsara* has its root in this mistaken or false sense, in this ignorance (*ajnana*). But what devolves upon the phenomenal individuals as ignorance on account of its delusive spell is at bottom some sort of a free-play of self beguilement (*avidya-vilasa*) – a playful self-forgetting for the exigency of self-delight-on the part of the absolute. Nothing short of radical change in the perspective, a changing over to the view-point of the Absolute itself can mitigate all the sufferings that become one's fate for clinging to the phenomenal and investing it with reality sense. This can be done by realising one's absolute identity with Brahman and this is called *Brahmavagati*. And since this realisation culminates in elimination, without any residual trace, of the evil of ignorance (mal-knowledge), which is the root-cause of the cycle of phenomenal existence<sup>1</sup>, it amounts to the supreme end of life. The desire for knowledge of Brahman (*brahmajijnasa*) thus becomes a relevant issue for one ferrently seeking for release from the bondage of phenomenal existence, only because Brahman is the true self of the phenomenal individuals and knowledge of Brahman is the knowledge of one's own true identity.

Sankara, in his commentary on the first *sutra*, has 'extended' knowledge of Brahman, as aimed at in *Brahma-jijnasa*, beyond the limit of informative knowledge and has indicated direct realisation of identity as its goal. This knowledge, says Sankara, has direct acquaintance (*avagati*) its goal<sup>2</sup>. Two kinds of knowledge seem to be involved here – one leading up to the other as the goal. The first or initial knowledge is of the form of *informative* knowledge. This is indirect knowledge of the nature of *Brahman* gained through careful study of the Vedanta texts. This knowledge is *pramanajanya* – arising from an accredited source of knowledge such as scriptural testimony. As *pramanajanya* this knowledge is object-oriented (*vastu tantra*), and in that sense, factual or objective knowledge. This informs what *Brahman* is, also why, or in what sense, *Brahman* is also called *Atman*. But, although this knowledge is also *Brahmajnana*, that is, knowledge of *Brahman* insofar as it has *Brahman* for its object, this knowledge is not *Brahmavagati*, not the direct knowledge of *Brahman* reacted through realisation of self-identity. This latter knowledge is intuitive. It is not knowledge in the ordinary sense. It is not also *pramanajanya*, since all *pramanas* (sources of knowledge) presuppose dualism of subject and object, and necessarily takes its content as an objective something (*visaya*). *Brahmavagati* does not have *Brahman* for its object. It is knowledge of self-identity – of the absolute one-ness of subject and object. It is of the form of self awareness or self-realisation. This is the 'end-knowledge' while the other one is the 'means-knowledge'. Sankara speaks of this when he says that by means of the knowledge which is *means-knowledge* – *jnanena pramanena*, the end, the desired goal, viz., self-identity with *Brahman* is realised – *avagantum istam Brahma*<sup>3</sup>. The classical interpreters have taken *Brahmavagati* to mean knowledge of the form of immediate acquaintance (*saksatkara*). The figure of description is defective and even misleading. It means direct meeting of one with another. The Pancapadika did not offer an explanation of the concept, '*avagati*' when it used it synonymously with the expression '*apavarga*'. In subsequent rendering, the Pancapadika takes '*avagati*' to mean '*Saksat anubhava*' – direct knowledge or intuitive knowledge<sup>4</sup>. Prakasatman accepts that meaning<sup>5</sup>, while the Ratnaprabha takes it to mean '*akhanda-saksatkara vrttijnana*' – the cognitive mode 'comprehen with the full (undivided) essence'<sup>6</sup>. The Bhamati appears to labour under two distinct pulls. Initially it accepts '*avagati*' in the sense of direct knowledge of the form of 'comparisons' – *saksatkara-jnana*. Coming to realise later than such knowledge of the objective type cannot be the desired end (*purusartha*) if the objective content or terminus of the *vrtti* is '*anapeksamiyavisaya*' (unlocked for object, not actuating any desire), the Bhamati takes '*brahmavagati*' to mean '*Brahmasvabhava*' (the very nature of *brahman* which is blissful (*anandaghana*)). The Bhamati

thereafter, takes good deal of pains to explain the circumstance under which the self-shining nature of Brahman may phenomenally appear to manifest anew through removal of the veil of *avidya* apparently shrouding it. These academic acrobatics seem to be absolutely uncalled for in the context. The point that Sankara wanted to make out is simply this – the desire for inquiry is to the nature of *Brahman*, the reality, prompted by the impelling necessity for release from bondage (as brought forth by the expression *atah*) has for its end (*ista*) realisation of self-identity in *Brahman* (*Brahmavagati*). This is direct knowledge the clue to which is furnished by the kind of indirect knowledge of Brahman as the absolute identity (*atman*), of all and everything that the Vedanta texts as *sastrapramana* may deliver to us. The desire for knowledge of *Brahman* (*brahmajijnasa*) is not to terminate with mere informative and objective (*vatutantra*) knowledge of *Brahman* secured through an assiduous study of, and critical reflection on the Vedanta texts. But that *factual* knowledge, which necessarily operates in the form of certain cognitive modes (*vrtti*) insofar as Brahman is represented there as an object (*visaya*) of knowledge, is to lead up to, and culminate in, direct self-realisation, that is, realisation of one's own identity in *Brahman*. And this knowledge is not mediated by any physical mode (*vrtti*), since *Brahman* does not figure there as an object at all but only as the 'Self' of the seeker. This is all that Sankara seems to have meant in his commentary and so the descriptions of the terminal knowledge (*vagati*) as '*saksat anubhava*', '*saksatkara*' '*Brahma-svarupa* or *svabhava*' or as *akhandasaksatkara Vritijnana*, involving as they do an 'objective reference' and an objective attitude or posture, are definitely misleading. Realisation of one's own identity may be looked upon as unmediated knowledge (*aparoksanana*) but it is no knowledge in the ordinary sense, and the expression '*saksatkara*', or '*saksat anubhava*', not being being free from the sense of dualism of subject and object, cannot, therefore, fit into its description'.

The 'end' of the inquiry being thus defined as realisation of self-identity in *Brahman*, the question to be next settled is . What can be its relevant pre-requisites (*purvavrtti*)? What can, so to say, facilitate, this inquiry and can be conducive to its fulfillment or success? Sankara was aware that he would be required to break in upon new grounds against orthodoxy of the traditional ritualistic school. The orthodox schools regard the Vedas, the revealed scriptures, as one integral whole in spite of noticeable differences in the trends, of thought as also in the declared aims and objectives. Sankara is no blind follower of tradition without questioning the authenticity of the earlier part of the Vedic teaching, known as the *Karma-kanda* which a person less catholic and temperate in nature would have done, he takes the later part, known as the *jnana-kanda* and comprising of the principal Upanisads, as radically different both in import and purpose. This is reflected in his ascertainment of the 'necessary preconditions' of the inquiry as to the of a here of Brahman. The purpose or end of the enquiry being release from the bondage of life, and this 'release' being of the nature of realisation of one's identity with Brahman (which the Upanisads, the Vedanta texts, describe not only as the absolute Reality but also as the Atman or self of everything that is there), there can be, according to Sankara, no logical link between, This inquiry and knowledge and the kind of knowledge that the earlier teachings of the Vedas import concerning advancement (*abhiudaya*) or prosperity in this life or the next. The desire for release or freedom and the desire for prosperity or pleasurable ends are poles apart in attitude and psychological motivation. The Upanisads themselves speak of their fundamental differences<sup>16</sup>. It is evident, therefore, that the end as liberation or release requires mental attitude and disposition of a radically different kind.

The Badarayana *sutra atha* *Brahmajijnasa* has three component parts – '*atha*', meaning 'thereafter', *atah* meaning 'because of' and *brahmajijnasa* meaning 'desire for inquiry as to the *Brahman*'. A commentator, in his interpretation, has to adhere to the meanings of the words used in

the aphorism with meticulous care. '*Brahmajijñasa*', in the context, means opting a thorough disquisition of the Vedanta texts (*vedanta-vakya-vicarana*)<sup>17</sup> with a view to deriving knowledge of *Brahman* as the means to the supreme end. The nature of the *end* looked for, as also o the *means* adopted for its realisation, throws light upon what may be the *reason* for opting for the type of end, and what may, again, be the *pre-requisites*, the fulfillment of which may equip one or the task ahead. The supreme end looked for being release from the bondage of phenomenal existence, and knowledge of *Brahman* being the contemplated means there-to, what can be reasonably supposed to be the necessary pre-requisites, the fulfillment of which is likely to facilitate the inquiry as to the nature of *Brahman*, and what may again, be one's reason for venturing upon a quest of the kind ? The replies to these two questions determine what meanings in this context we are to give to the expressions '*uttha*' and '*utah*' respectively. The principal commentators of the Badarayana *sutra* have, do not differ in their rendering of the word-meanings. But as to the meanings of these words in the context of the Vedanta literature and the disquisition which goes by the name of '*brahma-mimamsa*', there has been very wide difference between Sankara and the other commentators particularly, Ramanuja.

Although liberation on release from bondage of phenomenal existence has been traditionally looked upon as the supreme end, the desire for opting for it is not spontaneous or automatic. There is a natural and insensate craving for joys and pleasures of life however, fleeting and adulterated these may be. Frustration or failure in getting at durable pleasures does not necessarily reform the mind and create an urge for liberation. An incentive is, therefore, necessary. Liberation or release looked for here is not a negative fulfillment as is provided by the Sankhya or by Buddhism. The supreme end is supreme fulfillment also. The Upanisads, enjoying undisputed authority in matters transcendental, clearly and unequivocally testify to the perishableness of the fruits of all actions, ordinary as well as thou which are sacrificed by the Vedic injunctions. They again, at the same time, declare that knowledge of *Brahman* ensures realisation of an end which is everlasting and supreme insofar as it is of the nature of absolute freedom from travails of life and is a blissful existence. This, then, becomes an inducement both for turning away from pursuit of perishable ends and for opting for the inquiry as to the nature of *Brahman*. The expression '*utah*' in the *sutra* suggests this as the '*reason (hetu)*' for the inquiry. The commentators do not differ substantially on this point. But Sankara maintains that this *hetu* itself, that is, disillusionment about the benefit of striving for all other ends o life and the urge for seeking a goal which is to being about release form infatuation and bondage, gives rise to certain psychological attitude and dispositional set up conducive to successful completion of the inquiry about *Brahman*. These are the four-fold disciplines, (*sadana catustaya*) which, so to say, form the '*preparatory set*' – the indispensable subjective conditions to be fulfilled, in order that the projected disquisition of the Vedanta texts may successfully terminate in *Brahmavagati* – realisation of *Brahman*. The goal contemplated is no theoretical knowledge of *Brahman* as the absolute Reality – a knowledge which the Vedanta texts as *sastrapramana* may deliver. That knowledge which is *pramana-janya* (originating from a source of knowledge) and so *objective* is to lead up to, as Sankara sees it<sup>18</sup>, a subjective and intuitive knowledge of the form of realisation of identity with *Brahman*. *Brahman*, being the one Reality and the self of all, is not knowable in an objective attitude but only in an indissoluble '*identity-experience*'. This goal is not only arduous, it is baffling also for a commoner without requisite re-adjustment and reformation of attitude and temperament. The Upanisads themselves speak of the hazards, of insurmountable difficulties that a seeker of a truth of this kind is to face<sup>19</sup>. They also speak about the necessity of certain disciplines to be gone through in order to qualify for the mysterious knowledge (*brahasya vidya*)<sup>20</sup>. So Sankara may be said to urge upon fulfillment of the very same or similar conditions which the Upanisads themselves have declared as absolutely necessary for reaching the goal. The four-fold requisites, the indispensable

preconditions (*purvavrtta*) or *brahmayajñasa* that Sankara speaks<sup>21</sup> of, are (1) The capacity to discriminate the stable from the fleeting objects of life, (2) absolute disinterestedness towards enjoyment of fruits of action in this life as also in the next, (3) habituation in such disciplines as control of senses—external and internal, endurance, abstinence, concentration and faith and finally, (4) an ardent desire for release (*mumukṣutva*) the word '*atha*', meaning 'thereafter' used in the *sūtra* suggests. According to Sankara, the fulfilment of these subjective conditions by the seeker of absolute knowledge.

The Badarayana *sūtra* then rendered in the way Sankara takes it means. After having cultivated certain attitudes and dispositions conducive to the nature of the knowledge looked for, one, who has, on the authority of the Upanisads themselves gained the conviction that no fruits of actions, whether secular or Vedic, are imperishable or permanent, while knowledge of Brahman ensures an end which is imperishable, will form an ardent desire for the knowledge of Brahman with a view to realising one's identity with Brahman. It is to be borne in mind that the Upanisads and their teachings form the only basis of the inquiry contemplated since the concept of Brahman is peculiar to the Upanisads. It is Upanisads, again, and not the earlier part of the Vedas which inspire this quest! That the fruits of all Vedic rituals are also ultimately perishable and that no actions, whether the obligatory ones (*nityakarma*) or the actions enjoined for attainment of desired ends—*niमित्तika karma*, can help realisation of the supreme end of life can be gathered from the Upanisadic statements only. Finally, Badarayana himself being the author of the Brahmasūtras, can be understood as articulating the view of Reality, truth, and supreme value as taught by the Upanisads and not by the Vedic literature generally. Such being the case, the strength or weakness of Sankara's version of the case will have to be reviewed in its proper context, that is, within the limits of the Vedānta texts. Any reference, therefore, to outside matter to any tradition or convention of doubtful chronology is simply irrelevant.

Sankara, be it clearly noted, was not less orthodox than any other in his unswerving faith in the revealed authority of the Vedas. But all the same he had a logical mind so essential for a philosopher and an acute ease of distinction of what is relevant and what is irrelevant in relation to a certain context. In the context of the first *sūtra* of Badarayana, he, therefore, attempts to bring into focus the distinctive nature of *Brahmayajñasa* as also the distinctive nature of the goal looked for for the realisation of the supreme end of life—release from bondage. Since Brahman, in the Upanisads, (as he sees it), has been described as the Atman, as the self of all and everything and as the one Reality without a second, he takes *Brahmavagati* (realisation of the nature of reality) to mean realisation of absolute self-identity on the part of the seeker, his individual form and self-hood being regarded as a mere appearance invested with the sense of reality through ignorance. This kind of knowledge—the sense of reality through ignorance. This kind of knowledge—the knowledge of Brahman as the true self is not ordinarily accessible. The *śāstrapramāṇa*, that is, the Upanisads alone, provides all the evidence and proof in this matter—But this *śāstrapramāṇa* is also an indirect source of knowledge—*parokṣa pramāṇa*. Even to cultivate faith in it is no easy matter. To transport and transform the objective knowledge (*vastutantrajñana*), an informative understanding into a direct content in self-realisation, into knowledge of absolute identity with Brahman requires a de-conditioning in which the knower (*pramātā*) and known (*prameyā*) are to be realised in absolute unity. So, Sankara felt, what should precede as a 'necessary condition' of this knowledge—seeking, this inquiry as to the nature of this Brahman—Atman must be a preparatory set of dispositional adjustment, the group of mental disciplines called *sādhana-catustaya*. Not that, like an uncompromising bigot, or a die-hard controversialist, he over rules a disquisition into *dharma* as the *Purvamīmāṃsā* provides for as an anathema. That will be doing injustice to him. He only rejects its absolute relevance and



necessity *Dharmajijnasa*, as this disquisition is generally called, is *not* an indispensable condition of *Brahmajijnasa*, there being no *logical link*, no relation of causal dependence on the part of the latter on the former. Such absolute pre-requisites of *brahmajijnasa* are the *sadana-catustaya* since given these, that is, once these dispositional adjustments are provided, one may qualify and go for *brahmajijnasa* with or without *dharmajijnasa* being there. '*tesu hi satsu pragapi dharmajijnasayah urdhvancu sakyati brahma-jijnasitum jnatumca, na viparyaye*'<sup>22</sup>. The type of argument involved is called *anvayavyatiraki*. The *Sadana-catustaya* are indispensable preconditions because *without them* even though the knowledge of *dharma* is there one cannot successfully gain the kind of knowledge in question here as with them being there, one can with or without knowledge of *dharma* gain knowledge of Brahman. He, then works out elaborately the logical grounds of the view he defends.

We may briefly review Ramanuja takes *dharmajijnasa*, the disquisitions into the nature and ends of actions enjoined in the Karmakanda of the Vedas as the necessary precondition (*purvavrtta*) of *Brahmajijnasa*. It is not clear whether he regards the dispositional adjustments, the *sadana-catustayas* that Sankara speaks of as essential or not. May be, being a votary of *videhamukti*<sup>23</sup>, and also as one who looks upon liberation as a kind of new attainment<sup>24</sup> (*apya*) he has no unqualified support for absolute renunciation (*vairagya*) of all fruits of action—not for such fruits which are to accrue in an afterlife. His mind is absolutely tradition-bound and that seems to be his main argument. He thus quotes the tradition which maintained the Jaiminisutras and the Sarirakasutras, comprising sixteen chapters in all, as a single treatise, the difference being such as exists between sections and chapters<sup>25</sup>. A modern mind is not likely to find any sanctity or logical point in such conventional belief since not only the subject-matter but even topical arrangements go to show them as separate and distinct treatises. Ramanuja's claim that one has necessarily to go through the entire compass of the Vedic literature together with its auxiliaries<sup>26</sup>, the *vedangas* and also through the entire cause of *Purvamimamsa* before venturing upon *brahmajijnasa* and a disquisition into the Vedanta literature is simply astounding. This may be a necessary programme for a Vedic scholar but not suitable for one seeking liberation. Sankara also admits the necessity of study of the Vedas in a general way<sup>27</sup> but he considers disquisitionary study of the Karmakanda of the Vedas as wasted labour on account of various reasons he discusses next. The main point of Ramanuja's objections will, however, be traced elsewhere. We shall briefly go through it.

Ramanuja was a votary of *samuccaya-vada*, according to which, *jnana* or knowledge has to be action-oriented in order to produce any result. As for the knowledge of Brahman which is to help attainment of release, Ramanuja maintains, it is not to be knowledge in the form of simple understanding of the to be knowledge in the form of simple understanding of the meaning of the Vedanta-*vakyas*, such as, '*Tat Tvam Asi*' (*vakvartha-jnanamatram*)<sup>28</sup> but needs to be an action-oriented knowledge in the form of constant meditation or prayer (*upasana*), since mere knowledge resulting from verbal testimony cannot lead to liberation or release. The view that *jnana* needs to be Karma-oriented, the *jnana-kurma-samuccaya-vada*, has a hoary antiquity. For all that we know many of Sankara's predecessors such as, Brahmadatta, Mandana, Bhatraprance, as from criticism of their views by Suresvara<sup>29</sup>, and Ramanuja's immediate fore-runners like Yamuncarya and Nathanauni were all ardent supporters of this view. Even, Kumarila, the great mimamsaka, is known to have lent support to the view. Historically speaking, this *samuccaya vada* seems to have been influenced by the acts theory of knowledge of the *Purvamimamsa* according to which all Vedic statements are informative in respect of certain actions to be done, and mere informative knowledge from Vedic statements is either a myth or is absolutely Trivial. So Ramanuja in his interpretation of '*brahma-jnana*' takes it to mean '*brahma-vedana*' or '*brahmaupasana*'<sup>30</sup> and does not find any reasonable ground for Sankara's



radical distinction between knowledge and action. For the very same reason, he cannot support the Sankarite view that *dharma-jijnasa* has no relevance for *brahma-jijnasa*, since both involve activities of somekind under the guidance of knowledge. Ramanuja, in this context, quotes *Badarayana sutra* 3.4.26 which provides for a selective use of *karma* or action even for the kind of knowledge that the Vedanta upholds as the means towards liberation.

Sankara's defence is logically connected with his view of knowledge. Knowledge is *not caused*, nor is it a peculiar human achievement. Reality itself being defined in term of self-shining consciousness or *jñāna*, activity or action has its relevance only towards furnishing the preparatory set and thereby removing the hindrance – the mal-adjustment or non-adjustment which stands in the way of self-expression of knowledge. Action has therefore a negative bearing and is no direct condition of knowledge even where any action is helpful. Action may be conducive towards development of the dispositional set which, in the Advaita Vedanta parlance, goes by the name '*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*'. Even the study of the Vedānta texts, the employment of sense-organs or reasoning, – even *nidhidhyāsa* or meditation should not be looked upon as *causas* or positive, that is, contributory factors, of knowledge. Their function is limited to pre-paring the grounds for self-manifestation of knowledge by removal of hindrances to knowledge. The metaphysical basis of this doctrine will be discussed in its proper place. Suffice it to indicate at this place that Sankara's rejection of *samuccayavāda* is connected with his rejection of the act-theory of knowledge and his adherence to the view of knowledge as *suigeneris*. But academic niceties into the Vedāntic disquisition it is absolutely necessary for one either to go through the entire Vedas together with all its auxiliaries or to go through the entire cause of interpretation of the Vedic texts provided by the *Purvamīmāṃsā*. Then, again, if Brahman is to be accepted as the true self of all, and if knowledge of Brahman is accepted in the meaning Sankara proposes, that is, accepted in the meaning Sankara proposes, that is, realisation of self-identity dependence of knowledge upon action is automatically ruled out.

Sankara appears to take the view that disquisition into *karma* leading to spiritual merit (*dharma*) that the *Purvamīmāṃsā* provides is no invariable, immediate antecedent (*niyatāpūrvavṛtti*) of the kind of knowledge that *brahmajijnasa* aims at. Nor is *brahmajijnasa* absolutely dependent on it (*ananyathasiddha*). His is a moderate view. *Dharmajijnasa* is not looked upon as an anathema, only it is not regarded as absolute precondition. This absolute precondition without which an inquiry in Brahman would be desultory and useless is the group of four disciplines (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*). *Karma* may have bearing upon development of the dispositional set that these *sādhana*s (means) stand for. But neither the knowledge of Brahman is a kind of *karma*, nor is it an effect of *karma* – such knowledge not being in essence any new achievement but being the realisation of an eternal truth, shut out by hindrances and distorted on account of them. Sankara had to make out a case for self-sufficiency and exclusiveness of the Upanisadic teachings insofar as their aims, procedures and objectives are radically different from the earlier part of the revealed texts (*karmakāṇḍa*). He had to make out a case for the Advaitic version of the Vedānta philosophy on the authority of the Upanisads themselves, – even the *Badarayana sūtras* playing a secondary role.<sup>11</sup> Sankara's rejection of logical precedence of *dharmajijnasa* is based on the following arguments:

(1) *Brahmajijnasa* is not logically dependent on *dharmajijnasa* as its invariable and necessary antecedent, since one who has read the Vedānta texts and is conversed with their tenor, may fitfully enter into disquisition about Brahman and desire for its knowledge without going through the cause of *dharmajijnasa* – *dharmajijnasayah pragapti adhitavedāntasya brahmajijnasepapatich*.

(2) The revealed texts themselves do not prescribe any relation of sequence, that of before and after, between the two as they have done in the cases of sacrificial procedure of using one item before another or after another

(3) No organic relation or relation of means and end (*sesasamive dhikrtadhikara*) either, is noticeable between them, and there is no evidence also in support of such contention (*pramanabhavat*)

(4) Moreover, the two disquisitions exhibit radical differences as regards their *aims*, *procedures* as well as their *ends* (*phala-jnyasabheda*). This seems to be Sankara's main point of controversy as besides being raised discussed repeatedly in course of the first four *sutras*, this has in one way or other influenced Sankara's discussions all through out his commentary. We shall take up this issue for more elaborate treatment in the next chapter. The points of difference between the two disciplines *dharma-jnyasa* and *brahma-jnyasa* are stated as follows.

(a) Knowledge of *dharma* (*dharma-jnanam*) aims at material advancement (*abhyudaya*) of some kind, that is, prosperity in this life, or *after this life*<sup>12</sup>, and this knowledge is dependent on ritualistic performance or actions (*annusthanapeksa*) which are believed to give rise to merit (*dharma*) which secures such advancement. Mere knowledge of 'oughts' or 'ought-nots' achieves no purpose or ends. Practical execution of certain sacrificial works or rituals is understood to give rise to certain excellence (*apurva*) or spiritual merit (*dharma*) by virtue of which material benefit like enjoyment of happiness in heaven may result. Knowledge of *Brahman*, on the other hand, is to culminate in the *realisation* of the supreme goal in liberation or release which is neither any material benefit nor is, again, dependent on any action or ritual, —this knowledge itself being self-sufficient (*na annusthanantarapeksam*) and being itself the goal. (b) *Dharma*, the object of quest for *dharma-jnyasa* is not an existential content, it is something — that is a kind of spiritual merit which is *yet to accrue* (*bhavya*), *yet to be ushered into existence*, *yet to be produced or achieved*. It does not 'exist' at the moment one has knowledge about it (*na jnanakate asti*), dependent as it is on the practical efforts to be put in by the person, desirous of achieving it (*purusavyaparatantratvat*). Not so the *Brahman*, the end of *brahma-jnyasa*. *Brahman*, on the contrary, is an eternally accomplished fact, the reality eternally existing (*nityanirvrita*), and so does not depend on anybody's effort to be brought into being (*na purusavyaparatantram*). It is to be clearly noted that knowledge, according to the view defended by Sankara is not limited to an *existential matter* only, as is frequently misconstrued<sup>13</sup>. 'Dharma' — 'oughts' and 'ought-nots' also are contents of knowledge. There is knowledge of the *bhavya* (yet to be) as there is knowledge of what is already there (*bhuta-vastu*). The difference is — by simply knowing what ought to be done, one cannot get at or achieve any result which is *dharma*, this only follows upon an actual execution of the work under the guidance of principles. This is the point emphasized here. But knowledge in respect of an existential matter (*bhuta-vastu*) *terminates in that object* in being the revelation of that as content. It does not depend on any human effort to bring the content into existence. (c) The import of the Uedic statements<sup>14</sup> in the two contexts is also different (*codanupavrttibheda*). The statement which is definitive of (*dharma-sya laksanam*) and constitutes the evidence (*pramana*) thereof, *dharma* is *injunctive* in nature. It becomes informative to a person in respect of what is to be done in order to acquire merit. It thus enjoins as to what actions are to be executed by a person to qualify for an excellence or merit. But the Uedic statements about *Brahman* makes one cognisant of *Brahman*, and since this knowledge of *Brahman* follows upon the statement itself, the statement does not engage anybody to an act of achieving this knowledge. The knowledge here results as directly from the statement as a means or source *Pramana* as the knowledge of a sense-object follows upon sense-contact with the object.

There is more in this last argument than what meets the eye at first. In fact, this has been Sankara's main ground for claiming a separate and independent status and foothold for the (*jnana*kanda) of the Vedas. The expression 'codana', in the mimamsa usage, means an injunction for a mode of action. *Dharma* or spiritual merit has been defined as that which has been defined as that which has the Vedic statement enjoining a certain action to be done for its attainment as its theoretic basis (*pramana*) – *codana – laksanarthah dharmah*. There is no other evidence or basis (*pramana*) for it outside the Vedic statement. The statement about *Dharma* is an injunction for the performance of an action, a certain ritual. But the knowledge of this injunction does not lead directly to any result, such results follow upon performance of the action enjoined. *Dharma*, therefore, is something which is 'yet to be' and which for its emergence is dependent on performance of the action enjoined. Knowledge, here, then does not secure its content which is 'dharma' directly, but is dependent on performance of an action in order that such content may emerge. Knowledge of *dharma*, then, is the knowledge of an action to be done in accordance with a Vedic injunction, and the Vedic statement there is a *directive* for an action. The statement about Brahman, in the later part of the Vedas, is not however, any *directive* for an action to be executed. It is informative of an existential content and delivers up (by way of revealing) that content in the somewhat as sense-contact with an object reveals that object as a content of knowledge. While using the word 'codana' both in the context of '*dharmamimamsa*' and '*brahnamimamsa*' Sankara takes the word in its general sense as a Vedic statement, and not in its retracted and special meaning that is as an injunction for action. As one who revolted against the Purvamimamsa limitation of the meaning of vedic statements to injunctions for actions, Sankara may be supposed to have refused to abide by the use of the word 'codana' in its narrower and special sense introduced by the mimamsa school. As this issue is connected with the larger issue, that of import of vedic sentences in Karmakanda and Jnana-kanda, what formed the subject-matter of Sankara's commentary on the '*samanvaya-sutra*' we shall defer its treatment till the chapter that follows. But there is one important fact which should be kept in view and it is that Sankara has used the words 'codana' and 'Codanatantara' sometimes in his own 'wider meaning' and sometimes in the 'narrower meaning' of the mimamsa school with the result that '*brahmajnana*' has to be regarded as '*codanatantara*' in one sense (the wider, since the *srutis* constitute the primary and even the only admissible *pramana* of Brahman, while in another (the narrower) sense, it is not again, '*codanatantara*' for reasons to be explained later on.

Although Sankara's dissertation on the first *sutra* has three main issues, such as, (a) the type of inquiry intended and the goal thereof, (b) the nature of the means appropriate for reaching that goal, and (c) what can be regarded and what cannot be regarded as the indispensable pre-requisite of *brahma-jijnasa*, the central among them, as far as the first Sutra goes, is however, the first – the nature of the inquiry itself. The other two issues, as we have already observed, are logically linked with it. In plain terms, the issue is inquiry as to the nature of Brahman insofar as Brahman – the one, absolute Reality is also the *one and the true self* of all, – of the seeker himself. Knowledge of Brahman is not then to be looked upon as an 'objective knowledge' of an existential reality which is out there. This knowledge is no knowledge in the conventional sense, it exhibits no distinction between knower and known, nor does it involve an outer objective reference insofar as Brahman as much as the self is described by the Upanisads as '*avisaya*', a 'non-object'. It would be an interesting point to know how the non-Advaitic interpreters meet this theoretic demand for absolute '*avisayatva*' of the supreme reality of their conception. There are other points also but we shall put off consideration of them at present.

It is the concluding portion of the commentary on the first *sutra* which is most vital. Sankara, in this part seeks to bring home to us in his own inimitable way what the concept of Brahman has been understood to stand for in the Vedanta texts, and why a disquisition of the type of critical ascertainment of the import of the Vedanta texts (Vedanta-vakya-mimamsa) in the light of the Sutrās, as undertaken by him, is the only guide to the proper understanding of the significance of the concept as also of the Vedantic theme<sup>38</sup> Sankara asks 'if Brahman is a non-controversial issue or is absolutely unknown and unheard of?' The uncontroversial or the already settled by consensus does not call for a fresh inquiry, and a laborious one like the one contemplated in the *sutra*. An 'abracadabra', a 'square-circle', or 'crow's truth' (Karatadanta), as again, no fit object of inquiry in so far as these are incapable of being ascertained as a fact, as a useful content. From the way Sankara deals with these alternative postruns, the version of the passage given by Vacaspati, rather than the one given by Padmapada seems closer to his meaning<sup>39</sup> The Bhamati, here, interprets Sankara to mean: if it were the fact that the nature of *Brahman* could be decided with certainty from a cursory reading of the vedanta texts and in that way Brahman could be regarded as an already settled issue, there would not arise the need of any disquisition of the vedanta texts as is here contemplated; if, on the other hand, *Brahman* (as *Atman*) were a theme unheard of (*a-prasiddha*) in the Vedanta literature, as so incapable of being established by the Vedanta, the disquisition would be vacuous and absolutely without purpose, and since the concept has no footing in the ordinary sources of knowledge (*laukika pramanas*), it would be spurious and incapable of rational treatment<sup>40</sup>. But the Bhamati seems to have gone somewhat outside its commission in its overenthusiasm to show how Sankara, in the passages that follow, put forth evidences for 'Tat' and 'Tvam' separately, and thereafter, argued for the unity of the two by way of *samanadhikaranya*<sup>41</sup>. The Bhamati seems also to have gone too far in demonstrating in what way, and to what extent, the accounts of reality and self current in the historical schools fell short of the ideal requirement proposed in the Vedanta. One of the historical views cited in Sankara's exposition being the Advaita Vedanta view, Sankara does not seem to have been interested in exhibiting discrepancies or incompleteness of the views in question, besides showing that, although the issue in question that is, 'reality-self' is not *aprasiddha* (quite unfamiliar) in philosophical parlance, there is wide divergence of views and opinions as to its specific nature (*tadvisesam pratt vipratipattech*)<sup>42</sup>

Sankara, it can be seen in the text, put forth the grounds in support of the contention that *Brahman* as *Atman* is not a concept all together foreign, or unfamiliar in so far it is current in the Vedanta literature. But even then, as there is wide divergence of views as to the specific nature of reality and the self among the historical schools on the issue, breeding an air of double and uncertainty, it becomes necessary to enter into a disquisition of the Vedanta texts supported by elaborate logical arguments conforming to such texts (*tadvirodhitarakobha-karana vedanta-vakya-mimamsa*), to clear the grounds of absolute need of *brahmajijnasa* for the purpose of realising the supreme end of life<sup>43</sup>. As for the evidences the Upanisads themselves speak of *Brahman*. The absolute reality, as omniscient and omnipotent as also eternally pure, self-luminous and free<sup>44</sup>. Then, again, from the very etymological sense of the word '*Brahman*', the very same idea about *Brahman* can be derived. What we come to know about Brahman is not only that Brahman is the absolute reality but also that this reality in being self-conscious, pure and free (self-sufficient) is also the self (*Atman*). Finally, Brahman has been declared to be the self (the indwelling spirit) of all and everything. *Sarvasyatmatvat ca brahmasitvapraddi*<sup>45</sup>. The meaning of this sentence is the existential reality of *Brahman* (*brahmasitva*) becomes established (*prasiddha*) insofar as *Brahman* is regarded as the self of all (*sarvasyatmatvat*). This issue is also a part of upanisadic declaration, although verifiable only transcendently in term of one's self. The argument for absolute indubitability and unrejectability

which follows next is, in essence, a transcendental argument<sup>39</sup>, – not an empirical argument to show unrejectability of one's self-sense or ego in term of introspective mode of self-awareness. Vacaspati is definitely wrong insofar as he makes out a case for indubitability of the existence of the empirical person (*Tvam*) in this part of Sankara's argument<sup>40</sup>. Sankara's arguments are all a connected whole and there is no transition in them from an argument in proof of '*Tat*' to an argument in proof of '*Tvam*' – since the latter fact, the '*Tvam*' does not require any argument in support of its existence as a fact – that would be open to *siddha sadhana dosa*<sup>41</sup>. Sankara, is, here, arguing all through out to show *prasidhatva* (apparent familiarity) of the concept '*Brahman as Atman*' in various ways.

It is the Vedanta texts themselves which speak of *Brahman as Atman*, nay, as the one self, the true self of all, and insist on the unconditional acceptance of that theme as a truth of fact in spite of our ingrained feeling to the contrary. This ingrained feeling is denounced as *avidya*, or as the result of inveterate ignorance. Had not the Upanisads themselves maintained the doctrine and shows ways for realisation of this transcendental theme as the truth, no argument on the basis of any ordinary *pramana* could ever succeed in proving it. So, it seems indisputable that the arguments for absolute unrejectability of the self that Sankara enters upon on the next, are arguments in favour of absolute unrejectability of the one self underlying all individual self-feelings. This is corroborated by Sankara's last sentence in the paragraph, and by an Upanisadic statement as that, '*atma ca Brahma*'<sup>42</sup>.

The arguments in question are 'everybody is reflectively aware (*Pratyati*) of the existence of the self<sup>43</sup>', nobody ever reflects that 'I do not exist' (*nahumasmiti*). It, again, the existence, of the self were not as established fact (*yadi hi natmasit-vaprasiddhisya*), every one would have the feeling 'I do not exist' – *nahumasmitipratyut*. The self is *Brahman – Atma ca Brahma*. The self meant in these sentences is not the ego, not also Descartes '*I am*' (*sum cogitans*)<sup>44</sup>. We come across the very same argument in Sankara's commentary on the fourth sutra<sup>45</sup>. The self in question is the witness (*vaksi*) the revealer (*avabhasaka*), the very ground (transcendental) of unrejectability of the 'I', of the ego, as a posited content, – the very ground of its positedness.

It may be that Sankara was well-aware that many among his predecessor of the Vedanta school also did not regard Brahman as the one self, as the true self of all and did not look upon realisation of absolute identity with Brahman in pure knowledge as the only way to liberation. So, the view of *Brahman* that he believes to be the Upanisadic view has also to be established currently by means of *Vedanta-vakya-mimamsa* supported by logic against rival opinions on the issue. So, there is '*vipratipatti*' among the Vedantists also which has to be combated by a thorough disquisition. Even though people in so far as they are aware of their self and its apparent unrejectability and so far *Brahman* may be supposed to be an already known content yet all do not look upon their self-knowledge in the way the Upanisads require of them to do, so there is conflict of opinions (*Vipratipatti*) as to what one *exactly* knows or realises when one claims to be aware of one's self – is it any substantial reality, any spiritual principle or is it a physical principle – an emergent product of somekind? Is it individual or universal? Is it one or many? Is it an agent, or an enjoyer only, or is neither of the two? So, there is divergence of opinions as regards the specific nature (*avisesam prati*) of the self as reality. The purpose of *brahmajijnasa* is *brahmavagati*. This *brahmavagati* is *purusartha* as it ensures release from bondage and suffering. But how an one look upon *brahmavagati*, realisation of identity with Brahman as the goal unless it is established once for all and with about certainty that Brahman is, *de facto*, the one true self of phenomenal pluralities? So the inquiry as to the nature of Brahman has to take the aid of *Vedanta-vakya-mimamsa*. Supported by kindred arguments (*tadavirodhitarhipakarana*) for satisfactory consummation in self knowledge. This seems to be the line of argument of Sankara in the concluding portion of his commentary on the first *sutra*.

To illustrate the reigning controversy on the nature of the self, Sankara lists almost all the views of the various schools of Indian philosophy. Thus, he says – uneducated people and the philosophers of the Carvaka school understand by self the body endowed with the quality of consciousness, some take the self as the aggregate of the senses insofar as these are sentient. Some take it as the mind. Some, again, as the stream of momentary conscious states. Some regard it as the void. Some take the self as the migratory agent and enjoyer (*samsara karta bhokta*) distinct from the body, the senses etc., some, again, as the enjoyer only, not the agent. Some, again, hold that apart from such individual selves, there is an over-individual (*Isvara*) – omniscient and omnipotent. Some, hold, that the self is the very self of the enjoyers, not itself the enjoyer.

Although the last view in the list is the Advaita Vedanta view, or approximates to it, it is remarkable that Sankara does not have identify it. He leaves it as one of the contesting views in the field. The suggestion is that what can be regarded as the correct view as also the view defended in the Vedanta he leaves to be decided in course of his disquisition. The rival opinions also are examined and criticised in course of the commentary. The Advaita Vedanta view on the self of reality is also not shown in its specific colour and perspective till his commentary on the *samanvaya sutra* for the first *sutra*. therefore, the theme of Reality as the self, that is, as the *one absolute self* of all, remains theme is to be explored at first. So Sankara, next, enters into the logical question – What may constitute evidence (*pramana*) of the theme of *Vrahman* as *Atman*.

## References

1. Sree Bhasya. Sec. 4.
2. 'Brahma ca vakhyamanataksanam 'janmadyasya yatah' iti. B. S. B. 111.
3. Sarvasyatmatvat ca brahmasattivopasiddhih' B. S. B. 111.
4. If knowledge is not the immediate means to release one wonders why the *sutra* is 'Athato' *Brahmajijnasa*' instead of 'Athato' *Brahmopasitavyam*'
5. The *sutra* or scripture which has liberation' for its end.
6. *Brahmavagatirhit purusartha*' B. S. B. 111. '*Brahmavagati* in Sankara's meaning is no knowledge of Brahman as an objective reality, like knowledge of *sukti* (nacre at the end of nacre-silver illusion). It is realisation of one's identity with Brahman.
7. It has to be noticed that '*anaditva*' (beginninglessness of *Samsara*) is not sought to be explained in term of the beginningless *aropa* on the part of the individuals themselves but by postulating an eternal playful fixation (*avidyavilasa*) of apparent self-losing in the nature of reality itself.
8. '*Nihsexasamsara vijavidyadyanartha nivarhanat*' B. S. B. 111.
9. '*avagati paryantam jnanam sanvacyaya icchayah karma* etc B. S. B. 111.
10. *Ibid* also cf. Tasmal Brahmajijnasopanyasamukhena vedantavakyamsmamsa 'Tadavirodhitarkopakarana n:hsreyasaprayojana prasthyate' B. S. B. 111.
11. pancapadika, p. 66.
12. Pancapadika-vivarana p. 174.
13. Down the passage the Ratnaprabha interprets '*avagantum*' to mean '*abhivyanjayitum*'. '*Avagati*' is thus taken to mean *vrttijnana* of some kind. The extracts from the Manavapurana quoted in the *v varanaprameya* give a graphic description of this *vrttijnana*.
14. The expression is borrowed from S. Alexander. Cf. Space, time and Deity.
15. There is a basic difference between one's direct knowledge of what is other than one's self, such as, a



tree or a mountain and one's awareness of identity with, say, his previous self as a boy. Knowledge of Brahman as the origin of all things in the earlier part of Uddalaka's narration serves to give only indirect knowledge. But the type of knowledge 'That thou art' (*Tat tvem asi*) is to give is of a different kind all together. This knowledge the speaker cannot impart, nor can the hearer readily gain by means of any mental

- 16 Picturing. This is knowledge which involves no picturing at all and no *vr̥ti* is involved here. This is knowledge as *avagati* as Sankara takes it. 'Brahmavagati' is the 'end' of Brahmajijnasa' in this meaning.
- 16 Katha I 2. 1-2.
- 17 B. S. B. I 1.2.
18. *Ibid.*, I 1.1, '....jñānena hi pramāṇaṁ avagantum iṣṭam. .'
- 19 Katha I.1 22, I 2 8, I 2 12., I 2 23, I 3 14
- 20 Br. Ar. 4 4 23. Mundaka I 2. 12-13. The need for penance and meditation has been stressed almost everywhere. There are innumerable anecdotes.
21. B. S. B. I 1.1, 'nityanityavastuvivaka, śamutrārthphalabho gavīraga, samadamadīśadhaṇasāmpat, mumukṣutvaṇca'
- 22 B. S. B., I 1.1
- 23 'Videhamukti' is liberation to be attained after the fall of the present body at death. Sankara, as the Sankhya and Buddhism before him, puts greater emphasis on a kind of liberation to be realised while living in this body-*jīvanmukti*.
- 24 This also distinguishes the Sankarite view according to which, liberation is not getting at anything new, it is regaining what is there eternally but simply lost sight of in ignorance or oblivion.
- 25 'Samhitametad sarīrakam jaiminiyena sodesataksaneti sāstrakārtvasiddhiḥ' Sree Bhasya. 5
- 26 'Adhitasangatasiraskavedasya anantarabHAVINI' Sree Bhasya. 2
- 27 Sree Bhasya. 17. Sankara, it can be seen, does not take this *jñāna* as *vākyarthajñānamātra*. '*Brahmavagati*' springs from (*nirvṛti*) knowledge of the form of absolute determination or ascertainment (*adhyavasāna*) resulting from disquisition of the *Vedānta* *vākyas*, says Sankara. B. S. B. I 1.2. Elsewhere he speaks of *Pramāṇajñāna* (resulting from *sāstra*) being, again, the means leading to *brahmavagati*. B. S. B. I 1.1. It has not been possible to authenticate Prof. Radhakrishnan's observation that some disciples of Sankara regarded *Vākyarthajñānamātra* as means liberation. *tattvamuktakatapa* quoted in this connection is a non-Sankarite text. See *Hist. Ind. Phil.* vol. II. p. 661
28. Cf. *Naiskarmasiddhi*.
29. Tarkabhūṣaṇa' edition of *Vedānta Darsan* vol. I. p. 549, also Sree Bhasya seems to present the view of Bhaṭṭa Bhaskar in sec. 12 (p. 15 Bengali Edition).
30. Sree Bhasya. 21
31. This secondary role for the Sūtras is proposed in the statement *vedānta-vākya kusumaṅgrathanarthatvat sūtranam*. The Sūtras do not have any independent purpose or authority.
32. The belief in life in is not just the belief in a next life since for believers in re-birth this next life may mean the new life secured through re-birth. By 'after life a life in heaven is meant here.
33. It is not correct to say that '*dharma*' is no object of knowledge and that '*dharma*' is no knowable content in the face of expressions such as, '*dharma-jijnāsa*' and '*bhavyasā dharmajijnāsyā na jñānakāte asti*'. The distinction, therefore, is between a knowable content which is already there (*bhūta*) and a content which is yet to be (*bhavya*).
34. The word 'codana' is taken to mean Vedic statement, generally, not an injunctive statement only.

- 35 See Bhamati 'Codana iti vaidikam sabuam aha; 'Visesena samanyasya laksanavat, The Vedas being, again, a-paurusiya' 'command' etc. do not seem to fit into the context of Vedic statements, and an informative meaning is of greater relevance. The gaimini sutra, 'Tasya jnanam upadesah' (1.1.5) also lends support to taking of Vedic statements in the sense of advice for knowledge'
- 36 See the last sentence of B. S. B. 1.1.1
- 37 It is indeed difficult to translate Sankara's very simple expression 'prasiddhamaprasiddha va syat' keeping in view the context and also his subsequent elaboration. Expressions, such as, 'familiar or unfamiliar' 'known or unknown' are found misleading.
- 38 The Pancapadika takes 'prasiddham' to mean 'pratipannam anyena Kenacit' –but other methods of knowledge do not appear to have relevance in the context and Sankara need not be understood to have posed an irrelevant alternative. This suggestion is not, again, in keeping with 'ananyathasiddhatam' admitted by it in the very next paragraph, pp. 67-68.
- 39 Cf Bhamati *Vedantabhyo pauruseyataya evasiddha pramanyebhyah prasiddhamaprasiddham va syat* etc.
- 40 'Tadevam tatpadarthasya suddhatvadeh prasiddhim abhidhaya tvampadarthasanyaha - sarvasyatmatvaca brahmastitva prasiddhih.' Bhamati. That Brahman is the self of all is also spoken of by the Upanisads so that this part of Sankara's statement need not be taken as demonstration of Tvampadartha as the Bhamati proposes. 'Sarvohi atmastitvam pratyeti, na nahamasmiti' – need not be taken to mean that everybody feels the existence of self as 'I am' nobody ever feels 'I do not exist', It means really, everybody feels the existence of the self in 'I am', no body feels 'I am not' –ego feeling is intended to be the evidence of sakshi-caitanya, not of the ego.
- 41 See the Bhamati. The Advaita Vedanta view is contained in 'Atma sa bhakturityapara' B. S. B. 1.1.1
- 42 B. S. B. 1.1.1 Concluding sentence.
- 43 The Bhamati takes the view that part of the statement, such as, *nityasuddhabuddhamuktasvabhava* is illustrative of the impersonal absolute of the Upanisads and part of Sankara's statement such as, *sarvajnam sarvasaktisamanvitam* of the personal absolute (*saguna brahman*) of the Upanisads. The Pancapadika takes the curious stand that all that Sankara puts in as evidences in support of prasiddhatvam are to be accepted as following from the 'meaning' of the word 'Brahman' pp. 70-72 Sankara's text sentence in B. S. B. 1.1.2 clearly shows that there are lots of Upanisadic sentences in support of 'nityasuddhabuddha' etc.
- 44 B. S. B. 1.1.1 cf. 'Atadatmgamidam sarvam, tatsatyam, satma etc.' chandogya. see also Katha 2.2.12, Mundaka 2.1.4 2.2.5. Sveta. 1.15, 3.21., 6.11
- 45 Cf Kant.
- 46 See Bhamati 'Tvam padarthasya apvoh ' sarvasyatmatvaca brahmastitvaprasedhih', etc.
- 47 Seeking to prove the already established.
- 48 B. S. B. 1.1.1
- 49 It is to be noted that Sankara does not speak of 'everyone being aware of one's own self as existing – not 'svatmastitvam pratyeti, but 'atmastitvam'. The positive mode of this awareness such as 'I am and exist' is deliberately omitted to put off reference to the ego and only the negative mode 'not that I do not exist' is endorsed. This also is remarkable, although vacaspati misses the hint. See Bhamati.
- 50 Cf. Descartes - Meditation Ch. 2
- 51 'na, tatsaksitena pratyuktatvat' restores the transcendental point in the argument. B. S. S. 1.1.4

## The Grounded of the Metaphysical Doctrine of Reality as the Self

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That intuitive realisation of one's identity as also of the identity of all plural appearances with the one Reality (*Brahman*) can alone become the supreme end of life (*paramapurushartha*) insofar as it releases the individual from the bondage of an ego-oriented and individuated life of suffering and tension is the grand *motif* of the first *sutra*, according to Sankara. The logical basis of this metaphysical doctrine Sankara discovers in the authority of the Upanisadic texts themselves. What is *singular* and so very remarkable in his critical survey of the *Brahmasutras* is his insistence that not only the *evidence* furnished by the revealed texts in respect of this metaphysical doctrine is absolutely complete, and unassailable by conventional logic, but also that this *proof* is superior to any that could be adduced by speculative reason in matters metaphysical. The first of this contention Sankara diligently and with rare insight establishes in his commentary on the *Brahmasutras*, relating to the four *padas* of the first *adhyaya*. The second part of the contention is established in the thorough refutation of all rival metaphysical systems of Indian philosophy reared up and sustained, as Sankara feels, by logic *unaided by revelation*. This refutation figures in Sankara's commentary on the *sutras* of the second *adhyaya*, more prominently in his treatment of the first two *padas* of that chapter, commonly known as the *Tarka-pada*.

The absolute identity of Reality and the self, of *Brahman* and *Atman*, is the one central theme of the principal Upanisads. This Sankara has forcefully maintained in his commentaries on them<sup>1</sup>. The *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana have no independent validity or relevance. They are not purported to put forth any independent logical argument, they are, on the contrary, calculated to cite the relevant Vedantic texts as the only admissible evidence in support of the metaphysical doctrine defended by them<sup>2</sup>. Sankara deliberately commits the *sutras* under this self-imposed limitation. Even the very first *sutra* of Badarayana would be pointless and the knowledge of Brahman would be incapable of being the supreme end of life, incapable of being the means of release from the bondage of life, if absolute identity of the self with an all-pervading reality were not a *releasable* fact or content. It is the Upanisads, Sankara finds, which speak of realisability of this pure identity. Were *Brahman* an 'other' of the self, knowledge of *Brahman*, like the knowledge of an objective fact – a foreign and distant entity, could be an informative knowledge of an object-matter, but it would be absolutely incapable of ensuring the individual's release from bondage. *Brahman*, again, could not be understood as the *one* Reality without a second (*ekamevadvitiam*) in being juxtaposed against an individual who was

to grasp it as a knowable objective content. It is the Upanisadic doctrine of *Brahman* as the true identity, and so, as the *one self* of all phenomenal forms, which then, fulfils the theoretic requirement even of the very first *sutra* of Badarayana. What Sankara insists all throughout his commentary is that it is not enough to take the absolute reality, *Brahman*, as one self-conscious, self-existent absolute self, the *Atman* alongside other selves. The description of *Brahman* as *Atman* is intended to signify the fact of absolute one-ness, the *true identity* (self-hood) of plural appearances in the *one*, that one reality being the 'self' of all. It is being the *truth of fact* (*tattva*), liberation of empirical individuals (*jivas*) can only mean a conscious transcendence of their ego-oriented individuality and realisation by them of their true identity in the all-free, all pervasive reality, *Brahman*. This conscious realisation of their true identity is to be their 'self-realisation', since their apparent self-hood as empirical individuals is a pseudo-fact. Not only this. If *Brahman* has been described as pure undifferentenced consciousness (*cit*), it is not because the world of plural appearances are an absolute naught, ungrounded in Reality (*Brahman*) – an utterly mistaken interpretation foisted by the classical commentators on Sankara's writings. It is only because a consciously realised state of self-identity is by its very nature an undivided, undifferentenced pure consciousness, unregistrative of its plural phenomenal manifestations. One cannot get at his personal identity so long as one dwells upon one's plural associations. Does this imply that the self-identical individual does not and cannot have another and a different aspect of conscious existence, as a Brahmin, a teacher, a householder and so on? As we have diligently worked out in the fifth chapter, it is not Sankara's thesis, not also of the Vedanta he espoused, that the plural appearances are all illusory and so absolutely ungrounded in Reality. It is the taking of the appearances not as 'mere' appearances but as absolutely real, subversive of Reality itself, which is false knowledge and the product of illusion. Sankara's Absolute is not so blank as his classical commentators have made it out to be. The world of plural manifestations are not imaginary, or faulty creations of your mind or of my mind. They are also grounded in *Brahman*. The second *sutra* of Badarayana – *jñanmadyasyayatah* is an absolute repudiation of that contention. A good deal of muddle has been reared up by an absolutely unwarranted over-emphasis on the distinction between the so called *tatastha laksana* and *svarupa laksana*. This distinction is, of course, valid and vital, and we shall elaborately deal with it in the sequel. But are not the so called '*lakṣana*' categories of logic, – of human understanding, and are not the *svarupa* and *tatastha lakṣanas* indicative of the subject's two-fold appraisal of the self-same reality? A *lakṣana* is a mark, or it is that which is taken as a mark<sup>1</sup>, a pointer, and it is for the benefit of a cognising subject. Has the category any meaning for one undifferentenced reality which is without a second? The classical interpreters have confused the logical with the metaphysical and so they have unnecessarily encumbered themselves with their self-created difficulty to explain away the *tastha* in their final and ultimate account of *Brahman*. *Brahman* which is all and everything, which does not have any negation or absence anywheres, – *Brahman*, which is unlimited and all-comprehensive, has been laboriously drawn out by them as a blank and empty form without substance, simply because there is to be an absolute one-ness, pure non-difference in the identity – consciousness which necessarily leaves out differences. That is not Sankara. That is not also the Upanisadic truth that Sankara draws upon. The phenomenal is, of course, not the transcendental, but it is not also outside the transcendental, and a product of subjective fancy, of mental aberration. The reason is, as we have explained already<sup>2</sup>, there is no such independent subject to foist upon Reality any arbitrary forces, the phenomenal subject being only a phenomenal expression of the one reality, and so phenomenally grounded in it.

In conformity with the Upanisadic doctrine that one knowing *Brahman* realises supreme end<sup>3</sup> the first Badarayana *sutra* holds out the promise that an inquiry as to the nature of *Brahman* can release the individual from the bondage and suffering of phenomenal existence. This then gives rise

to the logical demand to explain the relationship of the phenomenal individual and of all cosmic appearances with *Brahman* in a manner which can justify the expectation of absolute release. The second *sutra*, Sankara rightly points out, is no inferential argument tracing the world-pluralities to an assumed first cause. Such an argument would have been an exercise in futility. Did not Kant also demonstrate<sup>6</sup> the utter illogicality of such a logical argument in his review of the conventional cosmological argument? It is very singular and remarkable that Sankara, many centuries ahead of Kant, suggested dialectical inconclusiveness of such an inferential argument. What Sankara has observed in this context is worth our close attention. *Brahman*, the supposed cause of origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world-multiplicities, the primal ground from which all things phenomenal originate, in which all live and into which all again are assimilated in dissolution, is no object of sense-experience, the relation of the world of effects (*karyajata*) with such a primal ground is not empirically verifiable. Had the argument presented in the second *sutra* from effect to cause been an inferential argument, it would have remained undecidable whether the world of effects is grounded in *Brahman* or in some other cause<sup>7</sup>, such first cause not being an object of sensuous experience (*indriyavishayatvena*)<sup>8</sup>. Not that Sankara did not give a close look to the so called marks of design and intelligent planning as exhibited by the world of effects in its very composition and arrangements, the marks which became the theoretical ground of the conventional teleological argument. In fact, in his commentary on the second *sutra*, as also in his first alternative interpretation of the third *sutra*, he gave a close look to these marks of intelligent planning in the world-order as also to marks of supreme intelligence and omniscience (*sarvajnatva*) displayed in the authorship of the *sastras*, of the marks which rule out explanation of the world of effects by reference to an unconscious primal matter, or by reference to primitive atoms, or non-being, or a finite intelligent first cause<sup>9</sup>. Thus, he has argued that the world-order which is manifest in infinite names and forms, which is associated with infinite number of agents and enjoyers, in which everything is ordered and regulated in terms of space, time, causality and fruits of action, the planning or design of which is baffling to human understanding and imagination, could not not have been grounded in anything short of an omnipotent and omniscient cause<sup>10</sup>. In the context of the third *sutra*, again, he has argued that the *sastras* such as the *Rgveda*, which like a lamp throw light upon all that is worth knowing and seeking for, could not have sprung from a source other than one that is by nature omniscient. So it cannot be said that while accounting for the express world-order and contemplating the relationship of the world of multiple appearances, including the empirical individuals to the one reality, Sankara was not alive to the apparent plausibility of the conventional teleological argument from design. Yet in his proof of the transcendental one-ness and identity of the express order of phenomenal subjects and objects with the one reality, such as, *Brahman* – which is to be regarded as the one in-dwelling self (*pratyagatman*) of phenomenal appearances, he regarded all inferential arguments, inconclusive and desultory.

Sankara however, did not like Kant brush aside the conventional inferential arguments from effect to cause as absolutely useless. With him, the evidence furnished by the revealed authority of the Vedas in transcendental matters is to count as primary and incontestable. Inferential arguments, have a supporting and secondary role and are, therefore, useful if they conform to and corroborate the evidence furnished by the revealed texts<sup>11</sup>. But where such inferences conflict with the revealed testimony they are to be rejected as spurious<sup>12</sup>. Speculative reason cannot have any independent or absolute jurisdiction in matters pertaining to transcendental metaphysics. Sankara is thus at one with Kant as far as both. The capacity of speculative reason to function as an organ of knowledge in the sphere of metaphysics. Sankara also in his commentary on *sutra* 2 | 1 | 1 has supported Kant that

speculative reason turns dialectical and is incapable of giving any fixed decision in metaphysical matters. The difference between Kant and Sankara is that while Kant leaves all metaphysical issues to be decided by Practical Reason as postulates of moral faith, Sankara provides for an alternative justification for them as facts of knowledge. Metaphysics is not only knowledge, but it is absolute knowledge (*para vidya*), incapable of contradiction or sublation by any other knowledge. How has this been done?

The Vedanta doctrine of release from the bondage of life, as Sankara sees it, not to be a mere article of faith. The empirical individual (*jiva*) is capable of being liberated since what causes bondage and is at the root of human suffering is ignorance or misapprehension (*avidya*). The substantial one-ness, an absolute identity and non-distinction of plural appearances, is a *fact of existence*. It is not to be realised as an article of faith. In *rerum natura* it is so. What creates division in the one reality is a matter of *expression* or *manifestation* but these plural appearances is *not* subversive of the existential one-ness, nor are they *internal distinctions* (*svagatabheda*) existentially obtaining in the one as the Ramanujists would maintain. The distinctions are no existential distinctions, these are mere facts of *appearances*. Does a tree cease to be one existentially at any time in spite of its many branches, sub-branches, leaves, flowers and fruits? So, speaking *existentially* and from the point of *being* (*satta*) there is to be an absolute repudiation of all forms of *bheda* (distinction) and *bhedu bheda* (distinction and non-distinction as co-ordinate aspects). There is existential *abheda* (non-distinction) and this alone is *nitya* (eternal). The plural appearances are *mere appearances*. Although *existenti-ally* here there is no plurality and the plural appearances are all unsubstantial, as the Upanisads have defended, the plural appearances are *not also illusory appearances*. They are there *appearingly* as expression of *becoming*<sup>11</sup>. In conformity with the Upanisadic teachings Sankara explains this *becoming in manifold*. The plural appearances in respect of the existentially one being with the help of the category, of *Maya*. This category smacks of a certain 'mere-ness', insubstantiality and *assumed*, character. But in an Advaitic exposition, conforming textually with Sankara's own version which is one with that of the Upanisads, this *maya*, although the root of *avidya* and so described in the Sankarite texts as *mula-avidya* had to be distinguished from *avidya* (ignorance or misapprehension) *as such*. The world-pluralities are *facts of becoming* and are not simple facts of *experience* or knowledge. These are not mere epistemic what is merely empirical (*vyavaharika*) and in that way epistemic is *the faulty or mistaken regarding* or these pluralities, particularly, of the plural empiric individuals as substantive facts, as *existential realities in themselves*. This is *avidya* or mis-knowledge. On account of this the empiric individuals come to feel distinct and exclusive identities for themselves. But has there been no plural expressions or manifestation of the *one*, there could not have arisen the further distortion of these multiplicities as substantial entities in themselves *by way of experience*. Moreover, these being only one absolute reality even this distortion has to be located in the one Reality and associated with it. There is no escape from this. Sankara himself *did not* seek in escape in the way his classical commentators have arbitrarily and, of course, mistakenly provided for the master. The cosmic play is to be sure the *avidya-vilasa* (sportive display) of the one. But it is merely sportive, although the joys and sufferings, hopes and frustrations, tension and equanimity, this cosmic play engenders are so very empirical evident that these feelings and the empirical individualities which sustain them cannot be straight-way rejected as *no-facts*. The Sankarite concepts of *anirvacya* and *anirvacanya*, as we have shown in our fifth chapter, come in as apposite descriptions of these sequences.

The metaphysical one-ness of the empiric individual (*jiva*) with Brahman being a fact of existence, and the distinction, apartness and the separate self-feeling, which is characteristic phenomenal individuality, being all pseudo-facts regred and sustained by ignorance, and, again, this



feeling of separate identity being the root-cause of bondage, – as escape from this bondage can be effected by means of *recognition* of the fact of true identity of the individual in the Absolute consciousness alone. This is what, according to Sankara the Upanisads, have propagated. Because Sankara had found that the Upanisads, all of them, propagate *brahmatmakatva* (one-ness of Brahman and the self or Brahman being the one self of all), he, in his commentary on the *Brahmasutras*, undertook to demonstrate that undivided one-ness (*atmakatva*) of the self is the one truth of fact which all the Vedanta literature upholds!<sup>14</sup> In expounding this Vedantic theme, therefore, he was under no necessity to take the help of inferential reasonings or arguments. From the very fact of the case, he was called upon to defend and demonstrate, firstly, that the revealed Vedanta texts, in their harmoniously taking, do support his interpretation and secondly and this against the *Purvamimamsa* contention, that the later Vedas called the Upanisads can well be a *pramana* in respect of an existential reality of an extraordinary kind as distinguished from the earlier part of the Vedas which admittedly deal with non-existential *apurva* or *dharma* (spiritual merit). The logical defence of the admissibility of the revealed texts as a valid source of knowledge (*pramana*) is no doubt an important theoretical issue. But, as Sankara has examined this last issue in connection with his commentary on the second *adhyaya*, we shall take it up in our ninth chapter. Following Sankara's own exposition and the arrangement of the *Budarayana sutras*, we shall immediately pass on to the consideration of the first two issues. But before entering into them, we shall give a brief tentative consideration of the third issue, the relevance and importance of the *satrapramana* for Sankara's problem and its solution.

The metaphysical theme to be established is transcendental one-ness of the infinite variety of cosmic appearances. This, again, is not to be a mere thought-construction, not also to be a mere article of faith. There is to be a solid basis for this theme in the intuitive experience of individuals, an experience which is 'given' to the individuals in an immediate way in moments of sudden enlightenment, ecstasy or inspiration. This transcendental one-ness of all existence, is, again, not to be let off as something hypothetical. This is claimed as realisable, as directly verifiable in an absolute consciousness that the individual as capable of. The individual, again, is capable of this absolute consciousness because such consciousness is the individual's *true* identity while his separate identity is the result of misconception (*avidya*) which is capable of being removed or transcended. The Vedantic theme, therefore, stands on a different logical footing. One claimed transcendental experience is open for verification by an individual's cultivating the very same experience under appropriate guidance. This has been eminently brought out by Sankara in his statement that *brahmavagati*, realisation of absolute one-ness with the all-pervading reality, springs from the enlightenment developing from critical contemplation (*victoria*) of the meanings of the Vedanta *Vakyas*, and cannot be expected as arising from source of knowledge such as inference and other ordinary *pramanas*<sup>15</sup>. *vacaspathi*, at this place strikes a very significant note is discussing what could be the appropriate role of inference or inferential reasoning in such a context<sup>16</sup>. He opines that its role would be like that of *arthapatti pramana* which resolves conflict between one evidence and another. We shall return to this issue in a subsequent chapter.

It may now be asked. What kind of evidence does Sankara adduce for his metaphysical doctrine of absolute one-ness of Reality and self? Is this evidence logically sufficient? We have answer to the first question in the critical exposition of relevant vedanta texts which the *Brahmasutras* of the first *adhyaya*, according to Sankara, aim at. The *sutras* of this part which in their grammatical form, look as arguments, having been presented mostly in the fifth-case-ending (*pancamivivakiti*) are to be understood as arguments of a very distinctive and special type. These are arguments on the basis of relevant Vedanta texts and arguments which are 'expressly limited to the words and the intended

meanings of these texts accepted implicitly as unquestionable authority in the context. They are not to be confused, as Sankara clearly points out in his interpretation of the second *sutra*, with independent logical arguments of the type of inference. An inferential argument has for its ground an observed relation of invariable concomitance between the *sadhya* and the *hetu*. No such ground is indicated here. If taken as arguments these are arguments on the basis of the meanings of the citable Vedanta texts. They are *interpretative* in character and their purpose is to bring out critically what the relevant Vedanta texts can be taken to *mean*. In the last sentence of his commentary on the first *sutra*, Sankara has admitted two things as relevant for defence of his metaphysical doctrine. These are : (a) *Vedanta-vakya-mimamsa* — a critical interpretation of the meanings of the Vedanta texts and (b) *tadvirodhi-tarkopakarana* — auxiliary means (*upakarana*) or aids in the form of logical arguments which do not conflict with the bearings of the Vedanta texts<sup>17</sup>. In his commentary on the second *adhyaya*, he appears to have introduced another variety of logical arguments called '*srutyanusari* or *srutyanusari* or *srutyanugrhita tarka*' — logical argument which *conform to* or *is supported by* the *sruti* — texts. The distinction between the *srutyanugrodhi tarka* and the last mentioned *tarka* is, however, not very clear from Sankara's exposition, although they are capable of being technically admitted as different.<sup>18</sup> In his interpretation of *sutra* 2.1.11 where he speaks of *srutyanusari* or *srutyanugrhita tarka*, Sankara has sounded a very remarkable note for the benefit of those who have unbounded faith in logic and logical reasoning. It is that logical reasoning, not to be desultory, inconclusive, dialectical or absorptive, requires an '*experiential basis*' of some kind. It cannot exercise itself in vacuum. This experiential basis may be provided by ordinary experience or by experience of some extraordinary nature, both being admitted as experiences.

The *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana grouped into four *adhyayas*, each *adhyaya*, again, distinguished into four sub-sections or *padas*, are not, all of them, abridged reproductions, or aphoristic expressions of relevant Vedanta texts, although Sankara has acclaimed<sup>19</sup> that to be their main purpose. Quite a considerable number of the *sutras* — the *sutras* of the *tarkapadas* mainly and some others interspersed here and there all along are of the nature of logical arguments. But these can be brought under *srutyanusari*, *srutyanugrhita* or *srutyanugrodhi tarka* and, therefore, Sankara's claim that logic, unsupported by revelation, is an inept means for metaphysical knowledge, and that the Vedanta metaphysics is grounded in evidences of an altogether different kind and is supported by logic of a different footing does not seem to be open to dispute. The *Brahmasutras* seems generally to abide by the following arrangements; the *sutras* of the first *adhyaya* are relative to the Upanisadic texts which show Brahman as the one Reality and the ground of everything that *seems* to be there, and therefore, the *true identity* of all. These then constitute the much needed evidence in support of the Sankarite doctrine of absolute one-ness of Reality and the self and its theoretic foundation. The *sutras* of the second *adhyaya* defend the Vedanta metaphysics by showing untenability of all rival formulations of metaphysical doctrine. These also show what kind of evidence and what kind of logic should be there if any transcendental metaphysics is to be admitted as delivering truth of fact. In short, these provide the only logical defence that a transcendental doctrine of metaphysics can have. The *sutras* of the third *adhyaya* by citing the Vedanta texts show what can be regarded as the method of intuitive realisation, the *sadhana* of the Vedantic truth. These then provide for the method of direct verification of the truth the *sutras* of the first *adhyaya* advocate by relevant quotations from the Upanisads. The *sutras* of the fourth *adhyaya* finally by appropriate citations from the Vedanta texts, the kind of ends *phala* which follow upon realisation of the Vedantic truth. These then substantiate the formal claim advanced by the first *sutra* that release from bondage and suffering can be effected only by means of intuitive knowledge (*avagati*) of absolute identity of *Brahman* and the self — *Brahmutsarikatva*. These also substantiate Sankara's own claim<sup>20</sup> that although the revealed texts

and logical reasoning conforming to them, as far as admissible (*yathasambhavam*), constitute (*pramana* in respect of the transcendental truth advocated by the Vedanta, the final evidence in the shape of direct verification results from intuitive self-realisation in which then the theoretic process terminates (*anubhavadavasanatvat brahmavijnanasya*.)

Although all the *sutras* of Badarayana and the Upanisadic texts which these bring into focus constitute the foundation of the Vedanta as an well-argued system, the *sutras* belonging to the first two *adhyasas*, each divided into four *padas* roughly represent its theoretic side. It is to them, therefore, that we shall address ourselves to look for the theoretic defence of the Vedanta philosophy. It is not to independent logical reasoning but to the Vedanta texts themselves, considered as an *extraordinary (talaukika) pramana*, and to the logical auxiliaries which they support that a modern critic should limit himself to assuage the theoretic value of the Vedanta philosophy. A Vedantist does not exhibit any nervousness to meet the challenge of any uncompromising rationalist or sceptic to whatever tradition he may belong. Nor does he find any ground for being apologetic for his adherence to a philosophy which openly declares the *sruti-texts* as its primary base. He does not also take shelter behind dogma. He is out to prove that the revealed doctrine is as valid and unchallengeable in its own sphere as is perceptual knowledge in the sphere of ordinary experience.

Sankara's claim that his metaphysical doctrine of absolute one-ness of Reality and the self is grounded in the *sruti* -texts which as embodying *revealed truths* are an extraordinary *pramana* the authority of which cannot be questioned did not automatically solve his problem. It was to be established that the so called revealed *sruti*-texts can legitimately uphold the doctrine of an existential reality (*bhutat vastu*). Even when this was done it was to be established that the existential reality advocated by the *sruti* texts was really a self-conscious absolute like the *Brahman* of the Vedanta and not an unconscious *materia opima*, the ground of all manifested plurality, such as the *Prakrti* or *pradhana* of the Sankhya philosophy. It was also to be proved how an *existential* reality can be the subject-matter of an extraordinary *pramana*, since the existential seems exclusively to belong to the sphere of ordinary *pramanas*<sup>20</sup>. Even this was not all. The most arduous and difficult task for him was to establish that his own interpretation of the Vedanta texts, even of the *Brahmasutras* of Badarayana was the only legitimate interpretation of them, comprehensive and all-coherent. As a matter of fact, the Upanisadic texts and the Vedanta Sutras are capable of widely divergent interpretations, and they have actually been interpreted differently, giving rise to the rival schools of the Vedanta. It was not, therefore, an easy matter for Sankara to work out and defend an *advaitic* interpretation of an appallingly medley of utterances and aphorisms.

Of these issues, the last, it can be seen, cannot be settled all at once. So Sankara made this the general issue of his whole commentary. The other three relate to the *pramanya* in the form of *admissible textual basis* of the Vedanta metaphysics. These have become the subject-matter of the first *adhyasa*. As for the *pramanya* in the form of logical tenability of the vedanta doctrine, one has to look into Sankara's commentary relating to the second *adhyasa*, – more significantly to the commentary on the *sutras* of the first two *padas* of that chapter.

To fulfil the logical requirement of an *advaitic* doctrine of the Sankarite type it is not enough that the Upanisadic texts should furnish evidence in support of *substantial one-ness* of *Brahman* and the multifarious cosmic forms. They have also to show that *there is a way* that the *Brahman* without losing its own self-identity can give rise to cosmic multiplicities, can sustain them so long as they endure and finally assimilate them in itself. This origination, sustenance and dissolution in cycles cannot be regarded as a temporal of fair, – the result of a passing whim, or a caprice. Nor can the Advaita Vedanta regard this order of becoming as a *no-fact* without damage to itself. It is not

possible, for instances, to establish Brahman as the *true* and *absolute identity* of all cosmic forms on the basis of the classical view that these cosmic forms are simply *illusory*. The multifarious cosmic forms are, of course, *appearances*, but as themselves they are *not* and can *not* be regarded as *illusory* appearances. Not only this cosmic becoming in multiple forms, but even their *fabricated* and *fancied being* as *substantive reals* (which is due to *avidya*) is also to be regarded as a *fact*, however playful this fixation may be from ultimate view-point. There being no other reality, no other principle of explanation, nothing that is co-ordinate, nay even subordinate to one absolute reality, Brahman has to be taken as the *one* ground of *all* manifestations. The Upanisadic texts *do* provide this kind of evidence. Sankara accepts their evidence. But his classical commentators create insoluble problems for Sankara Vedanta by their misinterpretation of *avidya* and *adhyasa*. What way could be there to establish and even to know that Reality is an absolute identity-experience, – formless, pure and undifferented, if, in the first place, there would not have *appeared* multiple forms, and in the second place if these forms did not, as a matter of fact, pose or fancy themselves as substantive reals, – if they did not 'forget' their true identity, and finally, if some of these could not resurrect themselves by regaining their apparently lost true identity? In Sankara Vedanta, as we have argued in the fifth chapter, there is neither any logical demand for taking the multiple *appearances* as real, nor for summarily dismissing them as all illusory. *Brahman* would cease to be *Brahman*, that is, *all comprehensive*, and the Vedanta doctrine of liberation as *refunding* by phenomenal forms their *true identity* in the Absolute, would be simply an idle exercise in language, if the phenomena becoming is not admitted even as an *appearance*, and if these multiple appearances again, were not capable of losing their true identity in a mistaken identity as substantive reals themselves.

*Brahman*, the world-ground, the one absolute fact, has been frequently referred to in the Upanisads as the '*That*', while the manifest order of cosmic plurality has been spoken of as the '*this*'. Had not this '*this*' been in some ways or in some-sense, *there*, the expressions, such as, 'This is that' or 'Thou art that' would make no sense. If the '*this*' or '*thou*' were already given as the '*that*', the Upanisadic sayings and the Vedantic discourse would be either meaningless or redundant. So the '*given-ness*' of the '*this*' or '*thou*' cannot be sensibly disputed. The Advaita Vedanta of the schools seem to have short beyond the mark by unnecessarily going to question the *fact of 'given-ness'* of the manifold even as *appearance* while what is questionable is if these appearances can be accepted as substantively real. As we have already discussed, the Advaita admits a third category (logical) between the real and the illusory, such as, *appearance* and this is neither the one nor the other. This '*neither real nor unreal*' is not simply a '*category of thought*'. It is an undeniable presence. It is what the self-expressive reality *becomes phenomenally* without losing self-identity. To this point we shall return towards the end and demonstrate, in the first place, that Sankara himself *means* this, and in the second place, that this supposition does not militate against the Advaita of Sankara.

The second *sutra* '*Janmadyasya yatah*' which is, as Sankara has pointed out, not to be interpreted as an inferential argument, is purported to define relationship of world-appearance to Reality, which is Brahman in the light of the *sruti*-texts. The *Bhrguvalli* of the Taittiriya Upanisad declares that all cosmic multiplicities originate from *Ananda*, are sustained by it, and when disappearing, are assimilated in it and that this *Ananda* is *Brahman* itself (in as much as it is *svarupa* (the very nature as such) of *Brahman*). Not that this passage quoted by Sankara is the only one which expresses *Brahman* as the ground of the phenomenal multiplicities. There are many other passages in other Upanisads<sup>21</sup>. What special significance, then, Sankara attaches to this passage in this context? This point seems to have escaped the notice of the classical interpreters of the *Sankarabhasya*. An inferential argument from effect to cause, says Sankara, can serve only to prove the existence of something as the cause, but it cannot inform about its *specific nature*, nor can it inform about its

specific relationship with the effect<sup>21</sup>. Sankara has quoted two passages from the *Bhṛguvalli* – the first stating that *Brahman* is to be accepted as the ground of all cosmic pluralities including the empirical individual, and the second, which Sankara calls '*nirṇayavākya*'<sup>22</sup>, specifically shows why *Brahman* has to be accepted as the ground of origination, substance and assimilation of all things and beings. This is significant. The cosmic pluralities are not freaks of Nature. They are regulated by definite laws of time, place and causal sequence. They, not only in their origination and maintenance, but even in their dissolution or disappearance, are regulated by *Ananda*, a certain animation of free pleasure or delight which has to be accepted as the *svarupa* of their ground. All cosmic manifestations are expressions of free delight. All the six forms of modifications mentioned by Yaska, such as, *asti* (exists), *jayate* (originates), *Vardhyate* (grows up), *viparinamate* (matures), *apaksyate* (declines) and *naśyati* (disappears) are according to Sankara reducible to the three basic manifestations *jayate*, *jivati* and *layette* or *abhisamvṛtati* mentioned in the *Bhṛguvalli*<sup>23</sup>. The world of effects are immanent in their cause from which they arise, in which they stay, and into which they disappear in ceaseless cycles. *Ananda* is their ground, since *ananda* is ever expressive, since it is the force that breaks through all bounds and limitations, and is incapable of containing itself within limits. The cosmic multiplicities have *Ananda* for their material ground, for, do they not exhibit and display animation, pleasure and attachment in their origination, subsistence and absorption? Not only that, one, who realises one's true and absolute identity with this ground, is charged with this force of *ananda*, and becomes free from all fear and sense of privation<sup>24</sup>.

Does the above rendering argue in support of the view that the cosmic appearances are *not* even appearances emanating from *Brahman*, holding in *Brahman*, and disappearing in *Brahman*, that they are purely illusory – the creations of an *avidya* residing in the *jivas* which themselves also are not appearances in any sense but all illusory, and so their liberation is also illusory? There could not be a bigger nonsense, since it renders the entire Vedānta literature an exercise in frivolity. For any aspirant of absolute knowledge, the order of phenomenal becoming is the necessary starting-point. This essential foothold is not to be demolished. This may as well be allowed to remain standing as an appearance, that is, as mere appearance without militating against the absolute one-ness of Reality. That absolute one-ness need not be construed as a blank static spatial form. The one-ness spoken of is *realisable* and also the *realised* one-ness<sup>25</sup> – so characteristic of self-consciousness. In the experience of self-identity, the manifold expressions are transcended or reduced to their substantial identity – experience. Where can one find a blank identity experience? Sankara's *Brahman* would be reduced to a transcendental insentience if the cosmic manifestations are all cut off from *Brahman* as merely illusory. This would be denial of *ananda* as a *svarupa lakṣaṇa* of *Brahman*. What is really illusory is the fancied substantivity and exclusiveness, the fancied substantive reality of cosmic appearances. Even, these latter are enacted by Reality in its free-play (*līlā*), that is, in a sportive display. This sport assumes a serious character in stead of being a mere play – in the delusive understanding of the *jivas*, who, although substantially one with *Brahman*, fancy themselves as exclusively real and as 'other' than *Brahman*.

The immanent or substantial unity of the given world of plural appearances, so essential for establishing absolute one-ness of the *jiva* with *Brahman*, the *sine qua non* of absolutes release, could not be theoretically proved by any inferential argument. The traditional cosmo-teleological argument, as Kant rightly observes, presupposes the ontological argument 'from mere idea to actual existence' and proves as infructuous as is the latter argument<sup>26</sup>. Nor could any of Udayana's arguments in proof of God's existence could establish this essential one-ness of cosmic forms with the Absolute<sup>27</sup>. Thus, Sankara, quite justifiably, falls back upon the revealed authority of the *śruti*-texts as providing the



requisite evidence in support of the belief. This need not be misconstrued as a dogmatic fad. The propriety as also self-sufficiency of the extraordinary *sruti*-propriety in a matter like this has not been left unexamined and unexplained by Sankara, and we shall return to them at the end of the present exposition.

In his interpretation of the third *sutra* - *sastrajunitvat*, where Sankara interprets that *sutra* in two alternative ways, he has furnished us with several momentous cues scarcely noticed by his orthodox interpreters of both the schools. In Sankara's rendering, the third *sutra* has virtually assumed the form of *two sutras*, one affiliated to, and very significantly brought alongside, the second *sutra*, the other affiliated to the fourth *sutra*. Although both interpretations are borne out by the text, and serve specific purposes, it is the first interpretation which deserves closer attention than has been given to it heretofore. Ramanuja has inadvertently missed this interpretation, and consequently, has missed a very important line of defence of *sruti*-*pramana*. There is another linkage with the second *sutra* which almost all traditionalists have missed. In a sense, the second and the third *sutras* are complementary - that which is the ground of the entire order of becoming is also the ground of the *sastras* which, as expressions of wisdom, are also integral to Brahman's phenomenal manifestations, and so, cannot be considered as falling outside of the all-comprehensive Reality, the *one* without a second. So, Sankara's first interpretation of the third *sutra* corroborates the evidence of the second *sutra*. The evidences furnished by the *sastras*, including the *sruti*-texts, again, from the basis of the argument posed in the second *Sutra*, since that argument is *srutyasrayi* (*sruti*-based) and not inferential, according to Sankara's own submission<sup>10</sup>. Now, the *srutis*, again, are shown to have emanated from that very source from which cosmic multiplicities have arisen, in which they stay, and into which they pass away when disappearing. This, at once, establishes that *Brahman* is not only the *ratio existendi* of the whole order of becoming but also the *ratio cognoscenti*. There would have been a circularity of reasoning if the two grounds were distinct and different. But where the two are united in the self-same matrix that charge either fails or is escaped. The theoretic situation projected by Sankara's first interpretation of the third *sutra* has several other advantages, not enjoyed by many of the rival commentaries on the *Brahmasutras*. In the first place, the dualism between *Brahman* as a *thing* to be established and the extraordinary *satrupramana* which is to establish it, is transcended or resolved. In the second place, *Brahman* escapes from being an *object* - an object to be known or proved by extraneous means. *Brahman* retains its role as the one subject, self-shining, self-manifest and self-proved. There is even a more momentous finding associated with this interpretation. This, even Sankara himself, has not elaborated, although he has furnished the cue. It is this that as *Ananda* is *svarupa* of Brahman, so also is *cit* self-shining consciousness. So, if the cosmic forms of phenomenal forms of subjects and objects emanate from *Brahman* as necessary expressions of *Ananda*, all phenomenal expressions of wisdom, knowledge and ever foibles are varied and playful manifestations of *Brahman's svarupa* as *cit* (enlightenment). Taken within the limited compass of the third *sutra*, the argument is - the *sastras*, like the Vedas and the Upanisads, *could be* there because *Brahman*, their ground, is infinite wisdom, because *cit* is the *svarupa* of Brahman, just as the cosmic pluralities *could* originate, *could* hold and *could* finally pass into *Brahman* since infinite self-delight (*ananda*) is the *svarupa* of Brahman, and this *Brahman* is their ground.

It will, however, not be correct to say that Sankara's first interpretation of the third *sutra*, in which certain *sruti*-texts are cited as evidence of Brahman being the ground of the *Sastras*, is exactly like the above. In fact, Sankara has not fully worked out his first interpretation. Making a brief reference to the passage of the *Brhadaranyaka*, the *sruti* text which speaks of *Brahman* as the source of the *sastras*, such as, the *Rgveda*, etc., he argues that only an omniscient being (*parvajna*), such



as, *Brahman* could be their ground" But if the rhetoric of '*anandamaya*' was found inapt and misleading as description of *Brahman* even though the *Badarayana sutra* describes *Brahman* in that way<sup>3</sup>, the same censure should attend upon Sankara's description of *Brahman* in the context of the third *sutra* and in many other places as *sarvajna*, since Reality to him, is not a personal being. Then, again, the orthodox Purvamimamsa view of the Vedas as *apauruseya* in the sense of being independent of personal authorship (and in that sense, being self-existent, self-dependent and self-complete) seems to have made Sankara half-hearted in pressing the point of *Brahman*'s being the *absolute* ground of revealed literature (*sastras*) to its logical limit" A modern writer would be feeling amused at the attempts made by the classical interpreters of Sankara Bhasya and their followers to work out a laboured and unconvincing compromise. Between *Brahman*'s authorship of the Vedas and at the same time, *relative independence* of the Vedic literature" In his commentary on the *Brhadaranyaka*, Sankara himself, when commenting on the passage, appears to have endorsed a similar line of defence. Tradition dies hard. Ramanuja's omission or neglect of the first possible interpretation of this third *sutra* has left an uncovered dualism between the Absolute of his conception, an *object* of knowledge and worship, and the *sastrapramana*, the source of knowledge of that Absolute. Sankara's first interpretation which takes *Brahman* as the *causa existendi* of the *Sastras* undoubtedly bridges the gap since the *sastras*, the *ratio cognoscendi* of *Brahman*, to all purposes, turns out to be a made of self-expression, although phenomenal, of the self-same Reality. The knowledge of *Brahman* which the *sastrapramana* is to provide, is, in a sense, *Brahman*'s knowledge of itself. This seems to be a more reasonable approach if absolute non-dualism is to be defended. But the *sastras* alone cannot be held as self-expression of the limitless *cit-svarupa* of the Absolute. Lesser knowledge and even our fooleries and fables will have to be taken as expressions of the self-same *cit* may be under conditions more involved and less sacrosanct. The varied phenomenal manifestations of the absolutely limitless are themselves limitless. The immanent cause from which Sankara and Ramanuja sprung up is the same from which not only less intelligent beings such as ourselves but even the lower animals and vegetable organisms and inanimate objects also sprung up. So, why should the natural misconception of human individuals, on account of which these individuals conceive of themselves as substantial realities, and their other modes of fooleries, have a different *ultimate* ground? The delusions which hold us apart from *Brahman*, oblivious of our *true identity*, and the Upanisadic wisdom, which removes the delusion and restores normalcy and help in the discovery of that true identity, must have emanated from the very same ground. Sankara's first interpretation of the *sutra*, therefore, 'furnish the cue to the discovery of transcendental one-ness of all cosmic manifestations, both in the order of *being* and in the order of *knowing*. Is not *Brahman* the unity of *Sat*, *cit* and *Ananda*? Can there be different grounds for different kinds of cosmic manifestations at the ultimate level?

Now, to return to the second and the third *sutras*, in so far as these are to be *Srutyasrayi* (*Sruti*-based) arguments and not inferential arguments. It can be seen that the third *sutra*, by the second interpretation of Sankara, is not exactly a *sruti*-based argument but is a logical argument which justifies the doctrine of *Brahman* by a general reference to the revealed authority of the *sruti*-texts. That *sutra*, by the first interpretation, however, seeks to prove the existence of *Brahman* from the *sastras*-conceived as consequents or affects, on the express authority of relevant *sruti*-texts describes *Brahman* as the ground, the immanent cause of the *Sastras*" By the second interpretation, the *sastras* become (are taken to be) the *logical* ground for our acceptance of the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* as the *one* Reality and the self. The distinction of the two approaches, although thin and somewhat involved, seems to be significant. The issue may also be expressed in another way. The second *sutra* and also the third *sutra* by the first interpretation seek to establish *Brahman* on the

internal evidence of some express statements of the Upanisads (the Vedanta Vakyas) – as different from inferential arguments from effects to their cause. The third *sutra* by the second interpretation makes the bold claim that the type of evidences cited by the *sutras*, that is, the evidences furnished by the Upanisadic texts, will have to be accepted, for all relevant logical purposes, as binding and unassailable.

Whether the Upanisadic texts citable in the context of these two *sutras* are about *Svarupa laksana* or *tatvestha laksana* of *Brahman* are scholastic issues into which one need not enter at this place. Sankara himself evinced no interest in such discussions in this context. The issues of *svarupa* and *tatvestha laksana* may, in an important sense, be shown to be purely linguistic. We shall take them up in a more appropriate place.<sup>38</sup> As for the second *sutra*, the *sruti*-evidences are of the following type. Varuna guides his son, Bhrgu to the knowledge of *Brahman* by asking him to meditate on 'that which can be regarded as the source from which all things and beings arise, that which can also be regarded as the principle sustaining them all so long as they endure, and finally, that into which, again, all enter as they go out of existences. The source of origination, of sustenance, and the final resting place of cosmic multiplicities are to be one and the same, according to the statement. *Brahman* is to be the source of all origination, the principle sustaining and also the final resting place – this is the clue that Varuna gives, but the discovery is left to his son who is to follow up the clue through penance and meditation. Bhrgu, so the anecdote relates, made successive discoveries of what this ultimate metaphysical principle could be but he remained unsatisfied and his question still haunted him. He returned to his father again and again, and asked for his guidance. Varuna asked him to meditate more closely and to find the truth for himself. Finally, through penance and meditation, Bhrgu got answer to his question. He was no longer agitated by doubt and suspense. He came to realise that *Brahman* as *Ananda* (freedom of self-delight) was the source, the sustaining principle as also the goal of all. This is the evidence that the *Bhrguvalli* of the *Taittiriya* Upanisad furnishes. The *chandogya* reiterates, the very same evidence when it describes *Brahman* as '*Tajjalan*'<sup>39</sup>

As for the third *sutra* – '*Sastrayanitvat*', insofar as it can be taken as an argument based on express *sruti*-texts, it proves the existence of *Brahman* as omniscience, that is, as limitless *cit*, which, again, is *svarupa* of *Brahman*. The citable *sruti*-texts are passages of the type of the one in the *Brhadaranyaka*. The passage of the *Brhadaranyaka*<sup>40</sup> is as follows. 'As from a fire laid with damp fuel, clouds of smoke separately issue forth, so, too, variety, from this great being has been breathed forth that which is Rgveda, Yajurveda, Sama-veda, Hymns of the Atharvans and Angirasa, Legends (Itihasa), Ancient Lore (purana), Aphorisms (Sutra), explanations (anuvya-khyana), and commentaries (Vyakhyana) . . . from it, indeed, have all these been breathed forth'. With slight variation the passage occurs also in the *Maitri* Upanisad.<sup>41</sup> It can be seen that Sankara does not quote the passage in full but only such parts which may constitute a *sruti*-based proof of the fact that the great being, the source of the Sastras like Rgveda, must be absolutely all-knowing and all-powerful.<sup>42</sup>

The passage in question is only a part of Yagnavalkya's instruction to his dear wife Maitreyi who had no desire for earthly happiness and instead, sought guidance of her husband to the path of immortality (*amrtatvam*). This passage and the other passages succeeding it instruct to the effect that *Brahman* or *Atman* is not only the source of the *sastras* and the entire mass of knowledge<sup>43</sup> but also of all things and beings. In this regard, the *sutra* may be regarded as allied to the second *sutra*. While commenting on this passage in the context of the *Brhadaranyaka* Sankara takes the word '*sastra*' to cover all vedic and allied literature. But since neither the Vedas, nor the multifarious allied literature can be supposed to have originated at any specified time, a modern interpreter, we think, will be justified in not taking the alleged evidence of their authorship' in literal sense. The

*sruti*-argument, here, is calculated to establish an infinite intelligence or wisdom (*prajñana*) as the root-principle. This need not be taken to mean, as the tradition has understood it that this root-principle is the 'author' of the Vedas or any other treatise in the way a human agent becomes the author of certain composition. This has on the contrary, to be taken to suggest that had not the root-principle been of the nature of infinite intelligence and enlightenment, there could not have been the 'revelations', the 'truth-perceptions', the infinitely varied expressions of knowledge and experience in the manifest order. The impersonal (*a-pauruṣeya*) character of the Vedic literature can perhaps be better explained on this unorthodox supposition – the so called revealed truth' being all manifestations of the truth-principle itself (which is *Brahman*) through the human media of the seers who 'saw' or intuited them but did not *make* or construe them as views or opinions personal or private to themselves. Their essential 'given-ness' in the calm contemplation of 'de-conditioned'<sup>43</sup> human seekers such as the sages, may be accepted as the reason at the back of our acceptance of them as impersonal (*a-pauruṣeya*) and also as a justification for their claim to *universality* and self-validity (*svataḥ-pramānya*).

On the issue of *a-pauruṣeyata* (impersonal origin) of the Vedas, including the Upanisads, – an issue maintained and defended by the Purvamimamsa school and the Vedānta, there is lot of controversy. One classical formulation of the view can be found in Kumārila's 'Tantravartika' where he expresses that it is independence (*svatantrata*) on the part of any personal agent in the formulation of Vedic maxims which is assiduously to be denied or ruled out of order<sup>44</sup>. This, then, implies that a personal agent may be a vehicle or medium of Vedic maxims which are self-expressed but cannot be their author, formulating or emending them. With the two schools of *purvamimamsa* – the Prabhākara and the Bhaṭṭa, the Vedas are eternal (*nitya*) and this their eternality pertains to the Varnas (*letters*) and their arrangement (*anuparva*) in the Vedic statements. The atheistic school of the Bhaṭṭamimamsa, insofar as it does not believe in the agency of God, and does not believe also in absolute creation and periodic dissolution, takes the Vedas as having been perpetuated in course of transmission from preceptors to disciples in an *infinite series*. The Theistic school of Prabhākara mimamsa, on the other hand, in so far as it believes in successive creations and dissolutions by cycles, conceives of the Vedas (which are eternally the same unalterable arrangement of Varnas) as existing in the divine Mind at the time of every dissolution, and being re-introduced in the beginning of every new creation<sup>45</sup>. The classical Vedānta, we are told<sup>46</sup> adheres to some such view with the difference that, in common with the Nyaya-vaishesika school, the Vedānta does not believe in the eternality of the Vedas, either in their *Varna*-aspect or their *pada* – aspect<sup>47</sup>. It is indeed difficult to accept the Mimamsa version of the case in the context of the Advaita Vedānta. There is a logical demand for a new and unorthodox version. The Vedānta, to be sure, does not believe in the eternality of the Vedas. For the Advaita Vedānta, therefore, there is no demand for safe-guarding independence, relative or absolute, of the Vedas in relation to their ultimate ground, such as, *Brahman* – a line of traditional thinking with which Sāṅkara himself has laboured in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka<sup>48</sup> and upon which the Bhaṭṭa, the Kaṇṇataru and the Paṇḍita have ridiculously exercised themselves in the context of the third Sūtra<sup>49</sup>. It can be seen that Sāṅkara in his first interpretation of the third sūtra, takes *Brahman* not only as *sarvajña* (all-knowing) but also as *Sarvasakti* (all-powerful), and his expression *puruṣanīvasavai*, taken along with the expressions '*a-prajñāna*' and '*tīrtanyayena*' do not go so much to suggest relative independence of the Vedas as their having been *effortlessly* breathed out by *Brahman*. Even then the description is metaphorical which is not to be taken literally. The more reasonable meaning seems to be that the Vedas as the body of revealed truths must be supposed as having emanated spontaneously from the nature of *Brahman* as *cit* (enlightenment). The Vedas are

called *a-paurusey* because no personal agent, human or divine, is their author or composer. This is their *Svatatva* (self-supported), their *anapeksatva* (absence of dependence on anything extraneous) and *a-pauruseyata* (being impersonal in origin). The description of *Brahman* in this context is undoubtedly metaphorical as also the expressions '*sarvajña*' and '*sarvasakti*' are. In a descriptive elaboration of a theme such 'figures of speeches' are unavoidable. The Bhamati and its auxiliaries are guilty of taking at first the description of *purusa* liberally to mean a personal agent although divines, and thereafter seeking to explain *a-pauruseyata* and *anapeksatva* of the Vedas by attributing to them a quasi-independent existence. The Pancapadika shows no improvement in the treatment insofar as it accords to the Vedas a status co-eval with *Brahman*.<sup>10</sup> These interpreters, blinded by their orthodoxy, have failed to take notice of the fact that the second Badarayana *sutra* would fail in its object if the *sastras* are allowed to have, in any form or shape, an independent or co-eval being. The Vedas, on the ground of their alleged *a-pauruseyata* and *anapeksatva* cannot be admitted as a second *Nitya*, coexistent with *Brahman*. The supposition that *Brahman* is simply the cause of *ablivyakti* (manifestation) of the Vedas which pre-existed in their fixed and unalterable arrangement all through is out and out absurd. Firstly, can this nonsense be logically established. Secondly, this would be going against the spirit of the text quoted and its context. Yajnavalkya, to be sure, was explaining in that context how one self permeates all multiple forms, how these forms, all rise from one great source and how, finally, all their differentiations are lost as they all merge in one reality<sup>10</sup>. In that very context it has also been stated that *Brahman* eludes him who knows anything other than the self and as existing in distinction from the self'. The self-validity of the Vedas on the ground of *a-pauruseyata* and *anapeksatva* will have, therefore, to be explained some other liner.

There are at least two other reasons why Sankara cannot fall in line with the Mimamsa view of the Vedas as a self-existent and self-ordered body of knowledge. Sankara is a *vivartavadi*, and so, according to him, every manifestation, whether by way of knowledge or by way of being (becoming) is to be an 'appearance' of some sort, at times even a radical distortion. So, in his system, the so called *niyataracanavat*<sup>12</sup> does not have a place and its '*ablivyakti*' cannot be an unaltered reproduction. The other reason is, in his *Adhyasabbhasya*, Sankara has already maintained that all the conventional *pramanas* including the *sastras* are to an extent vitiated by falsity (*avivhavarisayani*)<sup>13</sup>. In the context of the third *sutra* (first interpretation), again, *Brahman* is argued to be source of the *sastras* in the same way that *Brahman*, in the context of the second *sutra*, is accepted as the source of the manifest order in all its three-fold aspects - origination, sustenance, and dissolution. In both cases, certain *sruti* passages are quoted as furnishing the required evidence. The *Brhadaranyaka* passage, quoted in the context of the third *sutra*, introduces the analogy of fire in wet-fuel (*ardredhagni*), giving rise to smokes and sparks of varied forms and thus to explain the origin of the different *sastras* from *Brahman*. The implication, then, is that it is not *Brahman* as *Kutastha* (pure itself) which is the source of the *sastras* but *Brahman* in cosmic display and as informed by *Maya* which is so. There was then no logical demand, as far as, the Advaita Vedanta is concerned to accept the vedas or *srutis* (insofar as these have been enumerated within the category of '*sastras*' by the passage) as an absolutely fixed arrangement of words (*niyata-racanavat*)<sup>14</sup>, eternal and independent. If Sankara's classical commentators were so anxious to make a compromise with the Mimamsa and deny *svatantra* (independence) or *Brahman* in respect of these texts<sup>15</sup>, it was only because the thought that the weight and sanctity of the *sastrapramana*, the only admissible *pramana* for the *Brahman*-doctrine, would be seriously impaired otherwise. Such apprehension, however is groundless, as we shall see next.

The *sastras*, here are the Vedic and Upanisadic sentences. They are admitted as an indirect source of knowledge, although regarded as an extraordinary (*alaukika*) *pramana*. As couched in words

and syllables, these statements like all other statements, for their meanings, are dependent on four conditions, such as, expectancy (*akanksa*), compatibility (*vyogvata*), contiguity (*asatti*) and contextual intention (*tatparya*). They are dependent also on interpretation in order to become communicated knowledge. Both the Mimamsa and the Vedanta accept that the absolute validity of the communicated knowledge given by the Sastras is not due to unimpeachable veracity of the speaker, that the *sastras* are not to be regarded as *aptavacana*™. Their absolute validity pertains to their nature as such, that is, to the truths they communicate. These truths are uncontradictable. These are truths of facts, truths of the very situation itself, truths of certain stations (*asrama*) of life. They are not man-made truths, and they do not have a legislative authority outside of themselves™. They are, so to say, self-legislated and self-valid. It can be seen that this self-validity as well as uncontradictable authority of the *sastrapramana* can as well be defended by regarding the Vedic and Upanisadic sentences as delivering or communicating truths which are, 'revealed' in the sense of being 'given' in certain extraordinary state of the mind. These truths may be taken as certain extraordinary 'truth-perceptions'. It is also affect that the Mimamsa and the Vedanta accord to *sastrapramana* or *srutipramana* a place similar to what we accord to perception (*pratyaksa*) in the realm of 'ordinary', that is, 'conventional' knowledge. All the mediate forms of conventional knowledge involve logical reasoning of some kind which requires some perceptual base as its ground. It is not, therefore, unusual to expect that in transcendental matters logical reasoning should ungrudgingly accept the guidance of the 'revealed evidences' furnished by the extraordinary *sastrapramana*. Logical reasoning, drilled and tailored in the ordinary conventional kind of experience, cannot have any legitimate jurisdiction in the sphere of the super-sensuous. There is nothing unnatural or extraordinary in this claim since logic is always *sapeksha* (dependent). That even in the sphere of our ordinary knowledge of matters of fact, logical reasoning does not enjoy an unbridled scope. In case of conflict of logical understanding with a 'given' perceptual experience we do not accord to the former any preferential treatment. When two perceptions conflict with each other, we, no doubt, accept arbitration of logical reason to decide which of the two is true and which one is false. But even, there, logic cannot dispute that both experiences were 'given', and if the special circumstances of their 'given-ness' are taken into account, instead of giving an over all decision, each 'given' experience has to be admitted as equally valid. In the context of the *sruti*-texts, the same rule is to be followed. When two *sruti*-texts conflict with each other, logic has, of course, to arbitrate. But in this arbitration, logic cannot throw out any of them overboard. It has to find accommodation for each within what would be the proper limit of its scope—its relevance and jurisdiction. The early Vedic statements for instance, which are *prescriptive* and enjoin actions (*Karma*) for achievement of spiritual merit (*dharma*), and the later Vedic statements in the Upanisads which are descriptive, and many of which repudiate or speak of dis-utility of vedic rituals, are to be accepted equally as embodying 'given' truths of revelation but belonging to different mental planes. The conflict among various forms of revelations or intuitions can be resolved in the same way. Any 'given' truth of fact, be it perceptual or revelational, is in same sense 'impersonal' in the sense of being out and out 'objective'. If the Vedic texts are specially designated as '*apauruseya*', it is only because the truths envisaged in them are, to a very high degree, extraordinary (*alaukika*) and are also independent (*anapeksa*) of habitual conditioning of the mind. We cannot significantly speak of their having been *brought into being*, or *having been manipulated* by any human agent—cannot speak of their having been 'authored'. It may be true that these *srutis* are called as that because these have descended down from perceivers to disciples in the form of oral instructions in unrecorded pre-historic times before coming to be compiled and written down. But neither the Bhatta view that these are *nitya* (eternal) in the sense that they never had originated but were beginninglessly transmitted as a fixed arrangement. Of words and syllables, nor the Prabhakara view



(to which the classical Vedantic view is to some extent allied) that an eternally fixed arrangement of words and syllables resided in the Deity at the time of every cyclic dissolution (*pralaya*) and came to be promulgated in their fixed order and arrangement at every new creation, seems to make any sense. Senseless bigotry has given rise to senseless sophistry. Inability of the modern mind to make a fetish of such trivialities does not bespeak of any academic disqualification. We can now work out a rational defence of the *śrutis* as embodying 'revealed truths' without any such orthodox assumptions. And this may well fit into Sankara's deliberations in his *Brahmasutrabhasya*.

For the Advaita metaphysics, *Brahman* is the sole substantive reality and the ground of all phenomenal manifestation. All expressions of knowledge or wisdom will have, therefore, to be traced to that very ultimate source. There are infinitely varied expressions, good and bad, great and small, beautiful and ugly, superbly wise and limitlessly foolish, because Reality is capable of expressing itself phenomenally in infinite variety of forms. There can be no other ground or source of anything from the *ultimate* view-point. Now, there could not be any self-forgetful empirical individuals and their self-deceptive beliefs and inclinations, had not the Absolute given itself out in such forms playfully in self-delight. There could not also be self-searching, enlightened individuals, had not the Absolute itself provided for such manifestations. *Self-forgetting* and *self-finding*, suffering in bondage and rejoicing in the re-discovery of freedom, *going all out* in the progressively physical and material, and *coming in or coming to itself* in the progressively spiritual— are two ways of cosmic manifestations of the Absolute. That the Absolute is one undivided pure consciousness, an absolute identity-consciousness, is established in self-finding and self-realisation. That the Absolute is *all the cosmic multiplicities* is established in self-forgetting and in limitless individuating—in the assumed plurality of discrete and separate forms. Where do the 'revealed truths' stand or figure in this kind of phenomenal display, let us ask? The question of their having a separate source of origin or manifestation, a separate location *outside* Reality, is at once ruled out. These 'revealed truths' then figure in the process of progressive 'self-searching' and 'self-finding', in the process 'self-realisation' of the spirit. As developing out of the self-same Reality, not in its bid for becoming many<sup>14</sup>, but in the process of *realisation* of absolute one-ness of being, these revealed truths in relation to the empirical individuals (*jivas*) are 'given truth-experiences' and 'revealed' through their media. And, insofar as their revelation is dependent on the individuals gaining greatest approximation to the absolute core through penance and meditation, (which are processes of *de-conditioning* or individuality and concomitant consciousness), these are transcendental truths which reflect the nature of Reality itself. Taken in this way, these revealed or 'intuited' truths and the *sastrapramana*, which communicate them through spoken or written symbols, may be considered as beyond censure and dispute of our ordinary experience and the logic fashioned in its light, the so called *alaukika*, *apauruseya*, *anapeksatva* and *svatastatva* of the *sastrapramana*, we think, can be defended in this way as well. Sankara's first interpretation of the third *sutra* in which *Brahman* is taken as the source (*yonir*) of the *sastras* seems to agree with this explanation<sup>15</sup>.

Nor is it necessary to defend any absolute standard in respect of 'the truths of revelation' in justification of their claim to 'having been given' and not having been manipulated or fabricated. There may be several levels in the attainment of 'de-conditioning', several levels in revealed knowledge. Truths intuited at every such level can be accepted as 'revealed' or 'given', truths and a distinction of higher and lower is quite feasible in respect of them. The revealed truths of the earlier Vedas and those of the later Vedas, for instance, need not be accepted as exhibiting the *same degree* of approximation to the nature of the real. Yet both can be regarded as revealed knowledge. The very name '*Vedanta*' the utmost limit of knowledge or enlightenment, marks off the Upanisads as



delivering up the supreme truths of fact. This kind of gradation in revealed knowledge and truths need not be considered— sacrilegious. Even the most orthodox schools have valued the *śrutivākyas* by reference to their subject-matter, and all the *Vākyas* have not been given equal weightage. The groupings of the Vedic sentences into different orders prove this very eminently. The Purvamīmāṃsa has shown scant respect to the *Śruti*-statements of the Upanisads by coercing them to fall in line with the injunctive meaning of the Vedic sentences of the earlier part. Sankara, again, has attempted to chalk out an absolutely different sphere of relevance and impost for the Upanisadic sentences. For interpretation of meaning of the *śruti*-texts, we have, of course, to take the help of logic. The Jaiminī sūtras, the Sabarabhasya, the Brhātī, the Sloka-vartikā or the Tātravartikā, all have attempted logical interpretation of the highly disordered mass of *śruti*-texts. No sacrilege has been committed thereby. Interpretation is a logical task. It is only to be seen that logic here, as also elsewhere, works in conformity with the 'given' truths and in a spirit of accommodation, and not by suppression or outright rejection.

Sankara's dual interpretation of the third *sūtra* has given rise to some very interesting logical points. The first interpretation shows the third *sūtra* as a *śruti* based agreement seeking to establish *Brahman* as the immanent cause of the *śāstras* just as the second *sūtra* establishes *Brahman* as the immanent cause of the origination, sustenance and the final resting-place of all cosmic manifestations. In both cases, relevant *śruti*-texts taken up as evidences in support of the argument which is not to be looked upon as an inferential argument. The second interpretation, again, takes the *śāstras* as constituting the theoretic ground of our knowledge of *Brahman*. In a way, this is simply the reiteration of the logical issue of proof raised and discussed in the second *sūtra* that it is the evidence of *śruti* - texts and not inference which is to be admitted as proof in this transcendental theme<sup>40</sup>. So, Sankara has remained consistent in his stand as far as *śāstrapramāṇakutva* (*śāstras* being the ground of proof) of *Brahman* is concerned. But there is another aspect of the issue in question which shows a certain circularity of reasoning. *Brahman* is to be taken as the ground of the *śāstras*, and the *śāstras* are to be taken as the ground of our knowledge of *Brahman*. And this is not the only circularity, there is another. The *śāstras*, constitute the evidence of their own derivation from *Brahman* and such evidence is to be the only evidence admissible in respect of their own origination as also of *Brahman*, as the ground of that origination. In what kind of logical fixation, let us ask, can this circularity as also the other one prove to be an excellence, in stead of being a drawback or defect of the system?

There is, of course, a way in which no circularity will be involved. This is, if the *śāstras* are taken as co-ordinate with *Brahman*, falling outside of *Brahman*, that is, if the *śāstras* are conceived as independent of *Brahman*. But this will militate against Absolutism, the doctrine of one all-comprehensive reality. It is not clear if Ramanuja and other exponents of the Vedānta doctrine noticed this systems, such as, the Purvamīmāṃsa do not have any difficulty in this admission as they do not have any pretension to monism or Absolutism. For Absolutism or non-dualism, it is imperative to accommodate the *śāstras* somehow within the one reality. Now, the question arises: how can this be done? Sankara by his first interpretation of the third *sūtra*, attempted to explain the *śāstras* as having originated from the self-same matrix which is the ground of origination, sustenance and dissolution of everything phenomenal. This he did, not by means of a speculative argument, but by citing passages from the *śrutis*, that is, from the *śāstras*. Insofar as the *śāstras* are looked upon as furnishing theoretic evidence in support of the doctrine of *Brahman* they are to be looked upon as the *ratio cognoscendi* of *Brahman*, and again, insofar as *Brahman* is accepted as the ground, the very matrix, from which all forms of knowledge, including the revealed knowledge the *śāstras* embody, have sprung up, *Brahman* has to be taken as the *ratio essendi-cum-ratio existendi* of the *śāstras*. When the two, the *ratio existendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* are combined into one as *aspects* of the same reality what do

we have except that *Brahman* not only comprehends all, but also makes itself known and understandable as that all-comprehending reality, in term of its own manifestation by way of *cit*—the self-expressive knowledge? Does not this become an argument in support of the doctrine that *Brahman* is not only *ananda* but is also *cit* that both *ananda* and *cit* figure as *svarupa* of *Brahman*, the one absolute Reality? What proof of self-revelation (*svaprakasatva*) of *Brahman* would be there if the *sastras* which communicate as to its nature were a distinct and separate entity and not an expressed of its nature as *cit*?

As for the other circularity—The *sastras* being the evidence of their own derivation from the *Brahman*, which itself rests on the evidence of the *sastras*. It can be seen that Sankara has accepted the word '*sastra*' in the *sutra* '*sastrayonitvat*' in somewhat different meanings in his two interpretations of the *sutra*. As is clear from Sankara's interpretation of the fourth *sutra*, that is, the *samanvaya sutra*, it is *sastras* in the form of Upanisads only which he regarded as the *yoni*, that is, the source of knowledge of *Brahman* as an existential reality (*parinisth-itavastu*). So, in the second interpretation of the *sutra*- *Sastrayonitvat*, the word '*sastra*' stands for the Upanisads. But, by the first interpretation of the same *sutra*, the word, *sastra* stands for all the so called sacred literature, and the passage quoted from the *Brhadaranyaka* also confirms this supposition. In point of fact, there would not have been any oddity if in the second interpretation, and also in the *samanvaya sutra*, the word '*sastra*' would have been taken in its greater comprehension to include all the *srutis*—the Vedas and the Upanisads, and all auxiliary disciplines, although Sankara himself has not done so<sup>43</sup>. *Brahman* is the one *sut* and this *sut* is *svarupa* of *Brahman* in so far as *Brahman* is absolutely unnegatable in itself as also in its appearances. What there is is *Brahman* and what appears is also the appearance of *Brahman*, even all distortions in the form of plural substantives are *Brahman* as distorted gamefully. It can be seen, therefore, that in one regard *Brahman* appears as many and is also taken or understood as many, while in another regard, that is, as not-appearing, it is one, not a many, and is also revealed or expressed as that *Brahman*, as self-expressive and self-knowing reality, knows and makes itself known in both ways. In conformity with this dual presentation of reality, which, at bottom, is self-presentation. There can be *sastras* communicating *Brahman*, the one reality, in either way. And *Sastras* can communicate in such ways only because the *sastras*, as also other expressions of phenomenal knowledge, are nothing in themselves, because all have emanated from *Brahman* and are ingredients of *Brahman*'s self-conscious manifestation. If the Vedanta texts, the Upanisads, are given greater weight, it is only because they give an integrated and harmonious view of Reality and its appearances, while other texts and other forms of knowledge present reality segmentally in expressions which lack cohesion and finality. It is for this or a son that the Vedanta is the final end of all knowledge and comprehension. The Vedanta, as Sankara undertakes to show, gives to each conscious expression and its cognate picture of reality its proper place in the total figuration and reveals the nature of reality as an all-comprehensive unity which is at bottom or centrally one absolute identity-consciousness. And this Vedanta is as much our knowledge of *Brahman* in supersensuous intuition as it is *Brahman*'s own mode of integrated self-revelation. Such being the case, the circularity debated about is no circularity but an essential feature of Absolute non-dualism of the Vedanta doctrine.

That the Absolute one, *Brahman*, is such and such because the *sastras* say so, and the *sastras* are unimpeachable, the final authority, in such matters, smacks of yogmatism. Sankara seems to have been aware of this. So before presenting the *Sastras*, particularly the Upanisads, as the sole custodian of *Brahman*-knowledge in his second interpretation of the *sutra*, '*Sastrayonitvat*', he showed how the *sastras* may be regarded as modes of self-revelation of *Brahman* and nothing alien in his first

interpretation As *Sastras* themselves are grounded in Reality as modes of its self-expression, there can be no charge of dogmatism if it is maintained that the *sastras* alone constitute the evidence of the Reality which is all-pervading and yet, as the one self of all, a pure absolute identity consciousness. What the *sastras* communicate is at bottom how the self-manifest reality reveals itself through phenomenal media.

## References

- 1 See Bhasyabhumika of Bhādaranyaka ' Brahmatmaikatva – Vidyapratipattaye.' , Bhasyabhumika of Chandogya ' advaitatma-vijñanam. Vaktavyam, iti upanīśadarabhyate', Abhasa - Bhasya of Aitareya ' Kevalanīśakriyā brahmatmaikatvavidyā- pradarsanarthamuttaro grāṇtha arabhyate' 'Svayancāma brahma tadvijñānat avidyānirvrtti, atah brahma vidyarthopanīśadarabhyate' Taittiriya, etc.
- 2 'Nānumanopanyasartham. Kim tarhi ? Vedantavakya-pradars'a- nātham ' B. S. B. 1 | 2.
- 3 'lakṣyata anena is lakṣana' and so the expression has reference to cognising subject.
- 4 Chapter V
- 5 *Brahmavidaphnoti param* Taittiriya 2 | 3 also Katha 1 | 2 | 7 and Svetasvatara 6 | 12 and 6 | 15
- 6 Critique of Pure Reason – Transcendental Dialectic
- 7 'Karyamāhrameva tu gṛhyamanam kim Brahmana. Samhaddham, kim anyana kenacid va sambaddhamiti na saṅyam niscetum' B. S. B. 1,1 | 2.
- 8 B. S. B. 1 | 2
- 9 'Na yathoktavisesanasya jagots yathoktavisesanamīśvaram mukta anyatah pradhanadacētanad anubhyo va, abhavad va, samsarino va utpattiyat sambhavaṣitum saṅyam, na ca svabhavatah, Viśiṣṭadeśakalādhinimītopadanet'. B. S. B. 1 | 2
- 10 'Aṣya jagato namarupabhyam sarvajnat sarvasakteh Karanadeveti tadbrahmeti vakyaśesah' B. S. B. 1 | 2
11. '...tadarthgrahanadarśhyaya anumānamapi Vedantavakya-virodhi pramanam bhavat na nivarīyate' B. S. B. 1 | 2.
- 12 'Virodha tu anapaksam asti hi anumānam'
13. See Chapter V
- 14 'Yatha ca anyam arthah sarvesam Vedantanam vāymasyam sariraka-mīmāṃsāyam pradarsayīṣyamah' Adhyasabhasya.
- 15 'Vakyarthavicāranadhyavasānanirvrtta hi brahmavagatih – nānumanadīpramanentara nirvrtta' B. S. B. 1 | 2
- 16 'Anumānam vedantavirodhi tadupapāvi cetyapi drastavyam. Yuktiścarthapapattīranumān am va' Bhamati 1 | 2
- 17 '... vedantavakya-mīmāṃsā tadavirodhi tarkopakarāna nāśesaprayojana prastūyate' B. S. B. 1 | 1 | 1.
- 18 'Vedantavakya-kusumagrāthanāthatvat sūtranam. Vedanta vakyaṇi hi sūtrairudahrīya vicāryante' B. S. B. 1 | 2
- 19 'Śrutyādayaḥ anubhavadāyaseḥ yathasambhavaṇiḥ pramanam. anubhāvavasanatvat bhūta vastuvisayaṭca brahmavijñānasya' B. S. B. 1 | 2
- 20 'Nānu bhūtavastu visayaṭve Brahmanah pramanantaravisayatvamēva.' B. S. B. 1 | 2

- 21 Cf. Katha 2.3.1 and 2, Mundaka 1.1.7.. 2.1 entire, Aitareya first part, Svetasvatara Ch. III 6-10
- 22 'Karyamatrameva tu grhyamanam. na sakyam niscatum' B. S. B. 1.1.2.
- 23 'Raso vai sah. Rasam hyevayam abhyanandi bhavati-ko hyevanyat kah pranyet yadesa akasa anands na syat' Taittiriya 2.7
- 24 B. S. B. 1.1.2.
- 25 'Esa hyevanandayati, yada hyevaisa etasminnadrsye ananye anirukte anilayane pratistham vindate, ata sobhayam gato bhavati' Taittiriya 2.7
- 26 This 'Oneness' is eternally realised in Brahman, it is, again, the *realisable* one-ness for the aspirant seeking liberation.
- 27 Kant critique of Pure Reason. The Transcendental Dialectic.
- 28 Udayana – Nyayakusumanjali. Siyakas.
29. B. S. B. 2.1.11
- 30 'Nanumanopanyasartham ...' B. S. B. 1.1.2.
- 31 B. S. B. 1.1.3 'Na hidra sastrasya rgvedadilaksanasy sarvajnagunanvitasya sarvajnodanyatah sambhavosti'
32. Cf. 'Anandamayobhgasat' B. S. 1.1.12.
- 33 See particularly Sankara's commentary on the *Bṛhadaranyaka* relating to passage 4.5.11
34. See the Bhamati, the Kaṭpatara and the Perimla on this issue of 'no issue' The Pancapadika seems to evade the issue. Pancapadika vivarana is very elaborate but throws no new light.
- 35 See B. S. B. 1.1.3
36. See Chapter IX
37. Adhyaya III. Khanda XIV
- 38 Bṛhadaranyaka 4.5.11. Hume's translation has been adopted.
- 39 Muṇḍi Upanisad. 6.32.
- 40 '... tasya mahato bhutasya niratisayam sarvajnatvam sarva saktitvanceti' B. S. B. 1.1.3
41. Br. Aranyaka 4.5.13
42. This 'de-conditioning' is achieved by rigorous yogic practice: Penance and meditation have been expressly mentioned as the pre-requisite of 'truth' -perceptions. Sankara's insistence on '*Sodana-catustaya*' is significant in the context.
43. '*Atnatah pratishedhya nah proscenium svatantrata.*
- 44 Cf. Pandit P. N. Tarkabhusan's comments, Vedanta Darsana Vol. II p. 241 also Dr. Jogendranath Bagchi – *Pracine Nyaya & Pracina Mimamsa Sammata Pramanyavada* pp. 149-52 foot notes.
- 45 *Ibid.*
46. For a detailed analysis see D. M. Datta – *sixways of knowing.*
- 47 Cf. 'Niyataracanavato vidyamnasyn vedasyabhivyatish purusanis-vasavat. na ca purusabuddhiprayatnapurvakah, atah pramanam nirapeksa svatha' S. B. 1.16. 10 (Bengali Edition – Durga charan).
- 48 Cf. Bhamati '... sarvasaktirapt purvapurvargasarganusarena vedan viracayan na svatantrah'

49. . . . buddhipurvalat sapekṣam syat Na syat brahmavedanaditvat' Sixth Vamākam.
50. Br. Aranyaka 2.4.12
51. Brahma tam paradaḥ yo nyatratmano brahma veda' Br. aranyaka, 2.4.6.
52. Sankarass commentary on the Br. Aranyaka passage.
53. See Adhyasabhasya 'Avidyavadvi-sayadini pratyaksadini pramanani sastrani ceti'
54. Sankara's commentary on the Brhadaranyaka passage.
55. Cf. "....Vedanam yonerapi na ccsu svatantram" Bhamati.
56. This view is held by the Nyoya and the Sankhya schools.
57. This implies their 'a-pauruseyata'
58. Chandhyogya 6.2.3 Also 'Tadaksata vahu syam prajayeti' Astaruya 1.1.1
59. By that interpretation, the *sutra* does not mean that *Brahman* as a personal being or agent, is the efficient or instrumental cause of the *sastras*. It means, as does the second *sutra* that *Brahman* has to be regarded as the imminent maternal cause of the *sastras* the *yoni* or source from which those have sprang up or emanated.
60. In the context of the second interpretation of the third Sutra Sankara has argued that it is because the second *sutra* can be mistaken for an inferential argument on account of its verbal form that the third *sutra* has been added to explicitly state that the ground of proof here is evidence of *śruti-vakya*s and not inference. 'Tatra sutraksarena spastam sastrasya an upadanat. .'. B.S.B. 1.1.3.
61. See Sankara's commentary on the Samanvaya Sutra B. S. 1.1.4.
62. It would be quite consistent to take the word '*sastra*' generically in the two interpretation of 'Sastrayonitvat' and thereafter argue that if *all* the *sastras* are taken as a harmonious whole (*saman vitta*) Then since the Upanisads form the apex in relation to which the meaning of the entire revealed literature has to be determined such synthesised whole of the *sastras* can be taken as the proof of an all comprehending reality manifesting itself in infinite forms.

## The Sastrapramanakatva of the Metaphysical Doctrine of Brahman as Atman

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The third *sutra*, by Sankara's second interpretation, expressly, and the second *sutra*, according to Sankara's own submission, covertly<sup>1</sup> put forth the claim that the revealed texts, the *sastras* or the *srutis* are to be accepted as the fundamental ground as also the proof of the Advaita metaphysics. In his commentary on the second *sutra* Sankara has argued that in the sphere of the transcendental metaphysics, such as the Vedanta upholds, the type of logical reasoning one has to employ is to be *sruti*-based (*srutyasrayi* or *srutyamusari*) reasoning. There can be little doubt that Sankara here follows the Badarayana *sutras* both in letter and spirit. Now, the Badarayana *sutra-sastrayonitva*—when advancing the claim that the *sastras* (by which one is meant the *Srutis* or the Vedic texts) constitute the ground of the Vedanta metaphysics, faces an age-old controversy. The Vedic texts which have come down to us are not a unitary whole. They are a disordered mass of utterances or statements, embodying not one but several kinds of teaching somewhat discordant and mutually conflicting. Yet, as the entire body of these *srutis* has been accepted as a compendium of revealed truths about transcendental matters, it is not possible to accept some of the texts as authentic and authoritative and to reject the rest. Now, because the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman as Atman*, of Reality as the Self, is not indicated in or supported by the entire mass of Vedic utterances, so Badarayana in his fourth *sutra* recommends the type of approach one has to make to overcome the difficulty. And this is: to take all the texts *by way of harmony* – *'tat tu samanvayat*. The *sastrayonitva* of the *Brahman* -doctrine is established, not by means of any selective approach, not also by coercing all-vedic statements into one single pattern of instructions, relevance and meaningfulness as has been done in the *Purvamimamsa*, but by ordering them in the light of several levels of mental endowments and their *several purposes*, and thus harmonising them without a jar or conflict. It is by a harmonious taking of the whole, admitting in respect of different types of statements or utterances their appropriate range of meaningfulness and purpose that one can unmistakably discover the metaphysical doctrine of Brahman as the one self of everything phenomenal to be the terminal point of Vedic teachings. This, in brief, is the purport of the fourth *sutra*. That the *sastras*, the revealed authority of *srutis*, uphold and defend the *Brahman* doctrine becomes evident from a harmonious taking of the entire mass of revealed literature.

Those who have gone through the principal Upanisads may have felt that quite a number of expressions there would have remained unintelligible jargons or irrational myths had not Sankara



thrown light upon their intended meaning. Quite a number of the *sūtras* of Bādarāyana, in like manner, would have appeared baffling or unmeaning had not Sāṅkara elaborated them and explained their relevance. It is doubtful if, in the absence of Sāṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, the rival commentators, who ostentatiously differed from him, could ever give an intelligible account of some of the *sūtras*. Sāṅkara's depth of comprehension and intellectual sincerity as is noticeable in his commentary on the fourth *sūtra* can hardly be surpassed. As openly stated in the concluding line of his *Ādhyasabhasya*, the entire Vedānta texts are intended to establish undivided one-ness of the self.<sup>1</sup> This they accomplish by establishing absolute one-ness of *Brahman* and the self<sup>2</sup>, that is, by showing that *Brahman* is the *one* self of all phenomenal multiplicities. This doctrine, he next declares, is *śruti*-based and is supported by arguments which conform to the *śruti*-texts themselves. *Brahman*, as explained in the Vedānta literature, is an *existential* reality (*Bhūtavastu*)<sup>3</sup>. It is also eternally *self-accomplished* (*pariniṣṭhita vastu*)<sup>4</sup>. In its regard, then action or *Kriyā* of any description, that is, ritualistic action, or devotional action, such as, worship, prayer, even mental contemplation, are without any relevance<sup>5</sup>. Although not an *object* of knowledge literally, since *Brahman* is all-comprehensive, the one absolute self of all and therefore, the one absolute subject, it has to be realised intuitively in pure identity-consciousness as being one's true self. This realisation of one's own identity with *Brahman* can be metaphorically described as one's knowledge (*Jñāna*) of *Brahman*, although this knowledge, in as much as it is self-knowledge or self-realisation, is no knowledge in the objective attitude. But this terminal knowledge called *brahmanvagati* is to develop from critical understanding of the Vedānta texts attended by certain auxiliary disciplines. This understanding of the Vedānta Texts, however, is a kind of knowledge insofar as it helps comprehension of the nature of *Brahman*, as *Brahman* really is (*yathavat svarūpādhyakame*)<sup>6</sup>. So, in one sense, and that in the context of the *śrutis* which form the later part of the Vedas and go by the name 'upaniṣads', *Brahman* may also be taken as an 'object-matter', that is *Brahman*, insofar as it is an existential reality and eternally accomplished is radically different from what is 'not-yet' but is 'Yet-to-be' (*Bhavya*). The problem that Sāṅkara faces is if a *metaphysical doctrine* of an existential, self-so accomplished reality can at all be shown as *śruti*-based and as upheld by *sūtrāpramāṇa* in radical opposition to the Pūrvaśālikamīmāṃsā contention that all the Vedic texts are to be taken as *prescriptive of actions* for attainment of the not-yet (*apūrva*), such as, *dharma* (spiritual merit).

It can be seen that Sāṅkara was not interested simply in a metaphysical doctrine of reality of any natural on the contrary, he was seeking to establish and defend a metaphysical doctrine of reality of very singular nature, and to prove that it was *śruti*-based. This doctrine was to be non-dualistic, and in it, the one all-embracing reality (*Brahman*) was to be also the one absolute self-identity (*Ātman*) of whatever appears there as diverse and many. Such a metaphysical reality cannot be looked upon as an 'object', literally speaking, yet it is to be 'shown' as the *object-matter* of all the Vedānta texts, - the one central theme of all the Upaniṣads. To resolve the paradox, Sāṅkara, as early as in his commentary on the first *sūtra* made a distinction between an initial knowledge and what can be regarded as terminal knowledge. This terminal knowledge, named by him in that context as '*Brahmanvagati*', in so far as it cannot be taken as knowledge of an objective fact or content, is no knowledge in the conventional sense. But there is another form of knowledge which becomes instrumental to the emergence<sup>7</sup> of the terminal knowledge which is self-revealing. This Sāṅkara called *pramāṇa-jñāna* since, in that context, it follows upon critical understanding of the import of the Vedānta *śākyas*. This knowledge is knowledge in the conventional meaning since it develops from *śruti-pramāṇa* which, although an indirect (*aparokṣa*) source of knowledge, is, like all other forms of *Pramāṇajñāna*, *yathabhūta-vastuvivakṣyam*<sup>8</sup> that is, is in perfect conformity with the nature of thing as it is. While the terminal knowledge is intuitive, *aparokṣa* (unmediated) and un-objective since it

is realisation of self-identity, the *pramanajñana*, which is to result from critical understanding of the *Vedantu vakya* (*Vedanta-vakya-vicarana*) is to be *descriptive* knowledge of reality as *this* or *that*. This descriptive knowledge is to be the basis of the metaphysics of Brahman as Atman. In conformity with Badarayana's *sutras* -*sastrayonitvat*, and *tattusamanvayat*, Sankara undertakes to show that the metaphysical doctrine of Brahman of *his* conception is borne out by the Vedic texts, if these are taken as a harmonious whole. To substantiate this claim he has to overcome, at the very outset, the opposition of the Purvamimamsa that the *srutis* cannot be concerned with any *existential* reality, that, as an *ulaukika* (extraordinary) *pramana*, they are to be interpreted as enjoining actions to be done for the attainment of *dharma* (spiritual) merit, that they are *prescriptive* and not *descriptive* in their import. The Mimamsa posture, if valid, would leave no foot-hold at all for the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* since the Vedanta does not claim any other mooring for that doctrine. So, in his commentary, Sankara deals with the Mimamsa posture at first. But even when the Mimamsa objection is successfully met and shown to be extravagant, even when the case for a metaphysical doctrine of existential reality is successfully made out, the Vedanta has to face the opposition from the Sankhya system, making rival claim to having been *sruti-based*. But this is not all. There are passages even in the Upanisads, here and there, which seem to be supporting a non-dvaitic interpretation, or if *advaitic*, an *advaitic* interpretation of a quite different nature. Lastly, there is opposition from quarters which have no regard for the so-called truths of revelation', and which are wedded to conventional mode of thinking and its logic. It can be seen that Sankara, in course of his commentary, has utilised the *Badarayana sutras* in such ways that proper answers to all those kinds of objection can be incorporated. To understand Sankara Vedanta it is, therefore, necessary to view it in its entire perspective.

Sankara's commentary on the fourth *sutra*-'*tattu' samunvayat*' is, in the main, a thorough examination of the *extreme posturer* of the Purvamimamsa school in respect of Vedic statements generally. The Purvamimamsa is rigidly orthodox insofar as it believes in *eternality* (*nityatva*), self-dependence (*anapeksatva*) and self-validity (*svatah pramana*) of the Vedic utterance. Even where a divine being as creator is admitted, as in the Prabhakar school, such agency is admitted as some sort of a warehouse of the eternal Vedas, preserving them in their eternally fixed arrangement of letters and syllables at the time of periodic dissolution (*pralaya*) and repeating them in their unaltered form at the beginning of every new creation. Not only that, the eternal vedas are also regarded as the *rational* which God's creative process is to follow. It is not, however, very clear or intelligible how far this rigid 'orthodoxy' in respect of ever-fixed arrangement (*nityatan upurvyam*)<sup>10</sup> of the Vedic texts is consistent with the *jaimini sutras* and the *Sabarabhasya* which provide a fairly logical interpretation of these texts, classifying and ordering them into *vidhis*, *pratishedhas*, *vikulpa*, *utsarga*, *arthavada*<sup>11</sup> etc., etc. If, again, it remains an open controversy whether the meanings of the Vedic sentences are to be determined by *anvitabhidhana* method or by *abhihitanvaya* method of interpretation<sup>12</sup>, where does the doctrine of eternally fixed arrangements of the Vedas really stand? Sankara's attitude towards the *Purvamimamsa*, as one can see in the context of his interpretation of the fourth *sutra*, is not openly hostile. He treats both Jaimini and Sabarasvami with great respect<sup>13</sup>. He shows no open disagreement with the Purvamimamsa interpretation or version of the earlier Vedas which form the Karmakanda. If he refuses the guidance of the Purvamimamsa in his interpretation of the themes of the later Vedas, called Upanisads, it is only because he felt that adherence to the Orthodox Mimamsa principles of interpretation would involve over-stretching such principles beyond their proper logical limit. The meanings of a text can not be determined or settled *a priori*, or in advance of what the words composing its sentences can be understood to mean. No one can legislate what type of meaning of *all*-Vedic sentences must have. The claim that to be a Vedic expression means to have an injunctive

meaning looks arbitrary even on the very face of it. The Purvamimamsa extremism is guilty of arbitrariness in this regard.

Sankara can not be accused of side-tracking the Purvamimamsa while working out his defence of the Advaita Vedanta position in relation to the *Sastrapramana*. Perhaps no Purvamimamsa activist could be so thorough in presenting the Purvamimamsa objections to the Advaita Vedanta rendering of the later Vedas (upanisads) in its bid to provide a scriptural basis for its metaphysical doctrine. Sankara has summed up possible Purvamimamsa objections to the Advaita claim that the Metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* as an eternally self-established reality (*partinisthita vastu*) is *sruti*-based (*sastrapramanaka*) in the following manner<sup>14</sup>.

(1) Since the Vedic sentences are all to be accepted as meaning works to be done, and if not taken in that specific way, become meaningless and also useless, the *sastras* (the Vedic texts) are all prescriptive of actions to be done. Such being the case, the Vedanta texts, being a part of the Vedic texts, run the risk of being meaningless and useless in being taken as informative knowledge of an existential reality<sup>15</sup>.

(2) If it is argued that even in the Vedas there are statements or expressions which are communicative of persons, things and deities, etc. Which are all *existential* matter, it can be seen that such existential entities have their mention simply because these are necessary ingredient of the sacrificial actions enjoined and not as unconnected with any action to be done. And where their mention does not occur in connection with any overt actions of the ritualistic type, the existential entities have their relevance as parts of such mental actions as prayer and worship<sup>16</sup>. But the Advaita Vedanta conception of *Brahman* is the conception of an existential reality which is unconnected with any action whatsoever, which is only to be known or realised. Such use of the existential runs counter to the declared intention of the Vedic statements.

(3) An existential reality, again, is decidable by the *ordinary* or *laukika pramanas*, such as, perception, inference etc.<sup>17</sup> The *sastras*, which are an *alaukika pramana*, would be redundant and repetitive (*anuvadaka*) if employed in respect of existential contents. The non-sensuous spiritual merit which is yet to emerge (*bhavya*) from performance of rituals in conformity with injunctions is the peculiar object-matter of the *Sastrapramana*. But the *Brahman* of the Advaita Vedanta is an existential matter (*bhutatavastu*, and not an 'yet-to-emerge' "(*bhavyavisaya*) object like spiritual merit (*dharma*).

(4) Nor does mere knowledge of an existential reality serve any desired purpose of an individual. One desires either to shun and escape that which is unpleasant or painful or to attain that which is agreeable or pleasant. The knowledge of *Brahman* of the Advaita Vedanta does not serve any such purpose and is, therefore, simply useless<sup>18</sup>. What is there may, of course be known as being there but knowledge of such matters does not serve any worthy purpose. It is for that reason, that apparent statements regarding certain states-of-affair, met here and there in the Vedic texts, have been brought into connection with injunctive phrases and sentences and integrated in a way a word is interated in a sentence, so that they might not be absolutely meaningless<sup>19</sup>, but may mean expressions indicative of praises or dispraises of an action connected with Vedic ritual. It is for the very same reason that the Vedic *mantras*, which are apparently descriptive of deities or physical objects, have been connected with the *brahmanas*, specifying modes of sacrificial procedure by the method called '*Vakyaivakya*' (two sentences conjoined together as one sentence) in order that they might not be mean unglues but in being connected with the ritualistic actions enjoined, the *mantrapart* might be taken as descriptive of the nature of the deities or things connected with such actions. This is, illustrated in the case of the first *mantra* of the deities or things connected with such actions. This is, illustrated in the case

of the first *mantra* of the Yajurveda 'Ise tva' which is rendered meaningful by being connected with the Verb- expression 'cchinadmi' (I cut down) super added to it. All these show that in the Vedic usage descriptive sentences or phrases do not have any independent or isolated meaning. But since the relevance of all-Vedic instructions is limited to prescribing actions for the attainment of the desirable ends and for shunning the undesirable, it is neither conventional nor proper (*dr̥ṣṭopapanna* va) to interpret a Vedic statement without relation to, or outside the context of Vedic injunctions for actions<sup>20</sup>.

(5) As injunctions are possible only in respect of that which is capable of being brought about by act one, it follows automatically that there can be no injunctions in respect of the already accomplished and self-established reality like the *Advaitic Brahman*. So, it stands to reason that, since Vedic sentences can be meaningful only through their prescriptive use as injunctions for actions to be done, either the Upanisadic texts on *Brahman* will have to be interpreted in the way the Vedic sentences in the earlier part with mention of the person or agent, the deity, and the necessary implements or objects connected with rituals, are conventionally interpreted, or such texts on *Brahman* will have to be assimilated to the injunctive sentences about actions such as, prayer, worship and meditation – which form part of the later Vedas. The Upanisads themselves<sup>21</sup> All these serve the purpose of cumulative proof of that fact that the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* as an eternally established reality which is at once the absolute identity and the true self of plural appearances and is to be realised as that, can have no mooring in the scriptures and so the Vedanta claim of 'sastrayoniiva' for its metaphysical doctrine fails entirely

It can be seen that in the above summary statements the possible Mimamsa objections *specially to the Advaita doctrine of Brahman*, in all its unsavoury features, have been put forth as the *purvapaksa*. As the objections towards the end seem to concede half-heartedly that the *jñanakanda* of the Vedic teachings, consisting of the Upanisads, must be accepted as a distinct and separate part (*prakaranat*) and so the doctrine of *Brahman* may as well be regarded as *śruti*-based provided that *Brahman* there in is accepted as the *object of enjoined actions*, such as, worship, prayer and meditation (*pratipattividhivisaya*). The adherents of *jñana-karma-samuccaya-vada* may have the false sense that these strengthen their stand *vis-a-vis* the Advaita. But the objections are very much less conceding. Whether the Vedic sentences about Brahman are interpreted in the way the sentences as in the earlier part with mention of the agent, the Deity or sacrificial materials are interpreted, or, they are interpreted as integral to the sentences in the later Vedas (upanisads) which, according to this view, are unequivocally *injunctive* of actions like worship, prayer and meditation, the result of this exercise is to be almost the same, that is, attainment of *dharma* (spiritual merit). The objections, posed on behalf of the Purvamimamsa, rule out altogether the possibility of a doctrine of liberation (*mokṣa*) through *knowledge* of an existential and eternally accomplished reality, such as, *Brahman* being *śruti*-based. The purpose of the *sastrapramana* has been defined very rigidly by this school 'That is called *sastra* which by enjoining categorically imperative (*nitya*) actions or conditional (*Kāmya*) actions, guides people to motivation (*pravṛtti*) or restraint (*nivṛtti*)<sup>22</sup>. *Sastras* are, therefore, guides to actions, to be done or not to be done. They are about 'oughts' or 'Ought not's. According to the Purva mimamsa, the *sastras*, such as the Vedic texts have no relevance as informative knowledge about what is already there, that is, about any existential matter, unless such existential matter is utilised in some way in some ritual aimed at acquiring spiritual merit with is as yet non-existential (*apurva*) but capable of being brought about (*bhavya*). The basic reason for this is . the *sastras* give knowledge about the *supersensible* and the supersensible, being *non-natural (alaukika)*, can never be the already existential. That which is already existent is a fit object for all ordinary *pramanas* which the *sastras*, as an

extraordinary source of knowledge, can only offer guidance for the attainment of some spiritual goal, which is *yet to come about (bhavya)*. This seems to be the fundamental presupposition of the Purvamimamsa.

To put more cogently, the Purvamimamsa stand *vis-a-vis* Sankara's Advaitic stand in respect of *sastrapramana* may be indicated as follows:

(1) The *Sastras* are an extraordinary *pramana*. Whatever is existential is capable of being *given sensuously* and decidable by means of the ordinary (*laukika*) *pramanas*. If applied to the region of the 'given' existential, the *sastras* as a means of knowledge will be useless in being redundant. The *sastras* will be simply *repetitive (anuvadaka)* and will cease to be the *alaukika* (extraordinary) *pramana* that it is claimed to be<sup>21</sup>.

(2) The claim to be an extra-ordinary *pramana* can be vindicated only by regarding the *sastras* as a *pramana* in respect of the non-sensuous *yet-to be*<sup>22</sup>, which is by that reason non-existential, is not to be confused with the sensuous (possible', like a heavy downpour which may take place in future, or a son yet to be begotten. Such *sensuously realisable* matter may, of course, follow as a consequence of an acquired spiritual merit. But it is the spiritual merit, attained or acquired by performance of certain rituals in conformity with *sastric* injunctions (*vidhis*) which is to be the relevant object-matter of the *sastras* as a *pramana*. The 'yet-to be (*bhavya*) of the *sastrapramana* is *dharma*, a believed content.

(3) The ability of the *sastras* to give proper guidance as to the type of ritualistic performance which ensures attainment of merit of a specific nature and for a specific purpose cannot be questioned or challenged since the *sastras* being self-existent and self-regulated (*svatastva* and *anapeksa*) are impersonal (*a-pauruseya*) and free from human manipulation. What the *Sastras* assures is bound to happen. The *sastras* are infallible in their teachings.

(4) The nature of the *Sastras* and the *sastrapramana* being thus defined, it follows *a priori*<sup>23</sup> that all statements or expressions in the Vedas can only have an injunctive meaning, and the injunctions must be for what one should do or should not do, that is, the injunctions must be for certain courses of actions, and these actions must have only one aim and objective, such as, attainment of *dharma*. *Dharma* is the one relevant and desirable and (*purusartha*) which the *sastrapramana* holds out as a promised goal.

(5) From the above it also follows *a priori* that if there be any word or sentence in the Vedas which means or describes anything existential, or is narrative of an incident or a story the meaning of such words or sentences are to be moulded in such ways that they may closely fit into the general tenor of injunctive import of Vedic sentences, since, otherwise, that which, by general admission, *cannot be* meaningless or purposeless will become so<sup>24</sup>. The Upanisads' being the later part of the same Vedic teachings must also be interpreted in the same injunctive way. If, on the ground of the conventional distinction into two separate parts (*prakarana*) such as, *Jnanakanda* and *Karmakanda* a difference in the mode of instruction in the two parts of the vedas is insisted upon, the only concession that can be made is that *Brahman* has been advised in the later Vedas as integral to acts of contemplation or modes of meditative acts<sup>25</sup>, and not as an *existential reality* to be known or realised since mere knowledge of an existential reality cannot be advised in the vedic teachings since it cannot serve the purpose of any desirable end. The Purvamimamsa is very particular in denying the utility of mere *descriptive* knowledge of any existential content where that content cannot be utilised in action as a tool, a device or a means to being about a desirable end.



Sankara's examination of the Purvamimamsa runs. Throughout his commentaries on the first four *sutras*. But it is in the context of the fourth *sutra* that he brings into clear relief his fundamental points of difference from the Purvamimamsa stand which serve the purpose of providing for his Advaita metaphysics its much needed basis in the revealed authority of the scriptures. He, unlike the Purvamimamsa, does not take the help of any a priori arguments, nor is his procedure vitiated by any sweeping generalization or any extremist claim. One would simply wonder at his mastery of details and depth of comprehension. Not one *sruti* text is cited which is not absolutely relevant for his purpose<sup>23</sup>, not a single relevant point of objection to his stand is omitted or scraped through without close examination. His argument is based on the *relevant texts themselves*, viewed together as a harmonious whole. The Badarayana *sutra* also suggests as much, that the *Sastras*, the revealed Vedic texts, are an extraordinary *pramana* is freely conceded. That the subject-matter of this *pramana* is supersensuous or transcendental, and that it is not directly accessible to any of the *laukika pramana* is also conceded. But that the nonsensuous transcendental must necessarily be some non-existential spiritual merit, which is to be the emergent product of a certain course of enjoined actions, is not conceded whole sale without some specific reservation. Similarly, the a priori claim that simply because the revealed Vedic texts on account of their sanctity, bear the title '*sastras*', therefore, there can be nothing in their teachings which is not a guidance to certain enjoined modes of actions, or that *dharma* is to be the one *purusartha* envisaged in the entire vedic literature is not also conceded. Whether the statements in the Vedic texts are *Krnyarthaka* (prescriptive of actions to be done) or informative about any existential reality which is transcendental, can not be decided *a priori*. We are to be guided in this by the express meanings of the statements themselves<sup>24</sup>. It will be arbitrary and dogmatic to coerce all the statements of the Vedas to fall into any fixed pattern. The more reasonable procedure will be to interpret the manifold statements in the light of their appropriate contexts, and to order them all in a well-knit harmonious whole. Sankara does not dispute that the Vedic statements in the earlier part of the Vedas, called *Kamakanda*, are, in the main, injunctive, and prescriptive of actions to be done for attainment of spiritual merit (*dharma*), which latter is to be an emergent product (*bhavya*) of the actions enjoined. He, as is clear from his commentary, does not also dispute that in the *jnanakanda* of the Vedas, called the Upanisads, there are groups of sentences which advise mental contemplation, worship etc. of some existential realities as *symbols* of one absolute reality. Which is finally introduced as *the self of all* and to be realised as that. These sentences, so to say, figure midway between sentences enjoining actions in the form of Vedic rituals, and the sentences which describe a reality which is inaccessible to actions, inaccessible a reality which is inaccessible to actions, inaccessible also to knowledge in *objective attitude*, is no far as it is no object (*visaya*) at all but is the one true and absolute subject. Sankara has named the sentences of this type which occur occasionally in the Upanisads as *vidhicchayavanas*.<sup>25</sup> They are not to be confused with the sentences occurring in the *Karmakanda* of the vedas which are prescriptive in special sense in so far as they are injunctive out and out. These are *not* injunctive in that way. These are advisory but not obligatory. Their purpose, as Sankara sees it, is effecting a change in the natural drive of the mind, that is, in its inclinations towards outer objects in search of temporary gains or satisfaction<sup>26</sup>. It can be seen that Sankara does not rule out the actual existence of vedic or upanisadic texts of this kind or foist upon them an arbitrary meaning. But the presence of such sentences, which are injunctive in form only but are in-formative and emendatory in purpose, cannot vitiate the main body of the upanisadic texts which throws light upon the nature of ultimate reality, its relation to cosmic appearances and also as to what can count as the supreme goal of life. Thus the revealed texts have different types of sentences – all relevant in their special contexts, and the texts themselves do not warrant an *a priori* reduction of them to any single pattern. Nor is there any conflict in there



revealed authority, provided we arrange all 'intuitions' and 'revelations' as higher and lower, befitting their declared aims and purposes, and regard all of them by way of mutual adjustment in a harmonious whole. This is the burden of Sankara's protestation that runs through his commentary on the fourth *sutra*. This also is the defence of his metaphysical doctrine against all possible objections of the Purvamimamsa school.

While the doctrine of the nonsensuous religious or spiritual merit (*dharma*), developed on the basis of scriptural authority, can be defended on the allied ground of pious faith, the doctrine of a *sruti*-based existential, and in that sense, metaphysical reality, although claimed as non-sensuous (*atundriya*), cannot be defended on that special plea. No commentator of the *Brahmasutras* with the solitary exception of Sankara operate to have seen this very essential logical point. The doctrine of spiritual merit (*dharma*) which emerges from performance of ritualistic actions of some description as also of the ulterior benefit which may follow upon attainment of *dharma* in time to come or in an after-life, is not open to verification and has, therefore, to be religiously believed. But the metaphysical doctrine of an existential reality, even though non-sensuous, for its acceptability, is dependent on *possible*. But the metaphysical doctrine of an existential reality, even though non-sensuous, for its acceptability, is dependent on *possible* verification in term of *direct experiences* of some kind. It must not also be in direct conflict with reason or logical understanding. The real existential (*bhutatavastu*) is, as a concept, very much different from the would be or yet-to-be (*bhavya*) such as, the Purvamimamsa concept of *dharma*. The latter is some content yet to mature, yet to become a 'fact'. In its regard, there can be no logical demand for demonstration of 'fact-hood'. The proponents of the doctrine, it may be said, have designed their doctrine and defined its concepts in such a way that no logical demand for direct or indirect verification can arise. Can the Vedanta Doctrine of *Brahman* as an all-inclusive, self-accomplished (*parinisthita*) existential Reality escape the logical demand for verification in some ? If not, how would the non-sankarites - Ramanuja and other rival interpreters of the *Brahman* -doctrine, provide for meeting that logical demand ? The point is very interesting.

It has to be clearly noticed that Sankara's interpretation of the Vedanta texts which enabled him to discover a *sruti-based metaphysical doctrine of an absolute which is the one true self of all*, enabled him also to meet the above Logical point satisfactorily. In his case, the *sruti* - based doctrine need not be accepted on faith alone. It is also logically unexceptionable in so far as it provides for the possibility of verification in an immediate way. Sankara himself has claimed as much<sup>12</sup>. Can any one of his rival make the same claim ? Sankara was aware that, notwithstanding the claim of the *srutis* to be an extraordinary *pramana*, notwithstanding its claim to *infallibility*, the *srutis* are, after all, an indirect means of knowledge (*paroksa pramana*). So, even though the *srutis*, such as, the Upanisadic texts, form the prime and the only source of the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman*, the indirect informative knowledge delivered by the *srutis* must be capable of a possible direct verification in term of a transcendental experience, the possible 'given-ness' of which can be logically defended. This is because the metaphysical reality, discussed in the Upanisads, is *existential (bhutatavastu)* and eternally accomplished (*nitya* and *parinisthita*). Sankara, it can be seen, went so far as to accept direct knowledge of one's absolute identity with this metaphysical reality -*brahmatmaikatva* as the terminal proof of the *doctrine*<sup>13</sup>. How would the rival commentators establish that Brahman is a self (*atman*), that *Brahman* is self-shining consciousness, or that *Brahman* is the Absolute subject except on the ground of quotable *sruti* texts only? In their formulation, *Brahman*, seems always to remain an 'object' - an object of knowledge as far as the *srutipramana* goes, there after an object of veneration, worship and devotion - an objective presence transcendent of the finite, and yet juxtaposed

to it. Their metaphysical philosophies are, therefore, at bottom, faith-philosophies. Logic is not admitted in their systems as a friendly collaborator lending an indirect support but as an outcaste fenced off from the *sanctum sanctorum*.

That the admission of an existential reality as the ground of all existence logically entails a demand for its demonstrability in term of 'given experience' of some kind did not seem to have bothered all other commentators of the *Brahma sutras*. Sankara raids this logical point through the device of the Purvamimamsa objection that what is existential is for that very reason a content (*visaya*) of the ordinary *pramanas* and the *sastras*, being an extraordinary *pramana*, can deal with the non-existential, non sensuous content only. Sankara's reply to this objection was that although an existential reality, *Brahman*, the ground of all existence, is inaccessible to sensuous perception and also to all other ordinary *pramanas*, since they all presuppose sense-perception<sup>14</sup>. He however, did not dispute validity of the Purvamimamsa objection that an existential content should be open to direct verification of some kind. He conceded the point in a remarkable way. Many of his classical interpreters<sup>15</sup> seem to have become irresolute and nervous about it. They seem to have felt that Sankara would have been better advised had he left his Advaita theory at the charge of the *alaukika srutipramana* entirely without committing himself to the obligation of showing possible verifiability of his doctrine in term of given experience. These interpreters, by their pleading, would have left an uncovered gap between *Brahman-knowledge*, as one may derive from *srutipramana* – an objective knowledge of a described content, and '*brahmatmatkatva*' or '*atmatkatva*', the culminating direct knowledge of the nature of an absolute '*intuition*' which Sankara, in the preamble of his *sutrabhasya*<sup>16</sup>, as also in his interpretation of the first *sutra*, had accepted as the one true *vidya* and truth, which releases the individual from the bondage and suffering of his unenlightened existence. This would be making a peurile nonsense of Sankara Vedanta. Such interpreters lacked the profound depth of the master.

What does Sankara mean when he says '*anubhava-vasanatvat bhutavastuviseyatvate'a brahma-vijnanasya*'?' His *Brahman*, that is, *Brahman* of the Upanisads as he understand it, is *all* the reality and also the *one indivisible self* of all. The *srutis*, of course, *describe it as, being that*. But does that description '*give*' it in the word it is described as? It does not. It only describes *what it is* to be. It only furnishes the clue to its discovery and this discovery has to be made in some given knowledge which is different from the knowledge of description. Now, if *Brahman* is not to be simply a '*mode or description*', if it is to be known as an existential reality (*bhutavastu*), the self-accomplished (*parinisthita*), which is also the *Atman* (conscious self-hood). Then, in order to finally prove and establish that there is really such an entity answering the *sruti-description*, is it not absolutely necessary that there should be an *experience* of that kind? How, otherwise, can it be shown that *Brahman* is not a mere content of a playful description, that there is really something answering the *sruti-description* of *Brahman*? The proof of, the pudding lies in its tasting. So also here. *Brahmatmatkatva* or '*Atmatkatva*' is an experience. It may be nonsensuous and transcendental, but it is the experience of *Brahman* as the *Atman*. It is the terminal point of *Brahman-knowledge*, also the final proof that *Brahman* is *as it is described* in the Upanisads. It is also the proof that *there is really such an entity*, an existential reality answering the *sruti* description, that the *sruti* description is not empty. Sankara saw this. None else saw this – at least not in the way that the great master saw it. This is one reason why Sankara never feels tired in making a distinction between *brahma-jnana* and *brahmavagati*<sup>17</sup>. So, it follows that if Sankara's interpretation of the Vedanta texts as to the nature of *Brahman* is correct, then, the only way that *Brahman* of that description can be shown to be an existential reality – a fact and not a fiction – is by showing the possibility of an Absolute

experience in which one realises one's absolute identity in Brahman consciousness. This is the special significance of Sankara's statement '*anubhavavasanatvat bhutavastuvishayasayatva brahmavijnanasya*' That *Brahman* is all and everything, that *Brahman* is the true self of all. That '*Thou art That*' (*tvam asi*) these could not be known (indirectly) and such a strange notion as Brahman would not agitate the mind at all if the Vedanta texts as an extraordinary *pramana* were not there at all to inform us about it, had it not furnished the clue there to. And if there is the possibility of direct realisation of this truth supreme, it is because the *srutis* furnish the clue there to'. This is all correct. But along with this incontrovertible fact there is another. And it is this that Brahman is realised as all the reality and the true self of all, the *existential* claim of *Brahman* as Atman made by the *sruti-pramana* cannot be vindicated. This is why Sankara provides verification for the scriptural doctrine. It can be seen that if this verification—experience, this *brahmatmatkatva*—experience, were not possible, release from bondage would have been impossible and the *sutra* '*athato Brahmapujnasa*' would have remained a promissory note without proper authority behind it.

Regard for logic rendered Sankara's task as a commentator considerably more difficult. An *existential reality* (*bhutavastu*) unlike a content which is yet to materialise, yet to emerge (*bhavya*) cannot be significantly passed over as a 'believed' content. Taken in that way, that is, as an article of pious faith, it becomes indistinguishable from the non-existential 'would be' or 'yet to be'. A content such as '*dharma*', Sankara has already told us<sup>4</sup>, does not exist at the time one knows what it is to be, or in what it is to consist. Although its nature, the type of thing it is to grow into, is dictated and decided by Vedic injunction, its actualisation, maturation and fruition depend on a person's executive effort. Not so, however, is an *existential reality*, an established fact which is there already. In its regard, therefore, the possibility of a cognate experience has to be admitted. This given its demonstrability and also serves to confirm its *existential* claim. Sankara's *Jivanmuktivada* (The view that one may be liberated even while living in the body, here and now) confirms the view that he accepts direct verifiability of the Upanisadic doctrine of *Brahman* as the one true identity, — the self of all, in term of concrete experience and does not look upon the doctrine of liberation as a religious creed simply. With the non-Advaitic commentators of the Vedanta *sutras*. The case has been different. Of course, they also regard the Absolute Reality of their conception as *existential* and self-accomplished, and claim the later part of the Vedic teachings in the Upanisads, as distinguished from the earlier part, to be the source of knowledge, or *pramana* in this regard. But, believing, as they do, in the cult of *Videhamukti* (liberation after the fall of the present body at death), they do not utilise their concept of the *existential reality* in any way different from the Mimamsa use of the concept of the non-existent, yet-to-be (*bhavya*) '*dharma*'. But the Mimamsa concept, '*dharma*', being by definition taken to mean some merit or excellence (*a purvata*) yet to emerge, has one advantage. It has been designed to escape the liability or predicament of concrete verification of its claim to materialisation or fruition. The concept of an *existential content* does not enjoy this advantage. It can be seen that the non-Advaitic commentators have planned to enjoy the Mimamsa advantage and to escape liability of concrete verification of the truth-claim of their doctrine in two ways. Ignoring the fact that the doctrine of an *existential absolute*, to meet the logical demand for concrete verification, entails *Jivanmuktivada*, they have taken refuge in *videhamuktivada* which like the Mimamsa notion of '*dharma*' may hold on as an unverifiable hypothesis. They have, again, in the same Mimamsa way, taken refuge in the *sruti-pramana* as the sole *pramana* in transcendable matters, although disagreeing with the Mimamsa as to the logical import of the Upanisadic sentences which, according to them, are not *bhavyarthaka* or *kriyarthaka* but are *bhutarthaka*. They will thus not only eat the cake but have it too. This clever manipulation has one great disadvantage which these commentators seem to have scarcely noticed. For, in spite of the great logical exercises they have

displayed in determining *existential import* of the Upanisadic sentences which enabled them to build up metaphysical doctrines of an eternally self-accomplished reality, their exclusive acceptance of *sruti-pramana* to escape logical demand for verification, and adherence to the cult of *videhamukti* have rendered all their attempts simple exercises in devout faith, and their doctrine of *Brahman* has remained a religious creed as distinguished from a metaphysical philosophy. They also seem to have been guided by a certain spirit of compromise in a planned manner with the Mimamsa even in the sphere they wanted to chalk out as 'out of bounds' and extra-territorial for the injunctive cult of the latter system. For, although defending the concept of *Brahman* as a metaphysical concept, and so, as standing for an *existential reality related to knowledge*, they have, next, made it into an 'object' of devotional meditation, worship and prayer—that is, into an 'Ideal' of faith *to be realised here after* in its completed meaning and bearing as the 'Abode of all', by means of devout acts which bear affinity with the Vedic rituals to a considerable extent. Again, as in the case of the Vedic actions for cultivation of *dharma*, the *sanction* as also the guarantees of success in attaining the goal (which is *moksa* in their case) rest upon the Vedic statements exclusively. In short, the supreme goal of life, with the non-Advaitists, is very much like '*dharma*', an end yet to materialise (also dependent on the person's efforts) and so there is the very same *codanatantvata* and *purusavvaparatantrata* (considered by Sankara as essential characteristics of *dharma*' in their *doctrine of means*, while *vastutantrata* is only admitted *at the initial stage* of informative knowledge of the Absolute in terms of the *sruti*-texts, and *at the final stage*, since the Absolute, the goal ultimate, is conceived as ever fixed and accomplished in nature.

The momentous issue to be decided in the context of the *Samanyavayavakya* is, how one should interpret the Upanisadic sentences as a whole and what is to be the logical defence of this interpretation. It is not necessary to introduce any logic other than the logic which the *sruti*-texts of the Upanisads themselves embody. The logic to be used is, undisputedly, the *srutyanyasari yukti* or *srutyasrayi yukti*. Let us accept this as the logic of the revealed statements themselves. Logic to be logical cannot be self-contradictory. It cannot be arbitrary also. It is to be the logic of harmony. Badarayana's fourth *sutra* implies as much. In his commentary on the *sutra*, Sankara has, very assiduously and also conclusively, proved *three* issues. *In the first place*, the logic of the Vedanta texts themselves does not support any possible Purvamimamsa rendering of them all as *bhavyarthaka* or *Kriyarthaka*. *In the second place*, there is no logical support also for rendering the texts in the non-Advaitic way—no support, at the apex and the final stage, for regarding the Absolute Reality as in any way distinguishable from *pure self identity* of cosmic pluralities, — for regarding it as other than the *true self* of the empirical person. *In the third place*, the *existential reality* in question being the *true self* of all, the only way it can be grasped is by a terminal knowledge in the form of an absolute *identity-experience* and not by knowledge in an objective attitude nor also by any acts whatsoever, be these the ritualistic acts as enjoined by the early Vedic texts, or the devotional acts like meditation and prayer, as have been advised in some parts of the Upanisads themselves. To be brief, the *Brahman* of the Upanisads is an eternally self-accomplished existential reality. It is not an object but is the transcendental subject, the *true self* of phenomenal pluralities,— their substantial identity. In its regard, the ritualistic actions enjoined by the earlier Vedic texts have no relevance, nor is it an object of worship or prayer. The Upanisads furnish the clue to its nature, and as thus known, it has to be realised as the one absolute reality, and one absolute self in an immediate way, and thus 'self-realisation' ensures freedom from bondage.

Sankara was more clear-cut and consistent in his relation to the *Purvamimamsa*. The *purvamimamsa* maintains an extreme posture in so far as it regards all Vedic statements as falling

into a single *general* pattern. All of them, according to it are conducive to purposes of a practical nature. Not that they are not informative and do not give any knowledge<sup>41</sup>. That would be denying their role as a *pramana*. But they do not give mere *descriptive* knowledge. Of the *existential*, they instruct as to *what should be done* and in what way, in pursuit of *dharma* (spiritual merit), which is yet to emerge as a consequence of actions to be accomplished. As enjoining what action are to be done or what should not be done, the Vedic sentences are all to be accepted as *injunctive* in nature, and statements which do not readily answer this description are to be brought into conformity with the injunctive statements by certain rules of transformation and transmutation of their express meanings<sup>42</sup>. The Vedas are regarded as *sutras* in this specific sense, that is, as a body of instructions of a practical nature, means to be action-oriented (*kriyarthaka*) for the attainment of a practical end which is yet to materialise (*bhavya*). The *Purvamimamsa* rendering of the meaning and purpose of the Vedic sentences (including the upanishadic sentences), therefore, leaves no room for a metaphysical doctrine, no foothold for the Advaita doctrine of *Brahman* as an existential and self-accomplished (*parinishtita*) reality. It is understandable, therefore, why the *sutras* of Badarayana deal with the *purvamimamsa* posture at the outset, and why Sankara, their commentator, devotes so much care and attention to make out irrefutably a case for his metaphysical doctrine within the framework of the same revealed literature without recourse to any argument from outside the revealed texts. This is because Sankara has never foresworn that the *srutis* constitute the *prime* basis and source (*yoni*) of his metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman*, although, at the same time, conceding relevance of other *pramanas* (*anubhavadayah*), each within its *proper* limit (*yathasambhavam*)<sup>43</sup>. The doctrine of *Brahman*, being the doctrine of an *existential reality*, is, as he sees, characteristically different from the Vedic doctrine of *dharma*, – a content not existential already but yet to emerge. Such being the case, the *srutis* are not to be regarded as the *sole* proof of the *Brahman* – doctrine as is necessarily the case with *dharma*<sup>44</sup>. This observation of Sankara should not have created the confusion and should not have raised the controversy which unfortunately has been the case. There is actually no contradiction when commenting on the *sutra* 1-1.2, he said that *srutis* are not the *sole* proof in respect of the doctrine of *Brahman* as is the case with the doctrine of *dharma*, but the *srutis* as well as *anubhava*, etc., are the relevant *pramanas* as far as possible, and when commenting on the *sutra* 2.1.3, he said that the admission of relevance of other *pramanas* in respect of the *Brahma*-doctrine is all wishful thinking (*manorathamatram*) and that the issue under consideration can be rightly known *only* by means of *agama* or *srutipramana* as in the case of *dharma*<sup>45</sup>. The reason is that in the latter context he was considering *what could be the evidence that Brahman is the cause, the ground, of cosmic pluralities* which are apparently so very different from *Brahman*. Did he not answer such points in exactly the same way in *sutra* 1.1.2, when he said that '*junmadyasyayatoh*' is a *sruti-based* argument and that the point is not decidable by other *pramanas*, such as, inference etc. ?<sup>46</sup> Sankara has maintained all through out that the *srutis* are the *prime source* of evidence for the *Brahman* doctrine although they are not the *sole pramana* since *Brahman* described in the Upanisads is an existential reality. The point not to be missed is that the other *pramanas* are auxiliary, supporting and confirmatory *pramanas*. They are not relevant as *pramanas* in such transcendental matters if they work independently, or if they are mistaken for being the primary and the basic *pramana*. In Sankara's treatment, a fine distinction obtains between something being the *primepramana* and being the *sole pramanas*. The *srutis* are the *prime pramanas* in respect of *Brahman* but not also the *sole pramana* in its regard, as they are both the *prime pramana* and the *sole pramana* in respect of *dharma*. The other *pramanas* are all *supporting pramanas* and one of them, *psyches*, direct intuition (*anubhava*) as the *terminal pramana* is also confirmatory and verificatory. But unless and until *Brahman* is introduced first as the concept of an all-comprehending existential reality which is also the self of



the cosmic pluralities by the *śruti*-pramana together with all connected details, the other pramanas which are corroborative and supporting remain empty, and without commission<sup>47</sup>. What absurdity or contradiction can be there in this kind of exposition? The Vedanta *vačyas*, Sankara claims, when properly interpreted in the light of logic inherent in them furnish evidences in support of existence of a reality which is all-enveloping being the ground of everything and which, being the substantial identity of all and everything is also the *Ātman* of the cosmic appearances. Such being the nature of the *śruti*-evidence, there is a demand for *direct verification*, as also indirect justification of the issue posed by the *śruti*-pramana, which, after all, is an indirect means of knowledge. There is thus to be non-opposition (*avirodha*) from other indirect pramanas, and direct verifiability in term of given transcendental experience of absolute identity of the individual with the Absolute, although it is the *śruti*, and and *śruti*s alone which form the prime source of evidences. This is a unique logical achievement of Sankara's Advaita doctrine. In regard to the truth supreme, there is to be a *consensus* of all pramanas without any prejudice, each having a place and role consonant with its nature and accredited limit in a harmonious totality of truth-experience<sup>48</sup>. If reality is a harmony in all its expressions and if this reality is the one supreme Truth, is not, this Truth also a harmonious unity of its diverse presentations? We shall return to this topic in the next chapter where we shall consider the *logical* basis of the Advaita doctrine and examine its strength *vis-a-vis* other metaphysical doctrines of reality as advocated by the other schools.

As far as the later Vedic, the Upanisadic doctrine is concerned, Sankara is in *absolute opposition* with the *Purvamīmāṃsā* posture. The non-Advaitic schools have made their task easier by accepting the *śruti*s not simply as the *primebasis* of the *Brahman*-doctrine, as Sankara has also done, but by accepting the *śruti*s, the *smṛiti*s, and all other traditional literature as the one and the *sole pramana* in its regard. They are thus in a position to dismiss all other pramanas as simply irrelevant, whether in opposition or in agreement with their doctrine, which rests on pious faith. They have also yielded half the grounds by holding that although the later Vedas, the Upanisads, sponsor doctrine of an *existential* reality which is all-accomplished (*parinīṣṭhita*), this reality is sponsored there as an *object of devotional acts of contemplation*, worship and prayer, that is, as the *worshipable*, and not as an object of mere knowledge. Here, then, they concede the Mīmāṃsā point that mere knowledge of the existential serves no useful purpose, and does not help attainment of any desired goal (*puruṣārtha*). They, again, concede that the end or goal to be realised is something new and never, something yet to follow (*bhavya*) as a consequence of devotional acts, and also that its realisation becomes possible only in a life after death. In brief, they seem only to contest the view that the statements of the Upanisads are all injunctive in the same way as the statements in the earlier part of the Vedas are injunctive and that Brahman, the ideal of the Upanisads, has been introduced in the Vedānta as a ritualistic form and imagery of an 'adhyāsa-mode' of worship and not as an existential reality all accomplished in nature and, therefore as the Absolute Reality<sup>49</sup>. They again, subscribe to the *Jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda* (action-oriented knowledge bring the requisite means of salvation). Among them Ramanuja has been very much emphatic in defending the view that dharmamīmāṃsā and Brahma-mīmāṃsā are integral parts of the same Vedic teaching and that the difference is one of modality only<sup>50</sup>. What distinguishes, most vitally, the *Advaita* of Sankara from the non-Advaitic view of *Brahman* is the expressly *objective* attitude and posture of the latter. What the *śāstrapramāṇa* delivers is, according to the latter view an Absolute object, which is a divine Person, is also a subject and a self but different from finite subjects and selves. The finite subject, the individual knower and worshipper, is to be held apart from the Absolute in *some mode* of distinction (*Bheda*)<sup>51</sup> as a substantive entity and a self although not absolutely independent of the Absolute self, we are not at this place, concerned with merit or demerit of this compromise-arrangement. What is relevant at this place is



the kind of knowledge that the *sastrapramana* is admitted as delivering in the rival formulations of the Vedanta doctrine of *Brahman* in the Advaitic and non-Advaitic systems. With Sankara, the knowledge of *Brahman*, secured from the *srutis*, although primary and basic, cannot be self-complete or self-sufficient. The reason is that the *srutis* themselves *do not intend* that such *reparative* knowledge is to be the final knowledge<sup>12</sup>. The *sastras* give *pramana-jnana* which is necessarily *objective* knowledge that is, informative knowledge regarding the nature of the *known*, which is an *objectively presented* content. But *Brahman*, the existential reality which the Vedanta-texts deliver up *in the mode of the known*, that is, *as an objective content*, has to be conceived, as these very texts advise<sup>13</sup>, quite differently and *as other than the known*, that is, as other than an 'objective' fact or reality. This existential reality, the same *sruti* texts enjoin, has to be known in a different way all together – not in the objective attitude at all, since, according, to the *srutis*, themselves, that would be *mis-knowledge*, and no knowledge of truth<sup>14</sup>. The existential reality, it is said, is all comprehensive and the *true self* the *true identity* of all and everything. Knowledge of truth, that is, true knowledge of this reality as it is in itself, is, therefore, a matter of *intuitive self-realisation*, it is to be an absolute identity-experience. Such being the case, the *sastrapramana*, although pivotal and primary, falls short of the goal. That goal, which is ultimate knowledge is a matter of direct experience, very much remote from any conventional form of knowledge, also remote from any *pramana-janya* (caused by any instrumental cause of knowledge) *jnana*. Ramanuja definitely minimises the importance of the *sastrapramana* when he challenges Sankara to explain how mere knowledge of the Upanisadic sentences (*vakyartha-jnanamatram*)<sup>15</sup> can serve as a means to ultimate release. Sankara's rejoinder would be that the knowledge we get from critical study of the Vedanta texts (*vedantavakya-vicarana*)<sup>16</sup> is not mere knowledge of the words and sentences on the contrary, we come to know what the absolute reality, *Brahman*, is and *is to be understood-as*. When this clue is secured, one comes to understand absolute factuality of all *objective* means, including prayer, worship and meditation. That clue itself, as furnished by the Vedanta texts, shows the way of absolute realisation and release by way of transcendental knowledge and experience. So, it is not *vakyarthajnanamatram* which the *Vedantavakya-vicarana* or the *sastrapramana* helps in securing. What is secured is complete understanding of the *nature* of reality which the Vedanta texts through their harmonious interpretation unfold. Reality thus unfolded being the one Absolute self of plural appearances which latter are declared to be unsubstantial and as mere appearance, the clue is furnished towards absolute knowledge which is *vidya* and towards absolute release. For the Ramanujists, it can be seen, the *sastrapramana* presents *Brahman* as the *object* of worship and prayer which are all devotional acts, and in so far as it is not the knowledge of all devotional acts, and in so far as it is not the knowledge of *Brahman* so much as the mode of devotional contemplation and worship of *Brahman* that brings release, *Brahman*, *Brahman-worship* and *moksa* are regarded in almost the same way as the Mimamsa regards the deity, the sacrificial materials, the acts of sacrifice and the resultant *dharma*.

The crux-issue is, therefore, How the *sruti* texts of the Upanisads are to be interpreted. The Badarayana *sutra* states that these texts are to be taken as a harmonious whole. There is no call, therefore, for an *a priori* formula as method of interpretation. Sankara would allow the Upanisadic sentences to speak for themselves. These sentences are pronouncedly of the reparative or descriptive type. These cannot be meaningful if what they report or describe is not taken as an existential reality. This existential reality is, again, described as the indwelling self of all. Knowledge of this reality as one's true self is described as *vidya* while the conventional taking of plural appearances as substantive reals, also as distinct and separate facts, is described as *avidya*<sup>17</sup>. It is also said that this *vidya* and *avidya* are both given there as two modes of regarding the real. These also obtain in the mode of self-expression of Reality. There is no innovation or extrapolation from any outside source since

Reality is all-comprehending and has neither an inside nor an outside. It is also said that bondage and release both obtain in the structure of reality as do both *avidya* and *vidya*<sup>42</sup>, following the track of self-losing one finds oneself in bondage, and following the track of self-finding one enjoys the freedom in the absolutely free. There are undoubtedly some prescriptive or advisory sentences. But there do not clash or conflict, if interpreted, as they are intended to be interpreted, as insisting on change of direction of the mind from its normal course of self-losing in *avidya*<sup>43</sup>. It is not possible to ignore the express meanings of statements which describe reality as one and indivisible, which describe this reality as one with the self of cosmic pluralities, which describe it as unobjective, – an Absolute subject which is the ground of cosmic manifestation in plural appearances<sup>44</sup>. Such a step will be against the spirit of the texts themselves and also against the principle of harmonious interpretation.

It may be asked if by *sastras* we understand the entire Vedic literature together with its auxiliaries and not only the Upanisadic texts, it is possible to hold that the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* follows upon a harmonious taking of such a whole. In reply, it can be said that although Sankara mainly cites the Upanisadic texts to show that all such texts, taken in their harmony furnish an absolute basis for his doctrine, he does not have any difficulty in maintaining that the Upanisadic doctrine of *Brahman* is the consummate product of all Vedic teachings considered as a harmonious whole, – the apex of all wisdom and enlightenment that has taken a concrete shape in any philosophical literature, Vedic or non-Vedic.

It has already been stated that Sankara rejects the Mimamsa contention of *Kriyaparata* or *vutthiparata* of the Upanisadic texts (considered as a harmonious whole) absolutely. As against the Mimamsa or the Mimamsa oriented Vedantic view, he has undertaken to prove the following three issues. (1) He attempts to prove that the import of the sentences in the later part of the Vedic literature, the upanisads, is characteristically different from the import of sentences in the earlier part both as regards the specific nature of inquiry and the object or goal of such inquiry – *phalajijnasyubhedat*<sup>45</sup>. This means that there is an absolute distinction between the *Karmakanda* and the *Jnanakanda* of the Vedas<sup>46</sup> as regards perspective and goal of life, and that the *jnanakanda* represents the consummation of Vedic wisdom and is rightly called 'vedanta' in more than one sense. (2) He attempts to prove that the charge of *uselessness anarthakya*m) against the metaphysical doctrine of existential reality as also against knowledge as a means to any desired goal of life fails absolutely, since it is this knowledge and this knowledge alone, which from the very nature of the case, can be conceived as the supreme goal of life (*parama purusartha*) since it secures for the individual absolute release from bondage and suffering<sup>47</sup>. (3) Finally, he seeks to prove analytically that any attempt to foist a different interpretation of the texts under review, any attempt to interpret the concept of knowledge as introduced by the Upanisads as a 'variant of action' or as an auxiliary mean associated with any form of action, is repelled by the texts themselves<sup>48</sup>. Sankara's commentary on the fourth *sutra* has to be regarded in the light of the above three issues to avoid misunderstanding and confusion. Before we pass on to the consideration of the above issues we may take a brief note of the specimen sentences of the Upanisads that Sankara quotes initially to justify his stand. These are (1) In the beginning, my dear, all this was just Being (Sat) only, just one without a second (Chndyogya 6.2.1) (2) In the beginning, verily all this was just the one self (Aitareya 1.1.1.3) That is this *Brahman* which is without beginning, without end, without a gap in between, without any outside (or which is without cause, without effect, without any internal division and without a second). This is Tarkabhusan's rendering in Vedanta Darsan Vol. II. This self is *Brahman*, the all-perceiving (all feeling) Br Aranyaka. 2.519. (4) *Brahman* is the immortality (immortal order) ahead (in front) Mundaka 2.2.11.

Here there is a group of just *four* sentences selected from four different Upanisads which taken together present the entire metaphysical doctrine in a nutshell. It is that there is one eternal existential reality which is without a second and so, all-encompassing. This reality is the one absolute self. This, again, is Brahman, which is without an earlier, without a later, without a gap and without an outside. This, again, is the self, the all-feeling Brahman. And this Brahman is the *immortality*, ahead, also behind, to the right, to the left, stretched forth also below and above, – the entire order of absolute choice (*varistha*). We have, thus, a metaphysical doctrine which stresses knowledge of reality as the supreme end in so far as this reality is itself *immortality* (*amrtatva*) and its knowledge the concrete realisation of this immortality.

Sankara's arguments against the Purvamimamsa and allied postures, in this context, have followed certain well defined and some very cautiously calculated lines. In the context of first of the three issues specified above Sankara has consistently maintained that although the *dharma*-doctrine of the earlier part, the *Karmakanda* of the Vedas and the *Brahman*-doctrine of the later part, the *jñāna-kanda* of the Vedas are both *śruti*-based *śruti-pramāṇa*, and both have for their proof and sanction the authority of the Vedic sentences themselves, and, in this regard, both are '*codanājanya*', there is a radical difference in the *import* or *statements* in these two parts. Sankara's use of the terms and expressions in this part of his commentary has to be very closely and cautiously noted. The word '*codana*' for instance, used by Sankara when he admits the doctrines of both '*dharma*' and *Brahman* as '*codanājanya*' and in that context, speaks of radical differences in the '*intention*' of the sentences in the two parts of the Vedas (*codanapravṛtībheda*) he means by '*codana*' just the *vedic sentences*, and not Vedic injunctions. The Bhamati has brought this out clearly in its interpretation of Sankara's commentary on the first *sūtra*<sup>3</sup>. In connection with the first *sūtra*, Sankara has argued that the Vedic statements on *dharma* (*dharma-codana*) and the *vedic* statements on *Brahman* (*Brahmacodana*) which function there as *pramāṇa*<sup>4</sup>, That is, as sources of knowledge, in respect of their subject-matter differ widely in their *intention* (*pravṛtti*). Since, '*dharma*' as a content of knowledge is *bhavya*, that is, a content yet to emerge, the instruction in its regard takes the form of an injunction enjoining upon a person to engage himself in certain ritualistic action in order to acquire the spiritual merit advised<sup>5</sup>. The instruction, in this context, therefore, takes the form of an injunction as to what is to be done or not done. This is otherwise called '*karma-vabodhanam*', that is, making a person cognisant of a certain mode of ritualistic action to be done. But the Vedic sentences about *Brahman* (*Brahmacodana*) instruct in the way of making a person cognisant of an existential reality (*हितvastu*). This is like sense-contact with object which reveals its object<sup>6</sup>. The Vedic sentences in this context, cannot be meaningfully spoken of as '*engaging*, or '*enjoining*', since here there is no programme for any action whatsoever in respect of which there could be any injunction<sup>7</sup>. All this Sankara has said already in connection with his commentary on the first *sūtras*. In both the cases, the authority of the Vedic sentences functions as an extraordinary (*alaukika*) *pramāṇa*. There are several special features of this extraordinary *pramāṇa*. Commonly admitted by the Mimamsa and the Vedānta. That in respect of which it is a *pramāṇa* is not accessible to the other *pramāṇas* which for that reason are called ordinary (*laukika pramāṇas*). Both *dharma* and *Brahman* as object-matter of this *pramāṇa* are nonsensuous and transcendental. Then, again, while even the *laukika pramāṇas* are held as self-valid and as continuing to valid unless they are contradicted. This *alaukika pramāṇa* is absolutely immune from contradiction. And this is because the Vedic sentences are taken as *apauruṣeya* and *anapeksa*. The Mimamsa exploits these characteristics of the Vedic statements to as forming the logical ground of thus view that the object-matter of such sentences can only be nonsensuous *dharma* since *dharma* being a *non-existential* content, being something yet to emerge (*bhavya*) as a consequence of certain prescribed actions performed in appropriate way there can be

no demand for verification of the truth-claim of the Vedic sentences and so their claim to uncontradictability remains secure analytically and *apriori*. This logical reason guides the Mimamsa in its claim that to be a Vedic sentence means to be Kriyarthaka (injunctive) and to be injunctive is to be *bhavya-visayaka* or *dharma-visayaka*. But Sankara refuses to be guided by this *a priori* reasoning. With him, the Vedic sentences may have all the above formal characteristics but their meaning as also their subject-matter is dependent on the intention (*pravrtti*) of these sentences. In the case of the later Vedic sentences in the Upanisads the intention is very much different. By any large they are *reportive* in nature and not injunctive, they are descriptive and not prescriptive and there can be no justification for twisting or maiming their express meanings in obedience to an *a priori* formula. Sankara has attempted to demonstrate vacuousness of the Mimamsa formula, that is, *Kriyarthata* of any Vedic sentences, in respect of the Upanisadic sentences painstakingly. This is summed up in his statement that although the doctrines of *dharma* and *Brahman* are both *codanajanya*, that is, grounded in the authority of the Vedic sentences yet there is a fundamental difference in the authority of the Vedic sentences yet there is a fundamental difference between *dharma-codana* (Vedic sentences about *dharma*) and *Brahma-codana* (Vedic sentences about *Brahman*) in respect of intention and meaning of these sentences (*codanapravrttibhedat*).

To bring out the difference between the two types of Vedic sentences more explicitly Sankara shows that they also differ in respect of their goal as also their *object of inquiry* (*phala-jijnasyabhisat ca*). The Vedic sentences in the *Karmakanda* have '*dharma*' for their object of inquiry of knowledge. It will not do to say that these sentences, as the Vedic *pramana* of *dharma*, does not aim at any knowledge, although no less an authority than Padmapada himself is definitely confused on this point. We shall take up that issue when we interpret Sankara's concept of *pramanajnana*. The object of knowledge and so of inquiry of the Vedic sentences in the *jnanakanda* is on the other hand, *Brahman* and not *dharma*. The goal (aimed at by the sentences of the first category – which is also their defined purpose, is attainment of eminence and prosperity – *abhyudaya*, while the goal aimed at by the sentences of the second category – which is their defined purpose is to secure absolute release from bondage and suffering and this is considered to be the supreme end (*paramapurushartha*)<sup>29</sup>. This difference in the nature of the goal and the nature of the object sought for by way of knowledge, indicates quite a lot of other differences. The object of knowledge in one case is *bhavya*, that which is not there, but is *yet to be*. This then is dependent on *execution* of certain modes of actions of a practical nature, dependent on performance of certain rituals in conformity with Vedic injunctions – *anustanapeksam*. The object of knowledge of the other type of sentences is *Brahman*, an existential reality (*bhutatavastu*) and this being eternally self-complete (*nityanirvrttat*), does not require to be brought in to existence by any prescribed mode of action or for it the only procedure which is requisite is 'cognising it' *as there*, and this is taking no recourse to any extraneous form of activity – *anusihanantara-peksam*. Then, again, what is dependent on performance of certain actions is *purusavyaparatantra*, that is, dependent on the executive effort of some person. But that which is not so dependent and is eternally self-accomplished, is not *purusavyaparatantra*. From this does it not follow that what is *purusavyaparatantra* may not materialise at all, may not come into being in absence of an executive effort of the individual? It is, therefore, *janya*, that is, caused. But an existential reality like *Brahman* is uncaused (*ajanya*) and eternal (*nitya*). Sankara's analysis of the two situations is so very penetrating and the different facets of the distinction presented through the entire length of the first-four *sutras* so very fine and subtle that it is not at all improbable for people who are less gifted to miss the threads of his discussion here and there and to mis-connect them and fancifully discover incongruity, even contradiction.

For instance, Sankara introduces two concepts '*codanajanya*' and '*codanatantra*' in connection with his discussion in this context. These concepts look similar but are very much different in their connotation. '*Codanajanya*' is equivalent to '*sastrapramanaka*'. That expression is used in the context of knowledge of both *dharma* and *Brahman*.<sup>1</sup> The knowledge of both *dharma* and *Brahman* has as its source the Vedic sentences (*codana*). Had there been no such Vedic sentences one could not even come to know that there is such a thing as *dharma* or *Brahman*. Neither of them is derived from any *laukika pramana*. The *srutis* or the *sastras* are its sources of our knowledge about them. The *sruti-vakyas* or *Veda-vacanas* are called '*codana*' in the wider meaning of the term as *vacaspati* has explained. Even the *Mimamsa sutra* '*Codanalaksano 'rtha dharmah*' (1.1.2) read along with the *sutra* (1.1.5) which contains the expression '*tasya jnanamupadesah*' can be taken to suggest that *upadesa* (instruction) and not injunction is the normal and commonly accepted meaning of the word '*codana*' in the Vedic parlance since the *vedas* are accepted as impersonal (*apauruṣeya*).<sup>2</sup> The Vedic sentences, taken generally, are *instructive* and *informative* and not *directive* or *injunctive*. They assume the character of being *directive* in the context of actions which are *enjoined* to be done, that is, the context of the *prescribed action* which then assumes the form of a *duty (kartyavya)* to be done. The distinction is as fine as that. Sankara has used the expression '*codanatantra*' in the context of an *enjoined* Vedic action, technically called '*Kriya*' and nowhere else. The word '*codanatantra*' is absolutely meaningless in the context of actions generally, Vedic non-Vedic. It is, again, meaningful in the context of *dharma-karya*, that is, actions in pursuit of *dharma*, but not so significant in respect of '*dharma*' as the end or resultant fruit of such actions since both the mode of prescribed action (*Karma*) and *dharma* as its would be resultant derive their evidence (*pramana*) and also sanction from the Vedic sentence in the *Karmakanda* of the *Vedas*. Both are regulated as *co-determinates* of the Vedic sentences which determine them both and form their evidence and proof. When Sankara distinguishes between *dharmacodana* and *brahmacodana* that is, between Vedic sentences which are a proof of *dharma* and which are the proof of *brahman*, one non-existential and the other existential *visaya* (content) and speaks of difference in their intention (*prayatna*) and mode of employment he takes the doctrines of both *dharma* and *Brahman* as *codanajanya* and nowhere as *codanatantra*. A careful survey of the text will substantiate correctness of this rendering. For one fact, Sankara has nowhere used the expression '*codanatantra*' in the context of a *pramana*, all *pramanas* are, according to him, '*Yathubhuta-vastu-visayam*' and the expression '*Yathubhuta-vastuvisayam*' does not mean what the great disciple of Sankara in his *Pancapadika*<sup>3</sup> has taken it to mean, nor is the *pramana* of *dharma* at all *codanatantra* although '*codanajanya*' it certainly is. The difference between *brahmacodaka vakyas* and *dharma-codaka-vakyas* is just what Sankara himself has expressed in his inimitable way. The Vedic sentences in the *jnanakanda* makes us cognisant of the nature of an existential reality which is eternally accomplished (*nitya-nirvrita*) and that also without any prescription for action to be done or duty to be accomplished. The sentences of the *Karmakanda* also give us knowledge but this knowledge, in so far as it is the knowledge of a content which does not exist at the time of knowledge (*na jnanakale asti*) being a *bhavya-visaya*, and also, in so far as this content in order to come in to being is dependent on certain personal efforts of an individual executing some enjoined actions (*Purusa-vyaparatantratva*), this knowledge involves a prescription as to how and with what means an enjoined act of duty should be accomplished '*(svavisaye niyunjanaiva purusamevanbodhayati)*'<sup>4</sup> The knowledge of *dharma*, therefore, is the knowledge of an *enjoined mode of action* a *duty*, to be done in pursuit of *dharma*. *Dharma*, therefore, boils down to execution of a prescribed duty in the prescribed way, *dharma* being its promised result '*Abhyudaya*' - elevation, eminence, or happier living is also the promised practical goal to follow upon achievement or acquisition of *dharma*. The Vedic sentences in the *Karmakanda* are the only evidence and admissible



*pramana* of the entire complex. But what is *codanatantra* is the enjoined mode of action, the type of enjoined duty to be done unquestioningly and as Sankara has brought out at the end<sup>23</sup>, this action or *Kriya* is *vastu-svarupa-nirapeksa*, that is, indifferent to the nature of things *as they are*. This *Kriya* is not a *pramana* or source of knowledge. As emanating from an injunction, and guided and sanctioned by it it is *codanatantra*. The question of truth or falsity, validity or invalidity does not arise in the context of what is to be done. There may be question of warrant or sanction as also success or failure in its regard. But in such matters it is dependent absolutely on the impersonal directive principle, the injunctions alone. This is its *codanatantra*. The knowledge of *dharma*, of the injunction and the mode of action to be done is a separate and entirely different issue. This knowledge, as any other form of knowledge, any knowledge of an objective content—of a content either existing at the moment or non existing - is *pramanajanya*. As regards *dharma* and *Brahma* as contents of knowledge, their warrant is their knowledge and their knowledge has for its warrant or evidence the *dharmacodaka* and *Brahmacodana* sentences which are the *pramanas*.

Because the concept of Vedic *Kriya* or *Karma*, otherwise called *Kartyavya* (sanctified duty), and the concept of *dharma* are inseparable connected, Sankara, while emphasizing the radical difference between Vedic sentences of the *Karmakanda* and the Vedic sentences of the *jnanakanda* sometimes focuses light upon the peculiar ramifications of the notion of Vedic *karma* and sometimes, again, on the concept of *dharma*. While a Vedic *Karma* or *Kriya* is a kind of action of a practical nature, done in the prospect of gaining or acquiring *dharma* and having for its warrant some Vedic injunction, *dharma* is the promised result of successful completion of such action in accordance with the Vedic injunction. Both are, therefore, *codanatantra*, that is, determined and regulated by Vedic injunction only. Neither of the two is *vastutantra*, that is, neither of them is dependent on the nature of things which are used as materials or implements in the performance of the enjoined ritual. The very something is expressed in the context of the fourth *sutra* when Sankara says that ritualistic actions are *vastu-svabhava-nirapeksa* independent of and indifferent to, the nature of things. It can be seen that both a *work to be done* and a spiritual merit *to be acquired* are *bhavya* (what is yet to be) —neither of them is existential. In order to come into being they are, then, dependent on the executive effort of individuals —*purusavyaparatantra*. What is dependent on such executive effort is *ipso facto* dependent on the skill or capacity of the individuals. So what is *purusavyaparatantra* is also *purusatanttra*. And is it not a fact that what is dependent on an individual person is dependent on his *power of understanding* as much as it is dependent on his practical skill? So what is *purusatanttra* is also *purusabuddhyapeksa*<sup>24</sup>. This led Sankara to specify that in respect of knowledge of enjoined duty, that is, the type of action to be done in pursuance of *dharma*, there is no dependence *anubhava* (verificatory experience) and the *srutis*, the Vedic sentences, are to be the only proof of truth-claim, where as in knowledge of *Brahman*, an existential and eternally accomplished reality, there is need for confirmation in term of *anubhava* and also by other *pramanas*<sup>25</sup>. The reason cited by him is that an act of duty being *bhavya* is dependent on a person for turning it out to be what it is *to be*<sup>26</sup>, and, again, dependent on and is regulated by a vedic injunction since it is to be executed in a way answering the prescription of it. The content being a futurity and the mode of realising it being only a certain way of doing the act, there can be no rational or concrete verification of the result in term of direct experience (*anubhava*). The only fact, determinative in its regard, is whether the act has been done in the prescribed way and also *properly*—an issue integral to the injunction and not a fact of experience. As for its fruit, some form of material advancement to be realised hereafter, or in an after-life, conditional upon the person's attainment of spiritual merit (*dharma*) in this life, there is no way of ascertaining if such merit has been attained or not. All that is there, and can be there is the pious expectation that such has been the case. The *srutis* are to be the only *pramana*



in respect of *dharma* or a Vedic from of enjoined duty accomplished. Classical interpreters have sensed difficulty in reconciling the two characteristics of *Karma* in pursuit of *dharma*, its *codanatantrata* and *purusantrata* or *purusabuddhyapeksata*, that is, dependence on vedic authority and dependence on a person's inclination and intelligence. They feel no difficulty in accommodating *purusavyaparatantrata* provided this *purusavyapara* is taken to mean *blind practical execution* of the enjoined action. What sounds discordant with them is the *option* which, according to Sankara, is open to an individual to act in this way or that way, or not at all to act in any way (*Kartum akartum angatha va Kartum*)<sup>79</sup>. Intriguingly enough, the same observation has been made by Sankara in two places. Sankara's *purusastra-tabhatvatca Kartavyasya*, it can be seen, achieves two things at one stroke. It is calculated to show at the same time *agent-dependendness* of a Vedic duty aimed at attainment of *dharma* is so far as the entire-complex is *bhavya*, and absolute non-dependence of Brahman, the existential reality, on human efforts and human intelligence, making it necessary for the cognitive process to *conform* to it as to its true nature (*yathabhuta*)

Sankara's observation as regards *purusadhinatva* or *purusabuddhyapeksata* of Vedic *Karma*, be it noted is based on *internal evidence of the texts themselves* in the injunctive part of the Vedas. His claim respecting *Vastutantrata* of the Vedic texts in the *jnanakanda* also rests on the very same kind of internal evidence. There is no arbitrary, no *apriori* stipulation anywhere. So the classical interpreters could be at ease, and could as well take Sankara's observation in an easy-going way. In the injunctive part, there are *vidhis*, asking people to *do* or to act in a certain way, there are *pratisedhas* asking them *not to do* certain kinds of act, there are *vikalpas*, providing for actions in *alternative ways*, lastly, here are *nisargapavada*, prohibiting some acts as a general rule while enjoining the same acts in certain specified cases. So, Sankara raises the pertinent question how could these divergent forms of injunctions have sanctity and also authority, if human capacity as also human choice was not admitted as an essential factor in the matter of practical decisions about such actions? So, Sankara has put that all such varied programmes would be meaningful<sup>80</sup>, if *purusabuddhyapeksata* (dependence on human intelligent choice) is admitted as an auxiliary factor at the least. And this is being brought out by analysis with a view to *justifying* such varied prescriptions in the *Karmakanda* of the Vedas, and not for disparaging them. In the *atratra* sacrifice, one may use the sacrificial plate called *so dasi*. He may not do this also. The Bhamati takes the two instances as illustrative of the option of doing and not-doing (*Kartum* and *akartum*). Sankara's illustrations 'offering oblations at sunrise, and offering oblations before sun rise (or when the sun has not risen) are explained by the Bhamati as illustrative of two other alternative such as, doing in one way or in another (*Kartum angatha Kartum va*)<sup>81</sup>. This rendering, the Bhamati claims, tallies with the illustrations cited. In the first set, there is alternation between a *vidhi* and a *nisedha*, in the second set there is to be alternation between two ways of the *vidhi*. The Karpataky justified the stand taken by the Bhamati and advises interpolation (*adhyahara*) of another '*Kartum*' before '*anyathakartum*' so that the pairs could be '*Kartum-akartum*' and '*Kartum-anyatha Kartum va*'. Sankara's illustrations from the realm of ordinary human activity, showing the dependence of human activity on the person's will, seem to mention *three* alternatives such as, 'One goes by riding, or goes on foot, or does not go at all'<sup>82</sup>. These the interpreters would like to emend as 'going by riding or on foot' being the instance of alternation in the positive attitude, and 'going or not-going being the instance of alternation between the positive and the negative attitude. It can be seen that this arrangement would also require interpolation of an other '*gacchati*' before '*na va gacchati*'. In the view of these learned interpreters, such emendation is necessary to render the expressions of the Acharya more significant. Besides this group of interpreters, who look for improving upon the exposition of the master, there is a group of die-hard exponents of Vedic orthodoxy, who would refuse

to accept Sankara's version that Vedic actions could be in any way dependent on human opting to execute them in this or that way or not to execute them at all, even though desiring for *dharma*. There might be, according to them, alternations in the auxiliary parts (*angakarma*) of the principal *Karma*, but as for the principal *Karmas*, they are absolutely obligatory and binding, since they are Vedic, and human freedom cannot have any scope there. So, Sankara, according to these errant knights, is wholly mistaken.

It may be pointed out that over-erudition and diehard orthodoxy seem both to be equally inappropriate in this context. In Sankara's presentation, *Kartum*, *akartum*, *anyathava Kartum* are the three alternative modes of practical reaction in relation to a situation. In the *laukika* set of instances, going by riding or on foot (or in a boat or in a palanquin etc.) are instances both of *going* and *going in alternate ways* (*Kartum anyatha va kartum*). 'Not going' is the instance of *akartum*. The instances cited from the Vedic sources are designed to correspond to those three ways of activity in relation to vedic action, considered generically as one single unit corresponding to the *laukika* act of 'going'. In the situation, such as, *atiratra* sacrifice for instance, the use of the *sodasi* plate is the instance of '*Kartum*' in respect of the *vedic* act considered generically as 'doing something' in accordance with the *vedic* prescription. Similarly, not using the plate is the instance of '*akartum*' and '*udite juhosi, anudite juhosi*' are instances of performing the *vedic* act in alternative ways. It is not at all necessary to press perfect correspondence between the instances of *laukika karma* and *valdika karma*, since while the former are executed by way of convenience, the latter are undertaken in obedience to a *vedic* injunction on duty. What is required to note is if *vidhi*, *pratishedha* on the one hand, and *vikalpa* and *utsargapavada* on the other, afford instances of '*Kartum*', '*a-kartum*', and '*anyathakartum va*' or not? What Sankara insisted was that in the *vedic* action, there is provision for *vidhi*, *nisedha* and *vikalpa-utsargapavada*, and a *vedic* duty centre sanctified in each of these several modes of action, giving rise to *dharma*. To put it otherwise, *dharma* can be attained, and a *vedic* duty connected with it executed in alternative ways, and these alternatives are 'doing', not-doing, 'either doing or not-doing or both'. A *vidhi* is a case of doing, a *pratishedha* a case of not-doing, and a *vikalpa* a case of either doing or not-doing, while *utsargapavada* a case of both doing and not-doing, or both not-doing and doing. *Vikalpa* and *utsargapavada* taken together illustrate '*anyathava kartum*'. This resembles the principle of alternation of modern logic implying either A or B or/and both, *vidhi* and *pratishedha* are shown by Sankara in a separate group, illustrative of *kartum* or *akartum* - that is, 'doing or not-doing'. Rendered in terms of modern logic, the alternation has four members such as, A, not-A, either A or not-A, both not-A (in some respect) and A (in some other respect this looks as taking disjuncts within the working of total alternation or presenting disjunction and alternation conjointly). Sankara had omitted the instance of *utsargapavada*, may be, because it has more relevance in *smriti*, not so much in *sruti*, from which other instances have been cited. In case of *utsargapavada* a general prohibition goes along with a special prescription in limited cases, such as, prohibiting contact of raw human bone which if contacted requires taking full bath together with wearing, such as, clothes, - while the same act is prescribed for one who has murdered a Brahmin, and as a form of penance. A more apt example in modern times will be general prohibition about drinking of alcoholic preparation together with special prescription as a form of medicine. Since the *vedic* injunctions themselves make provision for alternative ways of executing *vedic* duties as also for alternative ways of attainment of *dharma*, it is pointless for diehard orthodoxy to raise any objection. It can also be seen that every *vedic* injunction as a well-defined specific purpose. Is it obligatory for a man who is not interested in heavenly bliss or in gaining earthly prosperity to perform sacrifices connected with such aims? Even *nitya karmas*, which are obligatory for people in general,

are not so in respect of *sannyasins* (ascetics).

What Sankara insisted on showing is that unlike knowledge of an existential content (*bhutatavastu*), injunctions of duty for attainment of *dharma* are capable of being formulated in several alternative ways, —each enjoying equal sanctity, and that this happens because a duty to be done is dependent on an individual person and is related to the individual's aim, purpose and station in life. But while there are several ways of attaining *dharma*, and several ways of doing duties for that attainment, knowledge of an existential content, such as, the stump of a tree, can become a knowledge in a fixed way only, as it has to conform to the nature of that existential object, which is also unchanging. A caution is very much needed at this place, since many seem to have overlooked this point. The point is this that what is herein being said about *karma* or *dharma* is not being said about knowledge of *karma* or *dharma*, that is, about *dharma-jnana* or *karma-jnana*. It is not true that to be knowledge, its content must be an existential content (*bhutatavastu*), — a point on which even the great disciple of Sankara, Padmapada, has surprisingly erred<sup>46</sup>. It can be no body's contention, least of all, of Sankara's own, that there can be no knowledge of *dharma*, simply because it is *bhavya* (non-existential), or that the *vedic* statements in the earlier part of the *vedas* are not a *pramana* in respect of *dharma*. That would be a palpable mistake, and Sankara cannot be credited or discredited with that foolishness, since it is not borne out by the text, except by a thorough misinterpretation of Sankara's statement '*pramananty yathubhuta-vastu-visayam*'. We shall examine this later on. At this place, there are only two issues — (1) An instruction for *dharma* being an instruction as to how an enjoined duty is to be attended to, *dharma* is dependent on the injunction for acting in a particular, which then constitutes, its only warrant and also sanctity. It is, therefore, *codanatantra*, the *vedic* injunction being its sole rationale. And there can be no demand for verification of its being what it is outside the *vedic* instruction and in term of given experience of any kind. (2) That which is dependent on a person for concrete or actual execution (*purusavyaparatantra*) is also relative to the needs and requirements, also to capacity and station of life of the person, and so, is *purusabuddhyapeksa*, and is, for that reason, capable of being formulated in alternative ways, each having the very same sanctity. These two characteristics are peculiar to *dharma* and distinguish *dharma* from Brahman — knowledge-which actually is the point at issue.

It is not an easy matter to present all the arguments of Sankara which explain the radical differences of the doctrines of *dharma* and Brahman in a connected way. The *Cudanapravrttiheda* (difference of intention or import of *vedic* sentences) that he indicated in the context of the first *sutra* covers not only the intrinsic nature of the *vedic* sentences in the two parts but also relates to the nature of the object of inquiry (*jijnasya*) as also to the nature of the end (*phala*) looked for. Sankara spared no efforts to make his analysis thorough-going and complete and to make his conclusion definite and unassailable. The discussions in the different parts are so very intermixed and interrelated that it is well-nigh impossible to present his arguments under separate headings. That the injunctions in respect of *dharma*, which is *purusavyaparatantra*, are capable of being formulated in alternative ways has been explained in the body of his commentary on *sutras* 1.1.2 and 1.1.4. Discussions in the context of *sutra* 1.1.4 bring forth other facets of distinction which are complementary. Thus, *Dharma*, the resultant fruit of *vedic* actions, admits of variation in degrees, (*taratamvam*) not so *moksa* (liberation), the end of Brahman-knowledge. This latter is uniform and of an absolute nature. The variation in the degrees of *dharma* is inferable from the directly known effects of *dharma* (*phalopratyakse*)<sup>47</sup> such as, happiness and distress, enjoyed in various proportions through the mechanism of body, mind or speech by all empirical subjects, from the vegetable organisms and human organisms upward up to the creator, *Brahma* himself. The difference in the degree of

acquired merit (*dharma*) naturally causes a difference in the degree fitness of persons (*adhikaritva*) in their enjoyment or suffering. It is wellknown that the nature of craving (*arshitva*) and the degree of capacity (*samartha*) are determining conditions of fitness of individuals for one kind of fruit or of another kind. Sankara, here, is possibly hinting at the conventional belief that the existing plurality in the various grades of empirical individuals is due to their *karmaphalas* (fruits of past action) of varied nature. He substantiates the point by reference to the *vedic* texts which speak of migration of human souls in two ways, *devayana* and *pitryana*, and their life in those lokas (worlds) till their acquired merit is exhausted<sup>48</sup>, when they return back to mundane existence. This then establishes, so Sankara finds, *three* facts: (a) There is wide variation in acquired merit (*dharma*) which admits of degrees, (b) the enjoyment of the fruits of *vedic* actions is dependent on there being a mechanism of that enjoyment, such as, body and the senses organs and (c) *dharma* as an end of life cannot be the ultimate end (*parama-purusartha*) since the type of beneficial consequence it ensures is temporary and not everlasting or eternal. Sankara undertakes to show that on the above grounds also there is radical difference between *dharma* or *vedic karma* on the one hand, and *Brahman* – knowledge and its end, *moksa* on the other, and so also between the two parts of the *vedas* which contain instructions on them.

*Dharma*, by common admission, produces agreeable (*Upadeya*) or *priya*) results, as *adharma* leads to disagreeable (*have or apriva*) consequences. *Dharma* results from faithful observance of *vedic* injunctions and execution of the kind of duty enjoining *Adharma* results from elation or non-observance of *vedic* injunction. But the enjoyment of the *upadeya* as also suffering of the unpleasant (*apriya*) consequences depends on bodied existence (*sariratva*) and continued existence in the cycle of existence (*sariratva*) through birth, death and rebirth. But these can have no relevance for a state of absolute release (*moksa*) which follows upon knowledge of *Brahman* as the one true self (*atman*). This state is characterised by *asraritva* which, as the *upanisads* declare is the *natural (svabhavika)*<sup>49</sup> and normal state of the individual, the state of things that eternally (*nitya*) obtains for him, if not duped or misled under the trammels of *avidya* and its *samskara* (latent tendencies). *Dharma*, therefore, for practice as also for enjoyment of its fruits, *presupposes*, as also *ensures* a bodied existence, while the *Upanisads* which hold out *moksa* through knowledge of absolute identity of *Brahman* and the self (*brahmatvaikatva*) show the way of realisation of *asraritva* by getting rid of his ignorant feeling of *bodied-ness (sariratva)* and empirical individuality (*samsaritva*). The two branches of the *vedic* disciplines are, therefore, poles apart and their ends (*phala*) are polar opposites.

By reference to express *sruti*-texts, Sankara shows that the concept of *moksa* as understood in the *Upanisads* is not the concept of what is '*parinamihitya*' (which remains the same identical substance in course of *real* transformation) but is the concept of what is called '*Kutastha nitya*', i. e. '*a-parinamihitya*' (which is always the same, all transformations being merely seeing and so, unsubstantial). Here, it becomes necessary to point out that, according to the *Upanisads*, *Moksa* is not a separate state or condition (*avastha*). It is the same as *brahma-bhava*<sup>50</sup>, that is, realisation of Brahmanhood as identical with self-hood, or realisation of Brahmanhood as the *true* self-hood. Such being the case, *moksa* through *Brahman*-realisation cannot be a state of existence which is *parinamihitya*. It is the *kutasthanitya* state and its radical difference from the fruit of any *vedic* action is upheld by the *sruti* that 'it is other than *dharma*, also other than *adharma*, other than the achieved and the unachieved, other than the yet-to-be and also other than what is, or *appears to be there*'<sup>51</sup>. *Moksa* is, therefore, singular in everyway. Being *nitya*, it cannot be the '*sadhya*' (achievable) and again, not being the result of an action, it is not *purusatantara*, not also proportionate to one's acquired merit not that which admits variation in degrees. It is *niratiseya* insofar as it admits of no limitation

and no distinction into greater degree or less degree. All these show its absolute difference from *dharma* as from the result of *vedic* action.

Sankara's discussions up to this point in his commentary on the fourth *sutra* supplemented by his observations in the context of the earlier *sutras* may be considered as his reply to the Purvamimamsa claim that the entire *vedic* texts are *Kriyarthaka* or *bhavyarthaka*. That such a claim is guilty of illicit generalisation and over-simplification of issues Sankara demonstrates by showing with reference to the *vedic* texts themselves that there is radical difference between the sentences of the *jnanakanda* and those of *Karmakanda* as regards the nature of the relevant sentences, their import, intention and use, also in respect of the object of inquiry and the end or result looked for. What distinguishes the texts of the two parts of the Vedas are (1) *codanatantrata* and *Purusavyaparatantrata* of the actions prescribed as means to the attainment of the goal, which is *dharma* in the *karmakanda*, and the *vastutantrata*, *anubhavapeksata*, and also *purusabuddhi nirapeksata* of the knowledge of *Brahman* which culminates in the realisation of the supreme goal of life, which is *Moksa*. Along side these differences there are differences of an equally radical nature in respect of the nature of the ends (*phala*) which again, form the object-matter (*jijnasya*) of *vedic* instructions in the two parts. These are : while *dharma* is *bhavya*, *Brahman* is a *bhutatvaya*, while the former is *abhudayaphala*, the latter as also its cognate *moksa* is *nihareyasaphala*, while the former is amenable to *alternative* prescriptions, the latter has a *single* mode of realisation, while the former admits of *degrees*, the latter is absolute and has no degrees, while the former is a temporary end, the latter is an everlasting up goal, while the former is *janya*, the latter is *ajanya* and *svabhavika*, while the former depends on bodied-ness (*sarirarva*) for its enjoyment (*bhoga*), the latter is experienced or realised in a transcendental state of *a-sarirarva* secured by getting over the false sense of substantivity in the empirical individuality which is the real *sarirarva*, the former for its attainment and realisation is dependent on there being a *samsari* individual, the latter is equivalent to *asamsarirva* and *amrtarva* which follows upon realisation of absolute and true identity of the phenomenal person with the eternally accomplished all-pervading spirit, the *Brahman*. Alongwith all these differences, there are two more. There are while *dharma* is a believed content, *inferrible* from *adhtkaritaratamya* and *sukhadutkhataratamya* which are matters of common observation, of direct knowledge, *moksa* is to be a matter of direct experiences (*anubhava*) of a special nature. The other difference is that while the effects of *dharma*, generally, materialise or bear fruits in an *after-life*, *moksa* can be realised *here and now*, in a liberated state of enlightened living. The differences between the subject-matter as also the *codanapravrtti* of the texts in the earlier and later part of the *vedas* being so wide and radical, is there any rational ground for the claim that the entire *vedic* literature and of one uniform pattern, that they are all *Kriyarthaka* and that the doctrine of *Brahman* or liberation has no foothood in the *sastras*, that the doctrine of *Brahman* is not *sastrapramanaka*? When the *vedic* texts in the *jnanakanda* are so very explicit in all these matters to ignore all these radical points of difference and to foist upon them a meaning and relevance borrowed from the earlier part would be, Sankara concludes '*srutahant-Asrutakalpana-prasanga*', that is, deliberaten neglect of established meaning and conjuring up of fancied meaning.

As for the charge of *anarthakyam* (uselessness) of *vedic* sentences if not geared to *vedic* actions, which produce results in term of *dharma* and *abhudayaphala* (advancement) or which enable one to attain the agreeable (*upadeya*) and to shun the disagreeable (*anupadeya*) or *heya* Sankara's reply is very definitive. It is that the realisation of self-identity with *Brahman* (*brahmatmavagamat*) is the fulfillment of the supreme end of human desire (*purusarthasiddheh*) in so far as it brings in complete relief from all sufferings of life (*sarvaklesaprananat*)<sup>21</sup>



Sankara's discussions on the above two points is direct refutation of the Mimamsa claim that the Vedic texts, all and sundry, have to be taken as *Kriyarthaka* or they will become *anarthaka* (useless). This is, again, established indirectly by the demonstration that follows next. This is to the effect that the texts in *jñānakāṇḍa*, in their harmonious taking, are such that any acceptance of them as integral parts of *vidhis* (*vidhisesa*), that is, taking of them as statements connected with '*Kartṛ-devata-prakāśana*,' as is integral to *Kriyavidhi* or *upasanavidhi*, or taking of them as *svaprakāśanagatopasanadikarmapara*<sup>24</sup>,— even as connected with knowing, *conceived as an act* of any description (*vidikriyakarmatvena*), would militate against both the wording and the spirit of the entire Vedānta texts. To this part of the discussion is Sankara's exposition we now turn.

The view that Sankara contests here is the view which Sabaraswami and the Prabhākara school of the Mimamsa might have held. This view would admit *śāstrapramāṇakā* of *Brahman*, but, since, according to the view— an existential expression could have a meaning only in being taken as integral to an expression meaning some form of activity and not by itself, the word '*Brahman*', as found in the Vedānta texts, was to be taken as integral to an *enjoined act* of meditation or contemplation,— the end or result where of would be attainment of immortality (*amṛtatva*). The twin purposes of the *śāstras*, according to this view are— 'urging people towards the desirable and restraining them from the undesirable'. Even in our conventional usage of words, words become meaningful in being taken along with an expression meaning activity<sup>25</sup>, the Vedic sentences become meaningful by implying modes of action to be done, they are necessarily to be taken as injunctions for actions<sup>26</sup>, so, the words denoting existential things, are necessarily to be taken as integral to actions (*tadbhūtanam kriyarthena samunnayah*<sup>27</sup>). Words, such as, '*Yupa*' '*ahavaniya*' do not mean in the *vedic* contexts *natural* objects, such as 'sacrificial post' and 'fire' but these objects made *non-natural* or *supernatural* (*alaukika*) in being designed and sanctified as parts of Vedic ritualistic practices. So also is to be the word '*Brahman*' as used in the *vedānta*. It is to be the supernatural form or mode under which the individual is to contemplate his self ritualistically in order to attain immortality. Instructions such as 'the Atma which is devoid of sin and blemishes is to be seen, to be searched for, to be enquired in to' are definitely injunctions for performing ritualistic acts such as, meditation, contemplation or worship. The so called descriptive parts of the statement are to be utilised in the way the *mantras*, descriptive of deities or sung in praises of divinities are utilised. The so called '*mokṣa*' or '*amṛtatva*' should mean new attainments which result from the enjoined acts of worship or meditation, and as in the case of *dharma* so also in these cases, success or fulfilment is guaranteed by the *śāstrapramāṇa* alone, that is, by the unchallengeable authority of the *vedic* statements themselves<sup>28</sup>. It is also a fact, the Pūrvaśāstra would argue, that the Vedānta texts do not stop advising that *Brahman* is to be heard from the scriptures. They also prescribe contemplation (*manana*) and 'meditation (*nididhyāsana*) as (*further acts* to be done. Neither a mere descriptive knowledge of an existential situation, such as, 'the world consists of seven islands, or 'that kind is going' helps attaining the desirable or shunning the undesirable. Similarly, a mere descriptive knowledge from the *śāstras* that *Brahman* is such and such cannot be credited with achieving any desirable end, such as, release from bondage of life or attainment of immortality. The argument that knowledge of thing which is really there in the rope-snake illusion serves to remove fear caused by the false belief in the presence of snake and also relieves distress due to that ignorant fear can have no relevance in the case under dispute. The reason is— one who has read and heard about *Brahman* and its nature thousand times is seen to behave in the way that an ignorant mortal behaves, having the very same kind of attachment to worldly life, and agitated by the same kind of anxiety, fear and suffering. So, this group of mimamsakas would hold that *although there is evidence for the doctrine of Brahman in the vedas*, this *Brahman* is not to be



taken as an all-accomplished existential reality, the mere knowledge of which releases one from bondage and suffering, and helps one to attain immortality. The *Brahman*, actually, and also quite befittingly advised by the *vedic pramana*, is the 'form' of a ritual, —of contemplation and meditation in a certain way, as advised by the *vedas*, and it is only when understood and practised (meditationally) in the way the *vedas* advise, can such ritualistic action help attainment of *moksa* and immortality. This rendering of the concept of *Brahman*, alone ensures its being current in the *vedic* literature (*sastra-pramanaka*).

In the very same context, Sankara discusses if *Brahman* that the Upanisads mean can be taken as an 'object' of knowledge (*viditkriya*) conceived as an *act*, if it can, again, be taken as an 'object' of worship or devotional contemplation (*Upasana* or *dhyana*). Here, he seems to have anticipated the doctrines of *Brahman*, defended by the non-Advaitic schools. It can be seen that this view would be only a variant of the modified Mimamsa view analysed above. The notable difference is : Here *Brahman* is taken as an all-accomplished (*parinisthita*) existential reality, an Absolute self, a Divine person and not the ritualistic symbol of a *vedic* act of contemplation or meditation, this view also upholds meditation, worship or prayer as means but these acts are not so much ritualistic as they are *devotional* in nature, and they are to follow upon the *jnana* of an existential reality, an Absolute Person, and this *jnana* being conceived as a complementary means. Sankara has quite a number of reasons to contest this view of *Brahman* as having been actually sponsored by the Upanisads. In this context, however, where he is out to contest the Mimamsa view of *Kriyaparata* of all *vedic* sentences and to defend the Vedantic doctrine of *Brahman* as radically different from the doctrine of *dharma* of the earlier part of the *vedas*, he rejects this view specifically on two points these (1) The *upanisadic Brahman*, the existential reality, being conceived as an *object* either of knowledge or of act of meditation and (2) the end, such as, *moksa*, being conceived as a new state which is to be the goal of some *achieving act*, and not the absolute self-identity of phenomenal multiplicities to be realised in an identity-experience.

Sankara's rejoinder to the above two kind of contention which take *Brahman*, as described in the *upanisads* either as an *object* integral to a ritualistic act of contemplation, or as an *object* or an *act of knowledge* that culminates in devotional acts of worship and prayer follows certain well-judged lines of specific differences and anomalies between the *upanisades* doctrine of *Brahman* and the doctrine of *Brahman* as per the interpretations of his opponents. The *upanisads*, as he finds, takes *Brahman*, not simply as the absolute, all-comprehending existential reality but also as the one *unitary absolute self*. Knowledge in its regard is to be that of absolute one-ness of *Brahman* and *Atman-brahmatmaikatvavijnana*<sup>100</sup>. Such knowledge is to ensure absolute release (*moksa*). Now, knowledge of this *identity* cannot be confused with any of the *vedic* acts of *upasana* on *samskara* which has conventionally taken four specified forms. These are three forms of *upasana* such as, *sampadrupa, adhyasarupa, visista-kriyayoganimitta (samvargoopasana)* and *Kurmagasamskararupakarya*. If *Brahmatmaikatvavijnana* (knowledge of absolute identity of *Brahman* and the self of phenomenal pluralities) as intended by the the Vedanta (*upanisads*) were admitted as equivalent to one or the other form of these *vedic upasanas*, so Sankara insists, then a harmonious and coherent meanings of the expressions, such as, 'Thou art That', 'I am Brahman', 'This self is *Brahman* itself' would have proved infructuous<sup>101</sup>. And the declared purpose and the culminating results, of the *jnana*, such as, cessation of *avidya* (mis-knowledge) which presents reality and the truth in a distorted way, would have been hampered<sup>102</sup> disproving authenticity of expressions, such as, 'one who knows *Brahman*, becomes verily the *Brahman* itself'<sup>103</sup>, and 'when the knots of heart (attachments) are all loosened and all doubts are uprooted etc'<sup>104</sup>.

The reason why knowledge of *absolute one-ness* of *Brahman* and the self cannot be equated with any one of these forms of *Upasana* requires close scrutiny. In an act of *Upasana* where one is to be contemplated as the other, a real distinction of the one from the other is presupposed. Otherwise, there can be no sense of contemplating the one as the other. Contemplation of one as the other does not require or involve absolute identity of the two, a situation where one is conceived as the real and the other a mere appearance and substantially identical with the first but distinguished from it on account of ignorance. Such does not become the case in contemplation. But knowledge to be knowledge has to be expressed in one uniform way, there being no sense in the expression 'knowing Jive as Brahman' or 'knowing the snake as the rope'. Knowing one thing as another will clearly be a case of confusion. But knowing the rope as none other than the rope, or knowing Jive as none other than Brahman is so far as it reduces one to other, rejects the sense of difference between the two, regards one as the distortion of the other, would represent a knowledge-situation. Knowledge works upon the principle of identity-grasping. A as A and rejecting the not-A if it happens to nestle or float upon A. But *Upasana*, which etymologically means 'sitting' closed involves duality. To contemplate one as the other means taking one in approximation to the other. The very notion of identity of the two would render *upasana* of one as the other impossible. Such being the case, there is radical difference between *upasana* of *Brahman* in this or that way and *brahmavijnana*, knowing Brahman as the Self and substance of all, as the one reality and Self. This Sankara brings out by contrast with the various modes of *Upasana* (analysed in the 3rd chapter of the *Vedanta sutras* and *Karmanga samskara*). Contemplating Jive as Brahman in the way the Mind is to be contemplated as the Visvadeva in *Sampat Upasana* is imposing (*aropa*) of a superior character on the inferior and thus seeking to elevate it to a supernatural content in sublimation of its natural character. In *adhyasa upasana*, otherwise called *pratika upasana* the inferior form such as the Jive is to be contemplated as the symbol of *Brahman* in the same way as the Mind is to be worshipped as Brahman as the Sun is to be worshipped as *Brahman*. Contemplating *prana* (vital breath) as the *Vasavya* because both *retract-prana* retracting all vital functions and *vayv* retracting all other elements within itself – is called *Samvarga upasana* which does not involve contemplating one as the other, but involves contemplating one like the other on ground of similarity of certain specific functional characters – *Visista-Kriyayoganimitah*. Under this form the Jive may be contemplated as *Brahman* as the functional characteristic such as, *Brhana* (expansibility) is common to both. The other form of Vedic act mentioned in the context is *Karmangasamskararup Karya*. Its difference with the other three, which are forms of *Upasana*, is that such of them is a whole act, a *pradhana* (principal) work ensuring an *apurva* (excellence) in its way, the last, however, is sanctification (non-naturalisation) or supernaturalisation) of an integral part (*anga*) of *vedic* ritual, such as, sanctification of thee and making it fit for offering to the sacrificial fire by the Yajamana's wife gazing at it (*ajyaveksana*). Thus, the *upasana* of Jive as *Brahman* may simply ensure *brahmadrsti* in the Jive and render the ritualistic act capable of secure 'immortality' or release for the agent. Sankara explains that none of these *vedic* acts is equivalent to *brahmaatmaikat-vavijnana*, the aim and object of the *Upanisads*<sup>(2)</sup>.

Next, as would have been the requisite logical step, Sankara examines the relevance of *vedic kṛya* as understood in the *Mimamsa*, or for matter of that, of any *Kṛya* whatsoever, for the type of end or the goal aimed at by the *Vedanta*. The previous analysis has shown radical difference as to their intrinsic nature between *brahma-vijnana*, the object-matter of the *jñanakanda*, and the *vedic* form of ritualistic action and even of *Upasana*. Now, to demonstrate utter irrelevance of action in any form to be the means to the end or goal looked for in the *vedanta*, he gives an acute analysis of the type of end that may result from any action, specially the *vedic* action, with a view to showing

its radical difference from the end as *moksa*, as understood in the Upanisadic literature. The end-product of a *vedic* act is capable of being of four possible forms – *Upadhyā* (what is brought into existence), *Vikārya* (what is the result of a process of transformation), *Apya* (what is to be newly attained) and *Samskārya* (what regains its pure form through a process of reclaiming or refurbishing). Insofar as the Vedantic goal is *moksa*, and insofar as this *moksa* is nothing other than realising the true nature of the self, which is all the reality–, Self-shining, all-accomplished and eternal, there cannot be any affinity whatsoever between it and the end-product of a *vedic* action. This, indeed, is Sankara's claim.

Had 'moksa', the final end maintained by the *vedānta* been either *Upadhyā* or *vikārya*, argues Sankara, the *upanisadic* statements in its regard could be understood as *Kriyārthaka* as the *Mīmāṃsā* claims. But, in that case, *moksa* would certainly have been non-eternal (*anitya*) being the end-product of an enjoined act, physical, mental or verbal. None has ever regarded a produced pot, or curd, which results from transformation of milk, as eternal substances<sup>106</sup>. Nor is it possible to regard the *vedāntic moksa* as *apya* – that is, attainment of the new and other than or extrinsic to what is there already. This *moksa* is realisation of one's own true nature (*svatmasvarūpa*). One's own real nature is not a content which is not in one's possession always – *anapyatva*<sup>107</sup>. It may only be that which although possessed of is missed. But, in that case, this missing of what is already possessed can only be due to ignorance or mis-apprehension, and it is knowledge which removes that mis-apprehension and not any act of any description which can exercise a curative effect and make a conscious recognition of what is already possessed but is ignorantly missed (*praptasyāprapti*) possible. Sankara taps the other alternative, an alternative which, for instance, would be favoured by the non-*advaitists*, in this context, and shows a *reduction ad absurdum* of the view that the Vedantic *moksa* can be regarded as 'apya' in any sense. This is that even if *Brahman*, claimed to be the indivisible true self of the phenomenal individual (*Jiva*) be taken as other than or transcendent of the phenomenal individuality realisation of or termination in the self-accomplished being of *Brahman* cannot be regarded as a new attainment since *Brahman* is *sarvagata* (all pervasive) and *nityaptasvarūpa* (its nature being eternally self-complete) like the all pervading and all-comprehending ether (*ākāśa*)<sup>108</sup>. This observation of Sankara should have helped the non-*Advaitists* in avoiding an error which they have committed. *Brahman*, by admission of all the Vedantic schools, being all the existence, leaves no room for anything as a distinct or external entity. It being, again, *nityaptasvarūpa*, that is, having a nature in which everything is secured, the *jive*, of apart from *Brahman*, remains secured in communion as an integral part of *Brahman's* being. So, even, on that alternative, what matters is conscious recognition of this being-in-*Brahman* which already exists. Knowledge alone is to be the means thereto. There can be no sense, therefore, in holding that this being-in-*Brahman* is to be a new attainment made possible by any act, ritualistic or devotional. Sankara's second alternative – *svarūpavyatiriktepi brahmanah nāpyatvam*, it can be seen, serves a very vital purpose for Sankara's own doctrine as we have elaborated in Chapter V and, which we defend as the correct interpretation of the doctrine as Sankara himself has propagated through his writings. Even when the *Jiva*, a playful development of the very same reality, *Brahman*, in the form of a phenomenal appearance (which is a 'mere appearance') feels towards itself (in the exigency of the cosmic game) *illusorily* as a substantive real and consequent upon that posture, regards *Brahman* as other than itself, (*svarūpavyatirikta*) *Brahman* being *sarvagata* and also as *nityaptasvarūpa* by definition, and also from its own side, does not stand as unattained and remote, since it is immanent in the misconceived (so called substantive) *jiva* form, and *moksa* being the realisation by the *jiva* of its true nature becomes at one with the realisation of the nature of *Brahman*. Vacaspati also takes the passage in this way, that is, 'even if the *Jiva* is regarded as

difference within the framework of the Advaita can at all mean. It cannot be that Sankara was referring to any difference other than the empirically and commonly felt difference (this misconceived difference) between *Jiva* either as a phenomenal appearance of *Brahman* or that phenomenal appearance, a mere appearance, forcefully posed as a substantive fact in the exigency, of the cosmic play, on the one hand and *Brahman* the all encompassing reality on the other. His reply has been, even if the *Jiva* and *Brahman* being regarded in this way, as one does when labouring under the influence of *avidya*, *Brahman* being *sarvagata*, that is, being *immanent* even in such cosmic and fancied forms and being also *nityaptasvarupa* (the phenomenal and fancied manifestations also being ever integrated in *Brahman*'s being and realised in those ways) there can be no sense in saying that *moksa* which is realisation of the nature of all-comprehending reality as the true identity of all and everything remain beyond reach and so *apya* since what shows this apartness (*Vyatirikhata*) is a mistaken attitude and a misconception. We would insist that this passage, the second and the none carefully throughout alternative, which could pose difficulty for Sankara's doctrine of *moksa* but which is solved by Sankara on the ground of *sarvagatatva* and *nityaptasvarupatva* of *Brahman* definitely supports our rendering of Sankara's doctrine, according to which the mere appearances of cosmic multiplicities and the illusory appearances of *substantive* separate subjects and objects are all grounded in *Brahman* as cosmic expressions and none of these is a human manipulation or human impositions from outside. Ignorance consists in regarding the appearances *not as appearances* but as *reals* themselves.

Sankara's treatment of the fourth alternative – *samskaryatva vis-a-vis* the Advaita conception of *Moksa*, is more detailed. This is, in particular, may be credited as bringing about is a *change* in the form of *samskara* (renovation). This is what a vedic *kriya* achieves by 're-forming' the *natural* and thereby making it fit to work as a means to the attainment of some supernatural goal. The point of argument, therefore, is that a *vedic* act may 're-forms' the given existential condition (*bhuta*) so much so that it can be the means to the attainment of the *bhavya*, which, in the given case, is to be *moksa*. The point to consider, then, is if the *uponisadic* concept of *moksa* which is declared to be realisation of *Brahman* as *Atman* can be meaningfully connected with *Samskarakarma* as the means? Sankara demonstrates absurdity of that supposition by penetrating analysis so that his findings can be accepted as conclusive. *Samskara*, he observes, may be either *replenishing* something with a new and adventitious quality (*gunadhana*), or *reclaiming* something by removal of impurities and blemishes (*dosapakarana*). But the first alternative cannot work, since *moksa*, being realisation of the very nature of *Brahman*, and this *Brahman* being all-complete and incapable of having any *addition* to its essence (*anadheyattisayasvarupa*) cannot have anything to do with *Samskara* in that meaning. The second alternative also fails. *Brahman*, being eternally pure and free from impurities, there can be no sense of any cleansing or reclamation in its regard. It may be argued: although a thing may be pure and resplendant in itself, may not that character in it be sometimes covered up by adventitious impurities, requiring such acts as brushing or cleansing so that the cover of impurities may be removed and the original splendour and purity may be restored? So, even supposing that *moksa* is nothing other than realisation of the nature of *Brahman* which is eternally pure and self-shining, does not the fact of *Brahman* which is eternally pure and self-shining, does not the fact of bondage suggest that somehow the eternally pure and free undergoes a state of eclipse of its natural form, and *moksa* is to be the *restoration* of that natural form? The analogy of a mirror which is naturally bright but is disfigured by a layer of dust and filth which is to be rubbed out in order to restore it to its normal state – is brought in to illustrate the point.

Before comparing the notes of the two schools of the Advaita Vedanta over the solution of the point raised, let us concentrate on Sankara's own observations upon this. The Self, as conceived in the Vedanta is incapable of any 'reformation' or change and cannot, therefore, be the seat or locus of any *Kriya*<sup>10</sup>. A *Kriya* or activity cannot expire itself as that, cannot attain its act-hood (*naivatatmanam labhate*) without bringing in some real change or transformation in its locus. The *sruti* texts which declare non-changeability or non-transformability the Self would be contradicted (*vudhyeran*) if the supposition were to be adapted. Then, again, what undergoes transformation becomes non-eternal (*anitya*) and the Self is not non-eternal, according to the Vedanta. So, the Self cannot be supposed to be inherent locus of any *Kriya*. Now can it be supposed to be the fit object upon which any activity resident in some other locus (*anyatraya-Kriya*) can be directed to bring out any reformative change. The reason thereof is, as Sankara, laconically puts, the Self cannot be an object (*avishayatvat*) relatable to such act or activity. But why so, and what does Sankara himself means in this? Quite a number of reasons may be advanced *a priori*. But it will be definitely a mistake if any reason is brought forward from outside the Vedanta texts themselves since Sankara has been attempting to prove what he is seeking to prove by explicit reference to the *sruti* texts and their harmonious taking (*samanvaya*) is this special context. Purely logical arguments have no relevance in this context.

It can be seen that Sankara has kept himself within the bounds of express *sruti* texts when dealing with the above point or any other point, in his commentary on the fourth *sutra*. Who is the apparently bound, and whose liberation (*moksa*) is sought for? – Let us ask. Evidently, it is the empirical individual who can be meaningfully said to be bound, and also, as seeking for liberation or release. In all Vedic *Kriyas*, he is agent and the central point of reference, since all *purusarthas* are related to him only, as his ends or purposes. The Mimamsa would like to regard the *moksa* of this individual as an effect of Vedic *Kriya* of the type or *samskara*. So the question is, if *samskarakriya* can achieve this? Contrariwise, the question is if *moksa* of this individual – which has been defined as the state of absolute identity of *Brahman* and *Jiva*, or as the nature of *Brahman* itself as *sarvagata* and *nityaptasvarupa*, that is, as the self-affirming reality itself in its total comprehension and absolute one-ness, can be a fit subject for *vedic samskara kriya*? It can be seen, that the *Kriya* here spoken of, is *anyatrayakriya*, such as, ablution, ritualistic cleansing of the mouth, wearing the sacred thread and numerous other ritualistic acts of *vedic samskara*, sanctified and enjoined by *vedic* injunctions<sup>11</sup>. Can acts of this type bring about the above described state of *Moksa* as the culminating result of *vedic samskara*? Sankara's reply to such a question. He dismisses that question on the ground that *moksa*, as conceived in the Vedanta texts, being one with realisation of the nature (*svarupa*) or *Brahman* is not relatable as an 'object' to such acts of *samskara-avishayatvat*. What is relatable to such acts or acts of any other nature is the configuration of the body. The mind and the sense-organs which, on account of *avidya* (ignorance) is *mis-taken* for the true and real self, and is looked upon as the agent (*karta*) and enjoyer (*bhokta*). It is this that is restored to normal condition of health by use of medicines when it is afflicted by diseases, it is this, again, which is cleansed and purified, even reformed and reclaimed by ritualistic acts of *samskara*. But this is not at all the self which the Vedanta advocates as one with *Brahman*, the eternal all-accomplished reality itself. Do not the *sruti*-texts themselves declare to the effect that under the same denomination and in the same configuration and close to each, a pseudo-self and the true self abide-the first living upon fruits of action while the other is the indifferent witness of the whole scene<sup>12</sup>? Is not this true self declared as 'the one divinity hidden in all things, the all-pervadin, the inner Self of all things, the witness, the overseer of all deeds in all things abiding, the sole thinker, devoid of all qualities'<sup>13</sup>. Is not the same real self declared



to be 'all-encompassing, the bodiless, scathless, the sineless, the pure and self-shining'<sup>14</sup>? So, Sankara contends, in what way can *vedic samskara* be relevant in respect of the eternally pure, in respect of that which being self-complete is not fit to be a receptacle of any addition or excess<sup>15</sup>. *Moksa*, to be sure, is the Brahmanhood (*brahmabhava*) and this being the true and the natural (*svabhavika*) state of the phenomenal, the empirical individual, the pseudo-self sustained by *avidya* (ignorance), how can the transition from the ignorant condition to the enlightened condition be explained in term of anything but right knowledge? This is neither a case of *real* transformation (*vikarya*), nor one of absolute production (*utpada*) nor one of passing from one *real* station to another (*apya*), nor, again, one of reclamation and purification (*samskarya*). This is a case of *recognition*, a realisation of that which is lost sight of due to ignorance. So, the final end advocated by the Vedanta texts is one where no *vedic* ritualistic action can have any relevance at all. How can the statements in its regard be *kriyarthaka* or *bhavyarthaka* then? This shows the radical difference of the later *vedic* doctrine from the earlier *vedic* doctrine conclusively, so Sankara holds.

Now can it be contended that between knowledge of *Brahman* as the true self which dispels ignorance in respect of substantivity and so the felt reality of the pseudo-self and brahmanhood as a realised experience (*brahmavagati*) an act of somekind can figure as an intermediate link (*karyantara*)<sup>16</sup>. Do not the *srutis* themselves declare 'one knowing *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* itself'<sup>17</sup>, 'one's fruits of action become all spent up when he is been – who is all, the supreme and not-supreme'<sup>18</sup>, 'what delusion and what suffering can be there for him who has perceived the unity'<sup>19</sup>,? and so on in a whole host of other texts?

Just as there can be no intermediate state of action (*karyantara*) between standing' and 'singing' in 'singing' standing', so also here<sup>20</sup> Sankara quotes Gautam's *Nyayasutra* 1.1.2. in confirmation of his view that when false knowledge or mis-apprehension (*mithyajnana*) is dispelled (this becomes possible for the *vedanta* by *brahmatmaikyavijnana*)<sup>21</sup> all effects of that ignorance such as, *pravrittidosa*, *janma* and *duhkha* where each preceding is the *conditio sine quo non* of each succeeding – are all eliminated. How can then there be any more action which can only follow upon *pravrittidosa*?

The question of there being an intermediary – an act or something also-readily suggests to the mind on account of a felt difference between *brahmatmaikya-vijnana* spoke of as the *means* and *brahmavagati*, *brahma-bhava* or *brahmasvarupata* being understood as the end, and so, as *moksa*. *Brahman* is all free, *Brahman* is the absolute freedom itself (*anadda*, the terminal point<sup>22</sup>, or *ananta* – boundlessness). It is *this svarupata* of *Brahman* which can be held to be *vikriya-rahita* (devoid of any transformation or change). So, an opponent (*purvapaksa*) may argue that even granting that this eternally existent fact or state which you argue to be the same as *moksa*, is neither *utpada*, nor *vikarya*, nor *apya*, nor even *samskarya*, what about the *transition* from the the bodied self-hood in bondage, from empirical self-hood, to the the unbodied transcendental self-hood? Is this not a *real transition*? If so, is not *moksa* than *apya*? How is this transition effected without there being some activity which changes the empirical self-hood into the transcendental self-hood, which *reduces* it to the other one? Does not liberation bring in *some change* in the empirical individuality, or prove curative of it? If so, how does the knowledge even of the transcendental one-ness of *brahman* and the individual self, a knowledge secured from *sastrapramana*, which is an indirect form (*paroksa*) of informative knowledge, achieve the miracle of making the empirical individuality *vanish* or *evaporate* all on a sudden? Is not the prescription of some reformative, curative or transformative act which may follow upon such knowledge of *brahmatmaikya* and which may bring in such change, a logical demand of the situation? If so, how is it established that there can no relevance for *Kriya* in the later part of the *vedas*, and that the statements, for that very reason, can never be *Kriyarthaka*?



It can be seen that the point does not admit of an evasive reply. Nor does the muddles which the classical interpreters have roistered in the name of a proper solution, take us any the nearer to the solution, intended by Sankara himself. The stock expression '*brahmasaksatkara*', as we have already argued in Chapter VI in connection with the interpretation of '*brahmayagati*' in Sankara's commentary on the first *sutra*, is a misleading title for '*moksa*', also for the knowledge ultimate. *Brahman* of the *upanisads* is not an '*object*', and is not, as it cannot be also, a direct '*content*' of any knowledge. The *śrutipramāṇa*, which is an indirect *pramāṇa*, presents it as a content, no doubt, but that it does in an indirect mode of presentation as an '*object-matter*' of discussion and so, as a spoken or instructed matter, – a content which, as per notation, is *not to be a content*. The analogy of the mirror<sup>22</sup>, introduced in the *purvapakṣa* argument, is an improper analogy, since neither is *Brahman* a physical object (or any object whatsoever) like a mirror, nor is the disfigurement caused by dust or filth analogous to the *avidyā*-formation such as, the pseudo-self. Both the *Pancapadika* and the *Bhamati*, again, quote a passage from the *Bṛhadaranyaka* which, if literally taken, seem to suggest a *real transition* from one state to another, supporting the idea that *moksa* is a new attainment (*āpya*). Thus, the passage '*ath yadatah para divo jyotirdipyate*' – the refulgence of light (*jyoti*) which is shining there beyond this *dyuloka* (translucent sphere) seems to suggest a movement from one sphere to another. So also does vacaspati's picturesque descriptions of a ship moving away from the area of the sea, disturbed and agitated by the breakers to the calm and undisturbed area of mid-ocean. Can *moksa* or *Brahmabhava* be undisturbed in the same way as a *transition* from one real state to another?<sup>23</sup> Again, what happens to the earlier state? Does it vanish into nothingness? Does it abide as it is but outside *Brahman* or *Brahmanhood*, and does *moksa* become similar to going out from one village to another?

It can be seen that every description labours under certain natural limitations. Once we overlook or ignore these limitations, – the *contexts* of the use of description, every description miscarries. To take Vacaspati's picturesque description at first. Both the disturbed area of breakers and the calm area of mid-ocean are the same ocean, the description of them as several parts are relative to an external gazer. Now, if this reference is left out, and the ocean is not taken as an *outer object*, what we have can as well be described as two kinds of experience – one agitated and ceaselessly renewing, the other calm and quiescent. The same ocean expressing itself, *as if* externally, in waves and breakers, and yet maintaining its self-identity inwardly. The expression or manifestation in the form of phenomenal pluralities, even of them as *substantive* individuals, reared up fancifully, is taken by Sankara, as has been done also by the *upanisads*, as *avidyā-vilāsa* (game of *avidyā*) or *Brahman*, – the one fact, the one reality. In this aspect, that is, as *vilāsa*, *avidyā* as the creative force is called *Māyā*. But in and through this *vilāsa*, this cosmic *display*. The self-identity of *Brahman*, is retained as an inward factor. *Brahman* remains self-identical all through out. The phenomenal pluralities, which are nothing substantial in themselves but only transitive '*mere*' appearances, next assumes *fancied substantivity* in the exigency of the cosmic *play*: *Avidyā*, no longer, remains a '*play*' in this peculiar formation, it becomes in respect of that from, a serious affair of empirical life, as this '*formation*' is ignorantly believed to be real substantive existence. It, thus, becomes the *mithyā-pratyaya*. The apparently substantial *Jivatva*, in self-distinction from true self, becomes the offshoot of this phase of *avidyā*, which is *mithyājñāna*. This *jivatva* is also sustained and nourished by the same, *mithyājñāna*. This gives the state of bondage. All forms of activity – Vedic and non-vedic, all *pravṛttis* and infatuation (*moha*), have their relevance in this mode of empirical individuality, misconceived as substantive and substantial. They all hold with the realm of this *avidyā*. They all presuppose this *avidyā* as their basis, – their very foundation. That being the case, no act or action of any description can have relevance in getting order or dispelling this *avidyā* (ignorance). This *avidyā* can be got

over, if at all, by *vidya* (right comprehension) alone. What can be the nature or or dispelling this *avidya* (ignorance). This *avidya* can be got over, if at all, by *vidya* (right comprehension) alone. What can be the nature or form of this *vidya*? Negatively, it can only be of the form: 'that which is felt or fancied to be substantive and substantial is not for that reason 'real', – it is the very nature of an ignorant fancy to take a thing otherwise than what it really is'<sup>24</sup>. In being so taken, the thing does not *really become* what it is fancied or *mis-taken* to be'<sup>25</sup>. The *Jivatva*, the phenomenal individuality, is not self-defined substantial unit which can, legitimately, poise itself as a separate and distinct fact, *as a subject* against the entire realm of existence, the entire realm of reality and its varied manifestations, *regarded as an object*. The poised (or self-poised, due to ignorance) subject is, again, as much a part of the same order as anything else. All this, on the negative side. This is to suggest *what the Jivatva is not*, although it is fan cried to be. On the positive side, this *vidya* is to bring home the *truth of fact* that the reality, substantivity, and also the identity of this *jivatva*, all are one with the Absolute reality, the Absolute subject whose phenomenal expressions the cosmic pluralities all are. It is that very undivided, all-comprehensive one which phenomenally assumes, or has assumed, the multiplicity of forms. Wherefrom does this *vidya*, preliminarily, as a kind of informative knowledge, spring? It springs from the *sastroparamana*, and in this specific context, from the later *vedas*, the *upanishads*, otherwise called, the *vedanta vakyas*. What is the place of these *vakyas* in the total configuration which is called the Reality? These, also, are the expressions or manifestations of the very same reality by way of experience and knowledge, these are phenomenal manifestations of *cit-svarupa* of reality, which is *Brahman*. There are varied forms of this *svarupa* – some ignorant and playful, some *kriyarthaka* and *prudential*, both *vedic* or *non-vedic*, some, again, expressions of sublime wisdom and enlightenment. The *Vedanta vakyas* belong to the last mentioned category. They are *informative* in respect of the real or true state of things. They are not *Kriyarthaka*, they aim at showing how the delusive presentation of separation, distinction and seclusion, which has been at the root of all suffering and which is symbolically expressed as a state of *bounder* is to be overcome. These *vakyas* have only one object—to deliver up *brahmatmaikyavijnana*, which is to be the gateway of liberation or release. What is the nature of this liberation, otherwise called release (*moksa*) and whose is this? This can be regarded in different ways in relation to the several contexts, *moksa*, of course, is of the phenomenal form, which ignorantly poises itself as a substantive reality, as the individual in one reference, it is simply the cessation of bondage and suffering. This is negative. In another reference, it is recognition by the individual of its self-identity in the Absolute spirit, it is discovering its *true*, the one eternal, self-accomplished identity in *brahman*. This is its *brahmaghaa* (*brahmanhood*). It remains a form of knowledge with the phenomenal form and in its behalf. This knowledge, as fostered by the *vedanta vakyas* remains in the form of objective knowledge, knowledge of a truth of fact. But this truth of fact *has to be realised* intimately as *the truth of the self*, where it turns to be *self-realisation*. This is no objective knowledge, no knowledge literally spoken, since there is no distinction of subject and object in it, –it being *ekarasa*, one unitary experience, as the *vedanta* says. This, then, is *moksa* as the terminal point of realised experience. This is *Brahmavagati* of Sankara's description. This is realisation of what was eternally the case— an existential fact, the goal of all the *vedanta*, as Sankara understands.

What happens to the erstwhile phenomenal individuality? The classical interpreters would like to see it melt in to its matrix, to disappear as an air-bubble. They have misinterpreted Sankara as meaning that the cosmic plural formations, being all products of *avidya*, *vanish into nothingness* with the termination of *avidya*, since, in their view, this *avidya* is a human manipulation purely – a misconstruction of man, the proverbial scape-goat. Do they not misinterpret *adhyasa* as a misconceived

Reality, the *Atman*, *ab extra* ? We have elaborately explained in course of five long chapters where these interpreters have systematically erred – the human person being incapable of standing in distinction as an outer fact to manipulate is, *the lapsing of reality-sense* in the phenomenal individual. This amounts to the loss of its *sense of substantivity*. It is so, because that is all that knowledge can do. Knowledge cannot create a fact. Nor can it destroy a fact. It can register only what a fact is *in its true shape and true nature* – *tadvattat-prakaratva*. It can also show *what a thing is not*, although what it is mistakenly taken to be – it dispels *tadabhavavattatprakaratva*. What it cannot do is preventing a thing to *appear circumstantially in the form of a mere appearance*. The rope at a distance and in 'dim light' may still appear as a snake, but the knowledge of the rope will prevent its being taken for a snake and that much. And where the circumstantial factors are integral to the Reality as its *Maya*, or *avidya-vilasa* or simply its way of manifestation, what check or control can knowledge or *vidya* provide taking the *appearance as that*, that is, as *mere appearance* ? Is not knowledge of appearance as only an appearance, a kind of *vidya* or knowledge, which is to be *tadvattatprakaraka anubhava* ? What oddity is there in a person's being physically, mentally, socially *such and such*, and yet being the self-identical person, *not in and through*, but in spite of and exclusive of all such differences ? What oddity can there be in the Vedantic *Brahman* in being *Satyam Jnanam anantam* or *anandam* in an impersonal posture, in spite of being through inscrutable and indefinable *maya* (which is neither its nature nor anything other than that nature) the creator, sustainer, the destroyer of all the manifest order of multiplicities, or in spite of its *becoming* and yet *not-becoming* all that there seems to be ? We shall return to this discussion in the tenth chapter.

Before we pass over, let us look again, into Sankara's own solution. Neither the *Pancapadika* nor the *Bhamati* clearly explains how the *uparva* of *moksa*, that is, how the concept of *moksa* as a new attainment, can be explained away in the face of the *sruti* text, such as, *Atha yadatah para divo jyotirdipyate*. There is, again, the doctrine of the *Kosas* (sheath)- *annamaya*, *pranamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijnanamaya* and *anandamaya*, which are described as successive coverings of the pure spirit. If *Moksa* is to be conceived as reaching out to the '*Jyoti*' or to pure '*cit*', even to '*ananda*' leaving off the anterior regions or states, do we not get at a new sphere or state as the point of absolute release? Is there no new movement, analogous to movement from one village to another ? Sankara's meeting of this sort of objection is very remarkable. Unfortunately, his classical interpreters have not elaborated upon the point Sankara's solution has been, as we have already discussed, '*svarupavyatiriktepi brahmanah napyatvam, sarvagatena nityapta-svarupatvat sarvena brahmanah akasyasyeva*'<sup>28</sup>. Brahman is all-pervasive, is not specially located at any region, at any point or sphere. It pulsates through all the *kosas*, overlaps all the *lokas*. Brahman does not have any external limit, as the Sky is also limitless. All phenomenal manifestations are in it, within it because they are all *phenomenal* manifestation of it. What separates them and keeps them distinct and so apart from Brahman is their fancied substantiality and substantiveness. This separateness, fancied substantiveness, and so, of fancied reality is also part of the cosmic play. Now, since, this also results in bondage and suffering, there is an urge for securing release and escaping the suffering. No activity, even no act of purification or refurbishment become necessary for rehabilitation in the Absolute spirit which is the *one true* identity of all. What becomes necessary is getting over the sense of separate identity which is fancied and false. What else can serve as a means in a situation like that except knowledge, except *vidya* which reveals true state of things ? How can action of any form help in this situation since every action ? be it *vedic* or *non-vedic* presupposes mention of the *reality-sense* of in the empirical individuality which is to be impound and discarded ? The fact of absolute identity of all in Brahman, of Brahman's being the one true self of all and in this sense, Brahman's all-pervasiveness is *anitya*

(eternal) and *kutastha* (immutable). *Moksha*, negatively, is getting over the false sense of separate identity on the part of the phenomenal. On the positive side, it is conscious realisation of the truth of fact, that is, of Brahman being the one substance and one identity of all. The change from bondage to release is like the change from ignorance to knowledge, from stupor or dream to awakening. There is no new gain or new attainment, but regaining the forgotten identity – an identity which was there, nay, which is there eternally but only occasionally missed on account of ignorance.

The fore-going discussion on the nature of knowledge (*jnana*) has made our task of interpreting Sankara's momentous distinction between *jnana* and *vedic Kriya* more easy-going. It will be found that Sankara's meaning (be it right or wrong) has been missed both by Padmapada and Vacaspati on account of their involvement in the grammar of language and rule of syntax. And the great disciple of the master, again, is guilty of giving an utterly wrong interpretation of Sankara's concept of *pramana*, failing to understand the proper meaning of a compounded word used by Sankara. Neither the Bhamati nor the Ratnaprabha is guilty of that mistake although this mistake has been the common mistake with almost all more recent writers on Sankara Vedanta. It is not in a spirit of uncoiled – for over-bearingness that remark is being made. Its purpose is to pin down the error, once for all, so that it is no more committed, since it has misrepresented Sankara considerably. In Sankara Vedanta there are two radical different uses of the word '*Jnana*'. There is 'means-knowledge' or '*pramana-janya jnana*'<sup>12</sup> and there is terminal knowledge or end-knowledge which also, in the absence of any more suitable expression, is called '*Jnana*'. This latter is not knowledge, literally speaking. Just as *Brahman*, the self, is no 'object' or content (*visaya*), literally speaking. Words, such as, '*prajna*' '*bodhi*' etc., are sometimes used as pointers to its very extraordinary nature. '*Jnana*', in this sense, has no relevance in the present context<sup>13</sup>. In this context, the word is used by Sankara in the sense of *pramana-jnana*. This is called *brahma-vijnana* as distinguished from '*brahmavagati*' or '*brahmanubhava*'. This '*brahma-vijnana*' is what the *Vedanta vakyas* are intended to achieve, according to Sankara. These *vakyas* are not *Kriyarthaka* or prescriptive according to him. They are reparative of an eternally existential content (*bhuta-vastu*) and are a *pramana*, that is, source of our knowledge (*jnana*) in respect of that existential content, regarded as the 'object-matter' (*visaya*) of that *jnana*. It can be seen that the two issues – '*Jnana*' and '*Kriya*' discussed here, are of different types. To use an expression so much in vogue in contemporary western tradition, they belong to two distinct 'categories' and it will be a categorial mistake to confuse them. While *jnana*, as understood here, is a *pramana*, a *Kriya* is not a *pramana*. The former is a way of knowing rightly, the latter is a way of doing something successfully or as far as possible. Even then, in the controversy between the Advaita Vedanta stand on *sastrapramana* and the mimamsa stand on the same subject, the two concepts come into a relation of contrast and juxta position. *Kriya*, the *vedic Kriya*, as enjoined by the earlier Vedic texts, becomes the accredited means to the attainment of *dharma*, a *bhavya-visaya*. The Advaita vedanta, in particular, speaks of total irrelevance of this *Kriya* for desired end of the Vedanta *vakyas*, such as, *moksha*, defined as *brahmabhava*<sup>14</sup>. Since this end is not *bhavya*, *jnana* is not bringing into existence the not-yet, but as per the context, it is realisation of what is eternally there. It is *jnana* (knowledge), then, which can serve as the means in this context, since what is wanted is removal of ignorance (*avidya*) – the false sense of separate substantial reality in of the empirical individual. This is the point of contention. In order to impress upon us what he considers to be a radical difference of nature of the two-*jnana* and *vedic kriya*, even as a means (*sadhana*) in their respective spheres, Sankara, through the artful device of *purvapaksa*, poses the question. Is not *jnana* also a 'psychical activity', and so, a *Kriya*, – a '*manasi kriya*'<sup>15</sup>? His reply has been exceedingly cryptical – '*na, vaituksanyat*' which literally means, 'no, for there is radical difference in natures. The controversy

now centres around what Sankara has exactly meant thereby. The classical interpreters of both the schools— the Bhamati and Vivarana — are at one in holding that what Sankara is that although a *manasi kriya* (psychical activity), *jnana* is different from a *Kriya* of the vedic type<sup>13</sup>. There are two important things to support this classical rendering. The word '*jna*' is a verb-word. A verb-word etymologically means an 'act' or 'activity' — so, a *Kriya*. The suffix '*anat*' also lends support to this meaning. This from the side of etymology. There is another and more important support for this rendering from the stand point of syntax —on account of the use of the word '*nanu*', before '*jnanam name manasi kriya*'. Tarkabhusan seems to support the rendering of the passage found in the Bhamati and the Pancapadika. According to him, were not '*jnana*' admitted as some type of *Kriya*, although different from the *Kriya* enjoined by a *vidhi*, the question posed by '*nanu*' would lose its relevance. So, according to Tarkabhusan, Sankara, in the passage quoted, is not denying that *jnana* is a form of *Kriya*, what he is really denying is '*vidheyatva*' (injunctive *Kriyoparatva*) in the '*jnana-kriya*'. Be thus supports the classical Version<sup>13</sup>.

The Pancapadika misuses<sup>14</sup> Sankara's expression '*codanajanya*' by taking it in the sense of '*codanatantra*' and explains that although *vastu-visaya-jnana* is also a *Kriya* (*vastuvisayasya-jnanasya kriyatvepi*), it is not the type of action which originates from an injunction and which is dependent on the executive effort of an individual<sup>15</sup>. According to the Pancapadika and the Vivarana school, '*jnana*' of Sankara's acceptance is no doubt an act (*kriya*) but, since its object is independent of it and so, uncaused by it<sup>16</sup>. This *jnana*, although an act, is different from the vedic act which is initiated by an injunction and is also dependent on an individual (*purusatanttra*). The Pancapadika definitely misinterprets Sankara in as much as it regards *jnana* (knowledge) as *Vastujanya*, that is, caused by its object, and also, so far as it regards the object as being always a content given in its own nature (*svarupa*) ahead of knowledge (*jnana*). Thus it says '*Vastu ca jnanat prageva svarupe vyavasthitam*' — the object is its own nature pre -exists knowledge of it<sup>17</sup>. Apparently, this is to be accepted as the Pancapadika rendering of Sankara's compounded word '*yathabhutavastuvisayam*' spoken in respect of *pramanam* after having defined *jnana* as '*pramanajanya*'<sup>18</sup>. It is indeed shocking that the illustrious direct disciple of the master, the author of the Pancapadika, was capable of such a mistake and the followers of the Vivarana school, including Dharmaraja Adhvarin<sup>19</sup>, would blindly cling to that mistake. Had Sankara meant that *jnana* (or *prama*) is *bhutavastuvisayam*, that is, is of an object already existing and ahead of it (as the Pancapadika interpreters in every case, why should the greater master of Sanskrit speech should write '*yatha-bhuta-vastu-visayam*'. Why is the word '*yatha*' there ? To be sure, the expression is '*yathabhuta*' — '*vastuvisayam*', meaning "as the object is in its own nature". What Sankara means, then is that knowledge, being *pramanajanya* has to conform to the nature of its object, has to be in complete accord with it, or as the Ratnaprabha puts, it is to be uncontradicted (*abadhita*) by any other knowledge of the same object. One would be tempted to ask the autho of the Pancapadika, whether there is anything called knowledge *jnana* of *dharma* or not, according to Sankara and also according to him ? What does Sankara mean what he said that *dharma* being an yet-to-be (*bhavya*) does not exist at the time there is knowledge of it ?<sup>20</sup> What, again, does the Jaimini sutra 1.1.5 mean when it says that knowledge of *dharma* (*tasya jnanam*) is the instruction (*upadesa*)? Apart from all these, how would the Pancapadika answer the question: Is *Sharma* known or unknown ? If known, is it a *bhutavastu* existing ahead of (*prageva jnanasya*) of knowledge ? If unknown, what is the basis of our acceptance of *dharma*, and in what way can the *sastrapramana* be a *pramana* in its regard ? There is little doubt that the Pancapadika has committed the mistake. The mistake is, again, repeated in its view that *jnana* is *vastujanya*<sup>21</sup> which seems to suggest a causal theory of knowledge, which is absolutely repugnant to the Vedanta. The entire



rendering is childish. Sankara's *vastutantra* is misunderstood as *vastujanya*, as Sankara's *codanajanya* is misunderstood as '*codanatantra*'. A direct disciple should have followed carefully the usage of expressions of the master. We refrain from entering into any full-fledged discussion of Sankara's epistemology. The '*bhavyata*' of *dharma* - the 'end-products' of 'oughts' and 'ought-nots' as also 'knowability' of 'what to be done or not to be done' precludes the logicity of the standard realistic interpretation of knowledge.

The Bhamati account on the point - If *jñāna* is a form of *manasi kṛiyā*, does not differ substantially from, the Pancapadika account, although it is not guilty of misuse of Sankara's expressions, not also guilty of mis-interpretation of Sankara's concept of *pramāṇa*. Thus, the Bhamati puts *Satyam, jñānam manasi kṛiyā, na tu iyaṁ brahmaṇi phalam janayitum arhati, tasya svayamprakasataya vidikṛiyā karmabhavanupapattib*. This may be rendered as, 'True, *jñāna* is a *manasi kṛiyā* (psychical activity), but it is incapable of producing any result (effect) in *Brahman*, since *Brahman*, being self-revealing, cannot be taken as an object of knowing as an act (*vidikṛiyā*). This rendering is considered by the Bhamati as Sankara's own by previous admission (*iti uktam*). This is similar to *ajanyaphataatva* (non-admissibility of any caused result or change in *Brahman*) of the Pancapadika account. Apparently, both the commentaries are arguing from the standpoint of the final and<sup>142</sup>, which is an eternally accomplished fact, *Brahman*. The knowing act, or the so called '*vidikṛiyā*' is, it is being said, incapable of producing any result in it. But if so what is the imperative necessity, logical or otherwise, to conceive, or admit it, as an act of *kṛiyā* at all? What meaning is there in holding that there is an act which produces no change, no result? Apparently none from Sankara's earlier discussions also it seems clearer that he was out to deny act-hood of *jñāna* in every respect. His later discussions at the end of the passage also lends support to the same view. As for the other points of dissimilarity (*vailakṣṇyāntara*) that the Bhamati adduces from Sankara's exposition, they are *vastusvarūpanirapekṣata*, *codanatantrata* and *puruṣatāmratata* of Vedic *Kṛiyā*, even of the type of *manasi kṛiyā* such as, mental contemplation (*dhyāna*). By implication, then Sankara's passage demonstrates radical difference between *jñāna* and *dhyāna*, both being taken as something mental. It is also to be noted that *vastusvarūpanirapekṣata* of *kṛiyā* or action is admissible only in respect of Vedic action which is *codanatantra* and not *vastutantra*, and not in respect of any and every *kṛiyā* or action. Can anybody sprinkle with fire or swim in the air? So, all the three, *vastusvarūpanirapekṣata*, *codanatantrata* and *puruṣatāmratata* or *puruṣavyapirantrata* have to be taken together to give a correct picture of a Vedic *Kṛiyā*. *Dhyāna* or mental contemplation of the forms cited in the instances in the texts is brought in for comparison with *jñāna* on the express admission that both are psychical in nature (*manasi*)<sup>143</sup>. But where is the admission, on Sankara's own part, that he would not mind regarding *jñāna* both as *manasi* (mental) and *Kṛiyā* (act)? Had that been his real intention, exceptionally guarded as he seems to have been his real intention, exceptionally guarded as he seems to have been always, what did prevent him from phrasing '*manasatvepi kṛiyatvepi*' or simply, '*manasakṛiyatvepi*', that is, 'although a psychical act' in stead of 'although psychical' - *jñāna* and *dhyāna* (on any vedic act of like nature) are radically different? Neither the Bhamati nor the Pancapadika seems to have an answer to this question?

What actually is Sankara's own contention in the context? He seems to have argued that there are only four alternatives to prove anything as a *Kṛiyā*, or a fit ground for the acceptance of it as *Kṛiyā-Kṛiyādvaram*<sup>144</sup>. These are, what it achieves is to be either *utpādya*, or *vikārya*, or *āpya*, or *ramskārya*. No one can show, says, he, any other ground for acceptance of anything as *Kṛiyā* than one of these four. So, if the state of *mokṣa* is found to be not any of these four, it is not proper to admit even an iota or semblance of action or *Kṛiyā* (*gandhamatram*) in the means to the end, - the



only alternative supposition remaining being that the requisite *means* is knowledge and knowledge only<sup>143</sup>. Why then is the insensate craving on the part of the classical commentators that this *jnana*, spoken of, is also to be supposed as a form of *kriya* and that such is the view of Sankara himself?

If Sankara himself has raised the point through *purvapaksa* that, to all appearances, *jnana* also is a form of psychical act (*nanu, jnanam nama manakriya*), it is because our conventional linguistic habit gives it that appearance, because we, conventionally take it in that way – this linguistic habit and our conventional way of taking it in that way are vitiated by confusion, Sankara does not deny psychicality (*manasarva*) of *jnana*. But he hastens to add that although it is psychical, there is a world of difference (*mahadvaitaksanyam*) between *jnana* and *kriya* on the one hand, and between *jnana* which is also psychical and *dhyana* which is both psychical and a *kriya*. A *Kriya*, which, in the context, means a Vedic *Kriya* (and that is the only relevant context), is enjoined (*codyate*) without regard to the nature of things, and which is also dependent on the mental propensities of individuals (*purusacittavyaparadhina*). It is also that which a person may enact, may not enact, or may execute in alternative ways. This is because it is dependent on a person's mode of effort<sup>144</sup>. Not so *jnana* (knowledge), which is the result of the knowing process (*pramana*) and this has to conform to the nature of its objective content as it is – *yathabhuta-vastu-visayam*<sup>145</sup>. The knowing-process, in order to be what it is, has to be only of one form – alternative ways of fulfilment are all excluded here from the very nature of the case<sup>146</sup>. The knowing process is not a free act, not any act at all. The resultant knowledge is a mental state, revealing or reflecting the object as it is *tadvatitaprakaraka*. What ambiguity is there in this presentation of the case by Sankara, – this rendering being faithful and almost literal? Instances are cited to make the distinction crystal clear. Contemplating a male or a female as fire, is a psychical act of the vedic ritual. Taking the fire of common knowledge (*prasiddha*) as fire is a psychical state of knowledge but no psychical act or *Kriya*. The warrant for the acceptance of the former as a mode of properly executed ritualistic act emanates from the vedic injunction alone – *Kevalacodanajanyatvat*. The guarantee for validity or truth of the latter is to be met in the nature of the thing as it is, it is *Vastutantra*. Such is the case in perceptual knowledge of objects. In respect of all other *pramanas* or sources of knowledge insofar as their object-matter is concerned, the very same rule obtains<sup>147</sup>. Such being the case, the knowledge (*jnana* in respect of the nature of Brahman and atman, insofar as that object-matter is (*yathabhuta brahmatvavisayam*), cannot be a mode of subjective act of contemplation (*idhyana*, a ritualistic act, guided by a vedic injunction (*codanatantra*). It is to be a state of knowledge, conforming to the nature of an object-matter. In its regard, therefore, injunctive modes of expression with verbal forms of 'lin', even if found at some places in the vedic texts, have no relevance, firstly, because the identity of Brahman and the Self is an accomplished fact and not merely a ritualistic mode of 'form' of contemplation, and cannot, therefore, be anything enjoinable by a directive (*anijyayavistayatvat*), and secondly, because the end (*phala*) in this case being realisation of what really is there, an eternally existential state of affair, is neither electable nor rejectable choice – *ahayan upadeyavastuvistayatvat*<sup>148</sup>.

It should be noted that what Sankara actually intended to say and whether what he intended is as justifiable or not, are two separate issues. There can be no doubt that he intended to deny *Kriyatva* or *idhisesatva* of *jnana* absolutely. His entire exposition in connection with the fourth *sutra*, in which he has attempted to make out a case of absolute distinction between the later part of the vedic texts and the earlier part, as regards their intention and import (*codanapravrttibheda*), and also as regards the object-matter of inquiry and end (*phala-jijnasyabheda*), would be an exercise in futility and irrelevance otherwise. He had no business to examine the Mimamsaka contention of *Kriyarthata* and *bhavyaparata* of the entire *vedas* with so much penetration and rigour, if he could accommodate

the view that the later *vedas*, *upanisads*, also prescribe an *action-oriented* something, – a knowledge which is a form of *Kriya* or devotional act of contemplation, as the means to some select end. But he had been absolutely rigid and unaccommodating on that issue. What could be the reason for this vehemence, – this unfaltering and uncompromising insistence that in the type of end that the *vedanta* conceives as its goal there could be absolutely no relevance even for any semblance of *Kriya*?<sup>131</sup>

The reason is – the Vedantic goal is *moksa* which symbolises freedom from all appetites and inclinations, – an absolute end or an end in itself, which does not become the means to some other further end such as *dharma* is. That the Vedantic goal is of such nature follows from the type of instruction that the *vedanta* gives as to *what is really there*, the state of affair which is *truly* there, quite apart from what we all, ordinarily and conventionally, take this state to be. The Vedanta it is that throws light upon what things simply *appear to be*, and what, again these appearances, *in their true shape and substance, are*. It is the Vedanta, again, which shows *two levels* of experiencing and understanding things – as persisting in the way of *avidya* (ignorance) and as transcending that level in *vidya* (right knowledge). The Vedanta, then, instructs a metaphysics, that is, a philosophical doctrine of what *only appears to be* and what *really is there*. Does it not say anything by way of advising us *to do*? Yet, it does. But this is not asking to do *an act* or a duty, in any enjoined and specific way, the attainment of a *merit* (*dharma*) which ensures some kind of material advancement (*abhudaya*) in time to come. It does not advise by way of *enjoining what kind of act is to be done*. What it advises to do is shifting and reversing the direction of the mind, and transcending *avidya*-level of existence and experience by the *vidya* – view of things and existence. Is this an advice for doing any form of act or enjoined duty? No, it cannot be so. It is an advice for *knowing* what is really the case, although it appears otherwise. Supplanting ignorance by knowledge, or getting rid of ignorance, is no mode of activity, – any expression of exertion or effort. When by a nearer approach, the snake-appearance makes room for rope-presentation, what kind of personal effort is involved there in the disappearance of the snake-form and manifestation of the rope *as the thing*? Evidently none. What oddity is, then, involved in Sankara's observation that the *apparently* injunctive expressions, such as, 'know the self', 'the self is to be heard, ratio-linated, and the mind is to be absolutely set in the way of what is to be its nature', – are not *vidhi-vakya*s such that 'the male and the female are to be contemplated as fire', 'the deity to which the oblation is to be offered is first to be contemplated in the advised way'? What oddity is these so called '*vidhis*', in the classical works on Sankara Vedanta, as to whether these are *apurvavidhis* or *niyama-vidhis* or *parisankhya vidhis* only illustrate how the traditionalists' mind has remained bogged down in its habitual pit<sup>132</sup>. That is not Sankara's way of understanding such group of sentences. So, he says that the purpose of such sentences, involving instruction or advice, is to change the direction of the mind from its natural drift towards outer objects<sup>133</sup>, from its course of progressive self-losing. Is not this advice for changing the natural drift of the mind an advice for doing an act? Yes, it may be taken as a negative act in the form of changing the attitude. It is like fixing a telescope from one direction to another. Sankara has not denied that. But he will ask – *What is the relevance of all this in the issue under dispute*? That issue is – if the the *prama na-jnana* of Brahman, which is to terminate in *brahmavagati*, – to *brahma-bhava* which is *moksa*, any form of activity either of the *vedic* form or of any other<sup>134</sup>?

The issue has been left considerably blurred and confused by the classical interpreters and has not been clarified by any of them. Let us see what would be the difference in the presentation of the *vedanta* thesis, if *Kriyapurata* of *brahman-jnana*, or even *samuccayata* of *jnana* with *Kriya* in the means of release be admitted. In the first case the *vedanta-vakya*s will have to be understood as introducing and enjoining, a new mode of ritual such as, contemplating the individual self *as if it is*

*Brahman* itself, or contemplating *Brahman* by taking the individual self as its symbol. In either case, *Brahman* is to become a mental representation of a deity, contemplated in the way the *śruti* texts have advised it to be contemplated, just as, Indra, Varuna, Visvadeva etc are contemplated. It is to be looked upon as a 'Conceptual form' or symbol of ritualistic contemplation, and no existential reality, as all the Vedānta schools have taken it to be. Such modes of contemplation would be of the type of *Sāmpat* form or *adhyāsa* form of *upāsana*. This will not be any knowledge, no *pramāṇa-jñāna*, but only a mental way of regarding one thing in the form of another. What might accrue from such modes of worship would have to be taken as a form of 'merit' whatever might be its end – *abhyudaya* or *mokṣa*, believed as possible on the strength of *vedic* injunction. This would be the situation if knowledge is taken to be the same as a meditative act (*dhyāna* or *cintana*). This will be no *pramāṇa-jñāna* but only a *codanatantra kṛiyā*. Where knowledge and actions are taken as complementaries, or as co-related means, *jñāna* is to come first followed by *Kṛiyā* or *Upāsana*. The *Vedānta-vākyas* will be understood as, first informing about an existential reality which is *Brahman*, and also an *ātman* on its own account, – a transcendental object, which is also a subject in itself, even a person in its own way. The descriptive and the informative part of the *vedic* teaching will be, however, only introductory. The act-part or the part enjoining worship or meditation is to be the main part. The worship or meditation is not to be done in the way the earlier part of the *vedas* enjoin. The worship will be of an *existential reality*, an Absolute looked upon as the supreme object of meditation and prayer. It is to be looked upon as the God of a certain religious creed, all beneficent, omnipotent and omniscient Being on whom everything and being is dependent in some way. The distinction and difference of the empirical individual from that absolute presence symbolized in the acceptance of it as *Brahman* will also have to be retained under one device or another. Three important facts of this view which stand apposed to the Advaita view of Sankara's meaning are (a) regarding the Absolute reality, *Brahman* in the *objective* way, an object of knowledge, an object of Veneration and worship, an object of contemplation (*dhyāna*), (b) there remaining always a distinction or difference between a larger self and a finite self, a notion which is very much remote from Sankara's conception of *atmaikatva* or *brahmatmakata*<sup>13</sup> (c) keeping the apparently injunctive sentences in the fore-front in spite of the fact that they are very much limited in number, and pushing the reparative and descriptive sentences to background. The domination idea is that *Brahman*, as an existential reality, is introduced in all its characterisation so as to fulfil the purpose of meditation, worship and prayer, since release from bondage is dependent on divine grace, insofar as the state of bondage is real. Due to the individual's own folly and misdeeds. Here, then, ignorance or *avidyā* is a joint-product of mis-knowledge and misdeeds, liberation is also the joint-product of right knowledge and righteous actions.

What is, then Sankara's insistence by way of contrast? It is, in the first place, that the reportive and the descriptive sentences *as they are*, not only figure in the fore-front and occupy the pivotal place, but also that they are to determine in what way the apparently injunctive sentences are to be interpreted in order to fit in to context and to render a coherent meaning of all the Vedānta texts possible. The reportive and descriptive sentences are all informative about an existential reality which is not only all-encompassing, that is, *Brahman*, but which is also to be understood as 'not-an-object' literally, being the one self of all, and, therefore, an Absolute subject, the *Atman* the *sastrapramāṇa*, no doubt, presents it as its object-matter (*viśaya*). But the same authority also advises that the object-matter, communicated by it is one which is to be conceived as a *non-object*, (*avisaya*) since it is also the true and absolute self of the conceiver. Such being the case, the presentation of the Vedāntic reality in the dualistic mode of knower and Known. Subject and object has to be taken a circumstantial and relative, and not absolute or final. It will have to be counted as a *necessary* mode of distortion,

since the reality that the Vedanta means cannot be described, *as it is in itself*, in the forms and idiom of conventional speech. It can also be seen that the Vedanta texts, which speak of it as the *unspeakable*, as *other than* both the knowable and the unknowable, *other than*, the given (*huta*) and the ungiven yet to be (*bhavya*), as unconceived by thou who claim to have conceived it, and conceived by those who feel it as inconceivable<sup>15</sup>, represent the *acme* of the Vedantic thought. The epigrams used are not simple rhetories. They are all necessitated by the very mode of comprehension<sup>16</sup>,— In them lies implicit a necessary compulsion of logical thought. Such is the stand point of the Advaita metaphysics. So, Sankara felt that the injunctive sentences, regarded by themselves alone, and apart from the total context of the Advaita metaphysics, would be vitiated by dualism of the object contemplated and the subject contemplating it. The result would be that the mode of contemplation or of knowledge advised in them would be indistinguishable from the ritualistic forms of the three kinds of *upasana*, such as, *sampat*, *adhyasa* or *pratika* and *samvarga*<sup>17</sup>. And this would on the one hand, militate against the *mahavakyas*, such as, 'That thou art', 'I am Brahman' 'This Atman is Brahman' etc and on the other hand, render statements like 'knowing Brahman one becomes Brahman itself' and 'all knots of the heart get loosened, all doubts are dispelled, all actions get completely aspect up in the realisation of the supreme which is the highest and lowest' —unmeaning and incoherent<sup>18</sup>. And the *srutis* themselves declare the dualistic standpoint as vitiated by ignorance and advise its transcendence and supplantation in absolute knowledge. Therefore, there can be no other way that to taking the so called *vidhi*vakyas and *bhidhicchaya vacanas* in the context of the vedanta, — their express purpose being changing the direction of the mind from object-ward to self-ward, from objective attitude to the subjective and the self-knowing attitude.

In the second place, Sankara has felt sure that absolute irrelevance of the question if *Jnana* is also a form of *Kriya* or action follows from a *means of knowledge*. A *pramana*, or means of knowledge, becomes what it is by conforming to the nature of its objective content as it is in itself, by reflecting the objective content as *it is in its own nature* — the being *yathabhuta-vastuvisayam*<sup>19</sup>. A *pramana*, is thus object-determined (*vastutantra*), and its nature is to be uniform always. It admits of no alternation, it is not dependent on any individuals will or free choice of action; it cannot also be made or unmade by any *vedic* injunction. What kind of action or *kriya*, can, then, it be? The original controversy was about *sastrapramanakata* or *Brahman*. It was argued that Brahman cannot be an object-matter (*visaya*) of *sastrapramana* and established by that means because *Brahman*, as the Vedanta claims, is not a *bhavya-visaya* to be brought into existence by certain modes of enjoined actions (*Kriya*). Is there any logical point, Sankara asks, in such argument? Sankara does not dispute that the early *vedic* texts are a *pramana* of *dharma*, and because this *dharma* is a *bhavya-visaya*, they are also a *pramana* in respect of the actions or *kriyas* enjoined for attainment (or materialisation) of *dharma*. But whether the *vedic* statements are a *pramana* in respect of this or that object-matter follows from the nature—the intension and import — of the *vedic* statements themselves. It can not be argued *pramana* in such-and-such. The intentionality or applicability of *vedic* sentences are not determinable by inference<sup>20</sup>. What, again, has *bhavyarthaka* or *Kriyarthaka* to do with the *Sastrapramana* as a *pramana*? The *Sastrapramana* like any other *pramana* becomes a *pramana* by being *yathabhuta-vastu-visayam*. Where the *Vastu-visaya* is *bhavya* and *Kriya-upadya*, it becomes a *pramana* by reflectively positing or *proposing* such a content. Where the object-matter is *bhutatavastu*, an existential content, the *sastrapramana* becomes a *pramana* by reflecting the nature of such a content. This consideration has got nothing to do with *apauruṣeya*, *svataṭatva* or *Kriya*? Acceptance of the latter alternative will render the Janamini *Vacana* '*tasya jnanam upadesah*' meaningless and non-sensical. Knowledge of an enjoined *Kriya* for the attainment of *dharma* can neither be a *Kriya* nor a *dharma* but an instructed knowledge (*jnana*). What has this knowledge to

do with a *Kriya* except that this knowledge is an information about the *Kriya*? Here also there is an objective determination (*yathabhuta-vastu-visayatā*, although the object-matter here is a *bhavya Kriya* accomplishing a *bhavya dharma*. Are *vedic* statements, simply because they are *svataṣṭva*, contentless (*Nirvisaya*)? The object-matter of a *pramana* is integral to it, so there is nothing to militate against non-dependence (*napeksata*)? The object-matter of a *pramana* is integral to it, so there is nothing to militate against non-dependence (*anapeksata*) of a *vedic Vacana* for that reason. It stands to reason, therefore, that even if *dharma* is 'codana. Lakṣanarthah' (or the nature of an enjoined action), the knowledge (*jñāna*) of *dharma* is not an enjoined action, although it is about it, and in that sense, conforms to it or reveals it. It is no point of argument that the knowledge of a true is the true itself because it has to conform to it as *pramāṇa-jñāna*, or that knowledge of *Brahman* is *Brahman* itself because as a *Pramāṇa-jñāna* it is to reflect that content or conform to its nature. Padmapada has definitely erred by misreading Sankara's & *Yathabhuta-vastu-visayam* as '*bhuta-vastu-visayam*', and there after flogging upon Sankara the misconstruction that the *vastu* of knowledge necessarily goes ahead of knowledge (*jñāna prageva svarupe vyavasthitam*)<sup>142</sup>. His demonstration of pre-existence of the content (*vastu*) of knowledge in every case of knowledge is incomplete. He talks of pre-existence of *lingua*, etc., in case of inference etc without specifying the 'etcetera'-s in case of all the other *pramanas*. It will be an interesting point to ask him if there is anything like *jñāna* of *dharma*, a *sastrapramana* or *pramāṇa-jñāna* about *dharma*? If so, how is this defined? A *pramana* or *pramāṇa-jñāna* has always to conform to the nature of its object-matter. Says Sankara<sup>143</sup>. Nothing can be a *pramana*, if it be a free act and not a regulated and content-determined process. Is every process an act or *Kriya* of somekind? When a seed germinates and grows up as a tree, is any act involved? Our linguistic habit may express every process as *Kriya* or act, but that does not make it an act. And even supposing that it does so, does so, how is the resultant fact, knowledge, as the culminating product of that process, concerned with it? It can be seen that even the early *vedic* texts, in their nature as a *pramana*, are not free and do not admit of alternations as statements about *dharma* or *Kriyas*. The alternation obtains in the types of modes of *Kriyas* advised. But the advice itself, the *vedic* sentences as *pramana*, holds the prescription of all the several alternative modes of action as one whole. Sankara, as is clear from his exposition, has not contrasted the nature of *sastrapramana* in the context of the earlier part of the *vedas* with the nature of *sastrapramana* in the later parts in so far as each of them is regarded as *pramana*. A long drawn controversy had reigned all along on their subject-matter and the nature of the end. He has contrasted *jñāna* with *Kriya* to make out a case for the later part of the *vedas* as against the earlier part. As *pramanas*, both the parts aim at giving knowledge. But while the earlier part gives knowledge of what actions are to be done, that is, gives knowledge of 'enjoined actions', the latter part gives knowledge as to what is to be the right knowledge of reality. The latter is a *pramana*, in being the means of *Brahma-vijnana*, that is, of knowledge of reality as *Brahman*. It aims at ushering that knowledge (*avabodhayati kevalam*)<sup>144</sup> what is this knowledge of reality, such as, *Brahman*? To be a *pramāṇajanya jñāna* of that reality, this *jñāna*, as the culminating result of the knowing-process, is to be in accordance with it. But what is the nature of reality in this case? It is an 'object-matter' (*visaya*) which has to be taken as incapable of being taken as an object given 'there' as a 'this' (*Idam*) in distinction from the knowing subject. It is an all-comprehensive existence, which, insofar as it comprehends also the knowing subject, and is the one self-identity of all, has been posed by the *śruti*s them-selves as '*avisaya*' the all-knowing subject, the indwelling self of all (*antarvamin*) and the universal witness (*sakṣi*). It is the reality of such a description which is to be the terminus,—the goal of the knowing-process functioning as the *pramana*. And to be the *pramana* in the way defined by Sankara, that is, as *Yathabhuta-vastu-visayam*, it has to coalesce with it. And, again, where the nature of reality is such



that it is not representable in an objective mode at all, – is not *picturable*, does not follow that the configuring or the configuration in the objective mode, which the Advaita regards as *Vrtti-actitanya*, should *liquidate* itself for final adjustment in the nature of such a reality? What scope is, then, left for any *Kriya*, or even for a *manasi vrtti* (psychic mode) in the end-knowledge which is to be the goal as *moksa*? So, Sankara seems to be quite justified in holding that both in the *vedantic* 'end' which is *moksa* and in the *means* to that end, such as, *pramana-jnana*, *Kriya* or action of any form has absolutely no relevance. This is another reason for accepting the apparently injunctive sentences in the Upanisads as *buddhicchaya-vacanas* and not as *vidhi-vacanas*. Where the reality is not cognisable objectively as an *Idam* 'a given, 'This' in front, where the goal or end by its very nature, as per the description of the *sruti*-texts themselves<sup>165</sup> is repelled to any act of meditation, (*dhyana*), worship and contemplation (*cintana*), what purpose can the so called *vidhi-vakyas* serve and by doing so, become relevant in the context, except by advising a change in the direction of the mind from outer things inward<sup>166</sup>?

In the third place, the utter absurdity of the claim of *Kriyarupata* of *jnana*, *Vidhisasata* of Brahman, and lastly, *Kriyar* that of the later vedic texts follow from the intrinsic *ananyasesata* (not being integral to the ritualistic part of the Vedas<sup>167</sup> of Brahman. This its *ananyasesata* coupled with its absolute indisputability and unrejectability insofar as it is taken as the self (*atman*) is a proof of its realisability in a non-objective way in pure knowledge of absolute self-identity. This also becomes a direct reputation of the Mimamsa claim that there is no part of the *vedas*, which is concerned with an existential reality simply<sup>168</sup>.

Although no 'object' of knowledge, not being knowable in the objective mode, Brahman as the self can neither be supposed to be non-existing, nor, again, can it be supposed to be unprovable or incapable of being known and established in any way<sup>169</sup>. This argument of Sankara throws light upon an interesting logical point. While local absence or non-existence of a thing or entity, which is already known to exist somewhere, can be known in some way, the absolutely non-existing, like a 'square-circle' or a 'sky-flower' may be a mere mode of speech, or a mere artful construction of the mind, but is incapable of being realised in knowledge either as an existential fact or as a possibility. The existence of *Brahman* as *Atman* follows from its *undeniability* in knowledge of all facts known objectively, although *Brahma* is not known nor ever knowable in the objective mode as out there in space. The reason is . *Brahman* is described as the self (*Atman*) of all. The *Atman* is the *focal point of self-identity* of plural appearances secured through successive rejection, rather through a successive process of negation of all 'this'–, of all that can be represented as ('*Idam*' (given 'this')). This is illustrated in the *process of with-drawal* articulated as 'not this', 'not this' – '*neti*' '*neti*', in order to secure the focal point, – the point of absolute self-identity even of the individual's self amidst plural psychic and bodily manifestations. It is, indeed, a real wonder that the seer of the *upanisads* could express that subtle logical point so simply and so unostentatiously in the '*Sa esa neti netyatme*'<sup>170</sup>. It is also remarkable that this subtle logical point so cryptically expressed in the statements of the Upanisads is brought out clearly by Sankara and made into the *final* and the *most decisive point* of argument in support of his claim that the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* the *upanisads* is so very singular and self-contained that it cannot be coerced to fall in line with the early *vedic* doctrine of ritualistic practices.

The doctrine of *Brahman* is *svaprakaranastha*— that is, articulated in the part of the *vedic* teaching which is specially about it<sup>171</sup>. And, as articulated there, *Brahman*, referred as *Atman* is *ananyasesa* – incapable of being taken as integral to anything outside of itself and outside of that comprehensibility which is peculiar to its nature. But who so? The reason is *Brahman* is accepted



as the *atman*, the self, the essential and absolute identity the ground of 'being-there-ness', of being revealed and manifested of whatever is positable as 'objects', as 'being – there'. This very description of Brahman as *atman* serves three things. First, it shows that it can be cognitively secured only through a process of gradual withdrawal from all that is outwardly manifest and is representable as a given 'this', through a series of negation of outer forms and appearances. this process of negation shows its up an *avisaya* (unobjective) and *Kutastha* (immutable cone). Second, it shows it up both as the absolute foundation of all plural manifestation, —their absolute ground, and also as, the self-shining light (*svaprakasa*) underlying and lightening up all the depend antly revealed, technically, the entire realm of objectivities. Third, it proves its absolute *undeniability*, in negatability, although not knowable in the objective attitude and not expressible in the idiom of conventional language which *saya* about objectively given facts. This is so because it is *logically* presupposed by everything that *appears* in the objective mode, — is spoken of, deliberated and even made into the subject-matter of all *practical* transactions. Even the *vedic* actions, involving an agent, his activity, the materials of his employment, the spiritual merit, the goal, he looks for — all presuppose and stand upon this foundational core, Brahman as *Atman*. Its rejectability, were it possible, would logically entail rejectability, nay, prior rejection of all and everything, and so also the rejectability of the person who rejects. This is the deep significance of two very short sentences of Sankara — '*atmanasca pratyakhyatum asakyatvat. Ya eva nirakarta, tasyaiva atmatvat*'<sup>17</sup> So, Sankara, in course of his analysis, proves that Brahman as the *ananyasaya* (un-integral to the early *vedic* texts about actions) and as the *svaprakaranastha* (that which is discussed only in the section of the *vedic* teachings which speak of it) can not be taken as non-existing. — as a figment of imagination, nor can it be sensibly said that it cannot be known in any way and cannot, therefore, be proved or established as an existential reality, simply because it cannot be known in the objective attitude as an object out there, as an '*idam*'

To clarify *this* meaning of the self, to put otherwise, what exactly should be meant by the description of something as being the 'Self' (*atma*) Sankara brings in contrast the Pravakar view of the Self. (*atma*) Sankara brings in contrast the Pravakar view of the Self. As that which is the content (*visaya*) of the consciousness as 'I'. The self which is knowable in term of 'I – consciousness' is not the self (*atma*) that the *upanisads* speak of — argues Sankara. The Self, which is *atampratyayavedya* (known in term of I– consciousness), is a matter of common experience of an immediate kind. It may be recalled that towards the end of his commentary on the first *sutra*, Sankara had once raised the point as to what we are to understand by the self of which we all seem to be aware in an immediate way and the existence of which cannot be denied without self contradiction. In that context, he pointed out that although everybody speaks about the self and admits it as an indisputable content, there is very wide controversy as to its true and specific nature'<sup>18</sup> Quite cursorily he then hinted at the *upanisadic* view of Self as the Brahman itself *atma ca Brahma*. In the context of the fourth *sutra*, he presents the same fact in the reverse order- '*Brahman* is (soyam *atma*) *Atman*' to which the multiple appearances refer as their principle of unity in the sense of absolute identity to justify his previous statement why is the *atman* to be the same as Brahman *Atma ca Brahma*'. '*Sa esa neti netyatma*' — what is the meaning? Evidently, the meaning is that Brahman is the *Atman*, the one *realisable* fact of absolute self-identity but this its realisation is that can only be secured by a process of withdrawal from the cosmic plurality of varied appearances, — things or objects towards which the mind habitually tends. Is this not, both in sense and substance, the very same as saying that there may be *vidicchaya vacanas* in the texts, advising, radical change in the direction of the mind from outward to self-ward, to assist the cognitive process (i.e. *pramanajñana*) in the full realisation of its nature as

*vathabhutavastuvistayam* by terminating in *brahmavatatati* which is self-realisation? Has not Sankara literally rendered the '*neti netyatma*' of the Brahadaranyaka in his version of *bhidhicchaya vacana*?

What, can be regarded as the '*Atma*'? Sankara was well-aware that '*Atma*' has been conceived in a wide diversity of ways. Commentary on the first *sutra*. He had there roughly indicated also the Vedanta view<sup>174</sup>. What was wanting there is the textual as also the logical explanation of the view which was, so to say, 'floated' there. That explanation comes here at the end of the commentary on the fourth *sutra*. That is *atma* (Self) which is the foundational principle of all multiple appearances, to which the multiple of all multiple appearances, to which the multiple appearances refer as their principle of unity in the sense of absolute identity but which, as itself is, contained in none of them in so far as it is securable only by a process of negation (*neti neti*) of all presentations, all the appearances. It is to be a self-contained (*ananyasesa*) principle, which is self-shining in the sense of being self-dependent and self-established, and which, again, is the principle of manifestation (*avabhasaka*) of all its plural appearances,<sup>175</sup> which all shine by its light and by so doing represent phenomenally the *svarupa* of their foundational principle as 'characters', that is, as adjectival properties, derivatively belonging to them. This self or *atma* is the one to which the *upanisads* alone furnish the clue. So, in the academic parlance, it is to be called '*Upanisad atma*', that is, the '*atma*' to which the *upanisads* alone hold the key. The so called self which is the content of '*I-consciousness*' and is apprehended as an object of that consciousness is the Ego, a mode of *antahkarana*, while the real self is to be the principle of that manifests it, shows it up or reveals it. The '*ego*', the object of '*I-consciousness*' cannot be supposed to be the principle of revelation of that consciousness, any more than the '*pot*', the object of '*pot-consciousness*' can be supposed to be the principle of revelation of the consciousness or cognition of pot. That principle of revelation of '*I-consciousness*' is, therefore, a transcendental principle which by revealing it becomes its transcendental witness. That is the real Self, the self in the true sense of the term which is the witness (*saksi*)<sup>176</sup>, of all presentations including the self realised as '*I*', this '*I*' being only a mode of *antahkarana* such as, the '*ego*'. Neither the injunctive part of the Vedas (*vidhikanda*) nor, again, any logical system of philosophy, has any glimpse of the real self or *Atman* which is one-eternal and immutable, uniform, the foundational principle of all things and beings, their very self in being their principle of revelation, – the witness<sup>177</sup>. This self or *atman*, being the transcendental witness and therefore, the logical presupposition of all agentship and enjoyership, as also of all agent-selves and enjoyer-selves, cogitated as the '*I*' is beyond them all. Being thus presupposed as their principle of revelation and sustenance and at the same time absolutely unknown to the Vedic disciplines on Karma, as also to the conventional mode of logical thinking. This self can neither be denied by any of them nor can it be tended as being integral to the injunctive pronouncements of the early vedic texts. Again, in so fares it is the self (*atma*) of everything that is there, their very foundational principle, it can neither be an object of choice nor again, an object of repugnance<sup>178</sup>. This is *Brahman*, the all-encompassing, and again, as the *atman*, the Self, it is the final limit of all negations and so the last and the absolute repose of all<sup>179</sup>. And it is this that the *upanisads* speak of. The Mīmāṃsa claim that neither there is, nor can there be any part of the revealed Vedic literature which discusses about a purely existential reality. Therefore, makes no sense whatsoever. This existential reality, the foundation of all, which reveals all manifest pluralities and being a *non-object* (*avisaya*) is not dependent on anything else for revelation is the *Atman*, spoken of in the *Upanisads* and their transcendental principle, as itself, then, is of the nature of the eternally pure, enlightened and free *nityasuddhabhaddhamuktatvabhava*.

The above represents the final settlement of the controversy entered upon in Badarayana's fourth *sutra*: how far, and in what way, the metaphysical doctrine of *Brahman* as the self may be understood

as *śruti* - based. *sastrapramanaka*. The discussion that follows how is calculated to present the Vedānta doctrine in a relation of non-opposition to the other *śruti* -based doctrines, such as, the doctrine of *dharma* and Vedic *Kriya* (ritual). This can, technically, be called avoidance of conflict with the *śrutis* of any other order of a different nature<sup>120</sup> This shows that unlike the Mimamsa, the Advaita of Sankara does not maintain an extreme and exclusive posture. This, Sankara says that the observation made by Sabaraswami to the effect that the Vedic sentences expressly advise as to the kind of actions (*Karma*) one ought to do, is not pointless or unworthy of note. All that was necessary to bear in mind is that the observation was really intended to cover the *vedic* sentences about *dharma*, and these are certainly prescriptive or prohibitive<sup>121</sup> Again, the Jaimini *sūtra* which states that the Vedas are to be understood as having actions for their one purpose and that the expressions not abiding by that rule, become all useless— is not to be interpreted in any absolute sense or meaning. It could not have been the intention of the author of the *sūtra* to stretch it beyond all reasonable limits, inviting incongruities, even contradictions. It seems quite reasonable to suppose that Jaimini, when formulating this *sūtra*, had taken the word '*amāya*' in the narrow sense to mean the *vedic* texts in the *Karmakanda* only, since he limited himself to framing rules of interpretation of that part of the texts only, and did not enter upon interpretation of the later *vedic* texts still. This task of interpretation of the later *vedas*, the *upanishads*, was left to be done by Badarayana. Had not the difference in the doctrinal elements of the two parts of the *vedas* been a matter of general acceptance at that time, Badarayana would have surely worded his first and the opening *sūtra* as '*Athato paristatadharmaajijnasa*' (now, therefore, begins the inquiry into the residual facets of *dharma*) and this could fully accord with the procedure facets of *dharma*) and this could fully accord with the procedure adopted by Jaimini himself, when, to indicate internal division within the self-same discipline, he prefaced a later part of the discourse as '*Athato Krativarthapurusa-jayorajijnasa*'<sup>122</sup> It is evident therefore, that the Jaimini *sūtra* cited here was not intended to cover the later *vedic* texts the *upanishads*, and to guide the rules of interpretation of these texts also.

It can also be seen that an extremist rendering of the aforesaid Jaimini *sūtra*, such as has been done by the Prabhakar school to suggest that the Vedic words and sentences, all, mean actions (*Kriya*) to be done, and that those that do not mean actions are all together useless, —is fraught with insuperable difficulties. Even in the *karmakanda* of the Vedas there are words and expressions which mean or describe existential entities or situations. It will be ridiculous to hold that such words and expressions also mean actions, or that there are no instructions in respect of existential matters or realities in the *vedas* at all. The reason is that both Jaimini and Sabaraswami seem to have admitted expressly the presence of words and expressions meaning the existential— past and present, when they prescribed taking of such existential contents as parts or ingredients of the ritualistic actions enjoined. Thus, Jaimini says '*tadbhutanam Kriyarthena samamnyah*' Meaning that the existential matters are to be correlated or connected with the Vedic *Kriya* for fulfilment of the purpose of that *Kriya*. Sabaraswami also says '*codanahi bhutam bhavantom*' meaning that existential matters, past and present, are also admissible in *vedic* injunctions if contributory to the actions to be done. Apparently, the above statements of both Jaimini and Sabara would be incoherent and irrelevant if within the Vedic injunction for *Karma* or *Kriya* nothing that is existential (*bhuta*) could have any relevance or use, if *vedic* expressions, all and sundry, would have to be taken as meaning *Karma* or *Kriya* only. It cannot also be argued that existential matters in being taken as integral parts of a *vedic Kriya* and give up their original character as existential objects. Do the existential words also turn into verb-words in being related to expressions meaning actions? The Prayakara theory of meaning, the *anvitabhidhanavada*, which holds that the meanings of words and expressions are

determined by their use in an action-situation so much so that a verb-word, meaning an action, forms the very nucleus around which all other words are to be necessarily correlated in order to have a meaning, does not seem to accord with the views of the elders, such as, Jaimini and Sabara. The expression '*Kriyarthatvat*' in the *aiminisutra* seems to have been intended to suggest, not that the *vedic* words and expressions are all to 'mean' actions and nothing else, but that the *purpose* of the *vedic* texts in the *Karmakanda* is to enjoin some ritualistic action in pursuit of *dharma* this, then, does not warrant the supposition that in the *vedas* as a whole, or even in the *Karmakanda* there can be no words or expressions denoting or meaning the purely existential, and wherever words or expressions of the existential type are met, they are either to be coerced into meaning 'actions' of some kind or to be so construed in their relationship with the action-word of the statement, that they would have only an adjectival role, and would serve to *specify* the ritualistic action to be done. So, Sankara has argued, no existential (*bhuta*) thing or content, in being brought into relation within, ever becomes a *Kriya* (action)<sup>101</sup>. The *Bhamati*, by way of elaboration, explains that an existential matter in being advised in connection with a Vedic *Kriya* does not become non-existential, it remains the very same existential matter but one conducive or helpful to the performance of the *Kriya*<sup>102</sup>. Here, Sankara, evidently favours the Bhatta theory of meaning, the *abhihitanyavayavada*, according to which, it is the meanings of the words themselves which determine what meaning their combined use in a sentence is to have, (*abhihitanyam eva anvaya*) This is not the place to enter into an elaborate discussion on the issue. Suffice it to point out that Sankara in this portion of his commentary is seeking to take away the edge from the *Mimamsa* opposition to the *vedic* doctrine of existential reality which cannot have any connection whatsoever with any kind of *Karma* or *Kriya* by showing that a reasonable and logical interpretation of the views advocated by the elders of that school, Jaimini and Sabara, do not pose any real conflict with the *Advaita* doctrine.

How a *vedic* statement is to be interpreted depends as much on the nature of the words or expressions that appear in the sentence as on the admissible connection or combination of them as a significant whole. It cannot be doubted that existential expressions which mean existential facts or contents have been used in *vedic* sentences which purport to enjoin certain modes of ritualistic actions using and utilising existential matters as helpful or components in such actions. These existential matters, in themselves, do not signify any motivation for or inducement towards any action. Nor do they, as themselves, mean an abstention from or repugnance to any action. So, Sankara, raises the point if, besides advising a move towards action (*pravrtti*) or a counter-move against (*nirvrtti*) the *Vedas* can advise also use or utilisation of existential matters for the benefit of an action to be done in pursuit of *dharma*, what earthly reason there can be that the *vedas*, in the *jnanakanda* cannot advise an existential reality which is immutable and eternal for an all together different purpose, a purpose other than attainment of *Dharma* which is *bhavya*<sup>103</sup>? Does not the *Mimamsa* take *nirvrtti* (abstention or non-involvement) for as good a purpose (*prayojana*) as is *pravrtti* -move for action) even in the injunctive part of the *vedic* teachings? What oddity can there be in the view that since 'knowledge' of the true nature of the self as one with the immutable absolute reality dispels the ignorance which is the root-cause of bondage and suffering, therefore, the *vedas* regard the advice for that knowledge of the eternally existential reality or fact as purposeful as is their other advice for ritualistic action in pursuit of *dharma*? The advice for knowledge of the true self, which is an *existential reality* but unknown without the aid of *vedic* statements and the advice for existential matters, which the *vedas* prescribe as means to the Vedic *Kriya*, stand on a par, since both are purposeful and both serve realisation of ends<sup>104</sup>. It is not also a fact that it is the essential characteristic of the *vedic* teaching to advise engagement in action or *Kriya* always. What kind of action do the

*vedas* advise in all its prohibitory mandates, such as, 'a Brahmin is not to be killed' ? This cannot be understood as an advice for doing an act, nor is this an advice for anything which helps and action or serves as a means thereof<sup>17</sup>. If an injunction like this is to be considered useless, or by the Pravakara protestation as 'meaningless', since here there is not advice for performance of an act, then all prohibitory injunctions, will have to be regarded as useless or meaningless. The *vedic*-injunctions have conventionally been distinguished into two types-prescriptive, that is, *vidhyarthaka* asking people to do an act, and prohibitive, that is *nisedharthaka*—advising abstention from certain acts. To argue that even an injunction like 'a Brahmin ought not to be killed', in stead of advising an attitude of withdrawal or shrinking away from a certain course of action which is considered sinful and damnatory, covertly advises certain *positive* modes of behaviour other than 'killing', such as, 'resolving in the non-doing of acts which may prove damnatory, will serve no useful purpose. Such ingenious interpretation will, at the first instance, obliterate the clear distinction between *vidhi-vakya* and *nisedhavakya* which are commonly admitted to be radically different<sup>18</sup>. In the second place, this will entail violation of the rule guiding the use of the negative particle 'not (*nan*)' without any assignable logical reason. The negative particle 'not (*nan*)', when used alongwith the verb-word of a sentence, signifies negation or denial of the act implied by the verb-word of the sentence. The case of *paryudasa* (indirect affirmation) is all together different from that of *prasaṅgapratishedha*, which latter means negation or denial of the 'normally implied act or function. In the injunction 'a Brahmin ought not to be killed', there is no advice for doing an act, what is advised is abstention (*audasīnya*) from a mode of action, such as, killing, towards which there is a normal tendency of persons in anger or hatred. Except in cases, Sankara points out, where the denial is enforced as a *prescriptive* rule of conduct to be observed obligatorily under a vow or sacrament as in the *Prajapativrata*, a denial or negation of an act has a prohibitory meaning only, as in the given case. It is not possible to invent any odd meaning of negation to counter the claim that the negative particle 'not (*nan*)', if associated with a verb-word in a *vedic* sentences, can only mean absolute abstention from an act which is normally prompted by human disposition. Thus, it clearly appears that insofar as the Mimamsa interprets the *vedic* sentences in the *Karmakanda* both as enjoining what actions ought to be done and what acts ought not to be done to attain spiritual merit (*dharma*) on the one hand and to escape from sin (*adharma*) and damnation on the other. So, the *jaimini sutra* will have to be extended to mean that the *vedic* sentences enjoin both actions and non-actions in its prescriptive and prohibitive injunctions and that non-actions are named actions in a pickwickian sense, not literally. All that is important is that some useful purpose, not accomplishable otherwise, must be served in order that a *vedic* statement may not be useless (*anarthaka*) and not that every such statement should advise some action to be done. Prohibitive injunctions prescribe no actions, they advise inaction or abstention from actions towards which there is a natural urge.

Sankara's analysis of prohibitive injunctions such as 'a Brahmin ought not to be killed' serves one very important purpose. It is a thorough refutation of the Pravakara asseveration that in the *Vedas* there is no advice for an existential fact or content as such, that *vedic* statements are meaningful only in being taken as prescriptions for actions to be done. To be sure, an act in order to be done is dependent on *Kṛti* (will to do or resolve). In *vedic* parlance, such *Kṛti*, otherwise called *prayatna*, is dependent on the presence of an action-word, technically called '*bhavarthasabda*' in *Jaimini sutra* 2.1.1. Now, in a prohibitively injunctive sentence, the presence of the negative particle 'not' (*nan*) alongwith the action-word amounts to *negation of the advice for action*. In the absence of an advice for action, there can be no *Kṛti* or resolve to do, and with no resolve, there can be no execution of work. So, Sankara, points out that the action-word in a prohibitive injunction, being



associated with the negative particle 'not' (*Na*), gets spent up in the same way that fuel lit with fire burns itself out and gets extinguished by itself<sup>136</sup> What positive purpose if any, does this analysis fulfil? It is this that, since a prohibitive injunction puts forth no action to be done, all that it does is making one aware of a sin which attends on any attempt to do a certain kind of action under the impact of an ignorant animal urge. It is knowledge, then, of a state of inaction or indifference (*audasīnya*) which is the kind of advice that such *vedic* pronouncements give. And they are deemed valid and useful by reason of that. Such being the case, the Jaimini *sūtra* cannot be supposed disclaim authoritativeness of the *vedānta vākyas* or their purposefulness on the ground that they do not enjoin, any action to be done but, on the contrary, advise knowledge of an existential reality. And this knowledge becomes corrective and so, purposeful in the same way as the negative injunctions of the *vedas* can be, since it curbs the natural human tendency to get entangled and involved in *samsāritva* which is rooted in ignorance just as the negative injunctions serve to guard against sinful acts and damnation. So, Sankara concludes that it is against those *vedic* texts which are purely anecdotal (*Upakhyāna*) or which narrate past events (*bhūtarthavada*) (uselessness) applies and not against the Vedānta doctrine of existential reality. This is how Sankara resolves conflict of his metaphysical doctrine with the views of Jaimini and Sabara and thereby scores a point in favour of the view that a harmonious interpretation of the *vedic* texts themselves has unqualified support for the doctrine.

Inasmuch as the prescriptive injunctions (*vidhis*) for performance of ritualistic actions involve and entail also advice in respect of existential matters (*bhūtavastu*) which are to serve as means (*Kriyāsādhana*), and the prohibitive injunctions (*niśedhas*) acquaint us only with an existential situation in which acts, towards which there is natural inclination, are forbidden, it cannot be said that the *vedic* statements do not contain advice for existential facts at all and that their sole purpose is to enjoin actions to be done. The only relevant point in respect of the *śāstrapramāṇa* is, then, whether the kind of advice or knowledge it gives fulfills any beneficial purpose or not, and whether this purpose or end is such that it cannot be realised with the help of any other *pramāṇa*, such as, the *laukika pramāṇa*. It can be seen that in this regard the *vedic* doctrine of *dharma* and the *upaniṣadic* doctrine of *Brahman* stand on a par. In both, we are to fall back upon the *śāstrapramāṇa* as the only resource. And the advice for knowledge of *Brahman* as the Self is not less purposeful, since it helps realisation of the supreme end of life, such as, release from bondage and suffering.

It cannot be contended that mere knowledge of an existential situation can serve no useful purpose. The existential situation, in this controversy, is nothing other than the nature of reality as the *upaniṣads* advise or inform it to be. This is *Brahman*, the self-accomplished, all-embracing, eternally existing reality. It is also the *Ātman*, the one true and absolute self of all that there appears to be. The knowledge, which is to be the *pramāṇa-jñāna*, advised in this regard, is realisation of absolute identity of *Brahman* and the Self, there being no other self and no other reality except the one indivisible self-shining, self-existent and self-accomplished reality. A knowledge of this nature is beyond the reach of all *laukika pramāṇas*. In fact, this knowledge is an *ideal*, the supreme enlightenment, and this is, projected by the *śāstrapramāṇa*, which, in this case is the *upaniṣadic* texts, the *vedānta vākyas* themselves. This is the goal contemplated in the *vedānta* teaching, - to which the *vedānta* teaching as a *pramāṇajñāna* is to terminate. The Vedānta regards dualism, divisions and distinctions of any kind as all transcendently false. In the absolute knowledge which is its goal, there is no distinction of *pramāṇa*, *pramēya* and *pramātā*. The absolute knowledge is the *end-knowledge* to which the knowledge as a means, that is knowledge as *pramāṇa-jñāna* has to necessarily terminate in order to realise its own nature as *pramāṇa-jñāna*, which involves its being *yathā bhūta-vastuvīśayam* or *tadvatītatprakāra*. The absolute knowledge thus, becomes of the nature



of self-realisation (*atmanubhuti*) or realisation by the phenomenal self of its transcendental brahmanhood (*brahmavagati* or *brahmabhava*)<sup>19</sup>. It is a not then, knowledge literally spoken as that, — there being no subject-object distinction. This becomes the one *vidya*, the supreme knowledge — *para vidya*. This also unsettles the truth-claim of all relational knowledge, of all knowledge in the objective mode, since all such knowledge is vitiated by dualism, and so, by false presentation. This consideration prompted Sankara to impugn all the so called *pramanas* including *sastrapramana* as vitiated by *avidhvavadvisayatva* in his *Adhyasabhasya*<sup>21</sup>. Even the *vedanta-vakyas* which constitutes the *sastrapramana* and is credited with leading up to the supreme knowledge has not been spared. The reason is the supreme knowledge, spoken of, is of the nature of self-identity consciousness, which is an eternally realised and accomplished fact (*parinispanna*), the very nature of the self-realised reality itself and not one newly to be ushered into existence. This is the nature of the absolute reality itself, which is self-shining, and which realises its immutable self-identity as an eternal fact intrinsic to itself. This knowledge is not *pramana-janya*, as all other knowledges, that is, knowledges in the objective mode are. As Sankara sees it, this absolute knowledge is the terminal knowledge to which the *sastrapramana*, which, in this context, — is the cognitive import of the *Vedanta vakyas*, leads up, but which it cannot represent or duplicate. This is due to the peculiarity of the situation and is nothing gratuitous. Insofar as the *sastrapramana*, geared up by the *vedanta vakyas*, is to be a *pramana*, or *pramana-jnana*, it has to absolutely conform to the nature of Reality as nondual consciousness of pure self-identity. It is to be *tadvattatpraka* it is to realise its claim to be *yathabhuta vastu-visayam*. This its self-fulfilment, which is fulfilment of the logical demand of its being a *pramana* in the Sankarite sense (*yathabhuta vastu visayam*), then necessarily leads up to its self-liquidation, liquidation of its *relational appearance* involving dealism of subject and object. Thus, the *sastrapramana* in the context of the *upanisadic* reality, realises its *pramajana-hood* by ceasing to be a *pramana* in the relational sense. Its self-liquidation is its self-fulfilment. The same is true about everything relational and phenomenal in the context of the Advaita metaphysics.

Reality, as conceived in the *upanisads*, being an eternally realised fact of pure identity or oneness of Being, the express and conventionally known and experienced order of duality and plurality has to be conceived as a *mere appearance*. But our conventional way of understanding and habitual behaviour (*naisargika loka-vyayahara*), presuppose and are rooted in the ignorant belief (*avidya*) that the express order of duality and plurality is not only not a *mere appearance* but that it is the *real* state of things, *substantial* and indubitable. By being so taken, what is, in essence, a *mere appearance* turns into an *illusory appearance*. It is the ignorant taking of the unsubstantial as substantial, a *mere appearance* as the Reality itself, which is the cause of *samsara* and bondage and the root-cause of all suffering and tension — the normal feature of our conventional mode of living. Nothing can relieve this tension and remove the cause of suffering, root and branch, except right knowledge (*vidya*) since what causes *samsariva*, and is it the root of all suffering is *ignorance (ajnan)* and *false belief (avidya)*. It cannot. Therefore, be said that the *vedic* texts in the *upanisads*, in being taken as an advice for the knowledge of the absolute reality which is also the true and one non-dual self of all, become all useless and misapplied, simply because they are not interpreted as offering guidance to the performance of *Vedic Kriya* of some kind. Such could not be the opinion of the well-informed veterans like Jaimini and Sabara. Such cannot be the considered opinion of any person who understands the proper import the *vedic* teachings, clearly distinguished into two radically different disciplines in the *Karmakanda* and the *Jnanakanda*. The *Karma*-disciplines is intended to the guide of one living a normal worldly-life (*samsarin*) with expectations higher than what his physical environment can afford. The *path* of *jnana*, of supreme enlightenment for securing absolute

freedom (*moksa*) has been advised, according to Sankara, for one who has already mastered the four-fold disciplines (*sadhna catustaya*) and has exercised his option for release from the bondage of life. Rather it would have been utter disuse if the Vedanta texts were utilised for any purpose other than absolute knowledge. It would have been surely a misuse if the *vedanta* were employed to subserve the aims and objects of an ignorant life grounded in the false sense of reality of the dual and the plural, since it is this very false sense of reality which the *vedanta* is to cure and eradicate.

There remains only one further issue to be decided and disposed of. How far can the *vedanta* texts used for the sole purpose of gaining absolute knowledge of Sankara's contemplation serve the purpose of release from the fetters of worldly life? This knowledge may be the knowledge of a transcendental, although of an existential reality (*bhutatattva*) which is at once the sole reality and one absolute self of all, as Sankara claims. But how can the mere knowledge of 'what is really there' serve any practical purpose by itself? It is seen that people with competent knowledge of the *vedanta* texts, even those who understand the nature of Brahman and the self in the way that Sankara speaks of, behave, and conduct themselves in the way ordinary mortals, bereft of such understanding, do. So, the claim that knowledge of an existential reality, such as, Brahman, by itself alone, can fulfil the purpose of release from the bondage of worldly life seems to be empty and frivolous. Furthermore, the *vedanta* texts themselves seem to have insisted that *sravana*, this is, knowledge of the *vedanta* texts derived from preceptors should be followed by *manana* (rumination or contemplation) and *nididhyasana* (meditation) which, to be sure, are disciplines of a practical nature allied to the Vedic *Karma*. This, then, seems to confirm the conclusion that the ultimate purpose of the *vedanta* is never realised by simple knowledge of the *vedanta* texts, their meaning and import. The way Sankara meets these objections and justifies his stand is indeed remarkable. To a modern interpreter the main force of Sankara's arguments in this context seems to lie in this: the circumstantial situation, the state of bondage, is so very peculiar in nature and content that the supposition of any other alternative means, even of a co-ordinate or complementary means for release from this bondage does not make any sense. Hence, the means advocated by Sankara is the *conditio sine qua non* of *moksa*. To this consideration we shall now turn.

The state of bondage from which an absolute release is sought is not a substantive fact, it is not real, not an existential (*vastusattaka*) or material development. It does not involve any *real* becoming, any material transformation into an emergent *real* state or condition. Similarly, release from it does not involve any material change, 'disappearance' or vanishing away of anything, whether real or simply a 'mere' appearance. A bodied being, for instance, need not become a dis-embodied something, even the so-called 'body' as a fact of 'mere' appearance need not melt or evaporate into nothing-ness in order that the 'release' as contemplated by Sankara is to materialise. It is very much doubtful if the classical interpreters of Sankara have ever clearly gauged the depth of the Sankarite view of liberation which is so radical and revolutionary. In our fifth chapter, we have strenuously worked out the Sankarite distinction between a 'mere' appearance and an 'illusory' appearance. Bondage or release has nothing to do with the world of 'mere' appearances. The one self-identical reality does express or manifest itself in the cosmic plurality of 'mere' appearances. These appearances are not creations of our fancy or imagination, and in their manifestation, human ignorance does not play any role. This is essentially the Sankarite stand, and that this is correct will be borne out by the Sankarite analysis of bondage and release in the context of the fourth *sutra*.

Bondage is a product of ignorance *jñāna* or *avidyā*. It does not involve any material change, any *real* becoming. It has operated in the way of *adhyāsa*, an *illicit superimposition* of the characters (*dharma*) of one to another, following upon a *misidentification* of one with another, the two being radically different poles apart. There has been a *tadatmyadhyāsa* following upon an *ekatvadhyāsa*. Sankara has brought this out in his *Adhyasabhasya* and we have elaborately explained what Sankara had actually meant, in course of four lengthy chapters. We shall not enter into any lengthy discussion on that, but suffice it to point out that Sankara's observations at the end of his commentary On the four *sūtra* have to be viewed in the light of what he had said in the *Adhyasabhasya* which is the preface to his entire commentary. It was pointed out by us that the so-called '*adhyāsa*' of *ātma* and *anātma* is not a human manipulation. This is *given*. We are victims of this delusion and not its perpetrators. We, ourselves, as *apparent* substantive individuals, are as much the off shoots of this delusive spell as are the multitudinous delusive experiences we have, involving distinction of *bhokta* (enjoyer) and *bhōgya* (enjoyed), *Karta* (agent) and *Karma* (deed), *pramāta*, *prameya* and *pramāna*. At the root of all these delusive manifestations, which, in accordance with the *inherent logic* of a delusive condition we all consider to be non-delusive and so as *substantially real*, Sankara has discovered the primal ignorance consisting of *atma-anātma adhyāsa*. This primal fact of ignorant transposition or mistransference has also to be looked upon as being there already,—that is, it is not what we ourselves have started doing at any point of time and was not there before. It is true that we *have been doing* this mistransference in our habitual behaviour and conventional way of understanding, but what we have been doing is a rehearsal of a *beginningless (anadi)* way of doing and thinking which is ignorant and vitiated by *avidyā*. That this transference or transposition of *ātma* and *anātma* and their characters is a mis-transference and mistransposition is understood when we have discriminative wisdom (*vivekajñāna*) in this regard. We then come to feel that the transposition or transference, otherwise called superimposition, did not involve any real change, that the whole exercise had been in a state of make-believe. Even this make-believe has to be located in reality in some way. This is done by metaphorically describing it as *playful (līlmatram)*. What is playful in the context of reality becomes a serious affair of life with us, the chess-men in fulfilment of the very exigency of the game. The *vedānta* has described this affair of life under the spell of life under the spell of ignorance, this bondage as *mithyā*. Being transcendently a no-fact it is not real, but being an experienced content it is not capable of being dismissed as a mere nothing.

In the commentary on the fourth *sūtra*, the discussion on bondage and release centres around two concepts. These are *samsarīva* (living in the worldly way) and *sarīratva* (bodied being). The concept *samsarīva* has another meaning which is more technical, such as, rotation in the cycle of birth, death and rebirth, but that is not very significant or appropriated in this context. Of the two concepts *sarīratva* has been treated here as the more basic one on account of fact that the conventional mode of living in the worldly way (*samsarīva*) depends on it. In this context, bondage may be taken as synonymous with *sa-sarīratva* and release can be taken to mean *a-sarīratva*. The controversy centres round the consideration if release, which is *a-sarīratva*, necessarily entails falling-off of the body, that is, being dis-embodied. Sankara's reply is that it does not. The reason given is—*Sa-Sarīratvasya mithyajñānananimittatvat*—embodiedness of the self is rooted in false knowledge, rooted in *avidyā*. Elsewhere, in an earlier statement made in the commentary on the fourth *sūtra*, Sankara had made known his express opinion on the subject when, he declared that *mokṣa* or release which, to all intents and purposes, means *a-sarīratva* is eternal (*nitya*) and this conclusion he defended by relevant quotations from the *upaniṣads*. In the very connection, he had stated that *a-sarīratva* is *svabhāvika*, that is, intrinsic to the nature of the self. On that ground of *svabhāvikatva* of *a-sarīratva*,

and, therefore, of *mokṣa* or release he had rejected the view that the state of *mokṣa* could be counted upon as *bhavya* (something yet to come into existence) and so, a product or effect of religious or spiritual merit (*dharma*) acquired by performance of any enjoined duty. He reiterates the very same view in an indirect way when he states that *sa-sarīratva* which is of the nature of false sense of self-hood in the body (*sarīratmabhīmanalaksanā*) can have no cause other than that false sense of self-hood and this is false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*). He stoutly denies that *sa-sarīratva* which is the other name of bondage and, therefore, the ground of *saṁsāritva* can be the effect of merit and demerit (*dharma-dharma*) acquired by the individual himself as a result of meritorious or sinful actions done by him. Sankara's arguments in this context deserve closer and more careful notice than has hitherto been given to them. His arguments have presage a radical change in the classical version of Sankara's doctrine of liberation. What are these arguments? They are several. In the first place, actions involving merit or demerit presuppose bodiedness of the self which itself is *asiddha*, not a valid fact, not a fact at all, is an utter absurdity – *sarīrasambandhasya asiddhatvat*. So, the supposition that *dharma-dharma* is an acquired investiture of the Self has absolutely no ground. Nor can it be a fact that action or *Kriyā* of any kind *inheres* in the self as their substance or support – *Kriyasamvayabhavātca*. So the self cannot be supposed to be an agent, and agentship (*karitva*) cannot hold in respect of the nature of the self – *Kartrvanupapattak*. The supposition that *sarīrasambandha* is due to *dharma-dharma* and *dharma-dharma* is due to *sarīrasambandha* can be a valid supposition since this is vitiated by the fallacy of *utaretasraya*, otherwise called *anyonyasreya* (interdependence or vicious circle). To take this interdependence as an infinite process in a beginningless series of cause and effect, and to justify it in that way, will be an irrational and blind process of infinite regress, unworthy of being treated seriously as a logical defence. Nor, again, can it be held that the self and the body in being situated together in close proximity (*sannidhīmatrena*), agentship which is an affair of the body comes to be invested on the self on the ground of a relation analogous to master and servant obtaining between them since no such relation of mastership or overlordship is conceivable in regard to the self which is unattached and unrelated – *asanga*.

What is singularly important to note in the above arguments is that Sankara is not disposed to admit logicity, even of factual correctness of an explanation of *sa-sarīratva* and therefore, of bondage in term of the effects of *svakṛta-dharma-dharma* (merit and demerit of one's own acquisition) on the ground that it involves a circularity which cannot be escaped on the specious plea that this circularity can be extended in an infinitely regressive process without a beginning. The supposition of such a beginningless process would be, he himself expresses an '*andhaparampara*' (a *regressus ad infinitum* which is blind and irrational). Can it then be supposed that the same Sankara would approve a causal explanation of *atma-anatmadhyasa* which he regards as *anādī* (beginningless) in term of a circularity of each succeeding *adhyasa* being regarded as the effect of a previous *svakṛta-adhyasa* dragged into an infinite regressive process, as Sankara's classical interpreters of both the schools have attempted to show in the *Adhyasabhasya*? Is there a material difference in the two cases? Is not imposition of the self or of self-hood on the body (*sarīra*) and contrariwise, imposition of the body and its characters on the Self the very same *atma-anatmadhyasa* deliberated in the *Adhyasabhasya*? To this we shall return at the close of the present discussion.

It is not by an accident that Sankara, in this context, introduces a self-theory similar to the Prāvakara theory, for purpose of review and criticism. This theory regards the Self as distinct from the body with which it is associated, and takes the self-feeling, the feeling of 'I' in the body, as *secondary* and derivative but *not false*. According to this theory, both the self which in this theory stands for the individual self) and its body are real and are conjoined together as two distinguishable

units in a complex whole. The feeling of 'I', the 'self'-feeling, which belongs to the Self primarily is attributed to the body also in a derivative way on ground of certain *affinity in quality*, and therefore, the self-sense in the body is not that false. The state of liberation has nothing to do, then, with the *lapsing* of the self-sense in the body as the Advaita of Sankara maintains. The point of special note here is that Sankara is not *at all interested in the presence or absence of the body as a fact of appearance*, as far as *moksa* is concerned. That sequence has absolutely no relevance. The *sariraka mimamsa*, which happens to be the name of Sankara's *bhavya* on the *Brahmasutras*, does not reject the notion of there being a world of phenomenal plurality as (mere) appearance, nor does it reject or repudiate the notion of there remaining a human body as a defunct appearance. The concept of *Jivanmukti* (being liberated even in this body), does not make any sense otherwise. We do feel that sufficient attention has not been given to this view in the orthodox interpretation of Sankara. Sankara becomes indistinguishable from other less gifted philosophers if this one point is not conceded in its full implication. The Vedanta also degenerates into a fetish of uncouth nonsense, if this one point is not conceded, and if an irrational demand is made to foist upon the Advaita of Sankara (which is the philosophy of the Upanisads) the doctrine of an Absolute which annuls all appearances *even as appearances*, and so does not appear or manifest itself at all in the form of cosmic plurality. No Self-identity, which alone is a true *identity* and not a meaningless tautology, can ever be like that. At any rate Sankara's *Brahman* is not the *Atman*, if taken in a different from this. *A-sariratva* does not imply *disappearance* of the body in Sankara Vedanta. It implies only the lapsing of the false sense of the self or self-hood in it, the cessation of false sense of the body being the Self. The *atma-unatma-adhyasa*, spoken of in the *Adhyasabhavya*, stands for this estrangement of the Self in being identified with the body and so also with the cosmic plurality of appearances, no longer regard as *appearances* but as the *reals* themselves. This estrangement again, is 'given' in the exigency, let us say, of cosmic play. So far this is 'Maya' taking a new phase in *avidya-vilasa* (mere play of avidya). This degenerates into *human* ignorance (*avidya* and *ajnana*) when the game turns into a serious affair of life and is no longer believed to be a game, when the playful estrangement ceases to be regarded either as playful or as estrangement. The self then turns into the not-self and the not-self (the body being the self) turns into the self in being taken as that. This its 'definedness' in term of the body is the *sa-sariratva* spoken of and the lapsing of this sense of defined-ness' in term of the body is the *a-sariratva* that Sankara asks us to understand. This *sa-sariratva* is false. *A-sariratva* is eternally there (*nitya*), only it is not always understood as that. This is realisable by *knowledge alone*. It is not an affair which is to be *made out* by any physical transformation or change and so by any *karma* or action. The Prabhakar theory is analysed and reviewed for serving this special purpose.

The comparison and refutation of the Pravakara view on the point serve to high-light the specific stand of Sankara Vedanta. In some sense, there seems to be a relation of *belonging* between the self and the body (*sarira*). With the Prabhakar, this sense of belonging is *real*, so much so, that the body is felt to be the self in a secondary and derivative sense, being its physical duplicate so to say with the Advaita, the *sariraka* (one invested with the body) is taken as *sa-sariri* only ignorantly. It is for ever and as itself *a-sariri* (without being the bodied). With the *prabhakara*, The self is *dehadivvyatirikta*, an *extra substantivity in addition to the body*, and the two—the self and its body are *distinct and different* being both substantively real. With the Advaita, there is *one* entity always—one identity in ignorance, one identity, in right knowledge, never a duality of two substantivities. That the body is the 'secondary' self and is really associated with the self, which is *really sa-sariri*, is untrue. This is because such a belief arises only in the absence of right knowledge of the Self. Had there been true knowledge of the self as the self is in its true nature, we could not speak in this way.



that there is a substantive Self and an equally *substantive* body. Phenomenally speaking, what is there is *not* a relation between two substantives, *known* in true distinction. What we have is a mis-identification of the self with the body in the absence of knowledge of the self, just as a stump is mis-identified, mis-known, and mis-called a 'human figure' in darkness, or a nacre is misknown and mis-called a silver, although one is not the other in either case, and no relation other than that of mis-presentation obtains there. Substantivity or reality is incapable of being segmented, and distributed equally between the real and its appearance. An appearance is admissible as an appearance only. To take it as real, as a substantivity, is to reduce it to an illusory appearance. So also here. Common folk have no understanding of the true nature of the substantial reality. The immortal Self. The perishable body, which is not the substantive Self, is misconceived as the self by them as they regard the body as the referent of the 'I' feeling. Even the intelligent people who claim to have discriminative knowledge (*vivekajñana*) behave in the same way as do the keepers of goats and sheep (*ajavi-patch*), although, like the Mimamsakas, they speak of a self in distinction from the body, senses, etc. (*dehadvyatirikta*). The reason is: their idea of the self is either an extra-physical expansion, a logical projection of an entity from the known human body or organism as the base of such construction or projection, or it is an *objective* but non physical *entity* devoutly admitted to be there beyond space and time on the authority of the *śāstras* operating in an indirect source of knowledge or information. In any case, there is gulf of difference between the notion of such a self and the Self that the Upanisads speak of. The Upanisadic self is *not* an objective self, situated alongside other objective entities and facts such as physical things or bodies. This self is the one subject, the transcendental witness of all objective presentations, – the one all-enveloping reality, which is the true identity of everything that there is, or appears. This self is the goal to be reached in intuitive realisation, following the guidance of the Vedanta *vakyas*. It is absolutely unknown outside the Vedantic knowledge. In the context of this self, the Absolute self, the human body or any other body, cannot be regarded as a secondary Self, and so, our instinctive belief in the substantivity of the bodily self, that is, in the body *as the self*, has to be regarded as much erroneous as taking a stump of a tree as a human person or the nacre as silver in the absence of true knowledge of the stump and the nacre. The Sankara has brought out eminently when he said that it is only when we have clear knowledge of distinction between two things given side by side, as also clear knowledge about the primary use of a concept that we can speak of a secondary use of the sense concept in respect of something different from the former but resembling it in some characteristics thus, when we know what is a lion and what is a man and know the distinction between the two clearly, we can call a man a lion in a secondary figurative meaning on the ground of that man having a certain leonine qualities, such as, courage, fierceness etc. But such an analogy entirely fails in respect of our instinctive belief in a bodied person, the empirical individual as the self. The reason is : such a belief rests entirely upon ignorance of the true self. Here there is no knowledge at all of the distinction that obtains between the Self and the body between – the reality and an appearance this is a case of a *prasiddha vastunbheda* (non-realisation of distinction) and so our belief (*pratyaya*) or the embodied person as the self and our calling that person (*sahdapravaga*) as the Self can only be regarded as ignorant and erroneous. This ignorance or error can only be corrected by true knowledge of the Self which is not limited to, or defined by a body, but which is the one real substantive and the absolute reality itself. When this realisation takes place, the self sense in the body automatically lapses, and the body comes to be regarded as a *mere appearance* with its claim to substantiality and so, to reality, absolutely rejected. So, the person, who becomes enlightened in this way, tastes the freedom pertaining to liberated life even though his body may continue to hang on without the least impact or influence on his consciousness. He remains *a-sariri* (without a body) even though apparently living in a body. The



presence of the body, the sense-organs and the objects of sense, is irrelevant and does not vitiate liberation which means dwelling in identity consciousness if the sense of reality and the sense of belongingness to them be no longer there. The body, or the physical complex attending the individual, becomes like the cast-off slough of a snake lying without animation on an ant-hill as that individual lives in full realisation of identity with the Absolute (*Brahman*). He is no longer affected by the turmoils of life, is longer agitated by cravings of a worldly existence. It cannot, therefore, be said that this knowledge of self-identity with Brahman derived from the Upanisadic texts, understood as giving knowledge of an existential reality, that is, knowledge of a state of affairs all self-accomplished and eternal, is useless. In fact, there could be no greater and no better use of the revealed texts than this re-awakening in the life of the spirit. It cannot also be argued that the prospect held out, that is, the prospect of being liberated even when apparently living in a body is incapable of fulfilment. Firstly because the revealed texts of the Vedas themselves (in this case, the later Vedas, the Upanisads) solemnly avow this. Secondly, when *sa-sariratva* is due to ignorance only, and the Self is eternally *asaririn*, uninvolved in the physical formation it could be a contradiction if the effect of ignorance were not eradicable, root and branch, by right knowledge. Lastly, what is the exact implication of the *upanisadic* statements at their highest stretch, pray? It is that so long as the sense of false-identity of the self with the body persists we all instinctively believe in the duality of subject and object, in the reality of the world-plurality and all over conventional *pramanas* (sources of knowledge) hold their ground as *pramanas*. But when this false sense of identity of the body with the self is got over and dissipated, and the unity, nay, the absolute identity of all in one nondual absolute self is realised, the sense of reality and substantiality of the plural completely ceases and all the conventional *pramanas*, including the *sastrapramana* lose forfeit, and go out of their commission. There are innumerable passages in the principal *upanisads* to avow this. Sankara, at the end of his commentary on the fourth *sutra*, quotes from Acharya Sundara Pandya some remarkable *gothas* (prophetic sayings) which support the very same conclusion. Will it not be absurd Sankara, asks, to hold that because a rich man who has identified his own self with the treasure in his possession and has set all his heart upon it, suffers miserably when he is dispossessed of that treasure by stealth or burglary therefore, he must be also suffering when, he gets over such infatuation and renounces the world as a recluse? A life in self realisation is so very remote and poles apart from the blind habitual worldly life in which one identified oneself with the physical body (*aham idam*) or rejoices in setting one's own heart upon material possessions (*mama idam*) that it would be a real contradiction to hold that one who has realised one's true self behaves in the same way or that self-realisation does not bring in any inner transformation and is a loose talk without sense. As the Chandhyogy a Upanisad has declared – one cannot be touched by any pleasure or pain when one has dissociated one-self from his ordinary life of physical or bodily being and has become *a-sarini*. The implication is not that one requires to be disembodied in a physical sense, – Bodylessness is an affair of consciousness, a correlate of body-'sense, that is, of the sense of the body as identical with the self-*ahamidam*. So long as this is not got over there is no liberation and it is irrelevant whether the person has a body in physical sense or his body has fallen off in death. With self-knowledge there is no liberation.

Such being the case, it is immaterial if the scriptures have advised *manana* and *nididhyasana* in addition to *sravana* of the Vedanta *vakyas*. *Manana* and *nididhyasana* do not introduce other disciplines of any practical kind. All the three taken together are intended to serve the purpose of knowledge of the Vedantic truth and nothing else. It is not, however, necessary to regard *sravana* (hearing of the Vedanta texts from the mouth of qualified master) as the main and the other two as *sahopakarika* (auxiliary) means leading to the realisation of the supreme truth as the *vivarana* school

seems inclined to believe. Nor is it a Sankarite stand to take '*śravaṇa*' as a *vidhi* (a prescribed mode of Vedic injunction) with some special sanctity or sacramental *aura* surrounding it. The truth that the Upanisads, otherwise called, the Vedanta, harbour and purport to bring home to us is that the true and undying reality is the Absolute one, nondual and undivided and this is also the one, nondual and undivided self in so far as this is realisable intuitively as one's true self by one looking for it under the guidance of the Vedanta. This self-realism does not entail falling off of the body in a physical sense, nor does this realisation causes a miraculous or magical disappearance of the world of cosmic appearances. Liberation consists in the *restoration* of the reality-sense and self-sense in the one unitary real and the plural appearances divested of their delusiveness as plural realities and selfhood hangs on as *mere appearances* since they are appearances of the one real, neither real in themselves nor a mere 'nothing' – the unreal about nought.

### References

- 1 "Tatra sūtraksareṇa spṛṣṭam sūtrasya anupadanat. " B S B. 1.1.3
- 2 ( atmaik atvavidyapratipattaye sarve vedānta bravyante.
- 3 'Brahmantmatkātva' is the central theme of the Upanisads to Sankara~ see his Bhasyubhumika of the principal Upanisads. 'Sarvasyātmatvat ca brahmasi, tvāpūnasiddhi, B S B. 1.1.1
- 4 ' bhūtam Brahma jīgnāsyam' B S B. 1.1.1 ' bhūtavastuviśayatvat ca brahmavijñānasya' B S B. 1.1.2.
5. B S. B. 1.1.3 and 1.1.4
6. Ibid., 1.1.4
7. Ibid., 1.1.3
8. Sankara's own expression is 'nirvṛta' which may be taken to mean 'shines forth'. Thus he says – 'vākyarthavicāranādhyāyas-ānānirvṛta brahmavagatih', nanumanadipramāṇāntaranirvṛtis' B S B. 1.1.2. See also Bhamati. The passage in the context of the first sūtra is 'Jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantum īśam Brahma, Brahmavagatirhi puruṣārthah'.
- 9 'Jñānāntu Pramāṇajanyam, pramāṇāntu yathabhūta-vastuviśayam' B S B. 1.1.4
- 10 See Bhamati B.S.B. 1.1.2. 'Niyataracanavats vidyamanasya' Br. Aranyaka 2.4.10 (Sankarabhasya).
- 11 B S B. 1.1.2
- 12 These are rival methods of interpretation formulated by Prabhakar school and the Bhaita school respectively. 'Anvitabhūdhana' may be taken to mean 'it is the relatedness of words which determine the meaning of the words and 'adhihitavaya' means it is the meaning of words which determines their meaning in relation.
- 13 Sankara mentions Sabara, not by name but as 'Sāstratātparyavid' implying that he is the one knowing the significance of the Vedic texts. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
14. See B S B. 1.1.4. Introductory portion.
- 15 Ananyasya kriyārthatvat anarthakyam atadarthanam' Mīmāṃsā sūtra 1.2. 'Atah Vedāntanam anarthakyam, akriyārthatvat'. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
- 16 'Kartṛtvevadiprākāśanārthatvena va kriyavidisesatvam, Upasānādi-kriyāntaravidhānārtham va' B.S.B. 1.1.4.
- 17 Na hi parimīṣṭhitavastu pratipadanam sambhavati, pratyaksadiviśayatvat parimīṣṭhita vastunah' B.S.B. 1.1.4
- 18 'Tatpratipādane ca heyopadeyarahite puruṣārthabhavat'. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
19. 'Vidhina tvēkavakyatvat stūtyarthepa vidhinam syoh' Mīmāṃsāsūtra. This rule guides interpretation of

- a Vedic sentence apparently unconnected 2.7 and narrative of an incident like 'he wept' (sah arodit). The rule for interpretation of such sentences is to treat them not as whole sentences at all but as 'words' by *Laksana* and integrate it as a component part of an injunctive sentence by the method called *padoikavyaketa*. Rendered thus, the expression is divested of its primary meaning, and being invested with a secondary meaning, it then means 'praise or dispraise' of an act of sacrifice.
20. 'Na kvacidapi vedavakyanam vidhisamsparśa mantarena arthavatha dṛṣṭa upapanna va' B.S.B. 1.1.4
21. B.S.B. 1.1.4 *Ibid.*
22. 'Pravṛtīrva nivṛtīrva nityena Kṛtākena va, pumsam yenopadisṛṣṭa tatsastrapramāṇabhidhiyate'  
A slightly verbally altered statement, says M.M.Pramathanath is found in Sankaranandavṛtti Vedānta Darsanam Vol II p. 269
23. The Sastras will also cease to be an *absolute pramāṇa* where this absoluteness consists in bringing about in existence what is not yet in existence, by prescribing or enjoining a certain mode of ritualistic action. There can be no injunction for bringing about what is already in existence. Cf. 'Na ca parinīṣṭhita vastu svarūpe vidhiḥ sambhavati' B.S.B. 1.1.4. Cf. 'Na ca parinīṣṭhita' and the Ratnaprabha.
24. The reason is that the already existent has already been given independently of the *sastras*-injunctions. It also has to be taken as sensuously given since it is the special privilege of the *Sastra* to say about the non-sensuous or to bring it into existence.
25. 'Ananyasya kriyarthatva...etc.' M.S. 1.2.1.
26. *Ibid.*, M.S. 1.2.7
27. B.S.B. 1.1.4, 'avakhyagatopasānedikarmaparātvaṁ' See the Ratnaprabha
28. In striking contrast to Sankara's quotations, Ramanuja's long quotations from every kind of religious treaties seem addressed to lay audience.
29. Sankara calls neglect of the obvious meaning and any arbitrary rendering of passages 'śrutiḥṇasruti-kalpana' dosa. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
30. B.S.B. 1.1.4, 'Vidhicchayāni vacanāni'
31. 'Svabhāvika-pravṛtṭi-viśaya-vimukhikarānārthanāḥ' Brumah' B.S.B. 1.1.4
32. 'Śrutyadayaḥ anubhavadayasā yathasambhavamīha pramāṇam' B.S.B. 1.1.2.
33. 'anubhava-vasanātvaḥ bhūta-vastu-viśaya-iva tvaḥ brahma-vijñānasya' B.S.B. 1.1.2. also 'Avagatiparyantam jñānam sanvacyayaḥ icchayāḥ karma jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantum istam Brahma. Brahmagatirhi puruṣārtha. B.S.B. 1.1.1 '...Sarvamaikatva-viśaya-iva avagataḥ' 2.1.14
34. 'Na ca parinīṣṭhitavastusvarūpatvepi pratyakṣa-diviśaya-tvaṁ' B.S.B. 1.1.4
35. *Ibid.*
36. 'Tasyanārtahetoh prāhanāya atmaikatva-vidyāpratīpattaye sarve vedānta aravyānis'
37. B.S.B. 1.1.2
38. *Ibid.*, 1.1.1 'Brahmagatirhi puruṣārtha', 'avagatiparyantam jñānam sanvacyayaḥ icchayāḥ karma'
39. 'Tatīva masīti brahmatmābhavasya sastrapramāṇarena anavagamyamanātvaḥ' B.S.B. 1.1.4 The meaning is not, however, that the knowledge furnished by the *sastrapramāṇa* is itself *brahmavagati* which is the terminal knowledge but this could not arise if the *sastras* did not furnish the clue. The Bhāmata seems to have erred on the point 'Anavagamyamanātvaḥ' in this context does not mean 'sastrapramāṇa eva anavagamyamanātvaḥ' Sastras are an indispensable condition but not the cause of the absolute experiences which is essentially uncaused.
40. 'Bhavyasā dharmo jñāsyo na jñānakāle asti puruṣavyāparatantra-iva' B.S.B. 1.1.1
41. This is a common mistake with many modern interpreters. Cf. Sankara's statement bhavyasā dharmo

*jñasyo na jñanakas asti puruṣavyaparitānatvat* B.S.B. 111

- 42 This device is called *lakṣaṇa*. The Mimamsa devises extreme use of this contrivance in processes such as *padaikavakyata* and *'Vakyaikavakyata*.
- 43 B.S.B. 112.
- 44 *Ibid.*, *'Kartavye hi viśaye nanubhava peksasiti śrutyadinameva pramāṇyam syat'*.
- 45 *'āgmatrasamādihgama eva tu ayam arthah dharmavat* B.S.B. 2.16.
- 46 *Cf* *Naumanadipramanantaranirvṛtta* B.S.B. 1.1.2.
- 47 *Cf* *'Śrutyaiḥ ca sahayaivena tarkasya abhupcīarvat'*. What is true of Tarka as an auxiliary proof is also true of other *pramāṇas* in matters transcendental.
- 48 It can be seen that vidyāranya is completely mistaken when he interprets Sankara to mean that Brahman is *'Vadaikameya* and that *pramāṇas*, such as *anumāna* and *anubhava* are *anuvadaka* merely *Vaiyākanyayamala* 113 second varṇaka.
- 49 In the *aropa*-mode of worship, such as, 'mind is Brahman', 'Surya is Brahman' the nearer object such as the mind or the sun is contemplated as the symbol (*pratīka*) of the distant and this distant is taken as the 'form' under which the mind or the Sun, the nearer object is to be contemplated.
- 50 *'Samhitamev sarīrakam Jaimīnyena sodeśalaksanēti sāstrīkatvasiddhiḥ* Ramanuja's quotation in Sec. 5 *sūtra* 11.1
- 51 The concept of *'bheda*' has been very ingeniously interpreted in different forms as *svajātiya*, *vijātiya*, *śagata*, *pure bheda* etc.
- 52 *'Anyadeva tadviditadāto aviditadadhi* Kena 1.4. *Cf.* *'Pratibodha-viditām matamamṛtam hi vindate kena* 2.4. *'Jñamatmani mahatī nityacchet tadyaccheccchanta atmani* Katha 1.3.13 *'Ētajñeyam nityamevatma-samsthām* Svata 112. etc. etc.,
- 53 *'Anyadeva tadviditai*. Kena 1.4 Also Br. Any. 2.4.14.
- 54 *'Yasyamatam tasya matam, matam yasya na veda sah, avjñatam ijanatam vijñatam avjñatam* Kena 2.3
- 55 *Śree bhasya* 11117 *'Kim vakyaḥ vakyaarthajñānametram bha sanmūlapasanatmakam jñānamiti .Tvātmatrenavidya-nivṛth yanupa-padbhecca'*
- 56 B.S.B. 112.
- 57 Mundaka 1.29-11, Katha 2.11-12., 12.3-4.
- 58 Katha 1.2.4 Isa 3.6,9-14,
- 59 B.S.B. 114. *'Svabha-vikapravṛthi viśayavimukhīkaranarthaniti brumahi'*
- 60 *Cf* The four quotations from Upanisads in the beginning of B.S.B. 114
- 61 *'dharmabrahmajñasayoh phalajñasayabhadat ca* B.S.B. 114.
- 62 Mundaka 1.1.4-5 also stress the difference as between *aparā* and *paravidya*.
- 63 B.S.B. 1.14. . . . *śrūṭayo brahmaavidyānantaram mokṣam darsayanti madhya tatkartṛkam karyāntaram varayanti* *'Atanyat mokṣam prati kriyānupravesadvaram na sakyam kenaciddarsayitum*.
- 64 *'Kunthibhavanti yapatēdisu prayukta-ksurataksnadivat* B.S.B. 114.
- 65 *'Co dana' iti vaidikam sabadām aha, viśesena samānyasya lakṣaṇat*
- 66 The Bhamati puts it as *'Jñapakapramāṇapravṛtti-bheda* B.S.B. 111
- 67 *'svaviśaye nityūpanaiva puruṣamavabodhayati* B.S.B. 111
- 68 *'Yatha aksarīhasannīkarsenarthavabodhc, tadvat.* *Ibid.*

- 69 'Avabodhasya codanajanyatvat na purusavabodha niyujyate' *Ibid.*
- 70 'Abhyudayaphalam dharmajnana, tat ca anusthanapeksam. ahsreyasaphalanu brahmanijnanam na ca anusthanantarapeksam' B.S.B. 1.1.1.
- 71 See Sankara's commentary on 1.1.1
- 72 the etymological meaning of 'codana' takes three forms -command (*ajna*) advice (*anujna*) and solicitation (*abhyarthana*) But these meanings are to be discarded in the context of statements having no person as their source. See *Isakabhusan-Vedanta Darshan* p. 304.
- 73 See Pancapadika.
- 74 B.S.B. 1.1.1
- 75 *Ibid.*, 1.1.4
- 76 *Ibid.*, 1.1.2. ; 1.1.4.
- 77 Kartyavyo hi visaye nanubhavapeksastili srutyadinameva pramanyam syat' B.S.B. 1.1.2.
- 78 'Purusadhinatmatobhatvatca kartyavyasya' *Ibid.*
- 79 See B.S.B. 1.1.2. also 1.1.4.
- 80 ' arthavanta eva syuh ' . B.S.B. 1.1.2.
- 81 The cited illustrations are 'atiratre sodasinam grhnati, natiratre sodasinam grhnati, udite juhosi anudite juhosi' .B.S.B. 1.1.2
- 82 'Asvena gacchati, padbhyam anyathava, na va gacchati' B.S.B. 1.1.2
- 83 What is meant is that just as the other set illustrates three alternative modes of *laukika* acts, the set of instances taken from the Vedas illustrates three possible modes of functioning in the *vedic* way of acting.
- 84 Mark Sankara's placing of *vikalpotsargapavada* as one unit punctuated by 'ca' before and after. B.S.B. 1.1.2.
- 85 The instance cited by the Bhamati is from Yajnavalkya smṛti
- 86 Pancapadika
- 87 B.S.B. 1.1.4
- 88 'Yavat sampalam Usitva. Chandogya 5.10.5.
- 89 ' tasya svabhavikatvat' B.S.B. 1.1.4.
- 90 'Brahmabhavasca moksa' B.S.B. 1.1.4.. 'Sasaritatvasya mithyajnananimittatvat', 'Tasya (asaratitvasya) svabhavikatvat' *Ibid.*
- 91 Katha 2.14 other than 'bhuta' – brings into focus the distinction between what *appears* to be existential and what is *really* so. It also shows the ground for Sankara's *avidya-vada*. The doctrine of misknowledge.
- 92 B.S.B. 1.1.4.
93. 'Brahmatmavagamadeva sarvektes' a-prahanat purusarthasiddhah' B.S.B., 'Brahmavidapnoti param'
- 94 The alternatives mentioned in B.S.B. 1.1.4 If admitted as integral part of the Karmakanda, the existential concepts, by the devices known as *padaikavakyata* and *vakyaikavakyata* are to be reduced to mention of the agent, the deity, or sacrificial materials connected with the Vedic *Kriya*, or as connected with the Vedic *upasanakriya* If admitted as integral to the jnanakanda, a distinctive part, there may be integral to the acts of meditation and worship advised in the *jnanakanda* itself. The third alternative is to take the concept of '*jnana*' in the sense of an act (*vidhikriya*) and to regard *Brahman* as the *object* upon which a knowing act is directed. Thoroughness in the treatment is remarkable.
- 95 'Pravrttinivrttiprayojanatvat sastrasya' B.S.B. 1.1.4. see also 'Pravrttirva nivrttirva niyena krtakena va, pumsam yenopadisyeta tacchastramabhidhiyate'

96. This is the prabhakara view of anvitabbidhanavada.
97. Sabarabhasya 30.
98. Mimamsa sutra 1 1 25.
99. 'Sastrarsto' drestomoksahphalam bhavisyati B S B 1 1 4.
100. The expression, which is repeated in all relevant places in Sankara's commentaries on the Upanisads, the Brahmasutras and the Gita, is brought in for contrast with the Vedic modes of *upasana* and their resultant fruits B S.B. 1 1 4.
101. The expression, which is repeated in all relevant places in Sankara's commentaries on the Upanisads, the Brahmasutras and the Gita, is brought in for contrast with the Vedic modes of *Upasana* and their resultant fruits B S.B. 1 1 4.
101. '...padasamanvaya pidyeta' B S.B. 1 1 4.
102. '...avidyanivrttiphalastavanani aparuddhyeran' B.S.B 1 1 4.
103. Mundaka 3 2 9.
104. Ibid., 2 2 8.
105. For details look into the Bhamati, the Vartika of sureswara on the Brhadaranyaka.
106. B.S.B. 1 1 4.
107. Ibid., 1 1 4.
108. 'Svarupavyatiriktepi Brahmanah napyatvam, sarvagatena nityapiasvarupaivat, sarvena Brahmanah akasasyeta' B.S.B. 1.1.4
109. 'Ata jivah Brahman ah bhinnah, tathapi na tena brahma apyate' 'The Bhamati.
110. 'Kriyasrayanupapattah atmanah' B.S.B 1 1 4.
111. '....snatacamana jajnopavitadharanadi'. B.S.B. 1.1 4.
112. The passage which occurs in R V 1 164 20, recurs in Mundaka 3.1 1 and Sveta 4 6. has been rendered non-metaphorically here to suit the context.
113. Sveta. 6.11 Same idea is mooted in Katha 2 2 9-13.
114. Isa. 8.
115. '...anadheyatisayatam nityasuddhatam ca Brahmanah darsayatah' B.S.B. 1 1 4
116. B S B. 1 1 4.
117. Mundaka 3 2 9.
118. Ibid., 2 2 8.
119. Isa. 7
120. B.S.B 1 1 4
121. Ibid., 1 1 4
122. Ibid., 1 1 4.
123. Vacaspati's cryptic reply ' juvastu brahmaiva kim meva prapyatam, bhedasrayatvat prapteh' does not seem to be illuminating since Sankara himself argues next on the supposition of their being *bheda* and gives what should be the solution.
124. See Adhyasabhasya -' A-tasmin ladbuddhir ity avocamah'
125. Ibid., '....tatkrienadosena gunena va anumatrencapi na sa sambadhyate'.
126. B S.B. 1 1 4.



- 127 See B.S.B. 1.1.4 'Jñantu pramanajanyam, pramanantu yathabhutavastuvisayam'. The compounded word is 'Yathabhutavastuvisayam' Compare pancapadika, p. 93
- 128 B.S.B. 1.1.1
- 129 Here we are concerned with the controversy if Vedic statements even in the later part are *Kriyarthaka* and *Bhavyarthaka* or *jñanarthaka* and *bhutarthaka* and if the means looked for is to be *Kriya* or *jñana*. So, we are concerned with 'means – knowledge' or '*pramana jñana*'
- 130 B.S.B. 1.1.4, '*brahmabhavasca moksa*'.
- 131 B.S.B. 1.1.4
- 132 Compare Bhamati and Pancapadika. The Ratnaprabha, however, avoids an explicit statement to that effect. What it says may as well be brought in line with our interpretation of Sankara?
- 133 Vedanta Darsan Vol II, pp. 645-48 of Mm. Pramathanath Tarkabhusan.
- 134 Sankara uses '*codanajanya*' in the context of *vedic* or *sastrapramana*. 'Codana' there means 'Vedic sentences' and the Vedic sentences, according to Sankara, fall into two distinct groups – *bhavyarthaka-kriyarthaka*, and *bhutarthaka-jñanarthaka*. Both *dharma-jñana* and *brahma-vijnana* are *codanajanya*, while *dharma* as a content and *Kriya* as its *sadana* (means) are *codanatantra*, not Brahman. As far as knowledge whether of *dharma* or of Brahman is concerned, there is *codanajanyata*, but not *codanatantrata*, since in both cases knowledge is to be a *pramana* and *pramana* is *yathabhuta-vastuvisayam*'. See B.S.B. 1.1.1., 1.1.2., 1.1.4
- 135 Pancapadika, p. 93
- 136 It is indeed a peculiar notion that '*dharma*', the object of *karma-jñana*, or '*Karmavibodhana*' is caused by *Kriya* or *karma*. Does this not make the Vedic injunction behind the act, redundant?
- 137 *Ibid.*
- 138 B.S.B. 1.1.4.
- 139 Vedantapariibhasa chapter I., account of Vrtti.
- 140 B.S.B. 1.1.1.
- 141 *Ibid.*
- 142 This seems to be a wrong stand. Apart from *jñanarthakata* as distinguished from *Kriyarthakata* of the *Vedanta-vakyas* which is the point of controversy of the 4th *sutra*, the real point at issue seems to be whether it is *jñana* or Vedic *kriya* which is to be the *acceptable means* towards the ultimate end, such as, *moksa*. Earlier part of the *vedas* is a *pramana* in support of *Kriya* do the later *vedas* also propose the same, or some of the *means* which is all together different? So, the issue is 'if the claim of *jñana* as the *means* to the end such as *moksa*, supported that it is a *kriya*, not a mental disposition, has no rational basis. Again, in so far as it eliminates ignorance of the nature of the true self and becomes the negative condition of *moksa* by relieving the stress and suffering caused by ignorance, it also *produces result (phala)* in one sense, although not as a mode of *doing* but only as one of *undoing*. So the supposition of producing result in Brahman is irrelevant and gratuitous. Knowledge acts in the way knowledge can act, that is, by not-acting
- 143 B.S.B. 1.1.4
- 144 *Ibid.*, 1.1.4
- 145 'Atonynt maksam prati kriyanupravesadvaram na sakyam kenacidarsayitum. Tasmāt jñanamak am muktva kriyaya gandhamatrasyoṇi anupravesa iha nopapadyat' It will be wrong to interpret the last line as meaning that the only way of *anupravesa* of *Kriya* that remains is *jñana*, since the text has already mentioned four possible *Kriyadvāra* and has denied the existence of a fifth B.S.B. 1.1.4.
- 146 See B.S.B. 1.1.4 and also 1.1.2

147. *Ibid*
148. B.S.B. 1.1.4. and 1.1.2.
149. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
150. *Ibid*, 'Evam sarvapramana visaya-vastusu veditavyam'
151. Kriyayah gandhamatrasyanupravesa ita nopapadhyate' B.S.B. 1.1.4
152. Note particularly the exposition in the opening section of vidyavanya's vivanraga-pranccya-samgraha.
153. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
154. The relevance for 'any other form' come from Sankara's absolute rejection of *Karma* or *Kriya* as such in Brahman-knowledge. Suresvara's Naiskarmasiddhi is the classical master-piece in this connection.
155. The basic idea maintained in the Brahmasutrabhasya as also in all other commentaries such as, commentaries on the Gita and the Upanisads.
156. 'Anyadeva tadviditadaito aviditadedhi etc ' Kena 1.3, Anyatra bhutacca bhavyacca' katha 2.14 'Yasyamatam tasya matam, matam yasya na veda sah Avijnatam vijnatam vijnatamavijnatam' Kena 2.11.
157. C/ 'Yo nastadveda tadveda na vedeti da ca' Kena . 2.2.
158. These have already been analysed in this chapter See B.S.B. 1.1.4
159. Texts quoted by Sankara himself B.S.B. 1.1.4.
160. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
161. 'na conugamyma sastrapramanyam yena anyatra drstam nidarsanamapekseta'. B.S.B. 1.1.4
162. Pancapadika, p. 93
163. 'Evam sarvapramana-visaya-vastusu Veditavyam' B.S.B. 1.1.4
164. B.S.B. 1.1.1
165. The entire 1st and 11nd parts of Kena.
166. 'Svabhavikat karyakaranasamghatapravrttigocarai vimukhikrtya pratyagatmasrotastaya pravartayanti atma va are drastavyah'
167. Ityadinik. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
168. 'Aupanisadasya purusasyananyasesatvat'. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
169. 'Ato vastuparo vedabhago nastiti vacanam sahasamatram' B.S.B. 1.1.4.
170. 'Nasau nasti nadhigamya ite va vaktum sakyam' The difficulty in bringing out the intended meaning forced a non-literal translation. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
171. Br Aranyak. 3.9.26.
172. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
173. *Ibid*,
174. 'Tadvisesam prati vipratipatich' B.S.B. 1.1.1.
175. 'Atma sa bhokturityapare' B.S.B. 1.1.1 It can be seen that *atma* is posited here as the terminal entity but not explained as to what it is. It is like saying *atma* is *sarvesyavastutasya atma*.
176. The Bhamati expresses this beautifully when it says 'prakash hi sarvasya atma tadadbhistanat'. 'Apica atmanah prakasasya bhasa prapanacasya pratha'
177. 'Tot saksitvena pratyuktatvat' B.S.B. 1.1.4.
178. B.S.B. 1.1.4.
179. 'Atmatvadeva ca sarvasam na heyo napyupadeyah' B.S.B. 1.1.4

180. 'Sa katha sa para gati' Katha 1.3 11
181. We would name it as 'anytarasrutivirodhapcchhara.
182. This is Jaiminisutra 4.1 1. The *sutra* means 'after this, therefore, inquiry into what relates to sacrifices and what relates to object of human desire, is being instituted.
183. 'Na hi bhutamupadisyamanam Kriya bhavati' B.S.B. 1.1 4.
184. 'Na hi Kriyartham bhutam upadisyamanam abhutam bhavati, apita Kriyanirvartanayogyam bhutam eva tat'.
185. 'Pravrttinivrttyatirekena bhutancet vastupadisati bhavyarthena, kutasiham astyam bhutam nopadisatiti ko hetuh ? B.S.B. 1.1 4.
186. 'Anavagatatnavastupadesasca tathaivabhavitum arhati. Tadavagatya muthyajnanasya samsarahetornivrttin prayojanam Kriyate ityavisistamarthavattvam kriyasadhanavastupadesena' B.S.B. 1.1 4.
187. '...na ca sa Kriya, napi Kriyasadhanam' B.S.B. 1.1 4.
188. 'Evem pratishedhasya vidheranyatvsm siddhyati, Anyatha vidhireva sarvam syat' Pancapadika, p. 97-98.
189. 'Sa ca dagdhenagnivat evayamiva upasamyati' B.S.B. 1.1 4.
190. B.S.B. 1.1 2, and 1.1 4.
191. 'Avidyavadvisayadini pratyaksadini premanahi sastrani sastrani ceti' Adhyasabhasya.

## The Logicality of the Advaita Claim to Transcendental Metaphysics

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The Advaita Vedanta, we have seen, is an orthodox system, believing implicitly in the infallibility of the *sastrapramana*. It seeks anchorage and mooring in the later Vedas. The Upanisads, taken as a harmonious whole. It is, again, a philosophy or metaphysics, not an interpretation of the rules of procedures of ritualistic practices as the *Purvamimamsa* is. As a philosophy, again, it claims to embody the *one* and *absolute* truth about life and the real order. With it, doctrine of truth is, at the same time, a programme of reform and re-adjustment of our attitude to life as this life is ordinarily lived. Absolute freedom, otherwise called release from the bondage of an ignorant life, is accepted as the goal of knowledge, – of knowledge defined as truth-perception. Knowledge, then, is to be not merely informative; it is to be transformative also. The one truth, which is knowledge of reality, is not, however, the knowledge of any *objective order* distinguished from the subject, the knower. It is the knowledge of the one subject which is the identity of all that appears in distinction and division as *subjects* and *objects*. The goal of knowledge is the identity-experience, the experience of all,—the diverse. As being the mere appearances of what is at the core, and substantially, an indivisible *one* Truth-experience thus becomes one with life-experience, the experience of an enlightened life. In this consists the verifiability of the truth, advocated as being the indubitable truth. That is knowledge of truth which liberates from life of bondage. With the Advaita Vedanta, this demand upon knowledge to fulfil itself in a liberated state is not to be entertained as a dogma. It is not to rest on pious wish. There is no extraneous guarantor, in the Kantian sense, to legislate that virtue should end in felicity. Nor is absolute self-surrender to an Absolute self bigger than the finite and limited self is piously looked upon as the sure and certain guarantee of release in a life hereafter—as in the theistic Vedanta. The Advaita takes *Jivanmukti*, liberation, here and now, even though *apparently* existing in the old frame, as the touch-stone of truth-realisation. The proof of the pudding lies in the eating, in directly tasting it as it is. This insistence on direct verifiability of truth-perception – of *Brahman* being the *Atman*, or that one knowing Brahman becomes Brahman even in this life, shows the Advaita doctrine of Sankara in a perspective which the classical inter-preters of Sankara-*Bhasya* seem to have either completely missed or have very much underserved. *It is that the total vanishing away of cosmic appearances, called the 'prapance' is neither the 'conditio sine qua non' of truth-perception, nor is it warranted by the nature of Reality as the absolute and all-comprehending one*. To be more direct and caustic, it is not any part of Sankara's doctrine, not also of the doctrine of the Upanisads, that

the cosmic multiplicities are your or my creation—that these are creations of human ignorance simply. What is creations of ignorance is the absolute *reality-sense* in the cosmic multiplicities. These are appearances simply, and obtain *as that* in the *rerum natura*. They are neither the real, nor, again the real which ought to vanish. We have already argued that Sankara's doctrine of *Jivanmukti* is a thorough repudiation of the view of 'melting' or 'vanishing' appearances'. What is to melt or vanish is the sense of substantivity, of absolute reality *in* the cosmic appearances, — not the appearances themselves *as* appearances. These mere appearances are an essential part of self-expression of Reality, a characteristic feature of the world-game of its self-delight.

An explanation of this world-game, commonly understood as the *existential* world-order, has to be sought and found *monistically* in the way the Upanisads speak of. It is for this reason, it became so essential for both Badarayan and Sankara to show that a dualistic explanation, like the one the Sankhya advocates, has no roots in the Upanisads, and so the Sankhya will have to be treated as an intellectualistic and conceptualistic metaphysics. Why does Sankara treat the Sankhya as the principal contender<sup>2</sup> in the metaphysical arena? One very important reason is that the Vedanta of Sankara's understanding does not totally dismiss the world-appearances as *asat* (absolute naught) and their experiences as *hallucination*. There is a clear distinction between an illusion and a hallucination. The all-pervading Atman is the bodiless in the multiple bodies, the one absolutely stable under the cover of the unstable and the fleeting, says the Upanisad'. It does not say that the bodies and that which is non-durable are absolute nothing that they do not even 'appear'. To the contrary, it says that these multiple bodies, the fleeting appearances, not only do appear but that the reality or the self is completely missed on account of them and that these bodies and appearances are mis-identified with it. Reality is lost in its appearances when the appearances are not recognised and not contemplated as appearances but are taken to be the real themselves. In *Jivanmukti*, the body does not vanish magically. It hangs on unowned, and so (for absolute experience or self-experience) as rejected (*tuccha*) appearance. It is not at this stage one fact against another, but simply an erstwhile fact which is a fact no more but yet hangs on. A fact is synonymous with the real.

The very fact that the Vedanta, even the Advaitic version of it, seeks to *explain the given order of experience with all its contents* proves that it does not seek to *explain it way* as an absolute naught. Its opposition to other metaphysical philosophies, has relevance on this ground. The given order of multiplicities it seeks to explain monistically, and in this monistic explanation, the multiplicities are viewed as *mere appearances* of the one indivisible reality, the Self. The nearest approximation to this account is the dualistic account presented by the Sankhya. The Vedanta is, therefore, very keen on showing that the Sankhya is not *sruti* based, — that it is postulatory, and is not based on *sastrapramana*, the revealed intuitions of the seers. But why is this anxiety to disprove *sruti*-basedness of the Sankhya? There can be only one reason for this: the *sastrapramana*, alone, and *not* reason as a logical construction, an inference, or deduction, can be the ground of a transcendental metaphysics'. As far as the negative side of this claim is concerned, Sankara, and for that matter, the vedanta philosophy of any brand, would join hands with the anti-metaphysicians of all ages and climes. But on the positive side of this claim there is the proposal to provide a new ground for transcendental metaphysics. How far is this claim justifiable?

The arbitration in this dispute, however, is left to the care of logic—to the care of the very same logical reason the capacity of which to formulate, or for becoming by itself the source of a transcendental metaphysics, remains for ever a suspect. The role of logical reason, in the context, is justificatory and critical, *not constitutive*. Logic is commissioned here to work judiciously as an arbitrator under full consciousness of its own avowed conditions, and therefore, of limitations. Logic,

by its very nature, cannot create a fact. That fact has to be 'given' in some way. The Kantian distinction between a faculty of *intuition* and a faculty of *judgment* seems to be on the right track. What is not on the right track is the Kantian limitation of the understanding, of theoretical or cognitive reason, to the 'given' of 'sensuous' intuition and the relation of reciprocal determination obtaining between them. Kantian phenomenalism affords an illustration where theoretical reason is both constitutive and justificatory of *objective* experience of facts which are essentially sensuous. Kant fails to trace the ground of a *non-sensuous intuition* because he worked under the fundamental prejudice that the 'given' real, to be given, and to be 'real', must be an *objectivity* of some kind. Next since there can be no objectivities non-sensuously given, so Kant concludes that there can be no *non-sensuous intuition*, and no transcendental metaphysics. This seems to be the Kantian predilection. But what happens if the non-sensuous intuition is to be the mode of 'given-ness' of an unobjective reality even more stable and stubborn? Although agreeing in the main with a position similar to the Kantian position that an 'objective real' can be 'given' only in some sensuous intuition, that is, in term of sense-perception or sensuous picturing in imagination, and completely disagreeing with a position like the Hegelian which obliterates distinction between 'being given' and 'being thought', the Vedanta of Sankara's meaning envisages a mode of non-sensuous 'given-ness' in a *de-conditioned* state of consciousness. There are, so says the Upanisad, two ways of intuiting – object-wardly through the conditioning imposed by the outer-senses, and subject-wardly by withdrawal (*avrittacakṣu*) from the outer, and so from conditioning. In the state of conditioning, there is dualism of subject and object *as it were*, says the Upanisad, but in the de-conditioned state, all become one undivided essence, where there can be no percipient and no object of his perception, standing over and against himself. The *śruti* – statements which the Upanisads, in particular, embody, may as well be looked upon as reports of what is intuited in this latter, that is, in the non-sensuous and de-conditioned mode of *intuiting*. At the farthest reach of this process of withdrawal inward, the absolute one-ness of reality and the self is 'given' as the basic fact of all existence. The secrets of how the one, indivisible and self-identical, assumes the form of the manifested 'many' through self-imposed limitations (*upadhis*) come to be understood also in course of a return journey of consciousness outward and object-ward. The possibility of direct Verifiability of the vedantic truth through one's own experience, as Sankara upholds, unmistakably shows that the *śruti*-statements in the Vedanta contexts at least, have to be understood as reports involuntary and so intuitive *truth-perception* of the wise (*dhīrah*), and not as mere traditional adage enjoying eternal perpetuity. These truth-perceptions, of course, at not subject to any limitation of person, age or clime, and can be anybody's conscious possessions, –being, in themselves, truths of fact, eternal and unchangeable. These truth-perceptions seem to provide for the much needed non-sensuous intuitions which Kant vainly looked for but did not find. These, then become the bedrock of a transcendental metaphysics which does not degenerate into a mere conceptualistic system and which can not be assailed by dialectic of reason. In spite of its mooring in the *śāstra-pramāṇa*, the Advaita metaphysics of Sankara, by Sankara's own admission, defends a doctrine which is directly verifiable in one's given experience, and also has to be so verified if its practical end, such as, liberation, is to materialise.

Quite apart from the logicity which the Vedanta claim for a non-sensuous intuition may substantiate there is another kind which proceeds from inner consistency of the system. For a doctrine which maintains reality as an all-embracing whole, there can be no extraneous justification if such justification is to be logical. In his dual interpretation of the *sūtra* 'śāstrayonitvat', Sankara has shown Brahman, the reality, as the source of the *śāstras*, and has, again, accepted the *śāstras* as forming and furnishing the theoretic evidence of the nature of that reality. We have argued in that context that in one respect the second *sūtra* 'Yanmadhyasya yatah' and the third *sūtra* 'śāstrayonitvat' (by



Sankara's first interpretation) may be regarded as complementary<sup>10</sup>. It can be seen now that they are necessarily so by Sankara's own intention. The second *sutra*, according to Sankara, is not an inferential argument<sup>11</sup>, it is calculated to cite *sruti-vakya* as evidence. Now, the *sruti-vakya* can be an admissible evidence of both *Brahman* and its being the cause of origination, sustenance and dissolution of all these empirically evident multiplicities if the *srutis* themselves are part of the self-expression of *Brahman* by way of communicated experience or knowledge. If the phenomenal multiplicities are expressions of *ananda* or self-delight of *Brahman*, the *srutis* are part of the self-expression of *Brahman* in so far as *Brahman* is self-revealing and self-knowing as *cit*. Although all experiences, even the utmost ignorant ones proceed from *Brahman*, there being no other ultimate source, some are self-beguiling for the exigency of cosmic—play, some others are self-finding, and those that are for the second purpose, achieve that purpose as eminently as the others also do, therefore, the *srutis* do. Find the nature of *Brahman* in its entirety, including the nature in cosmic display, and this claim of the *sruti-praman* need not be brushed aside as a dogmatic fad, since this *praman* also is integral to *Brahman* as a mode of self-expression.

The most important and also the commonly known proof of the logicality of the system furnished by the *Vedanta sutra* under Sankara's interpretation, however, proceeds from an immanent criticism of logic and logical argument. It will be wrong to suggest that Sankara, as a commentator of the *sutras*, accords to logical analysis and reasoning a place higher than the place he gives to the *srutipramana*. It is equally wrong, however, to suggest that he discredits logic or minimizes its importance in his transcendental metaphysics. The truth is that he accords to reason and authority their legitimate and therefore, appropriate places. Logic is primarily a faculty of *interpretation* and of evaluation or justification. While a fact has to be 'given' in some mode of experience, it is for the logical understanding to interpret it and make out what is this that is 'given', what it amounts to, what its nature and relevance can be. If this mode of treatment is called 'rationalisation', the capacity of logical understanding for this mode of extension of knowledge need not be questioned. But logic cannot by itself manipulate a fact, an existent state of affair. Even when as inferential reasoning it proceeds from known to unknown and thus seems to extend the bounds of given experience, it has to work on the basis of the 'given' of experience and cannot work usefully or meaningfully without that mooring. It needs certain premises, warranted by experience, to draw upon in order to be an organ of knowledge. An inferential reasoning, says Sankara in common with all-Indian logicians, needs a *lingua*, the *hetu* or the middle term working as the 'gign' for the significate. Nothing can be a *linga* if there is no relation of universal concomitance between it and the *sadhya*, and that which is to be proved – the major term. This relation of concomitance, called *vyapti* in Indian terminology, which is to be the fundamental premise of inference, has to be experience, – based. This is one reason why the logical process involved here is called *anumana*, where the prefix '*anu*', meaning 'after' or 'in accordance with', suggests dependence of this process on some perceptual base given in advance. As a process of knowledge, this logical process moves from premise to conclusion, but as a justificatory process it moves opposite-wise, from a *provandum* (*pratijna*) to such conditions or grounds as would prove it. This justificatory move brings in a logic of demonstration. Within its proper limits and in so far as the 'grounds or conditions' of this demonstrative process are furnished by prior experience of an immediate nature, this logical process remains legitimate and free from eccentricity (*utpreksa*). But logic becomes eccentric and desultorily speculative when, instead of deriving the 'conditions and grounds of the demonstrative process from an experiential base of some kind, it attempts to ingeniously postulate these grounds and conditions. The various forms of metaphysics, outside the *Vedanta*, rests upon some such logic of postulation. The name '*tarka*' is given to this logic of postulation.

In Indian logic, *anumana* or inferential process has been at the outset distinguished into two forms, such as, *svārtha* and *parārtha*. The former is the actual epistemic process, which is involved when the one infers for the sake of his personal knowledge. This is inference as a process of *actual knowing*. The latter is inference as a process in demonstration. Its purpose is to convince others about the new truth by demonstrating its logical linkage with the old truth, which, then, becomes the necessary premise of the deduction of the new truth. What was an *epistemic link* in *svārthanumana* is put forth, or made out to be, a *logical link* in *parārthanumana*, that is, in inference as a process of demonstration. But while the epistemic inference (*svārthanumana*) is a process of knowledge, the demonstrative process is really a process of proof or disproof, not of knowledge proper for the person demonstrating. But it fulfils a different purpose for the person to whom it is demonstrated. That person becomes convinced in a *logical way* of the truth of the conclusion without access to any given experience of the sort. There is nothing to complain against this exercise of logical reasoning. But the situation completely changes when the grounds with reference to which the truth of a *provandum* is sought to be established become farthense removed from any given experience. Logical reasoning then becomes *postulatory* out and out. This postulatory move soon transgresses the limits of all possible experience in search of ultimate or final grounds of a logical explanation of the given order of experience—the world. Logical reason in this bid for absolute freedom from the restriction of any form of given experience becomes speculative and eccentric. This, according to both the Vedānta and Kant, is the ground of all speculative metaphysics. What Kant named speculative reason, the Vedānta, particularly Sankara, names '*utprekṣā*'<sup>11</sup>. This is without a restricting or regulative principle—*nirankuṣa*. It is sustained by bad analogies and picture-thinking which have their roots in the fertile and infinitely diverse human imagination (*puruṣamatīvalisvarūpya*)<sup>12</sup>. Reason in this sphere, says Kant, becomes dialectical and incapable of giving a fixed and unitary decision. The Vedānta *sūtra* voices the very same feeling when it observes that reason or *tarka* in this free and unbridled exercise remain always de-established and unsettled (*a-pratisthita*)<sup>13</sup>. Neither in a purely speculative and therefore, free exercise of itself, nor by foisting upon the *śruti* a free interpretation conforming to its arbitrary conceptual categories, can speculative reason provide the basis of a transcendental philosophy. This is sought to be established by two cardinal *sūtras* such as, *sūtra* 2.1.1 and 2.1.11 by Bādarāyaṇa. Sankara has utilised these two *sūtras* in his commentary to serve two fold purposes—as arguments showing logicity of his transcendental metaphysics resting upon *śruti-pramāṇa*, and at the same time, removing the logical base of speculative metaphysics of any form. Kant's destructive criticism of speculative metaphysics will be acceptable to Sankara, but all the same Sankara's criticisms against speculative metaphysics form part of his argument in defence of a new transcendental metaphysics based on the *śruti-pramāṇa*.

Sankara's basic and the most vital argument both for defence of his system, and reputation of other systems is not, however, couched in any of Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras*. This is his own this has already been expressed in the context of his commentary on the second and the fourth *sūtras* while explaining the difference between *jñāna* and Vedic *Kṛiā*. *Jñāna*, Sankara has said, is *pramāṇajanya* and *pramāṇa* is *yathabhūtavastuvisayaṃ* (conforming to the nature of thing as it is). Knowledge of truth cannot be multiform. Contrariwise, where there is multiformity, wide diversity of opinion equally plausible, there we cannot locate the truth<sup>14</sup>. This wide diversity of opinions arises when logical understanding is not harnessed to the 'given' of an intuition of some kind. The conflict among several opinions can be resolved by a process of verification, that is, by appeal to some given experience. Whether the object in front is the trunk of a tree or a person cannot be settled without recourse to experience, — by means of logical arguments alone. In the sphere of transcendental metaphysics, reason has to accept guidance of non-sensuous intuitions such as are embodied in the

*śruti* statements. One way of deciding what is *transcendentally true*, says Sankara, is by deciding, even theoretically, as to what sort of knowledge can liberate the individual from a life of tension and suffering<sup>16</sup>. Metaphysics, as the Indian systems understand by the concept, is no conventional knowledge of our day-to-day life. It is knowledge of what turns out, or is discovered to be the *real state of* things and existence as distinguished from what is *ordinarily* understood to be the case.

In the context of Indian philosophical tradition, the claimants for being the source of metaphysical knowledge and supreme truths of life are the *śrutis*, *smṛitis* and logical understanding or reason. The Vedānta stand, however, is that neither the *smṛiti* nor the logical understanding can maintain an independent posture and claim to be self-dependent authorities in this field. This then is very different from maintaining that the *smṛiti* and reason have absolutely no relevance in the matter. But the *Brahmasūtras* and Sankara, their commentator, both maintain that neither the *smṛiti* nor logical reasoning can have a role in opposition to the *śruti* in matters transcendental. This issue cropped up from the urgency of the Vedānta as a monistic system of metaphysics to repudiate the claim of the dualistic Sāṃkhya to provide an alternative solution of metaphysical questions. In course of *pāda* 1 and 4 of the first *Adhyāya*, an attempt has been made to show that the dualistic Sāṃkhya doctrine has no foothold in the *śrutis*. Two alternative possibilities, therefore, remain to sustain the claim of Sāṃkhya dualism to be a valid metaphysics. These are (1) Sāṃkhya may as well put forth its claim to be a rival metaphysical system providing for a valid transcendental doctrine on the ground that it is one of the recognised *smṛitis* with a hoary tradition, (2) The Sāṃkhya may also claim to be a purely logical system, a rationalistic metaphysics, defended by well-knit logical arguments. So, in the second *Adhyāya*, before examining other purely logical systems of metaphysics, the Vedānta comes out with the view that neither of the two grounds – to be a *smṛiti* or to be a logical system, can sustain the claim of the Sāṃkhya to be a valid metaphysics system insofar as it militates against the *śruti*-doctrine and has no foot-hold in the *śrutis*. This then brings forth the Vedānta view that while the *śrutis* and logical reasoning may have a *supporting* role in the elaboration of a metaphysical doctrine based on the *śrutis*. They can have no legitimacy in opposition to the *śrutis*.

The above cannot be taken as an irrational or extra-logical claim. It can be seen, the Vedānta doctrine as sketched through the Vedānta *sūtras* and elaborated through commentary like that of Sankara's own commentary defends its claim to be a valid metaphysics on no other ground than that it conforms to the *śruti*-texts, is built upon their foundation, and is not in opposition to the *śruti*. The the *Jaimini Karmamīmāṃsā* may also be looked upon as having a footing similar to that of the *Manusmṛiti*, the *Gīta*, the Sāṃkhya, etc., etc. What is *anumāna* or inferential knowledge in relation to *pratyakṣa* (perceptual experience) in the sphere of our ordinary (*laukika*) knowledge, that is *smṛiti* in relation to the *śruti* in the calm of transcendental knowledge. Insofar as the *smṛiti* is to be an elaboration, a systematic and logical presentation of the *śruti* doctrine, it cannot claim an independent status for itself, cannot have independent validity. It is valid and useful when it is in non-opposition to the *śruti* but is abortive when it runs into opposition. One of the *Jaiminisūtras* also voices this<sup>17</sup> protest.

The *pāda* 1 of *Adhyāya* 2, of the *Brahmasūtras* opens with the logical issue if it is obligatory for the Vedānta, as a *śruti*-based metaphysical doctrine, which is, therefore, some sort of a *smṛiti* and not itself the *śruti*, to be in full agreement with a dissident *smṛiti* like the Sāṃkhya in order to be perfectly logical. The reply that has been given in course of the first *sūtra*<sup>18</sup> is that what is obligatory for any logical elaboration of a *śruti*-theme, that is, for a *smṛiti* of any kind, is its absolute conformity with the *śrutis* and nothing else. Agreement with any particular *smṛiti*, even a consensus among the various *smṛitis*, cannot be a necessary condition of validity of a *śruti*-based doctrine. If it is demanded

of the Vedanta to be in accord with the Sankhya, even though the latter is neither *sruti*-based nor is in conformity with the *sruti*, the risk is that it will run into conflict with the other *smritis* which are *smritis* proper insofar as they are in accordance with the *srutis*. The sagacity or personal eminence of the propounder of a metaphysical system can be no ground for its acceptance even though his teachings run counter to the *sruti*-texts which alone can provide for the basis of a transcendental philosophy. They Vedanta doctrine that *Brahman* is both the efficient and the material cause of whatever there is, and that this *Brahman* is also the identity, the self (*atman*) of all, has for its ground a harmonious rendering of the *sruti*-texts. This has already been stated the *samanyaya sutra* (B.S.B. 1.1.4). That the Sankhya doctrine has no roots in the *sruti* had also been demonstrated in course of the various discussions in the first *Adhyaya*. So, the only relevant issue to be decided next is if the *personal* authority of a sage, of the eminence, say of Kapila, traditionally regarded as a man of unlimited wisdom (*jnanamapratihatam*)<sup>19</sup>, can weight more than the *impersonal* authority of the *sruti*-texts in deciding which is to be a transcendental metaphysics and which not. Sankara's decision in favour of the impersonal authority rests on two-fold grounds: (a) the mental capacity of persons for understanding is essentially relative to one's mental endowment and so it varies with persons<sup>20</sup>, (b) even the so called direct enlightenment (*siddhi*) claimed on behalf of a person is dependent on fulfilment of some conditions (*sapeksa*). These conditions, however, have been explained differently in the context of *sutra* 2.1.1. and *sutra* 2.1.11. In the former context, it is said that *siddhi* (enlightenment) is dependent on following vedic prescriptions on righteous conduct. Even where the alleged enlightenment of the person is claimed to have been attained in that way, the authority of the earlier seers, such as, the Vedic seers, cannot be dismissed on the authority of a later seer (*siddha*)<sup>21</sup>. Moreover, the claimants to *siddhi* (enlightenment) being too many, it is not possible to decide who is more authoritative among the host without guidance of the *srutis*<sup>22</sup>, and it is wellknown that Kapila, insofar as he admits plurality of selves maintains a thesis which militates against the teachings of the *vedas* and which, therefore, can only be regarded as an independent innovation<sup>23</sup>. The issue, here, seems to have been decided on the ground that while the Sankhya, being a *smriti* is after all *pauruseyavacana* (personal composition) and so dependent on an authority other than itself (*mutantarasapeksam*), the *vedas* as impersonal (*a-pauruseya*) are self-valid, their validity not being dependent on the authority of a person<sup>24</sup>. In the context of *sutra* 2.1.11 a more powerful ground is cited. It is that the knowledge which the Upanisads give can alone be the right (absolute) knowledge since it is this knowledge (knowledge of identity of reality with self) and none other that can serve to release one from the cycle of existence<sup>25</sup>. The presumption is: what falls short of realisation of identity with absolute reality cannot ensure absolute release and cannot therefore be ultimate knowledge, and the Sankhya suffers from this drawback. This then disposes of the issue of any charge of illogicality against the vedanta metaphysics on the ground that it conflicts with a *smriti* like the Sankhya system. The defence, in brief, is: since the vedanta metaphysics is in fundamental agreement with the *smritis* which accord with the *srutis*, and since a valid *smriti* has always to conform to the *srutis*, its disagreement with or opposition to a dissident *smriti* like the Sankhya is not to be construed as an argument against the validity of the Vedanta system.

But why should there be this inordinate insistence on the *sruti-pramana* for providing the primary basis of a transcendental metaphysics? Why should the concurrence of the *srutis*, again, be an essential condition of any system of thought, otherwise well-knit and logical, for becoming a transcendental philosophy? What, if the Sankhya is not *sruti*-based or if it is not in accordance with the *srutis*? Cannot the Sankhya or any other system qualify for being a transcendental metaphysics although it is purely a logical system? In short, cannot logical reasoning (*tarka*) by itself and without the support of any revealed doctrine of the scripture provide us with a transcendental metaphysics?

This issue has been raised and divided by the Badarayana *sutra* 2.1.11. It is indeed gratifying to note that the Vedānta as sponsored in the Brahmasūtras in this part, and as elaborated by Sāṅkara's commentary on the *sūtras*, does not attempt at hedging what would ordinarily be regarded as its weak points but provided for a resolute and convincing defence of them with utmost logical rigour. The issue of logical reason *versus* authority has been examined in two perspectives— if logical reasoning by itself and unguided by the *śāstrapramāṇa* can build up a legitimate system of transcendental metaphysics, and again, if logical reason will be functioning logically in summarily rejecting a tenet of *śruti*-doctrine which does not fall in line with its improvised categories or laws of interpretation. This, in short, is reviewing the role of logic and logical reasoning (*tarka*) in the arena of transcendental metaphysics.

As in the case of *smṛti* so also here a supporting role is conceded. But this is not done arbitrarily. Logic, it is argued, has to work under certain natural, and so, inherent limitations in the transcendental as much as in the ordinary sphere of knowledge. In the sphere of ordinary knowledge, logical reasoning has to draw or follow upon perceptual data. It has to be *pratyakṣānusāri*. In the sphere of transcendental knowledge, it has to draw upon themes presented by the *śruti*-texts. It has to be *śrutyānusāri*. Left to itself and functioning independently as a constructive process, logical reasoning becomes manipulative and postulatory. It then degenerates into mere argument (*śuśka tarka*) which can achieve no useful purpose. Logic cannot manipulate facts which are to be 'given' in some way in advance of logical elaboration or extension.

The relevance of the *sūtra* 2.1.11 in the context of the Vedānta is, as we have already hinted at to be met elsewhere. In Adhyāya 1, *pādas* 1 and 4, the *vedānta sūtras* seek to prove that there is no internal evidence in support of the view that the dualistic metaphysics of the Sāṅkhya school is *śruti* – supported. In Adhyāya 2, 1 and 2, the *sūtras* at first show that the Sāṅkara cannot also be admitted as a *smṛti* proper insofar as it is not in conformity with the *śruti*-doctrine which is monistic<sup>26</sup> as every regular *smṛti* should be. The *sūtras* next examine if the Sāṅkhya as also the other historical systems, orthodox and heterodox, can be defended as genuine metaphysical systems sustained by independent logical reasoning. The *sūtra* 2.1.11 has been introduced specially in this context.

The pronounced adherence of the Vedānta to the *śruti* as furnishing the basis of a metaphysical philosophy is very often censured as rank dogmatism. It will, therefore, be highly interesting to examine Sāṅkara's criticism of rationalistic metaphysics resting on different varieties of postulatory logic (*tarka*), and his claim that a transcendental philosophy has necessarily to be based on nonsensuous intuitions of some kind. The *śrutis*, we have already argued<sup>27</sup>, although an indirect *pramāṇa* insofar as they in their word-form have descended down through ages, are, at their source, nonsensuous intuitions revealed and so 'given' to the mind in a state of 'deconditioning' of personal consciousness achieved through disciplining of the mind.

Sāṅkara's argument in this context boils down to this that logical reasoning which is not grounded in the *śruti* (*nyāgamah*), if extended to decide transcendental issues, becomes abortive or vacuous. It issues forth in infinite number of alternative postulations suiting infinite variety of mental disposition of mankind and lacking a fixed regulating principle (*ānkura*), it remains for ever unsettled (*a-pratiṣṭhita*) and incapable of a final decision. Not that the various rationalistic metaphysics monistic, dualistic and pluralistic-existentialistic or nihilistic, have not, each on its own behalf, made absolute claim to truth, – historically speaking. But such claim has remained arbitrary and a decision among these alternative has largely depended on personal choice. There has been, strictly speaking, no *rationale* whereby a decision could be made in favour of a particular alternative to the rejection of all the rest. But the *truth of a fact*, Sāṅkara has contended all throughout, cannot be varied and



multifarious. Nor can it be maintained that all alternative formulations in respect of a certain fact are simultaneously and equally true. That would be making a parody of the very concept of truth. This peculiar predicament of theoretical reason to take a fixed decision in transcendental issue Kant called the 'dialectic (of reason. The basic reason why, according to the Vedanta and Kant, theoretical reason is ineffective in building up a transcendental metaphysics is almost the same. Logical reason can work effectively and fruitfully on the basis of some 'given intuition' of some kind only. One ground why the Vedanta rejects the Sankhya metaphysics is that its 'categories' are purely conceptual and do not have any experiential basis – sensuous or nonsensuous. This is brought forth in the *sutra* "Itavesanacanupalabdheh" (2.1.2). The categories, such as, Pradhana, Mahat etc., Sankara explains, are like the objects of non-existent sixth sense and are neither mentioned in the Vedas nor are they matters of common experience<sup>21</sup>. What can be the deciding factor in favour of a transcendental metaphysics is neither the personal eminence of its propounder<sup>22</sup>, nor can it be a consensus of opinions among theoreticians themselves, of all ages and places<sup>23</sup>. For a transcendental philosophy, this deciding factor, according to the Vedanta, can only be as a proximate condition) conformity with the *sruti* – texts, and verifiability in term of an intuitive experience of a non-sensuous kind (as a final condition). What we have with the rival systems of Indian philosophy are purely *conceptualistic* metaphysics, which, at their bottom, are mere thought-constructions. They are products of manipulative thinking (*utpreksha*), ever ingenious but rootless (*nirankusa*) in its construction. As this mode of thinking is inherently incapable of a final settlement and fixed adjudication it cannot be admitted, says Sankara, as an organ proper for transcendental knowledge, which is the aim of metaphysics.

This need not be construed as a disparagement of logic or of logical method. Notwithstanding their belief in invulnerability of the Vedic authority, neither Badarayana, nor Sankara in his commentary on the *sutras* would go for an anti-intellectualistic stance. It is absolutely pointless to compare Sankara's position with that of any western anti-intellectualist, an intuitionist or a volar of unmediated experience. Sankara is emphatic that speculative reason or logical reasoning cannot by itself provide for a transcendental metaphysics. Yet he enlists the support of logic in bringing about a coherent interpretation of the themes of the *upanisads* and in working out a thoroughly logical defence of his Advaita system. It is on logical ground that he delimits the scope of logic in transcendental matters. His Advaita system is itself a logical liberation of the *upanisadic* themes, logically arranged in an order of primacy and fundamentality, and he himself uses the name '*Sariraka mīmāṃsā*' for his version of the Vedanta<sup>24</sup>. He declared his express purpose to be '*Vedanta-vakyaartha-vicarana*'<sup>25</sup>, that is, logical interpretation of the meanings and import of the Upanisadic statements. This '*Vakyaartha-vicarana*' is not, however, to be confused with the so called 'logical analysis' of the structure and the rules of semantics and syntax of the vedanta-vakyaas. Such analysis would be a part of a philosophy of language which has absolutely no relevance in this context. The *vedanta-vakyaartha* here stands for what these *vakyaas* or sentences communicate or talk about, and what they talk about is the unity or transcendental one-ness of all existence, the identity of *Brahman* and *Atman*. In the context of his commentaries on the principal Upanisads the one cardinal theme of all the Upanisads, Sankara discovered to be the unity of one-ness of *Brahman* and *Atman-brahmatmaikatva*<sup>26</sup>. This *brahmatmaikatva* is logically interpreted to be *atmaikatva*<sup>27</sup>, the transcendental one-ness of all selves, and so, the transcendental oneness of the finite selves with *Brahman*, the reality, by Sankara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sutras*. How does logic function here, to what use does Sankara put it. Sankara has clearly explained his stand in the context of his commentary on *sutra* 2.1.6. Thus, he says '*srutyanyugrhitā eva hi atra tarkanubhavanāgatvena asrjyate*' – here *tarka* or logical reasoning which is acceptable to the *sruti* – texts and so favoured by them is utilised as a support insofar as this becomes an aid to the comprehension. He, at the end of the same paragraph,<sup>28</sup> hastens to add



that this does not amount to making any concession for logical reasoning which functions independently without the guidance of an intuition or of the *śruti* and that utter deceptivity and sterility of that kind of logical reasoning will be exhibited in the context of his commentary on *sūtra* 2.1.11, to follow Sankara, it may be recalled, indicated the mode of utilisation of *tarka* (logical reasoning) in his dissertation at the end of his commentary *Badarayana's* first *sūtra*. Thus he said that *tarka* which does not militate against the Vedantic themes is an essential ingredient of *Vedānta-vākya-mīmāṃsā* and fulfils an essential purpose in the realisation of the supreme end<sup>24</sup>.

Such being the role admitted in respect of *tarka* when it does not militate against the Vedānta themes, it becomes pertinent to ask what role, if any, is admitted in its regard by Badarayana or Sankara if and when there arises a conflict between the Vedic testimony and the conventional logic of commonsense? In his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and elsewhere, this point has been raised and discussed by Sankara in quite a number of places through the device of *purvapakṣa*. As Sankara's decisions have moved on, more or less, similar lines in this controversy we may as well limit ourselves to consideration of some very remarkable specimens.

A clash or conflict between logical understanding and the *śruti*-themes may arise in three ways— (1) when the *śrutis* run counter to the evidence of all other *pramāṇas*, including inference which is based on logical reasoning, (2) when two *śruti*-texts seem to suggest opposite things and seem to contradict each other, and (3) when the *śrutis* suggest an explanation which, on the very face of it, seems vitiated and self-contradictory. The case under (2) and the case under (3) need not be the same—two texts seeming to contradict each other, and a single text suggesting things apparently irreconcilable. Logic cannot tolerate any form of inconsistency or contradiction. Truth, as logically understood, is free from any kind of contradiction—to consider, at first, the case of disagreement, even contradiction of a *śruti*-theme with the deliveries of other methods of knowledge: It can be seen that the *śāstrapramāṇa*, which in the context of the Vedānta deals with an existential state of affairs (*bhūtavastu*), but Sankara's own admission, does not enjoy the special privilege admitted of it by the *purvāmīmāṃsā* in the context of their doctrine of *dharma*. No doubt, here also it is acclaimed as an extraordinary (*alaukika*) *pramāṇa* and as the organ of transcendental truths. But the truths which the Vedānta *vākyas* are believed to impart are 'truths of fact', not truths about the consequences of righteous actions which are to materialise in a life hereafter, and which are, for that very reason, unverifiable. The Vedantic 'truth of fact' is an eternally self-accomplished reality all-pervasive and all-comprehending. It is the one absolute self of all plural manifestations—the realisation of which releases one from the bondage of life. An existential matter, that which is always there, should at least theoretically be a meet object-matter for all other *pramāṇas*, and cannot, *in principle*, be screened off from them, and this Sankara has himself also admitted<sup>25</sup>. So, it becomes an interesting point how to decide in which way the truth lies when the testimony of the Vedānta *vākyas* runs counter to conventional experience of mankind, or is repugnant to a simple logical understanding of the very nature of the case as presented in the *śruti*-texts themselves?

It will be helpful to illustrate a few of the above stated points of conflict. (a) The *śrutis* speak of one uniform conscious principle as being the source (both material and efficient cause) of the world where as the world, as it is commonly known and understood, is not uniform at all, but is an infinitely varied mass of both conscious and unconscious existents, distinguishable as enjoyers and the enjoyed<sup>26</sup>, the afflicted and the afflicting<sup>27</sup>. It will not do to say that such differences and distinctions are not there or that these, are not really experienced as being there. So, how to accept the *śruti*-version of the case that there are no real multiplicities, that all are, at bottom and in their ultimate source, one undivided and undistinguished consciousness? (b) The *śruti*-texts seem to maintain two opposite

thesis (1) That the manifest order, the world, is radically different (*vilaksana*)<sup>48</sup>, there being no community of nature between the world-appearance and the transcendental reality, such as, *Brahman*. (2) That *Brahman* is yet the material cause (*prakrti*) of the world-appearance. This seems irreconcilable (c) How can the self-same reality, which is declared to be formless (*niravayava*) and partless (*niravaya*), be transformed and determined in some part and untransformed and undetermined in some other part even on the strength of a *sruti*-pronouncement to the same effect<sup>49</sup>? All these are logical points posed in the *sutras* by Badarayana as objections against the Vedanta metaphysics. From the very mode of their formulation, they all appear to have been directed against the Advaitic version in particular. This seems to give the lie to the contention that Advaitism is an innovation of Sankara and that neither the *sutras* nor the Upanisadic texts which he wanted to laconically present through the *sutras*, has any *advaitic* bias.

Now, to return to the issues raised. It may be noted at the outset that had not the Vedanta any regard for logic it could cover up its flaws by raising a cloud of dust of blinding rhetories, in stead of raising such inconvenient issues are arguing against itself with so much logical rigour as we meet in Sankara's commentary in particular. Logic, in fact, has been shown all the consideration due to it since no system of metaphysics, however transcendental, can sail clear off logic. How, for instance, the issues raised are to be decided, and what faculty of cognition will given the decision in this way or that? It can be seen that the issues will have to be logically decided as they have been divided here also. Of all the faculties of cognition logic has the catholicity and openness even to take a decision against itself. This is most eminently illustrated in these three specimen cases. All the issues have been decided logically and that properly.

In dealing with the three issues – the conflict of *srutipramana* with *laukika pramanas*, the conflict among the *sruti*-statements here and there, and the conflict inside one and the same *sruti*-statement, we shall avoid reference to details, and consider the issues in a general way. In each and every case, it will be seen that the objections have been raised by logic of one frame and have been ruled out or disposed of by logic of a different frame. So it cannot be said that the issue has been decided in spite of logic and arbitrarily. To illustrate, our *laukika pramanas* are nearest to us, nearest to what is directly experienced by us. The 'unknown', if it is to be a content of knowledge at all, has to be interpreted and understood in line with and on the basis of the already known<sup>50</sup>. In logical reasoning or argument, this procedure is maintained. So, in ascertaining the material cause of the world with all its plural contents, which are distinguished as subjects and objects, we should look for principles which are *similar* to the given arrangement of things. What can then be the logical basis for acceptance of a formless conscious principle so very *dissimilar* to the world of effects as the root-cause on the testimony of the *srutis* as a *pramana*, more particularly, because that testimony is so very remote from us that it is more like traditional fad (*tattihyamatra*) than anything else<sup>51</sup>? Then, again, if it is deemed proper to resolve conflict among varied *sruti*-texts by coercing all others to conform to the meaning of the one text which is *felt* to be pivotal and unreducible, what impropriety can there be if in a conflict between a *sruti* version and the evidence of the other the *laukika pramanas*, the former is re-interpreted in a way that conforms to be latter<sup>52</sup>? To strengthen the argument of the apparent, Sankara, in the context of his commentary on *sutra* 2.1.13, cites the *Purvamimamsa* convention of interpreting the *mantras* and *arthavadas* in a secondary meaning (*gunartha* or *laksana*) where their primary sense rudely conflicts with the evidence of these other *pramanas*.

How has Sankara, or for matter of that how have the Vedanta *sutras* decided in a case like the above? Sankara's opponents and proponents both seem to have made the wrong guess. Sankara, it

can be seen, has resolved the opposition of the *alaukika sastrapramana* and *laukika pramanas* by limiting each to its own sphere without rejecting any, or without translating one in term of the other as was demanded of him. This stand he has explained in his commentary on *sutra* 2.1.13. As for the relation of the *conventionally known* and the *laukika pramanas* by limiting each to its own sphere without rejecting any, or without translating one in term of the other as was demanded of him. This stand he has explained in his commentary on *sutra* 2.1.13. As for the relation of the *conventionally known* and the *transcendentally knowable*, the solution has been presented in the *sutra* 2.1.14, and Sankara's commentary on it. The conventionally known order, it has been shown, is non-different (*ananya*) from the transcendental in spite of a radically different appearance. Sankara's opponents looked for a revision of the *sruti*-testimony in conformity with the evidence of the *laukika pramanas*, to be sure. This was expected not simply because, compared to the *sruti*-testimony, an indirect (*paroksa*) source of knowledge, the *laukika pramanas* are much nearer to us, but also because Sankara had, at an earlier stage<sup>41</sup>, resisted the view that the *srutis* constitute the only *pramana*. In respect of his transcendental doctrine since what this doctrine has for its subject-matter is an existential reality (*bhutatavastuvishayatvat*). The admission of accessibility of other modes of cognition, as far as possible (*yathasambhava*), made it doubly necessary, in the opinion of an opponent, to revise the *sruti*-view in conformity with the evidences of other *pramanas* in case of a conflict between the two. Now that, in the *is* context, Sankara defended infallibility and unrevisability of the *sruti*-evidences in the transcendental sphere, and described his previous admission of accessibility of the other *pramanas* in respect of this as *manorathamatra*<sup>42</sup>, his opponent is likely to discover in this a palpable contradiction and shameless submission to traditional bias. Most of his protagonists, again, seem to have felt that Sankara was forswearing his earlier commitment, in advertent haste, and was correcting himself in the way he should. They seem to have understood Sankara's expression '*tadapi manorathamatra*' in this context as meaning 'mere talk' or a 'mode of convenient speech signifying nothing'. Even Vacaspati thought that Sankara was denying relevance of other *pramanas* in the transcendental context *all-together*. But this is a mistake, since Sankara *did not* forswear or contradict himself.

Sankara's argument 'in this context'<sup>43</sup> may be textually rendered as follows. 'the contention, as per our previous commitment, that *Brahman*, being an existential fact, other *pramayas* may also prevail (*sambhavadayub*) in its regard, relates to a 'formal expectancy only' (*tadapi manorathamaram*). Being devoid of sense-qualities, *Brahman* can be no object of sense-perception; there being no sign-significate relation to guide, nor can it be the subject-matter of processess, such as, inference. So, like '*dharma*', *Brahman* can be known in all details (*samadhigamya*) by means of *agama* (*srutis*) only'. This argument is next supported by a group of two quotations from the *sruti* and another group of three quotations from the *smrti* which stress on the essential inscrutability and unthinkability of *Brahman* as a doctrinal theme. These induced Vacaspati to make a wrong deduction that although an existential fact, *Brahman* is not accessible to other modes of cognition and that the *srutis* and the *smrtis* are the only proofs in its regard<sup>44</sup>.

Vacaspati seems not have properly grasped Sankara's meaning in this context in spite of his great erudition and mastery over Sanskrit language. This is why he felt tempted to compare the *Brahman*-theme with *darsapunarvasa* sacrifice, as regards their results or consequences, and though that it was Sankara's view that the other *pramanas* are absolutely irrelevant (*anapeksa*) as regards *Brahman*<sup>45</sup>. Did Sankara for swear what he had said in the context of his commentary on *sutra* 1.1.2, in this later context of the commentary on *sutra* 2.1.6., or could it be that Vacaspati and others misunderstood his intention and meaning? We think it was the commentators and interpreters of

Sankara who committed the mistake. When in the earlier context, Sankara said that not only the *srutis* and its auxiliaries (*srutyadeyah*) but also the various other modes of cognition (*anuvavadayasca*) are *pramanas* in respect of the Brahman-theme as far as possible (*yathasambhava*), did he suggest ready or open accessibility of these latter to the Brahman-themes? What did he mean by 'Yathasambhavam' then? What he actually meant was that, in this context, the *srutis* and its allied literature figure initially and primarily and that the other modes of cognition come into prominence and become a *pramana* at a later stage and this is their *sambhavyata*, their possible and warranted accessibility from the very nature of the case. In ascertaining the nature of a distant object, say a table, whether it is made of wood or of some other material, the visual sense may be the guide at the primary and the earliest stage, and the factual and kinæstic senses may be the guide at a later stage from the very nature of the case, but such circumstances cannot render the use of the tactual and the Kinæsthetic senses irrelevant nor can it establish their inaccessibility in principle. It remains a 'formal expectancy' (*manorathamatram*) that if the object, when touched and pressed returns sensations of a special kind, it is to be taken as made of this instead of any other material. Sankara's expression '*adapt manorathamatram*' in the given context has to be interpreted in the same way.

It can be seen that Sankara had used the two expressions '*samadhigamya*' and '*manorathamatram*' in their literal meanings. It stands to reason that there could be no talk about Brahman as Atman, not even a wild guess that there was any such thing, had not the Upanisads. The *srutis* etc. presented such a theme. No other *pramanas* would have succeeded in having a glimpse of the theme or in forming even a conjecture about it, unaided by the *srutis* or by themselves. *Srutis* are, therefore, our primary and initiated source of knowing Brahman. It is the *srutis*, again, which have explained elaborately the specific nature of Brahman – what this Brahman means and stands for. The *srutis*, so to say, furnish the guide-lines of our 'would-be' quest and direct realisation. These are facts incontestable. So Sankara is fully justified when he says '*agamumatrasamadhigamya eva tu ayam artho dharmavat*'<sup>18</sup>, which means it is through 'agama' or 'srutis' only that a detailed descriptive knowledge (*samadhigama*) of Brahman can be had, as in the case the Vedic concept of 'dharma' also. This is not to be construed as a flat denial of the accessibility or relevance of other *pramanas* as it seems to have been done by the classical interpreters. From the very nature of the case, no other *pramana* can furnish the primary key or the clue, no other *pramana* can give detailed information about Brahman as Atman, and therefore, without the guidance of the *srutis* giving the much need primary information, the other *pramanas* cannot become operative. Does this suggest that the other methods of knowledge are absolutely irrelevant in the field and that Sankara had contradicted himself? By saying that other modes of cognition (*anubhavadayasca*) are, as far as possible (*Yathasambhava*) also *pramanas* in respect of the Brahman-theme what Sankara intended to say is that, from the very nature of the case and as befitting their nature and form of procedure, the other *pramanas* are to work on the trail of the *sruti* – texts and not erratically. Their functioning is very much useful and vital insofar as they help in bringing down the Brahman-theme nearest to us till the process terminates in concrete realisation of Brahman as a truth of fact. The talk about inaccessibility and irrelevance of the other *pramanas*, in this context, is itself irrelevant if we keep in view the fact that Sankara, in his commentary on *sutra* 2.1.14, which follows closely, finds his *conclusive and final proof* of the Brahman-Atman theme in the evidence furnished by one of these other *pramanas* – such as, the *realised identity of Brahman and Atman*<sup>19</sup>. But what is this direct realisability, the ultimate verifiability of the Brahman-theme, save a 'formal expectancy,' a 'fulfilment wished-for' (*manorathamatram*) at the initial and primary stage?

This then gives a *possible* new dimension, a new direction and guide-line to the other *pramanas*. In transcendental matter and transcendental quest, they are to follow the guidance of the *srutis* and work in conformity with them. This amounts to reversal of the direction of their normal functioning which is sense-experience-oriented. They are to follow, *as far as possible*, the clue and the trail of a new kind of intuition, so far only believed to be encased in the *sruti* – statements. The question of their opposition to the *sruti-pramana* does not arise at all since in the sphere of transcendental truth, except under the guidance of the *srutis*, they do not have any commission at all. It is logic, that is, a logical understanding and assessment of the nature of the case, which makes the award in favour of the *sruti-pramana* and *against* conventional experience and its logic, since the issue is transcendental. The unestablished-ness (*a-pratisthitatva*) and non-finality (*avimoksha*) of logical reasoning in delivering up a metaphysical system, a transcendental philosophy, explained in *sutra* 2.1.11, is also a discovery of logic, and a judicious settlement made by it. Logic is, so to say, aware that without the ‘given’ of sense it cannot make any pronouncement about the sensible world, and also that without some sort of nonsensuous intuition to guide it, it cannot legitimately embark upon any transcendental theme of metaphysics. Does logic or Sankara work dogmatically here?

But how is one to decide logically when the *sruti*-version of *existential* status of affair violently closet with our common and conventional experience of them, when things are experienced in a different shape and colour all together from what they have been made out to be in the *srutis*? How is it possible to subscribe to the view that things *are not* what they are commonly experienced as known to be, that they *are really* what the *srutis* speak about them, although the *sruti*-description does not have remotest affinity with what the things are commonly known to be, but is discrepant (*vilaksana*)<sup>11</sup> out and out? It can be seen that the present issue has a somewhat subtle link and connection with Sankara’s previous decision in favour of the *sruti*-testimony. What the *srutis* describe to be the case is *really* the case and is unchallengeable because this is also capable of direct verification in term of one’s given experience in the long run. But latter, the possibility of immediate verification, is still a *manorathamatram* (a formal expectancy not yet fulfilled). In the face of a fact of this nature, how is it possible to take an *ex-parte* decision in favour of the *sruti*-evidence? This seems to be the crux of the problem. It can be seen that here our approach to the problem is not the same as that of the earlier interpreters of Sankara. They would have thrown out the testimony of other *pramanas* without a hearing in their blind reverence to the vedic authority – which, however, has not been Sankara’s way. Sankara is less petulant and more accommodating, and therefore, more reasonable.

What has been Sankara’s approach in this controversy? This has been indicated in his commentary on *Brahma sutra* 2.1.13, also in his commentary on the Bhagavat Gita Sloka 66. His stand has been that the world, *as it is presented in conventional experience*, is true to that mode of presentation only and so, contextually and conditionally. The *srutis* declare what the shape of things would be regarded and known transcendently, unconditionally, and absolutely. But the transcendental view cannot be secured by merely wishing for it. There is no call, therefore, to discredit or to reject the evidence of the *laukika pramanas* and our habitual experience, *till* the very conditions of such experience are actually transcended. It will be enough if the evidence of our habitual mode of experience, is not considered final. There is no call, therefore, for revision of the meaning of the *sruti*-texts in the light of the testimony of our ordinary modes of knowing, *sruti*-version of reality as a mere *euphemistic* and so, an emotive description of things as they are in their conventional presentation, which under this circumstance, should be accepted as unexceptionable.



To illustrate Sankara's stand with reference to his commentary on the *sutra* 2.1.13. It is urged by the *purvapaksa* that the order of existence as it is empirically given shows a basic distinction between *bhokta* and *bhogyā*. There can be no sense in saying either that no such distinction is there, or that *bhokta* and *bhogyā* are really the same in essence. The *śrutis*, on the other hand, take all existential entities as *one* and *undivided* in essence. How to resolve this conflict? We cannot think of rejecting the evidence furnished by our habitual experience and the *laukika pramāṇas*, since that would put an end to all human behaviours and practices in life. Nor is it reasonable to regard the testimony of the *śrutis* and that of the *laukika pramāṇas* and common experience, each valid in its own sphere and absolutely so, since that would create a division in the real, so much so that the representations, can no longer be taken as aspects of one and the same reality.

It seems more reasonable to take the *śruti*-texts in a secondary and figurative sense to avoid conflict with the *laukika pramāṇas* which are nearest to us. The controversy raised in the context of Sankara's commentary on the Gita Sloka is as follows: how to ignore the distinction between, *Karta* (agent) and *Karma* (action) on the suggestion made by the *śrutis* that such distinction is grounded in the wrong belief of the self as a bodied individual? As our conventional experience testifies, the belief that the self is a bodied person cannot be wrong. So, why not take the *śruti*-view of the self as a disembodied spirit, universal and one, as an euphemistic and figurative description, in stead of taking bodied-ness (*sarīratva*) of the self as the result of a false sense of self-identity? Sankara's reply in both the cases is almost the same. The empirical distinctions which our conventional experience exhibits are actually so exhibited and are really felt to be there as far as that conventional experience goes, and there is no urge for denying this. All these are, however, relative to the conventional mode of knowing (*lokavat*)<sup>11</sup>. There is no bid to revise either the *śruti* - testimony or the evidence of common experience since what is transcendently true *may appear* in an altered shape and arrangement in common experience, although the non-difference (*ananyatva*) of the two apparently discordant presentations is a truth of fact. The sea, for instance, does appear in multiple breaker, waves, bubbles and patches of foam, and all these appear very much distinguished among themselves, when viewed *externally*. But all these manifest multiplicities may, again, be regarded as undivided and one when considered in their substance, since all are water<sup>12</sup>. Also regarded *internally* and from its own angle, it is one sea expressing itself in multiple forms. There is thus no call for denying actual presence of these two separate views or reduce one to the other. It is sufficient if we keep in mind *substantial non-difference* of multiple appearances with their transcendental unity or one-ness. In the context of the Gita sloka, the final solution has been that although at the level of conventional experience, vitiated by *avidyā*, the self is actually felt to be a bodied agent, individual and separate, when this *avidyā* is got over, the self is realised in its true essence as eternally unattached to the body and this experience also becomes as much *tadvatī-tatprakara* (knowing a thing as it is in itself) as in perceiving fire as fire in our common experience<sup>13</sup>.

What is then the logical ground of decision in the above controversy? It is that the evidence of the other *pramāṇas* is not to be thrown until it is *actually* removed and thrown out by a transcendental experience, ushering in an evidence of a radically different nature. Nothing is false unless it is *actually falsified* in some given experience. The conflict of the evidence of the *laukika pramāṇa* with the evidence put up by the *śruti* furnishes no ground for summary rejection of the former *then and there*. Nor does it become an argument for *immediate* acceptance of the latter as the *one truth*. Truth is a truth-experience. Pending concrete realisation of the truth as advocated by the *śruti* in term of some given experience, its claim to be the absolute truth, the only truth, remains *formal* only. And that the other truth, the *laukika* truth, is nothing final, or that it is liable to be



contradicted and rejected, also remains a formal decision. There is thus no *apriori* and no prejudicial decision in favour or against the truth of a particular level. Nor is there the provision for regarding both as *equally* true and in the same way. A possible alternation of truth-experience is admitted. That is the ultimate truth, absolute and unchangeable, which *actually* remains uncontradicted (*ahadhitā*) to the end. Contradiction, spoken of here, is not to be a *formal* affair. It means actual supersession and rejection of one experience by another, when only one truth-experience remains and the other ceases to be there in the field.

In case of apparent disagreement among *śruti*-texts, it is no doubt logic which is required to arbitrate. But logic *to function logically* has to put itself under certain restraint. Logic, for instance, cannot argue that a thing cannot look different from what it is, that one experience cannot be superseded by another. Logic can, of course, evaluate experiences as true or false. But logic is no organ of experience. It is only an instrument of interpretation and evaluation. Logic cannot, therefore throw out any *śruti* text, since it is a report of experience, any more than it can throw out any evidence so our conventional experience as not having been there. But it is an exclusive privilege of logic to harmonise, to grade, even to degrade evidences of given experience of this or that kind. Truth is, no doubt, an experience, but it is for logic to settle or stipulate what its nature is to be, any why so.

As the *śrutis* are all regarded sacrosanct and inviolable, an issue, such as, conflict among the *śruti*-texts themselves, or a discrepancy in the body of the very same text, turns out to be an issue between the *śrutis* on the one hand and logic, on the other. It becomes then a conflict between logic, and the *śrutis*. How has this conflict been resolved, how has logic been allowed to decide in such controversy as far as the Vedānta is concerned? This undoubtedly is a very interesting point. Let us illustrate by a typical case.

The *ananyatva* (non-difference) of the given empirical order of pluralities (which are all distinguished among themselves) with their substantial and so, their transcendental one-ness, has been defended and elaborated by Sankara in his commentary on the group of *sūtras* from 2.1.14 to 2.1.25. But this notion comes under the acid test of logic in *sūtra* 2.1.26. The Advaita conception of reality cannot throw out any order of existence or experience as not having been there at all. There being no second reality, whatever is there or appears in experience has to be accommodated in one *Brahman*. Therefore, the empirical order of mutually distinguished multiplicities will not only have to be shown as prevailing in Reality. Eventhough as its *appearances*, but it will have to be shown also how the transcendental one *becomes*, or *assumes the form of*, the many, of the plural appearances, and yet remains its self-identical unaltered self all through out. This indeed is the most fundamental issue of the Advaita doctrine and it is most disappointing to note that the classical accounts of Sankara Vedānta have mostly foundered on this issue. It will not do today, for instance, that *Brahman* is Brahman, the all-embracing reality, yet there is no 'all', no plurality, to embrace or envelop, and that the multiplicities are mere creations of your or my fancy as we stand over and against *Brahman*, and as co-ordinate to it. That would be making a nonsense of both Sankara and the Upanisads. The genuineness of the problem is vouchsafed by the presence of the *Bhādarāyana sūtra* 2.1.26 '*Kṛtsnāprasaktirniravayavatvasabdakopava*'. The Vedānta view of Reality has to be brought out through a logical solution of the difficulty raised or posed in this *sūtra*.

The issue to be decided logically is how *Brahman* which has been described in the *śruti* as partless (*niramaśa*) and formless (*niravayava*), assumes the form of the manifest order of multiplicities (*visvabhūtaḥ*) in one quarter of itself, and remains its unaltered, immutable and immortal self in its remaining three quarters (*tripada*)<sup>26</sup>? It, as Sankara itself, cannot undergo any transformation. If, on the other hand, it is transformable and has *become* the world, then, since it is partless (being

formless), it must have undergone a total transformation (*Kṛtsna parinama*) and therefore, has ceased to be its unaltered and unaffected self. To admit both would be a logical contradiction. To deny any would be going against the *śruti* text and doing violence to it (*śabdakopo va*). How has Sankara solved this logical difficulty?

It will be wrong, we think, to suppose that since the next *sūtra* (2.1.27) of Bādarāyaṇa – (*śruteṣu śābdamūlatvat*), which is purported to give the solution of the difficulty, makes it imperative to accept the *śruti*–doctrine as per the *śruti*–text without bothering about illogicality, if any, Sankara has been persuaded in that way without reservation. This is the reason why after dilating so much on inviolability of the *śruti* testimony in transcendental questions and futility of logical reason as a force or power in opposition to the *śrutis* in such context, he nonetheless meets the logical point logically again. As for the earlier reply framed in conformity with the *sūtra* 2.1.27, it will not be proper, we think, to dismiss it as a piece of bigotry. The *śrutis* are, as we have argued all through out, reports of truth-experiences descending down from unknown antiquity and form the guide-lines of what a transcendental and impersonal experience of reality is to be. When pitted against reported experience of any kind, logic cannot take a hasty decision against it, cannot simply rule it out of order. It has to be explored if under any circumstance of given experience, the apparently discordant *śruti*–statement may be shown to be a statement of fact. Sankara has followed this line without resting simply on the alleged inviolability of the *śruti*–testimony. He has attempted to show why in the given case the *śruti*–testimony may as well be regarded as inviolable.

Unlike the Sāṃkhya stipulation, the *śruti*–statements are not *postulational*. These are statements of facts as they are experienced at different levels. How a cause stipulated or postulated *a priori* gives rise to, or is transformed into the world of effects, is no relevant issue for the Vedānta. Here the relevant issue is : how the world of varied appearances, of multiple subjects and objects, is capable of being experienced, again, as a formless, shapeless, undivided and undistinguished, self-positing resplendent pure consciousness. The relevant question here is : how can the order of conventional experience, which sustains all our habitual modes of behaviour and practices, *Lapse* into an experience of an all together different nature, that of pure-self-conscious identity, –fulfilling the human quest for realisation of the supreme end (*paramārtha*) of life in immortality (*amṛtatva*) and absolute fearlessness (*abhaya*)? This is clearly brought out by Sankara when he said '*na cāyam parinamāśruti parinamapratipadanārtha, tatpratipatti phalavagamat*'. *Sarvavyavdhārahina brahmatmabhava-pratipadanārtha tveṣa, tatpratipattāv phalavagamat*. This *śruti*–text about *Brahman* becoming the world (*parinamāśruti*) – is not intended to explain the process of transformation of *Brahman* since that does not serve any practical end. It is really intended to establish one-ness of self and *Brahman*, transcendent of all conventional practices (involving distinction), since in that way supreme end (which is *mokṣa*) is deemed realisable. What does he mean?

In our effort to understand the mystery of existence, as also of the phenomenal becoming, we cannot, for any point of logic, pursue the process from the side of any assumed first cause and thereafter, seek to understand how, without undergoing a total material transformation (*Kṛtsna parinama*), it became the world of distinguished pluralities and yet remained unaltered and unaffected at the core. Knowledge is incapable of following up that trail and this has been previously stated clearly in a Vedic saying<sup>47</sup>. Knowledge can only begin from the opposite angle and progressively excavate to get at the root. This is what the Vedic seers did in their silent contemplation (*Tarpon*)<sup>48</sup>. Sankara has focussed our attention to this kind of process in the concluding portion of his commentary on the *sūtra*. King Janaka is described as following up this exploratory process, and through a series of negation, finally reaching at the root-principle. Be this as it may, one way to logically understand

how this world of multiple subjects and objects may have arisen from a reality-principle, without that principle undergoing any transformation or material change, and how this manifest order could be rooted in that principle and yet be *formally* and in express presentation, so very different, and discrepant, is taking this latter as a distortion (*vivarta*) and not as a *parinama* (real transformation) of the former. So, Sankara introduces the concept of *avidya* to suggest that the distinction between the cause and its so called effect, between *Brahman* as itself and the world of plural subjects and objects taken as its distorted appearance, is purely *epistemic*, that is, one that relates to modes of experience (transcendental and conventional) only.

How *Brahman* although formless, transforms itself into the manifest order of plurality and yet remains its formless undivided self is logically intelligible if it is kept in mind that no real transformation (either in part or as a whole) ever takes place, and what is actually there is a distorted view of reality seemingly juxtaposed against the true view of it. Not that a thing becomes different in being viewed differently. Epistemic distinctions do not cut into the nature of anything. Such a distinction between the real *as it is* and the real *as it appears* is incidental to misconception – it is *avidyakalpita*<sup>41</sup>, says Sankara. What does Sankara mean here? Does he say that *Brahman* in itself only and does not appear as this or that? Does he say that *Brahman*'s appearance in the form of the world of diverse contents is just the product of an arbitrary superimposition of a finite agent external to *Brahman*? That would clearly be non-sensical. What Sankara actually says in the context is that the *rupa-bheda*, such as, *vyakṛta* (modified) and *avyakṛta* (unmodified), is *avidya-kalpita* that is, an ignorant manipulation. So it follows that there is no such distinction in the nature of Reality, in the nature of *Brahman*, between what *Brahman* is and how it appears. Yet the distinction becomes a manipulation of *avidya*. And this manipulated product is characterised by *nama* and *rupa* and is indeterminable either as a fact or as a non-fact (*tattvanyatvabhyanirvacanīya*)<sup>42</sup>. How far is this intelligible? 'Tattva' is that-ness or being – itself, 'anyatva' is being other-ness, and the *avidya-kalpita* is neither 'that', nor other than 'that' (in so far as it is *ananya*, cf. *Tadananyatvam arambhana sūdadibhyah*). What is the relevance of this concept of the indeterminable? Why does it become a necessary appendage to the cult of *Brahman*?

To get an explanation, we shall have to revert to the trail of our previous analysis. To get at the root of the cosmic presentations we are to begin with the world of multiple subjects and objects and follow the guidance of our knowledge. The Vedānta is knowledge, is a way of understanding the nature of existence. It discovers that the conventional order of our experience is vitiated by ignorance, although it sustains our habitual behaviour and practices. This discovery is not the discovery that we have made the reality appear differently from what it is in itself. That we ourselves have superimposed a form of appearance upon it which does not hold in it<sup>43</sup>. The discovery specifically, is that *in us* and *in the manifest form of the cosmic multiplicities*, Reality which is *Brahman* playfully presents itself *in the appearance* and in the exigency of that play, again, this appearance-self of *Brahman*, this manifest order of pluralities of which we ourselves as empirical individuals are parts is also taken as the entire real order. That which is an *avidyavilasa* of *Brahman*, that is, an *avidya* which does not delude but is merely sportive becomes a deluding force with us so much so that we do not take the appearance even as an appearance but as the absolutely real. *Avidya* or false knowledge is false because although no knowledge it is taken as knowledge – *tadvatitiprakarajñāna*. Now, when this *avidya*, as a blinding force, is got over, alongwith that development, the reality-sense in the appearance lapses. What happens to the appearance then? It is known, then to be a mere appearance although it was once felt not as that but as the real itself. Insofar as this appearance once assumed the form of reality – itself it was not the *tattva* (reality). Insofar as it is for ever a mere appearance what it is? Is a

mere appearance anything other than the real itself? If the *mere*, the defunct snake-appearance not the rope itself, although looking different? So Sankara would not take it as '*tattvanya*', that is *other than tatra*, or plainly, as '*anya*'. So, this appearance is *tattvanyatvabham anirvacaniya*, indeterminable either as a fact or as a no-fact<sup>44</sup>. To describe the appearance as identical with or *as the same as reality*, would be misleading—since reality will then be confused with its appearance, or the appearance will itself be confused with reality, — this would just be the state of *avidya* and of the illusory appearance (appearance passing for reality). So the description of *sadasadvilaksana*, or as here expressed '*tattvanyatvabham anirvacaniya*' becomes unavoidable. This is a description answering the exact nature of what is being described as this content is successively known.

Now, then, *vidya* presents *Brahman* itself as untransformed, that is, as not appearing as the world of plural subjects and objects, and *avidya* presents it in this latter-form precisely. In the former case, there is lapsing of the world and in the latter case there is lapsing of *Brahman* so to say. Yet both, in some way, hold in *Brahman*, the *one* | *all-comprehensive reality*. The very concept itself such as *Brahman*, is intended to cover everything and to exclude nothing. What impropriety can there be, therefore, if to suggest this all-pervasiveness of *Brahman*, the *srutis* declare that this entire realm of cosmic becoming, the *avidya*-world covers only one quarter of *Brahman* while *Brahman* as *itself* covers three quarters of resplendent being<sup>45</sup>? In this description, there can be no suggestion of real transformation (*parinama*) because the *avidya*-order of cosmic multiplicities is *realised* only as a *distortion (vivarta)* which bases with the cessation of *avidya*. For the very same reason, the *avidya*-order can neither be regarded as *parinama* of a part nor as the *parinama* of the whole (*krisna*)<sup>46</sup>. Yet, the appearance – realm cannot be absolutely rejected as a mere nothing which did not or does not figure there in any sense, whatsoever. Since the transition from *avidya* to *vidya*, from *vyavaharika* to *paramarthika*, from a state of bondage to one of liberation, cannot be explained otherwise. This transition from *avidya* to *vidya*, it has to be noted, shows an absolute gap and cleavage between the *paramarthika* and the *vyavaharika*, between the transcendental and the empirical-conventional. There can be no sense, therefore, in suggesting that the *vyavaharika* is a *parinama* of the *paramarthika*. If you complain of oddity in this notion, you are to be told that such is really the prevailing states of affair and the truth of this is vouchsafed by one experience lapsing into another which latter remains unrejected.

There are two very subtle issues which Sankara has raised in this section of his commentary – issues which are of vital importance for proper understanding of Sankara Vedanta. The *paramarthika* for Sankara is no neutral, indifferent, objective order of being. The word '*paramartha*', means supreme end. So, the *paramarthika* is the state of realisation of the supreme and, the state of realisation of absolute freedom, fearlessness and immortality. This state can only be the state of absolute identity, of, absolute one-ness of self with reality—the state, such as, of *Brahman* realised as *Atman*. The other issue, which is connected with this issue, is that *Vidya*, which realises the absolute identity of *Brahman* and *Atman* in '*Brahman as Atman*', is also the realisation of the '*ananya*' the non-other, the non-different of *Brahman* that is, of the entire realm of cosmic appearances *as Brahman as one with it*. For, who will argue that the rope is not the rope on the ground that it *appears* as a snake either as a '*mere*' appearance, or as an '*illusory*' appearance, that is, as an appearance which is not known or regarded as an '*appearance*' but as the real itself?

Thus, so far as the *sruti* – statements, at this place, are statements about *facts of experience*, of an *avidya* experience terminating in a *vidya*-experience with concomitant lapsing of reality-sense in

the given order of existence, logic has to adjust itself to the requirements of the situation in order to be a faithful representation of the situation instead of running headlong into a clash and turning illogical about it.

## References

1. Chapter VIII
2. S.B. 2.1.12 - The Sankhya is called the 'Pradhana malla'
3. Katha 1.2.22
4. 'Na ca stindriyarthan srutimantarena kasodupalabhata iti sakyam sambhavayitum, nimittabhavat' B.S.B. 2.1.1
5. In the Advaitic context, the *manasi kriya* in *dyana* or *cintana* is of this form. Sankara holds that this does not amount to 'knowledge' of the nonsensuous. See B.S.B. 1.1.4.
6. Hegel and his followers seem to ignore 'given-ness' as the criterion of the real
7. Ratha Up. 2.1. 1-2
8. Br. Ar. Up. 2.4.14.
9. B.S.B. 1.1.2. 'anubhavavasanatvat, brahmanijñanasya'.
10. See Ch. VII
11. B.S.B. 1.1.2
12. *Ibid.*, 1.1.1 'utpreksayah nirankusatvat'
13. *Ibid.*, 1.1.1 'purusamativaisvarupyena taittvavyavasthanaprasangat' also B.S.B. 2.1.11 'na pratisthitatvam tarkanam sakyam samasrayitum, purusamati vaisvarupyat'
14. B.S.B. 2.1.11
15. *Ibid.*, 1.1.1 'Ekarupena hi avasthito yo'stha loka tadvisayam jnanam samyak jnanamityucyate, tatteivam sati samagjñane purusenam vipratipattirupapanna'
16. 'Samyagjñanat moksa iti sarvesam moksavadinam abhyupagamah' B.S.B. 2.1.11
17. J.S. 1.3.3. 'Virodhe tranapeksam syat asati hyanumanam'
18. Smrtyanavakasadosa-prasanga iti cet na anyasmrtyanavakasa-dosa-prasanagat. B.S. 2.1.1
19. B.S.B. 2.1.1 'Kapilaprabhrtinam ca arsam jnanamapretibhatam smaryate'
20. *Ibid.* purusamativaisvarupyena taittvavyavasthanaprasangat'
21. *Ibid.* 'purvasiddhayaścōdanaya artho na pascimasiddha-purusavacanavāsena atisankīrtum śakyaḥ'
22. *Ibid.* 'Vahitvat siddhanam pradarsitena prakarena smrtivipratipattih satyam na srutivyopasrayat anyat nirnayakaranamsti'
23. *Ibid.*, atmahedakalpanayapi kapilasya tantrasya vedaviruddhatvam vedanusarimanuvacanaviruddhatvanca na kevalam svatantra prakrtiparikalpanaya eveti siddham'
24. *Ibid.* 'vedasya hi nirapeksam svartha pramanyam, purusavacasam tu mulantarapeksam vaktismrti vyavah itan ceti vipraksarsa'
25. B.S.B. 1.1.11 'Atah siddham asyaiva aupanisadasya jñanasya samyagjñanatvam, nish anyatrasamyagjñanatvanupapattih samsaravimoksa eva prasajyeta
26. *Ibid.* 'atmahedakalpanayapi kapilasya tantrasya vedaviruddhatvam vedanusarimanuvacanaviruddhanca.
27. See Chapter VII.
28. 2.1.2 'A -loka vedaprasiddhattu mahadadinam sasthasyevendriyarthasya na smrtiravakalpat'

- 29 2 | 11 'Prasiddha mahatmyabhimatanamapi... paraspara vipratipattidarsanat'
- 30 *Ibid* 'Na ca sakyanta atitanagatavartamanastarkika akasmin does kale ca samahartum yena tanmatirekarupyaikarthavisaya samyagmaliriti syat'
- 31 See Adhyasabhasya-Concluding sentence.
- 32 B.S.B. 1 | 2
- 33 See the Bhasyabhaumikas of the principal Upanisads including Brhadaranyaka.
- 34 Adhyasabhasya-Concluding sentence
- 35 2 | 6 'Tarkapratishtanat' iti ca Kevalasya tarkasya vipralambhakatam darsayisyati'.
- 36 B.S.B. 1 | 1 'tasmal Brahmajijnasonyasamukhena Vedanta-vakya-mimamsa tadvirodhitarkapokarana nisticyasaprayojana prastuyat'
- 37 B.S.B. 1 | 2 'na dharmajijnasayamiva srutyadaya eva pramanam brahmajijnasayah, kintu srutyadayah anubhavadayasca yathasam-bhavamih pramanam, anubhavavasanaivat bhutavastuvicayatvacca brahmajijnasasya
- 38 B.S. 2 | 13
- 39 B.S.B. 2 | 10.
- 40 B.S.B. 2 | 4, 'Na viloksanatvat asya tathatvanca sabdat.
- 41 B.S. 2 | 26 'Krisnaprasaktumiravayavatvasabdakopo va.
- 42 B.S.B. 2 | 4, 'Drstasadharmena cadrsiamartham samarpayanti yuktiranubhavasya sannikrsyate.'
- 43 *Ibid*, 'viprakrsyate tu arthyamatreha svarthabhidhanat'
- 44 *Ibid* 'Yatha ca srutinam parasparavirodha sayitakavasena itara niyante evam pramanantaravisodhepitadvaseneiva srutirniyat'
- 45 B.S.B. 1 | 2 Srutyodayah anubhavadayasca yathasambhavamih pramanam'
- 46 *Ibid*, 2 | 6
- 47 *Ibid*, 2 | 6 'Yaduktam parinispannatvat brahmani pramonantarani sambhaveyuh iti tadapi manorathamutrom. Rupadyabhavat hi nayam arthah pratyaksasya gocarah, linagadyabhavacca nimanadinum, agamamatrasamadagaya eva tu ayam artho dharmavat'.
- 48 Bhamati 'Evam bhutatvavisesepi prithvyadinam manantara gocaratvam, na tu bh utasyapi bhahmanali. Tasya amanyakagocarasyatipaita samestamanantaasimataya sriyagamasiidhaivadityarthah.
- 49 See Bhamati. 2 | 6.
- 50 B.S.B. 2 | 6.
- 51 *Ibid*, 2 | 14 'Api ca antyamidam pramanam atmaikatvasya pratipadakam, netau param kincidakomksyamesti sarvatmaikatva vicayatvat avagatah'
- 52 B.S.B. 2 | 4
- 53 *Ibid* 2 | 13
- 54 *Ibid*
- 55 Sankara's commentary on gita Sloka 18/66.
- 56 'Lynvanasya matima tato jyayamsca purusa Padosya visva bhutani tripadasyamrtam dibi'
- 57 B.S.B. 2 | 27 'Yadi niravayavam brahma syat. naiva parinameta. krtisameva va parinameta' etc
- 58 B.S.B. 2 | 27.
- 59 R.V.X. 129



60 See Tattvīya. Chapter III. Bhṛguvalli.

61 'Avidyakalpitena ca namarupataksanana rupabhedona ek ' B.S.B. & 2 I.27

62 *Ibid.*

63 The classical interpreters have lent support to this mistaken version partly by taking Sankara's illustrations of illusory presentation too literally and partly by their incorrect analysis of the state of *avidya*, not as a condition or state in which we behave but as an state or circumstance which we create. See our chapters III, IV, and V

64 B.S.B. 2 I 27.

65 'padsoya bhavabhutani', etc

66 That which is not a *parinama* at all is neither a partial *parinama*, nor a total *parinama*.

## Refutation of Rival Metaphysics

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Sankara's claim has been that Metaphysics as a *transcendental philosophy* requires to be based on some *nonsensuous intuition* and is out of bounds for postulatory reason (*tarka*) which, by its very nature, gives rise to infinite alternatives, and is incapable of any fixed decision. For the Vedanta, then, the *sruti*-texts, which embody *impersonal* 'truth-visions' of a perennial nature, furnish this much needed basis, – the nonsensuous intuitions, linked together by a bond of internal harmony. A transcendental metaphysical doctrine can only be secured, therefore, by a logical and judicious interpretation of the *sruti*-texts (*Vedanta-vakyartha-vicarana*)<sup>1</sup>. That this Vedanta metaphysics is the *one* genuine metaphysics, and that there can be no other, is also capable of verification<sup>2</sup>. That alone can justifiably be maintained as the transcendental and absolute truth which can secure for an inquirer absolute release from the bondage of life. It also ensures immortality and absolute fearlessness (*abhiyaya*). Can this truth be anything other than absolute identity of the imperishable reality and the self? Can the knowledge of this truth be different from the realisation of *Brahman*, the all-comprehensive reality, as the *one* self, the true self (*Atman*) of everything including ourselves? Sankara asks. That alone can be the *paramarthika* – the truth supreme and absolute, which serves realisation of *paramartha* (supreme end). Insofar as the Vedanta shows in what was the *Vyavaharika* order of cosmic multiplicities of subjects and objects can be regarded as non-different (*ananya*) with the transcendental one-ness of being, it shows the way how by knowing one single matrix everything can be known<sup>3</sup> and also how in the realisation of *one* absolute truth of fact, the supreme end of life can be concretely realised. The Vedanta, therefore, is the *one* true metaphysics as also the *one* transcendental philosophy.

This its claim to be the only transcendental doctrine serving the purpose of realisation of the supreme end (*paramartha*) is however, contested by the rival Indian schools of metaphysics. The Vedanta, as a philosophical system, therefore, has to examine how far the claims of these rival schools to have provided for transcendental metaphysics can be regarded as valid. These rival systems have for their sponsors and propounders persons of great celebrity commanding great respect and veneration. These are also enunciated and supported by formidable logical arguments which give the appearance that these systems have been propagated by men of unlimited wisdom<sup>4</sup>. So people of common persuasion and weak-intellect may be misguided into accepting these pseudo- metaphysical doctrines as representing the supreme truths of fact. It, therefore, becomes necessary to expose truths of fact. It, therefore, becomes necessary to expose their hollowness in cosmic of defining the claim of the Vedanta as the only authentic transcendental metaphysics.

Sankara's refutation of rival systems rests on two fold grounds. (a) These systems are all postulational and are neither based on nor supported by the *śruti*-texts, conceived as an extraordinary *pramāṇa*. Again, (b) as systems rearing themselves upon independent logical reasoning and inferential arguments from effect to cause, these are inherently inconclusive and inadequate as explanations of the *transcendental* grounds of the world-order, and also beset with other logical difficulties.

(a) In course of his introductory remarks in connection with his commentary on B S. 1.1.5, - *Iksaternasabdām* Sankara touches upon a very significant point in this controversy. It is that the other orthodox systems, such as, the Sankhya and the Nyaya-vaśiṣṭika, at first, postulate by means of inferential reasoning what can be taken as the ultimate grounds of things, and thereafter, look for concurrence of the *śruti*-texts in support of their conclusions. This, they do not quite arbitrarily, and Sankara, it can be seen, is exceedingly fair when he points out the reason behind such procedure of the rival schools. It is that, since an ultimate ground of things must be an existential reality (*parinisthata*) *bhūtavastu* and not a *bhavyavastu* of the Purvamīmāṃsā specification, it should, ex hypothesis be as well accessible to *pramāṇas* other than the *śruti*-texts. If the purvamīmāṃsā were correct, the transcendental grounds of things, an existential content, could not at all be the subject-matter of the revealed literature. Sankara has no doubt repudiated that extreme posture of the Purvamīmāṃsā in course of his commentary on the first four *sūtras*. But Sankara himself has admitted, particularly in his commentary on B S. 1.1.2, that in respect of transcendental grounds of things the *śrutis* are not to be the exclusive *pramāṇa* and that other modes of cognition (*anubhavadaya*), which includes inference also, may also be an organ of knowledge and proof as far as possible. What harm can there be, then, if instead of beginning with the *śruti*-testimony and thereafter falling back upon other *pramāṇas* as auxiliaries we reverse the order and begin with inferential reasoning and after having deduced transcendentially the alleged ultimate grounds seek to corroborate such evidence by means of certain *śruti*-texts as far as possible? In his commentary on B S. 1.1.2, Sankara has already argued that no inferential argument can ever succeed in determining the *specific nature* of the cause in a transcendental context where such causal ground is not the object of sensuous knowledge (*indriya-viśaya*). It is specifically for this reason, Sankara argues, that the Vedānta as a transcendental philosophy falls back upon the evidences furnished by the *śruti*-texts, conceived as revealed knowledge, embodying nonsensuous intuitions which are impersonal in origin, and thereafter, elaborates and defends the *śruti*-version of the case by logical arguments *pro* and *contra*. Sankara, in course of his commentary on the relevant *sūtras* of the first *adhyāya*, particularly on the *sūtras* of the first and the fourth *pāda*, shows that the *śruti*-texts do not lend any support to the Sankhya or vaśiṣṭika formulations in transcendental metaphysics.

(b) Taken as purely logical systems of interrelated concepts, these rival metaphysical systems can only be looked upon as *alternative formal stipulations* regarding primal grounds of things which, as themselves, are for ever unknown and unknowable. These *alternative* stipulations, as has already been argued, may be infinitely varied, dependent as they are on infinitely varied constructive imaginative (*Utpatti*) of individuals. With no method to concretely verify, or prove the first principles of these systems which are like so many formal postulates, these systems all remain as like so many formal postulates, these systems all remain unestablished (*a-pratisthita*) and unsubstantiated to the end. Any decision in favour of any particular system, therefore, becomes extralogical in being dictated by personal choice and temperamental preference.

Before examining the logical sufficiency, of these rival systems of metaphysics as purely *postulational* systems, Sankara examines in the light of the Vedānta *sūtras* of the first *adhyāya* if these systems can be supposed to have been either *śruti*-based or *śruti*-supported. It can be seen,

however, that the Vedanta arguments to establish that these systems do not have any basis in the *sruti*-texts and are therefore, 'a-sabda' or a-*srauta* (non-vedic and unsupported by the *Sabdapramana*) are primarily, and in the main, directed against the Sankhya system. Taken in their entirety, the *sutras* in the first *adhyaya* are intended to accomplish two purposes – (i) to show that the *sruti*-texts, taken as a harmonious whole, establish *Brahman* both as the efficient (*nimithakarana*) and the material cause (*upadanakarana*) of everything and (ii) to show that the prime ground of things (*jagadikarana*) as spoken of in the *sruti*-texts, cannot be shown to be the same as what the Sankhya or other systems have postulated. The refutation of the Sankhya claim figures more prominently because, as Sankara has explained<sup>4</sup>, the Sankhya, insofar as it also admits non-difference (*ananyatva*) of the effect with its abuse, is nearest (*pratyasanna*) to the Vedanta view with greater chance of being confounded with it. The Sankhya has been mentioned as the foremost among the rival contenders<sup>5</sup> on this ground. With the Sankhya falling off as a-sabda (unbased on *sruti*), as Sankara explains at the end of the first *adhyaya*, other systems, such as, the atomistic metaphysics of the *Nayaya-vaisesika* etc. are automatically proved not only to be a-sabda but also as 'sabda-virodhi' (antithetical to *sruti-pramana*) insofar as these are opposed to *brahmanukaranuvada* and the absolutist doctrine of the *srutis*. These other systems, as is wellknown, puts greater emphasis on the efficient-cause (*nimitta-karana*) and are averse to the admission of *Brahman* of God either as the sole reality, or as the material cause of the world-order,—a view defended in the *srutis*.

The *srutis* have specified certain basic characters of the root-cause. These are ' (a) One that contemplates to become many (*ikṣita*), (b) One that is the self (*atma*), (c) One that retracts all manifestations within one's self-identity (*svapyaya*), (d) One that is its absolute itself, is all-knowing and lord of everything (*iva*), (e) One that is reality itself (*Sat*), (f) One that is the in-dwelling Self and the inner controller (*antaryamin*), (g) One that is the witness of all (*saksi*), (h) One that is both the efficient and the material cause, (i) One that is worshipped in the various symbolic representations of itself (*Upasya*) (j) One that is known by way of absolute self-identity (*Jneya*), (k) One that is self-accomplished (*parinisthita*) and self-forming (*svaparinami*), (l) One, by becoming which liberation is realised (*moksa-svarupa*), (m) One, by participating in which alone delight (*ananda*) is enjoyed and all else become dear (*priya*) to anybody etc. etc.<sup>6</sup>. These and other characteristics of the root-cause have been brought out in details in the *Upanisads* and by the *sutras* of the four *padas* of the first *adhyaya*. As already said, these *sutras*, together with Sankara's commentaries on them accomplish two objects— expounding *Brahman* both as the material and the efficient cause of the world, and showing that the root-cause, as described in the various *srutis*, is very different from what the Sankhya and the other systems conceive it to be. The *sutras* of the first *pada* are intended to show that the root-cause, as described in the *srutis*, is to be a self-conscious, intelligent principle, which is very much different from the concept of 'pradhana' of the Sankhya conception cannot be taken to be self-contemplating (1.1.5) Self desiring and self motivated (1.1.8), self-withdrawing (1.1.9) self-dependent (1.1.11) and self-enjoying (1.1.12). Nor can it be called the self (*atma*), as the root-cause has consistently been described all through out (1.1.10). Nor can one sensibly talk about realising one's identity, and there by being liberated, if it was the identity with an unconscious principle, such as, the *pradhana*, that was meant (*sutras* 1.1.7 and 1.1.19). The Vedanta, then would have ceased to be a *moksa-sastra* if the root-cause described by it was to be the same as the *pradhana* of the Sankhya<sup>7</sup>.

The *sutras* of the second *pada* of the first *adhyaya* present the root-principle as the worshippable (*Upasya*) in various forms and under various symbols. It is taken as the indwelling, intelligent (*cetana*) principle, which regulates and controls all plural manifestations from within (*antaryamin*)

*Sutra* 1.2.19 of this group explicitly states that there should not be an illusion that a principle of this kind can be the *pradhana* of the Sankhya conception. The *sutras* of the third *pada* present the root-principle in another dimension. It is the realisable (*jneya*), and as that the self (*sva*), the support (*pratistha*)<sup>12</sup> or *ayatana*) of everything. It is to be the state of conscious being or existence on liberation (B.S. 1.3.2), the absolute plenitude (*bhuma*) which is also the absolute fulfilment (B. S. 1.3.8). Unlike the Sankhya '*pradhana*', which though claimed to be eternal, is mutable, this root-principle, spoken, of is immutable (*aksara*), and in that way, eternal (*nitya*). All these unmistakably show that the '*pradhana*' of the Sankhya was never intended in the *srutis* to be the root-principle of all existence, animate and inanimate.

The *sutras* of the fourth *pada* of the first *adhyaya* are more specific and pointed in their refutation of the Sankhya claim to be *sruti*-based. They are intended to prove that *there is not a single world (subda) or expression anywhere in the upanisads which is an equivalent of any of the Sankhya categories*, such as, '*avyakta*', '*mahat*', '*purusa*' etc. Even where such or similar word-forms or expressions are found, the meanings of such words or expressions are quite different and the contexts (*prakarana*)<sup>13</sup> of their usage are also very much different. Therefore, the '*pradhana*' of the Sankhya, already declared to be an *a-sabda* (non-vedic word) in the B.S. 1.1.5 and B.S. 1.3.3 is unquestionably so.

It is worth noting in this connection that whenever the *sutras* mention the Sankhya and its categories, they unfailingly indicate the Sankhya as an *inferential system*, as is the *vaisesika* system by common acceptance. Frequently the *sutras* use the descriptive epithets '*anumanika*' or '*anumana*' as synonyms of the Sankhya system<sup>14</sup>. It is true that the Sankhya has also been given the designation '*smṛti*' in quite a number of places. But, as Sankara has shown in his commentary on B.S. 2.1.1., this has been done not because the Sankhya is a *genuine smṛti*, but because it, *claims* to be one such discipline on ground of conformity with the *srutis*, or is simply regarded as a rival *smṛti* by the common mass of people on account of their great reverence for Kapila and other exponents of the system<sup>15</sup>. As a rule, a *smṛti* has to conform to the *srutis* and their doctrine; non-conformity falsifies its claim to be a *smṛti*. A valid *smṛti* has to be *srutyanusari* and not *anumanika*. It cannot be based on independent reasoning as the Sankhya is, but has to be a faithful interpretation of the doctrine of the *sruti*, accepting no other evidence than the evidence of the *sruti* texts and of the *sadvapramana*. What makes the Vedanta so very uncompromising in its opposition to the Sankhya is that the Sankhya is a dissembler in so far as it displays its categories as being *sruti*-based or *sruti*-supported although these are the products of postulatory reasoning or inference. This is clear from Sankara's introductory remarks in the context of B.S. 1.1.5. '*iksaternasabdham*'<sup>16</sup>.

The Vedanta *sutras* have been very particular to establish '*a-sabdatva*' (non-vedic origin), of the Sankhya categories. This is because of the 'word-forms' of the principal Sankhya categories which resemble some of the expressions used in the Upanisads. So, the question arises: can it be that the *srutis* lend support to a dualistic metaphysical doctrine like the one the Sankhya maintains and do not propagate unity or absolute one-ness of all existence? The *sutras* of the fourth *pada* of the first *adhyaya* are intended to show that there is really no ground for confusion since the *sruti*-expressions which seem to resemble the Sankhya categories have all together different meanings and that this is quite clear from their context (*Prakarana*) as also from the purpose (*parisesa*) of their use. The Sankhya, it is commonly known, presents its twenty-five categories called the *tattvas* in a certain order of greater and still greater subtity and primacy. It is undeniable that the *Katha* verses 1.3.10 and 1.3.11 present categories, such as, the *indriyas* (*senses*), their objects (*artha*) the mind (*manah*),

the intellect (*buddhi*), the world-soul (*mahat*), the *avyakta* (the unmanifest) and the *purusa* (person or self) in a certain order of ascendancy which has rough resemblance to the Sankhya arrangement, and most of the terms in the arrangement have apparently the very same names or word-forms. So may pertinently ask Can it not be that it is the Sankhya categories which have been mentioned and indicated in the *Katha-sruti*? More particularly, can it not be that the category, such as, '*avyakta*' mentioned in the *Katha*-verse is the very same as the Sankhya '*pradhana*' or *Prakriti*, – the primal material cause of the world of effects?

The ten *sutra* of Adhyaya I, *pada* 4, consider the above questions from different angles, and finally reject the view that the *katha*-verses have anything to do with the Sankhya doctrine of categories. The grounds of rejection of the Sankhya contention, if any, may be briefly indicated as follows. (1) words and expressions are to be interpreted in the light of the context of their use as also in the light of the purpose for which they are used.<sup>17</sup> The *katha* in that context introduces the concept of the immortal Self, which although immanent in the totality of cosmic presentation and is the inner-controller, is transcendent of each psycho-physical aggregate called the enjoyer-self (*bhokta*) which is the same as the individual Self or *jiva*. This the *Katha* does in a progressive way – at first introducing the notion of the individual Self, which is associated with the psycho-physical complex called the body (*sarira*) and is capable of willing for the good as also for evil by introducing the analogy of a person seated in a chariot which is driven by a charioteer and is drawn by horses, held and controlled by reins, the *Katha* seeks to introduce step by step, the notion of the supreme Self, the inner-controller, unchangeable (*dhruva*) and imperishable, which is apparently hidden (*gudha*) under the cover of cosmic appearances and their plural forms. This being the context in which an attempt has been made to get at, or to introduce the more and more controlling principles till the ultimate principle which is the final resort of all is visualised, the question of *katha* bringing in the notion of the material *prama* of the Sankhya, the *avyakta pradhana*, arguing from effects to their remotest and ultimate material cause, does not appear relevant. What has served to give rise to the confusion is the misleading presence of two expressions, such as, '*mahat*' and '*avyakta*' in the *Katha*-verse 11. These, if read outside the context and without relation to what follows next in the *katha* elaboration, would create the impression that the *katha-sruti* has actually mentioned two very crucial categories of the Sankhya, including their ultimate material cause '*pradhana*', under the name '*avyakta*'. B. S. 1.4.1 has argued that since those expressions have been used in the context of elaboration of a metaphor in which the body (*sarira*) has been compared to a chariot or (*sarira-rupaka-vinyasta-grhita*), therefore, the word '*avyakta*' used in the context cannot be fancied to stand for the Sankhya category of *pradhana*, which is an inferential and so, a logical concept (*anumanika*). (2) The word '*avyakta*', as used in the *katha*-verse, is not denominative and is not therefore, the name of *pradhana*. It is a descriptive word used there to suggest the 'subtle'. The word is also not definitive to mean the Sankhya '*pradhana*' exclusively.<sup>18</sup> Nor is there any hint in the context that this '*avyakta*', is the equilibrium of the three *gunas-sattva, rajas*, and *tamas*, such as the Sankhya *pradhana*.<sup>19</sup> Nor is there any suggestion in the context that the '*avyakta*' spoken of is an independent *prama*, cause<sup>20</sup> such as is the Sankhya '*pradhana*'. (3) As Sankara put it, from a comparison of the items presented in the initial verses 3 and 4 of *Katha* first Adhyaya third *valli* with the items presented in the verses 10 and 11 of the same section, one can find that the very same items have been mentioned once in the verses 3 and 4 and again, in the verses 10 and 11 except that what has been called '*sarira*', the chariot in the earlier verses, has been mentioned as the '*avyakta*' in the subsequent verses. It is evident then that it is the subtle body or '*Karana sarira*' (which like a chariot bears the enjoyer-Self from life to life in cycle of existence) that has been



indicated by the expression 'avyakta' in the later verses insofar as this sarira is the very same as the *Karma-vija* or germinal stuff of *avidya* (ignorance). It would be odd to imagine that the *sruti* here, all on a sudden, has introduced two of the Sankhya concepts, 'mahat' and 'avyakta' outside the context, simply because the two world-forms used here resemble the Sankhya usage. Then, again, the sequence of relation between the individual enjoyer-self and the primal *avidya* (with the *Karma-vija* on the one hand, and between the primal *avidya* and the pure self (*Brahman*) on the other, may be similar to the relation between the 'mahat' and the 'pradhana (avyakta)' of the Sankhya on the one hand, and between the 'pradhana' and the transcendental Self, the *purusa*, on the other, but it would be unwarranted to leave off the *sruti*-context and the purpose of the *sruti*-instruction and to imagine that it is the Sankhya doctrine which has been propagated in the *Katha*. Sankara ridicules such misidentification of absolutely divergent entities, the subtle body with the *pradhana* on the strength of an analogous serial relation. This is like regarding a cow, not as a cow but as a horse simply because it stands in between horses" (4) The word 'mahat' in the verse is not, again, a substantive word. No where in the *sruti* has this word been ever used as a substantive. In the context of the verse, as also elsewhere, it has always been used as a qualifying word, as an adjective. The word 'avyakta' has been used in the *sruti*-context in the same adjectival way (B.S. 1.4.7.). This, then, goes against the contention that it is the Sankhya categories of 'mahat' and 'avyakta' which have been mentioned in the *Katha*. (5) Insofar as the 'avyakta' in the verses is not taken as an independent principle as the Sankhya 'pradhana' is regarded by convention, but only as a dependent functional principle, regulated and controlled by the Supreme Purusa, there should not arise, any ground of confusion between this 'avyakta' and the 'pradhana' of the Sankhya" (6) The 'avyakta' in this context is not also advised as 'that which is to be known' and thereby distinguished from the Purusa, as would have been the case were it the same as the Sankhya 'pradhana'" (7) What has been advised as contemplatable, that is, is that which is 'to be contemplated and known (realised) in this context, is the Self and it is this Self which has been described in the context (*prakarana*) as beyond sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, also as the beginningless and endless, *immutable* and ever the same *dhruvata*" (8) Verse No 13 in the same series advises progressive lapsing of the senses. In the mind, of the mind in the intellect and the intellect and the enjoyer self together with all its subtle determinants (the subtle body initiated by *avidya*) in the absolute and tranquil self *santa atma*) which is one and indivisible. Taken alternatively, the instruction in this context has been to lapse and transcend progressively the senses in the mind, the mind in the intellect and the enjoyer-Self, this latter in the world-Self, the '*hiranyagarbha*' of the *sruti*, and finally, this last in the absolute tranquil Self. Verses 7 and 8 of the second *adhyaya*, third *valli* of the *Katha* also seem to corroborate this. Any way, no where has the knowledge or contemplation of the 'avyakta' been advised as a means of liberation, and this certainly would have been the case, had the Sankhya *pradhana* been advised here as the 'avyakta' (6) It is also clear from Naciketa's query about the immortal Self and from the three *graces (vara)* granted to him by Yama that the subject-matter of the *Katha*-discourses were (a) the sacrificial fire which ensures joys in heaven, (b) The nature of the individual Self (*Jiva*) which is phenomenal and (c) the nature of the immortal one self, the paramatman, which remains hidden but is the inner-controller of all plural appearances. So, no where is there any discussion on the Sankhya categories and of the *materia prima* of the Sankhya, such as, the 'Avyakta' or 'pradhana'" (7) Even the word 'mahat' in the context signifies the self (*mahan atma*) and not the first evolute of 'pradhana'. It is, as will be apparent from the context, the very same self which has been advised in the *Katha* as being under different determinations of *avidya* and as being also transcendent of all such determinations. It will be a gross mistake, then, to take the various formations of the self—the self with the gross body, the self with the subtle body, the world-soul under determination of primal

*avidya*, as evolutes and so, as real transformations of the Sankhya '*pradhana*'. (8) Finally, the word '*avyakta*' as used in the context, can be seen to be a blanket term like the Vedic expression '*camas*' which means anything which has its lid up and a bottom down as in a pit'. The word '*avyakta*', used in the Katha-context, is to be taken in a similar way to mean anything that is subtle and is not grossly evident (B.S. 1.4.2). It should not, therefore, be taken as a synonym of the Sankhya '*Pradhana*', in complete disregard of the context in which it has been used.

After disposing of the case of seeming references in the Katha-verses to the categories of the Sankhya, the *sutras* of the fourth *pada* of the first *adhyaya*, next, debate the point if the expression '*aja*', as used in the context of the Svetasvatara Upanisad, is suggestive of the Sankhya *materia prima*. The word '*aja*' etymologically may mean an 'unborn' female. Conventionally, however, it means a 'she-goat'. The Svetasvatara verse under reference speaks of an '*aja*'. Which is red, white and black as begetting plural offspring and as being the source of infatuation as also of release. Now, since the Sankhya conceives its *materia-prima* the '*pradhana*', which is the equilibrium of three *gunas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the same way and these *gunas* are also described as being white, red and dark in their figurative account, one may be led to believing that the Upanisadic verse in the context actually speaks of the Sankhya '*pradhana*' as being the material cause of the world-pluralities. The point is really intriguing but the way the *sutras*, as elaborated and commented on by Sankara, tackle the case, there can be no lingering doubt that the *srutis* there do not really introduce the Sankhya concept of '*pradhana*', nor do they support the Prakritikaranavada of the Sankhya there. The *srutis* there introduces quite a number of metaphors in the preceding as also in the succeeding verses and there can be no reason why one such metaphor should be interpreted in a specific way to suit the concept of the Sankhya '*pradhana*'. The *sutra* 1.4.10 advises taking the word '*aja*' in the conventional (*rudhi*) sense to mean a she-goat. Sankara also advises that. Such an interpretation, which leaves off the etymological meaning of the word, such as, 'un-born', may not be incorrect or improper in a context abounding in metaphor. But even if the expression '*aja*' were taken in its etymological meaning, it would not have been difficult from the context to prove that the Sankhya concept has not been actually introduced or suggested there. It can be seen that the verse 1.9 in the same Upanisad uses the expression '*aja*' where the word cannot be taken to mean a 'she-goat'. It seems that to establish that the expression does not mean the Sankhya '*pradhana*' a reference to the verses preceding the verse 4.5 and also to the verses that follow, particularly verse 4.10 would have been sufficient. The expression may convincingly mean the beginningless and therefore, unborn '*maya sakti*' of Brahman in which all names and forms (*nama-rupa*) remain unmanifest (*avyakta*) in being potentially contained. Sankara hints at this solution at the end of his commentary on B.S. 1.4.9. As for the Characteristics, red, white and black the subtle elements referred to in B.S. 1.4.9 and also stated in the Chandogya Upanisad (6th prapathaka), such as, *tejas, ap* and *anna (prthivi)* could prove the case as components of that *maya-sakti* and the concept of the Sankhya '*pradhana*' would have been gratuitous, if not incorrect also since '*pradhana*' is accepted by the Sankhya as an *independent principle*.

It can be seen that Ramanuja does not have any scruple to accept the matrix as *Prakriti*, consisting of the three *gunas*, provided this matrix is not conceived as *independent* of the Lord and different from His nature<sup>26</sup>. That also amounts to rejection of the Sankhya claim that and Svetasvatara verse supports the Sankhya view of *pradhana* as the material cause. But in so far as the verse regards *Maya* as the *prakriti*, there seems to be no ground for either mistaking this *prakriti* for the Sankhya '*pradhana*' and ignore the fact that it is '*maya*' which is being described as being the basic nature (*prakriti*) of cosmic pluralities. This supports the Advaita View of Sankara then.

B S. 1.4.11 discusses the question if the group of twenty-five *tattvas* of the Sankhya has any support at any other place in the Upanisads, say, in the Brhadaranyaka *mantra* (verse) no 4.4.17 where there is the mention of five group of five agents (*panca panca janah*) together with *akasa* (space) as constituting the all-pervading immortal (*brahmanmah*). The argument here takes the following forms: (a) The additional mention of *akasa* in the context would give the total twenty-six and so there would be one in excess (*atirekat*) and not exactly twenty-five as required. (b) The Sankhya categories are all varied (*nanabhavat*) and in the absence of some common character (*sadharana dharma*) among five members of each grouping, it is idle to think that the expression 'five groups of five', even supposing that such is the meaning of the expression 'panca panca janah', cannot refer to the Sankhya categories, which cannot be grouped in five divisions<sup>21</sup>. It is more reasonable to take *panca panca janah* to mean only the group of five breaths just as the expression 'supta saptarsayah' is sometimes used to denote one group of seven stars going by that name. This seems to be the intended meaning from a look at the end of the Brhadaranyaka sentence (*vakyarevasat*)<sup>22</sup>. The final conclusion to which the preceding discussion all lead is that the Sankhya categories, each and all, are *a-sabda* (non-vedic) since there is no mention of them anywhere in the *sruti-texts*, explicitly or implicitly. That these categories are simply postulational is evidenced in the Sankhya logical operations with four cardinal notions – the *vyakta* (manifest), the *avyakta* (unmanifest), the *vyaktavyakta* (both cause and effect) and the neither *vyakta* nor *avyakta*, the *anubhava* (*netta*) – the transcendent *purusas*.

The *sutras* do not make any elaborate attempt to show that other orthodox metaphysical systems like the Nyaya-vaishesika also do not have any support in the *srutis*. The reason why the Sankhya is singled out for elaborate polemical treatment is its nearest approximation to the Vedanta doctrine and great prominence as a *smriti* in some circles: In course of his commentary on the last *sutra* of the fourth *pada* of the first *adhyaya*, Sankara stated the reasons why it was not thought necessary to establish *a-sabdarva* of other orthodox systems as well, as tenaciously, Sankara pointed out, in their harmonious taking, introduce one single principle both as the material (*upadana karana*) and the efficient (*nimitta karana*) cause of all things, and which, in being known and comprehended, all else are known, leaving nothing more, to be known<sup>23</sup>. The world-multiplicities are shown to be non-different (*ananya*) from their material cause by means of innumerable illustrations. There are innumerable passages, again, which speak of *unity* of the *upadana karana* and the *nimitta karanatva* in Brahman<sup>24</sup>. Such being the case, not only a dualistic system, which like the Sankhya makes an absolute distinction system, which like the Sankhya makes an absolute distinction between the *upadana karana* and *nimitta karana*, but the pluralistic systems as well like the Vaishesika system, – which regard the effect as essentially different from its material cause, must also be regarded as *a-vaiddic* (non-vedic), and so purely logical systems. The *sutratara*, says Sankara, has taken exceeding care to prove non-vedic character of the Sankhya since some *smritis*, such as of Devala, have adopted the Sankhya categories as if these are vedic, being misguided by the doctrine of non-difference of cause and effect, which is common to the Sankhya and the Vedanta<sup>25</sup>. But with the Sankhya claim of being *sruti*-based now thoroughly repudiated, the repudiation of all other rival orthodox systems as non-Vedic follows automatically<sup>26</sup>, since these systems are grossly pluralistic, and do not subscribe to the Vedantic view of *unity of all existence*.

Absence of support in the revealed literature, and therefore, in an experience of the transcendental kind (which is defended as possible here and now), shows off all rival schools of metaphysics, orthodox and heterodox, as purely logical systems-stipulative or postulatory. The general disadvantage of such logical systems has been shown pointedly in the *sutra* 2.1.11 'Tarkapratisathanat etc'. Such logical systems, it has been argued, cannot deliver up any *transcendental* metaphysics. At

best in them, we can have purely conceptualistic systems, proposing alternative conceptual schemes. But these all remain mere thought—constructions without any possibility of their ontological claim being ever established. The Advaita Vedanta, therefore, is very much in agreement with the present-day western analysts as far as the purely conceptualistic systems of metaphysics are concerned. But it disagrees with them completely insofar as it does not look upon the necessary limitations of conceptualistic metaphysics as the limitations of metaphysics as such.<sup>13</sup> There can be no absolute limitation of human experience to the sensory experience of the conventional sort. It is sheer dogmatism to argue that the conditions which determine our ordinary experience are unexceptionable or absolute and that such conditions cannot be altered or transcended. The Vedanta insistence all through out has been that it is as well possible to change the direction of the mind or mental process from the world of outer objects to the inner realm of various grades of subjectivity in relation to which alone the various grades of objectivities appear to be 'given' and to be 'known'.

Next, the Vedanta turns to a purely logical evaluation of these rival metaphysical systems as logical or conceptualistic systems. It takes up the *dualistic* Sankhya system at first since the Sankhya with its pretension to be an alternative *moksasāstra* is the principal contender (*pradhana*) *malik* in this field. It is to be borne in mind, and Sankara has insisted tirelessly, that in spite of all that has been said and argued for, the Vedanta interest in the causal explanation of phenomenal pluralities as having originated from Brahman, both as the material and the efficient cause, is secondary. The implication is not that the Vedanta is half-hearted or doubtful about the logical validity of its arguments and would give up its own logical position or make compromise with a rival logical account of the world-order. What the Vedanta seeks to bring home to us is that *paramārtha*, the supreme end of life, which is to be the goal of a true philosophy and a transcendental metaphysics is not realised in having a theoretical cosmology; how the world of infinite plurality of subjects and objects has originated. It is only by moving in the opposite process, and realising. It is only by moving in the opposite process, and realising in term of concrete experience the unity of all in the absolute one-ness of the Self which is the Brahman in cosmic manifestation, that such supreme goal can be reached. And this realised one-ness with Reality is the *paramārtha* insofar as this alone ensures immortality (*amṛtatva*), absolute fearlessness (*abhaya*) and release from bondage (*mokṣa*). The concrete reliability, even in this life, of this freedom and immortality in transcendental one-ness with the absolute and the true self, is to be the one *absolute criterion* for distinguishing a true transcendental metaphysics from a myriad of purposeless and erratic logomachies and conceptualistic flares which pretend to be true metaphysics in ordinary parlance. It the Vedanta undertakes to refute these systems *logically*, it is, as Sankara himself explains, for no other purpose than to expose their simulating nature as forms of transcendental metaphysics.<sup>14</sup>

The very first argument of the Vedanta is calculated to point out that the Sankhya system has to be looked upon as purely postulational and conceptual since 'not all its categories' have an experiential basis'.<sup>15</sup> This particularly true in respect of its most fundamental categories like 'pradhana' and 'mahat'. These are neither commonly known (*lokapresiddha*), nor are they mentioned in the Vedic literature. They are, as Sankara sarcastically puts, like the objects of a non-existent sixth sense.<sup>16</sup> Thus, 'Pradhana' and 'mahat' are mere postulational concepts. The Sankhya, under the guidance of its causal theory, which denies emergence of anything absolutely new, traces every effect to what would be its immanent material cause, substantially the same as the effect, and potentially involving it before actual manifestation. Following upon its causal argument from the conditioned to what would be its condition and so, the ground, the Sankhya seeks to arrive at the notion of an *unconditioned condition* or absolute material ground, which involves all cosmic manifestations in a

state of pure potency before evolving them progressively by self-differentiation. Now, a concept of this sort is without any experiential basis, and so, unverifiable. The Vedānta, it can be seen, although commending good many practical disciplines and methods of contemplation of the yoga-system, repudiates its theoretic base absolutely<sup>37</sup> insofar as the Yoga system takes for granted the validity of the Sāṅkhya postulate of 'pradhana' or *prakṛti*, as also of the doctrine of plural selves rather too naively.

The second *pada* of the second *adhyāya*, which in its first ten *sūtras*, presents the main Vedānta criticisms of the Sāṅkhya seems to provide for some sort of a 'transcendental disproof' of the system in the Kantian sense. It may be recalled that Kant<sup>38</sup> demonstrate self-sufficiency as also the *objective* validity of the categories of the understanding. The Vedānta arguments here provide for theoretic disproof of the fundamental categories of the Sāṅkhya by showing that they are *inadequate* and self-discrepant in themselves, and also *insufficient*, if not irrelevant also, for the explanation of the world-order as it is given and experienced although it is for a causal explanation of this order that the Sāṅkhya categories were postulated. B S 2 2 1. - '*Racanānupapattiḥ ca namumanam*' is the main Vedānta argument in this context, all other play a supporting role and may be looked upon as supplementaries.

It is indeed astounding that an erudite Sanskrit scholar<sup>39</sup>, while venturing to present a new commentary on the Sāṅkhya-Kārika in repudiation of the famous classical commentaries of Gaudapada and Vacaspati Miśra, should come out with the sensational statement that Sāṅkara, in his refutation of the Sāṅkhya, did not take note of the several inferential arguments in support of the doctrine of *prakṛti* (pradhana) advanced by the Kārika in his commentary. There can be no doubt that such an assumption is absolutely groundless. The fact is that both the Bādarāyana *sūtras* and Sāṅkara, as their commentators. Took cautious note not only of such arguments but also of other arguments which could be possible<sup>40</sup> while examining if the construction and constitution (*racana*) of the wonderful world-order warrant an explanation like the *prakṛti-kāraṇa-vāda* of the Sāṅkhya. Sāṅkara, under the guidance of successive *sūtras*, has actually reviewed the logical strength of the several *kārya-lūpaka* inferences in support of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *avyaktā* or *pradhana* advanced by the Kārika. The kārika seeks to establish *avyaktā* (or *pradhana*) as the self-Dependent material cause of the manifest world-order on the following four grounds<sup>41</sup> - (a) *parimāṇat*, <sup>42</sup> (b) *Samanvayat*, (c) *Saktitah*<sup>43</sup> *pravṛttah*, and (d) *Kārya-kāraṇavibhagat avibhagat ca vatsvarūpasya*.

In his commentary, Sāṅkara has taken up the second argument of the Kārika, such as, *samanvayat* ('*anveya*' in Sāṅkara's own putting) at first. He has argued that the external (*bāhya*) and the internal (*ādhyātmika*) series of the distinguished (*bhēdanam*), that is, the physical objects, and their corresponding mental status, cannot be supposed to have a (*community*) of nature, such as, pleasure, pain and dullness, or even a common matrix. Pleasure etc. are *feelings*, and they are internal and subjective. Sound, taste etc. on the other hand, not feelings. They all are objective and pertain to external objects. These later are the occasioning causes the subjective feelings which, again, differ in their specific nature on account of different mental predispositions (*bhāvanavisesat*) of individuals. Had pleasure, pain etc. been the components of external objects, all percipients would have been effected in the same way as they hear the same sound, see the same colour and so on. So, it cannot be said that the distinguished (*bhēdah*) - the subjective and the objective entities, do have a community of nature or that their primal material cause have the very same essences<sup>44</sup>.

The first, and the fourth argument of the Kārika, Sāṅkara took up together in the very next paragraph and the third argument *saktitah pravṛtteh*, it can be seen, has been drawn out at considerable



length and examined thoroughly in course of the commentary on the succeeding *sūtras*. It the initial *sūtra* of the second *pāda* of the second *adhyāya* attached primary importance to the Vedānta argument against the Sāṅkhya that its postulational system based on the supposition of an unconscious, self-dependent material cause is inadequate to explain the wonderful world-order of things and brings, it was because, as we have already explained, the Vedānta wanted to show that the world of effects which was to be the ground of the Sāṅkhya inference of a primal unconscious material cause, does not, in fact, support postulation of a *materia prima* of the form that the Sāṅkhya envisaged. That argument is aimed at some kind of transcendental disproof of the Sāṅkhya postulational system, as we have already expressed. Logical ineptness (*anupapatti*) of the Sāṅkhya postulation (*anumanam* of the *materia prima*) follows from the very specific nature of the world-order (*racana*), —this is the gist of the Vedānta argument in the first part of B.S. 2.2.1. Refutation of the fourfold arguments of the *Kārika*. As Sāṅkara sees them, follows next, and the syllable 'ca' of the *sūtra* is intended to refer to them<sup>41</sup>. The argument from '*racanamupapatti*' (logical insufficient to explain world-order) lays greater stress to the logical fallacy of '*dṛstantanupapatti*' (absence of a like or relevant example) as it is known in the Indian logical parlance. The examples or illustrations (*dṛstanta*) from common experience upon which the Sāṅkhya seek to build its theory of an independent (*svatantra*) unconscious (*a-cetana*) *materia prima*, such as, the 'pradhana' do not, it is argued, support or substantiate that conclusion or deduction. In Indian logic where inferential argument can never be purely formal, a relation of universal concomitance between the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhyā*) commonly called *Vyapti* forms the basis of the inferential process, and it is essential that this *vyapti* relation is supported by concrete illustrations in a number of observable cases. Where illustrations cited in support of alleged *vyapti* relation are themselves vitiated the entire process of inference remains vitiated and is pronounced to be invalid. The initial Vedānta argument, then, attacks the very formal logical basis of the Sāṅkhya postulation of 'pradhana' as the prime ground of the express order. As a logical argument this argument enjoys a certain primacy and in a general way covers up the *Kārika* arguments which are next examined and refuted. Since Sāṅkara in his commentary has brought out these logical points quite prominently, it baffles one to understand how Dr. Raja could commit such mistake.

Now to return to the Vedānta argument, the initial one, as elaborated by Sāṅkara, 'nothing that is unconscious is ever found capable, independently (*svatantra*) and unaided, of giving rise to anything to meet the very distinctive (*visistam*) requirement of a person, the enjoyer<sup>42</sup>? It is unconceivable then that the alleged unconscious 'pradhana' has, of itself and without being guided and controlled, and therefore, without being regulated by some conscious principle, produced this wonderful world-order, distinguished into the order of enjoyers having diverse formations of bodies and organs suiting their deserts and also into the external realm of objects having diverse composition, and requisite for being enjoyed in some settled ways. The Sāṅkhya, it is commonly known, insists on our acceptance of the express order of pluralities as an order distinguished into enjoyers (*bhokta*) and the enjoyed (*bhogyā*). The cosmic evolution, according to it, although automatic and quasi-mechanical, subserves the purpose (*prayojana*) of the plural *puruṣas* for enjoyment as also for release. These *puruṣas*, under the Sāṅkhya stipulation are mere centres of experience (and as that of illumination) but being absolutely inactive can be conceived as the guiding or regulating (*niyamaka*) principal of 'pradhana' which is supposed to evolve into plural forms out of itself having the potency for it —*śaktiḥ pravṛtāḥ*. The Vedānta argument here is that there is no instance (*dṛstanta*) of a material cause which, although unconscious, by itself and without active guidance, planning and executive effort of a conscious agent, ever gives rise to objects subserving individual purposes. So, if the evolutes of 'pradhana' have formed themselves into this wonderful order of enjoy and the enjoyed, as the Sāṅkhya holds, 'pradhana'



will have to be conceived as having been sustained and regulated by a conscious principle<sup>47</sup>

As is evident from a cursory look at Sankara's commentary the refutation of the Karika inference of a primal material cause comprising of three *gunas* on the ground (*linga*) of *samanvaya* (community of nature) follows next. There is something more in Sankara's argument here that what readily meets the eye. The internal and external formations (*vikaras*) cannot be justifiably supposed to have any community of nature, or to have the self-same characteristics, such as, pleasure, pain and dulness. The external, objective formations appear to have quite disparate characteristics, such as, colour, taste, smell etc. These latter, again, seem to be the occasioning causes of pleasure, pain, etc., which are subject give feelings and nothing objective. What is even more striking is that the very same (*aviseśa*) sound, taste etc. can give rise to very different feelings in individuals having different moods or predispositions (*bhavanavisesat*). How do we then get at the premise that the objective and subjective events have a community of nature or that they have a *common-matrix* which is to be the Sankhya 'pradhana' having a three-fold nature and not either manifold or absolute simple, although *appearing* different? Sankara seems to argue that *nothing specific* about the *nature* of a primal ground can be concluded by an inferential reasoning<sup>48</sup>

The Karika inference of the *avyakta* (pradhana) as a composite substance which is equilibrium of the three *gunas-sattva, rajas* and *tamas* and the ground of limitedness (*parimitatva*) of the distinguished plural formations (*bhedanam*) of the express order, next, comes up for refutation. Vacaspati in his *tika* brings in a very interesting point in this context. The *hetu* a *linga*, such as, *parimitatva*, adduced here by the Sankhya, is too narrow (*avyapaka*) since *akasa* (ether) which, although a distinct or distinguished entity, is *not* limited (*parimita*)<sup>49</sup> Sankara argues that if on the ground of 'limitedness' of the *distinguished*, a relation of conjunction of the factors which limit and there by determine the limited is to be admitted, and if on the analogy of roots and sprouts, which as distinguished and limited are found to depend on conjunction of several elements, the internal states and the external objects of our common experience are to be supposed as due to the conjunction of several factors, then, the Sankhya *gunas, sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, being limited and distinguished, will themselves imply and presuppose conjunction of several other elements in order to be produced. In other words, these *gunas*, each distinct and limited, cannot be admitted as basic or fundamental and as comprising the primal material cause of the Sankhya in any conceivable way. The concept of the absolutely undetermined, unlimited and primal matrix cannot be established by such an argument of the Karika. Sankara next, very briefly but at the same time very astutely disposes of the fourth argument of the karika urged on the ground (*linga*) or the very nature of cause-effect relationship (*Karya-karana-bhava*). In the Karika putting the argument is that the distinction between cause and effect *arises* from *differentiation* (*vibhagat*) of the former and the same distinction disappears when the cause is not so differentiated (*avibhagat*). In other words, the effects are substantially identical with their immanent material cause, they arise through differentiation and disappear in being integrated. In fact, this argument, the fourth in the Karika presentation to be finally established depends on the third argument – *sakitat pravrtteh* in the same presentation. This seems to be the reason why the Vedanta Sutra and Sankara, the commentator take up the third argument last and examine it both closely and elaborately on account of its pivotal importance. The fourth argument also implies that in production or evolution, it is the potential which unfolds the many by self-differentiation and again, in dissolution or destruction the many, the distinguished, returns back to their undivided state in the material cause, that disappears is only their distinguishedness or *formal* difference. To this Sankaras curt reply has been that the supposition of an immanent material cause

is not enough in the explanation of the emergence of effects. There is no known and commonly agreed upon instance where effects, such as, beds, chairs etc. spontaneously arise from their material causes without involvement of a conscious and intelligent principle. Such being the case, the emergence and differentiation of the world-pluralities, in the subjective and objective forms, considered as effects, cannot be explained by the mere supposition of an unconscious principle as self-differentiating and self-integrating material cause. Sankaras pointed mention of *preksapurvakatva*<sup>30</sup> (involvement of a conscious principle that plans) takes us back to B.S. 1.1.5- '*Ikṣateḥ nasabdām*' which rejects the claim of the Sankhya 'pradhana' for being the ultimate ground of the cosmic developments on the ground that 'pradhana', the unconscious principle, finds no mention in the Vedic literature, which speaks of a self-planning conscious principle, the Brahman, as being the ground. Thus, in course of his commentary on B.S. 2.2.1 Sankara besides disproving the theoretic relevance of the Sankhya postulatory system examines and refutes three arguments of the Karika in defence of its primal material cause.

B.S. 2.2.2 to B.S. 2.2.10 can all be taken together as these examine the Sankhya account of the world-evolution in the light of its two fundamental postulates – *pradhana* and *purusa*, which have been rigidly distinguished by way of negation and a relation of absolute exclusion of one by the other. These arguments, taken as a compact whole, repudiate metaphysical dualism as the arguments which follow subsequently repudiate metaphysical pluralism, nihilism, subjectivism, relativism and a hybrid of diverse tendencies which are all antithetical to the Advaita account. The *sūtras* 2.2.2. – 2.2.10 are, again, auxiliaries of Sūtra 2.2.1 since these also consider the very same issue if the given order of plural formations, which seem to well-knit together cannot be explained by means of the Sankhya postulates. Argument of the Karika for close examination. Sankara's commentary in this section, as will be clear from a closer look at the texts, considers two issues inter-connectedly. These are: (a) if 'pradhana', as conceived in the Karika and the Sankhya system, that is, an independent *materia prima* having potency of evolving into the world-pluralities, is capable, by itself alone, of successive unfoldment as is claimed by the Karika aphorism – *saktiḥ pravṛtteḥ*, (b) if the association, or the kind of relation proposed by the Sankhya between 'purusa' and 'Pradhana' can help the potential material cause in the kind of display that the Sankhya claims on its behalf.

A little bit of digression is necessary so that a modern reader with orientation in Western philosophy and some other, much burdened with orthodoxy to see the issues clearly, may not miss the salient points as also the logical strength of Sankara's criticism of the Sankhya in what follows. The Sankhya argument for the ultimate ground of things is *inferential* and proceeds from the given order of subjects and objects regarded as a sum totality of effects. The Vedanta, by Sankara's own admission, *does not argue inferentially*<sup>31</sup>. The argument adumbrated in the *sūtra* '*janmadyasya yataḥ*', as Sankara has explained, was never intended to be an inferential argument. It was an argument no doubt, but it rested entirely on the evidence of the *śruti*-texts, – although it is indirectly supported by logical arguments which by exhibiting hollowness and illogicality of all rival theories of metaphysics *construe certain logical points*, in course of logical refutations of other systems, which exhibit the logicity of the Advaita system. This is a very important issue and should not go unnoticed by the proponents and the opponents of the Advaita Vedanta. It is utter nonsense, for instance, to maintain that the Vedanta of Sankara is not a transcendental metaphysics, logically defended and elaborated but only a species of mysticism in the sense Professor Stace or some other defines 'mysticism'<sup>32</sup>. Truth, metaphysically regarded, can only be of *one form*, not varied or various, as Sankara has always insisted<sup>33</sup>. That being the case, what is not grounded in reality, is not an absolute fact – uncontradicted and incontestable, cannot be the 'truth'. Unfortunately, there have been distortions of the metaphysical

philosophy of Sankara either because the reader read too much which is not is Sankara or in the Upanisads, or he read too little. Reality is all one, according to the Advaita, yet it *appears* as many neither of these two items is ever denied. A third item has been added. It is that to regard the plural appearances not as appearance but as *substantive realities* in themselves is degrading these into illusory appearances. This also is never denied. All these are admitted as several *phases* of the one. The Advaita seeks to integrate the illusory into the 'mere appearance' and finally, the multiple appearances to their absolute unity in an undivided and undistinguished subject-consciousness or self-consciousness. It is the *realisation* of the self-identity and absolute one-ness with all *that seems to be there* which the Vedanta of Sankara defines as the *paramarthika* (contributory to the supreme and) and not any indifferent, neutral, unalterable and stubborn objectivity of very imagination. 'Reality' is the *realisable supreme truth*, which is, again, the one truth. It is only because the one reality has given rise to a variety of experiences, and in course of such experiences has assumed diverse forms that is why we demand to know retrospectively *whence* all these and *why*? This brings in the various categories of explanation. These categories of explanation do not have for the Vedanta any direct or exclusive relevance. It is not by knowing how the one has become several and finally, the manifest order of plurality that the supreme object of knowledge can be realised<sup>14</sup>. That end can only be realised by consciously reaching up to the identity-consciousness that is, one's own identity in the one absolute spirit. The logic of explanation which is a form of *manana* guided by *sravana* and when this consummatis in *nididhyasana* it can show the path to the final goal, which is an enlightened intuition. This logic of explanation does not have any relevance by itself, since without concrete verification in the identity-consciousness, this remains as just one rival theory among a host of others. This happens to be the basic Vedanta approach to logical considerations. In the Vedanta parlance, therefore, the categories of cause and effect, of ground and consequent, can intelligibly operate only on an *assumed distinction* between Brahman conceived as the ground and the plural appearances conceived as the consequent, and this distinction has limited validity, since *existentially*, there are no several things. So these categories are all metaphysically barren or vacuous. Not so with the rationalistic systems like the Sankhya and the Vaisheshika. With them, the categories of cause and effect are not simply logical or conceptual. With them, the logical is also the metaphysical, the intentional is also the real. This essential difference between the two approaches has to be kept in mind to properly gauge the strength of Sankara's arguments in refutation and in self-defence, and there is a medley of both the types in what follows next.

Now, to return to the Karika argument that an unconscious, self-dependent *materia prima*, which is the equilibrium of three-fold substances, such as, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, has, *by itself*, and by reason of its having the potency, has given rise to the world-order. Sankara argues that leaving aside the question of such a material cause constructing this world-order by itself, it cannot even be conceived to have the impetus (*pravrtti*) which can disturb its equilibrium and unleash its three *gunas* in their bid for preponderance among themselves—which is prerequisite for world-creation by the Sankhya admission<sup>15</sup>. The unseen and unknown can be inferred on the basis of instances already seen and known if the cases are similar. We never come across any instance where an unconscious material body or substance is self-active or self-initiative. Earth requires to be moulded by a potter to give rise to pots, a chariot needs to be driven and guided by a conscious agent in its career or course of movement. Nothing of common experience is found to be unconscious (*acetana*) and at the same time self-active or self-propelled (*svatantra pravrtta*).

From Sankara's exposition of the *purvapaksa* view in the context of B.S.2.2.2., it is clear that he is not interested in defending the view that activity or movement belongs to any conscious principle

insofar as it is conscious. Plainly, Sankara admits we do not have any empirical evidence of a conscious principle functioning by itself alone. Evidently it is found operative through some medium which is unconscious, or in association with it. And even there, the activity or change is attributed not to the conscious factor or principle but to such part in the association which is regarded as unconscious. In a living body, for instance, the activity or change belongs to the body, not to life or to the principle of consciousness in distinction from the body. But the actual point of contention, says Sankara, is whether anything that is unconscious and admittedly so, is capable of becoming active spontaneously and by itself, or if the activity which pertains to it has to be initiated by a principle which is conscious. If it is true that there is no empirical evidence where a conscious principle is found operating by itself, it is equally true that nothing which is unconscious is found to be self-propelled. But the Sankhya conceives its primal material cause as an active principle, capable of evolving and dissolving by itself. This looks absurd.

There is quite a good deal of scope for misreading and misunderstanding of Sankara's intention and meaning in this context, particularly on account of the various types of illustrations brought forth by him to explain several points of his argument. His principal issue has been here to prove that nothing that is admittedly unconscious, as the Sankhya 'pradhana' is by the Sankhya admission, can be self-propelled or self-active, although such is the Sankhya view. His second issue is what he and the Vedanta sutra 2.2.1 insisted upon. It is that to give rise to any development of a distinctively specific kind (*vixistakaryahhimukha*)<sup>36</sup> involving relation of means and ends, the guidance of an intelligent and conscious principle is a 'must', as it is the case of the construction (*racana*) of the wonderful world-order. His third issue, as he is going to develop through successive criticism of Sankhya dualism which keeps apart the *upadana* and *quest-nimitta karana*, *pradhana* and *purusa*, *this conscious principle is not to be an external agency but is to be an indwelling (antaryami) principle operating from within and through self-mechanism, that is, the Upadana and nimittakarana and to be united together in a single principle.* The Sankhya Purusa is not any such internal principle and the Sankhya theory of evolution and dissolution becomes vitiated on account of the absolute distinction and the relation of mutual exclusion it defends in respect of its two basic categories. Lastly, the role which the Vedanta would admit of the conscious principle is the one very much similar to the Sankhya notion but which the Sankhya cannot substantiate. It is that the conscious principle is the unmoved mover, the initiator of a moving and so a dynamic process but it is not itself involved in the process (*pravrtti pravartaka*, but *pravrtti-vihinam svayam*).

Now let us turn to Sankara's exposition of the Vedanta arguments against the Sankhya and the specific uses he makes of the various illustrations. Sankara argues, since an activity is seen in bodies having consciousness and is not seen in bodies devoid of consciousness it can be concluded that consciousness even though not an active principle in itself or when not associated with a body is the initiator (*pravartaka*) of the *pravrtti* or activity of the body in which it is present<sup>37</sup>. Fire, for instance, cannot burn and cannot give light in its abstracted self, yet the burning and lighting noticed in the fuel cannot be supposed as due to the fuel, it has to be supposed that such changes in the fuel are due to the presence of fire inside it since no such development can take place without the presence of fire. The point Sankara seeks to explain by this illustration is that of the unmoved mover, of the initiator of a movement without the presence of which changes observed in the context could not happen. There is no attempt here to show that fire is a conscious principle<sup>38</sup>.

One may ask here does not the Sankhya also admit the concept of an unmoved mover in its notion of 'purusa' and does it not also draw upon a number of analogies, including the analogy of the magnet which by reason of its mere presence and contiguity (*sannidhi*) initiates movement in a

piece of iron? It is not, however, difficult to see relevance of Sankara's criticism here. The Sankhya postulation of the material cause is that of a self-dependent matrix which is active in itself, and has the potency not only of involving all the plural forms within itself but is also capable of unfolding all of them spontaneously. It is according to it, dynamic even in the state of involution and equipoise. The Vedanta argument here is against this Karika notion of *Sakitiyah pravrttih*. If any *pravrtti* per activity for development starts from an impact, even from 'mere' contiguity of some external and alien principle, as the Sankhya dualism admits, what specious reason can be there for maintaining that the activity was essentially Pradhana's own and latent in it, and not an extrinsic and adventitious development due to external cause or causes? How is, for instance, possible to believe that a piece of iron or a pool of water has moving activity inherent in it, if without contiguity of a piece of magnet in one case and without the presence of low ground in the other case, no movement ever takes place? Sankara is arguing here on the basis of the Sankhya admission of two absolutely distinct principles, one immanent and the other transcendent, strictly defined in the way that the Sankhya does. The Vedanta, as he understands it, does not make any such distinction between the efficient (or final) and the material cause, nor does it regard the conscious or intelligent principle as transcendent and operating from without.

From B.S. 2.2.2, to B.S. 2.2.5 the argument is against self-activity or spontaneous functioning of the 'pradhana' of the Sankhya conception. It is sometimes found that the very same illustrations are found faulty while arguing against the Sankhya, and again, flawless when illustrating the Vedanta case. Sankara is aware of this anomaly and it is interesting to note that instead of dodging he shows how such anomalies may be removed or explained away. This he has done in the context of B.S. 2.2.3. Thus, while the Vedanta *sutras* of the first *pada*, of the Second *adhyaya* rule out the necessity of admitting any factor outside Brahman to explain manifestation of world-pluralities from that absolute ground or matrix, and make use of some illustrations which the Sankhya also cites to illustrate evolution of all cosmic pluralities out of one single, self-dependent common matrix, such as, the Pradhana, the second *pada* of the second *adhyaya* argues against validity of those very illustrations as illustrations of a self-sufficient material cause. The *sutras* 2.1.23 and 2.1.24 explain the possibility of a self-sufficient material cause giving rise to plurality of forms *without external aid*, and to illustrate such possibility introduce stone (*asma*), milk and water as examples. In the context of the Vedanta criticism of the Sankhya concept of 'pradhana' in the second *pada* of the same *adhyaya*, the very same instances are, again, shown as inadequate and dependent on some external and additional condition. Is not this an anomaly? If milk and water cannot be suitable examples of an unaided and absolute world-ground, such as, Brahman? If, again, such instances suit the Vedanta context – the development of plural forms from an unaided absolute ground, they ought to fit into the Sankhya explanation of evolution of world-plurality out of an unaided *materia prima*. The point is undoubtedly intriguing.

But there is a missing point which even Sankara seems to have overlooked. It is that the illustrations of milk and water have not been used in the two contexts exactly in the same way or for identical purposes. There in the *sutra* 2.1.24 development of multiple forms out of an unaided matrix or ground has been sought to be instantiated. No doubt, that issue also has relevance for the Sankhya case. We shall defer treatment of that issue till we explain the *difference* of use of the illustrations in the two contexts. The context of B.S. 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 is that of an unconscious principle being self-active or spontaneously operative. What is argued here is simply that the illustrations of milk flowing for the benefit of the calf (*vatsa vivrddhaya*) or water of rivers flowing for the benefit of mankind or vegetation are *not* examples of any unguided, spontaneous activity (*svatah pravrtti*). That



milk or water of rivers flows to serve anybody's purpose is not a relevant issue for the Vedanta. It is relevant issue for the Sankhya since the Sankhya is interested in showing that the spontaneous evolution of Pradhana is not purposeless, that it subserves the purpose of Purusa, a conscious principle. The Vedanta argument in B. S. 2.2.3. points out that neither the flow of milk from a cow's udders nor is the flow of water in the streams can be supposed to be spontaneous or automatic. This is argued because the Karika verse 16 argues that the evolution of the Pradhana is comparable to different formations of water in different containers. Now the Vedanta *sutra* 2.2.2. has argued against the very possibility of disturbance of the equilibrium and therefore, of the Pradhana's initial movement towards evolution uninitiated or unguided by a conscious principle and spontaneously. The instance of milk flowing from the udders of the cow is an instance where the movement is not spontaneous but initiated by love of the conscious cow for calf and sucking by the calf—both additional factors in disproof of spontaneity. In case of flow of water in streams also there is no spontaneity as there is dependence of such external factors as the low level the ground. There is no immediate call for substantiating the Vedantic view that all changes are guided by some conscious principle. The issue is—if there instances serve the purpose of illustrating self-initiated movement or activity of an unconscious principle such as, the Pradhana of the Sankhya. Evidently, they do not serve that purpose. B. S. 2.2.4. argues that since the Pradhana, *ex hypothesi*, is a self-dependent principle (*anapeksa*) and since no external initiator or regulator can be supposed to be there, (its other principle such as, Purusa, by its own admission being inactive and indifferent (*udasena*)) there can be no periodic evolution or dissolution of the world-pluralities out of, and into, the material cause proposed by it. The point here is—how can there be *periodic* evolution and dissolution of the manifest order in the absence of an external regulator in the case of a material cause, which is self-dependent and at the same time, unconscious and unintelligent? The Vedanta needs no such external regulator as Brahman, the ground of all plural manifestations is a conscious principle and is both the *upadana* and the *nimitta karana* combined into one. The *sutra* 2.2.5. shows inappropriateness of the illustrations, such as, the grass (*trnadivat*), spontaneously, becoming transformed into milk, since even such transformations are dependent on certain external special conditions, but in the case of the Sankhya Pradhana, such external special conditions are ruled out, as by hypothesis, Pradhana is self-dependant. This is logically connected with the previous *sutra*, since the basic reason is *anapeksatva* (non-dependance on any external factor in spontaneous activity). The grass requires to be eaten by a milch cow and not by a bull, in order to issue forth as milk." B.S. 2.2.6. gives a new turn to the Vedanta argument. It aims at showing certain self-discrepancy in the Sankhya, even if spontaneity or self-activity of Pradhana,—which the Sankhya assiduously maintains and the Vedanta with equal vigour repudiates, were granted as an established issue by mutual agreement (*ubhyupagama api*). It is part of the Sankhya doctrine that the evolutionary process is purposive, that it subserves the twin ends of *purusa*—enjoyment (experience) and release<sup>40</sup>. If it is accepted that Pradhana is capable of functioning spontaneously and is self-motivated and self-initiated, then as we are to rule out as external auxiliary circumstance in its self-unfoldment, we are to rule out also any external purpose. In being *anapeksa* (non-dependent on anything extraneous), it is to be independent of any outside purpose also. This militates against the Sankhya statement that Pradhana works for enjoyment and release of Purusa<sup>41</sup>. If the Sankhya takes the stand that what it rules out is simply an external auxiliary in *pradhana's* creative development in order to establish that *pradhana* is capable of evolving into the manifold by itself but not also that there can be no external purpose and that *pradhana* does not subserve any purpose or anybody's purpose outside its creative function, then the Sankhya will have to prove what purpose that purpose is to be. Is it enjoyment or release or both? If it is enjoyment, how is this enjoyment possible in respect of *purusa*, which, by definition is indifferent and self-complete and suffers no



addition or accretion to its being. If, again, *purusa* suffers any accretion due to enjoyment of *pradhana*'s display it cannot get out of it and release would be impossible. It can not be for *purusa*'s release, since, by the Sankhya admission, *purusa* is free eternally and so before the display of *pradhana* begins, that display of *pradhana* becomes purposeless. Then, if freedom be the end, there souls not be any enjoyment and so, no experience of sense-objects. If the display of *pradhana* is to subserve both the purposes of enjoyment and release, then since this display is to being in infinite varieties of enjoyable objects here will be no cessation of the display and no release— The purpose cannot be also fulfillment of curiosity – the unconscious *pradhana* can have no curiosity, nor can *purusa*, by nature pure and placid, have any curiosity requiring fulfillment. If, finally, it is for fulfilling theoretic requirement of its prior supposition that *Purusa* is to be the centre of experiencing capacity and *Pradhana* is to be invested with creative power (*sarga sakti*) the self-initiated cosmic display, of *Pradhana* is to be admitted, then, since such capacities are definitive of the very meaning of the two concepts these would endure for ever and will never cease (*anucchedat*) and so there can be no release from the bondage of life. All these logical discrepancies Sankara would regard as contradictions in the fundamental commitment (*pratijna hani*) or the Sankhya<sup>42</sup>

Thus far have been brought out inadequacies of the Sankhya doctrine in so far as the Sankhya seeks to explain the creative process, the cosmic manifestation of plural forms, in term of self-initiated activity of an independant *materia prima*, such as, *pradhana*. In the light of four Vedanta *sutras*, which follow next, Sankara examines if the logical difficulties of the Sankhya can be got over on the supposition of any form of relation of cooperation between the two fundamental postulates, *Purusa* and *Pradhana*, admitted in the system. This, then, necessitates examination of the Sankhya in a new direction. The issue here is – if the admission of a conscious principle, guiding or initiating dynamic development latent in the unconscious matrix, *pradhana*, from outside, makes the Sankhya case intelligible without logical difficulty. The Sankhya brings in the analogies of a lame man with sound visual capacity but himself incapable of movement guiding a blind man, capable of movement but without any sense of direction, and thus through mutual assistance getting out of a dense forest, and of a magnet attracting and guiding movement of a piece of iron by mere proximity (*sannidhi*)<sup>43</sup> These analogies, be it noted, are not to be understood as mere analogies but illustrations needed for defending a *vyapti* relation where with the issue in dispute (*pratijna*) can be proved. Both analogies are intended to illustrate an unmoved mover, a characteristic, which even the Vedanta insists, is to be the characteristic of a conscious principle (*cetana*) in any causal development<sup>44</sup> With the Sankhya now conceding that point, that of conscious and intelligent guidance in the dynamic development of *Pradhana*, one would expect that the Vedanta should acquiesce with the Sankhya explanation. But this does not happen. The reason is that the Vedanta is opposed to metaphysical dualism of the conscious and the unconscious as two independent substances. It also does not subscribe to the view that the conscious (*cetana*) is an external principle, functioning or guiding from without. The difference between the two stand points, of the Sankhya and the Vedanta, will be fully treated at the sequel.

B S 2.2.7 examines how far the Sankhya succeeds in giving an intelligible account of the evolution and dissolution of *Pradhana* through alleged cooperation of *Purusa*, in the light of its two analogies<sup>45</sup> – that of a lame man guiding the movement of a blind man, and that of a magnet initiating movement of a piece of iron by reason of sheer proximity. In both the cases, an external principle is supposed to influence, guide or initiate the movement from without, itself not getting involved actively in the movement that takes place. In the first analogy, Sankara points out, the conscious principle uses the unconscious as its support (*adhishtana*) – the lame man supporting himself on the blind man whose movement he guides. In the second analogy, the conscious principle initiates movement

n another without getting involved in the same process (*svayamapepravartumana pravartayati*). The logical difficulty here is, as Sankara points out, that, if these analogies are to be accepted as illustrative of the Sankhya position, then, the Sankhya evidently goes against its own prior admission (*abhyupetahanam*). The Sankhya speaks of Pradhana as being independent and by nature active and denies activity and initiative in respect of Purusa, which is indifferent (*udasma*). A lame man can guide a blind man by issuing vocal direction which is a form of causal activity (*vyapara*) involving exertion. But Purusa, being functionless (*niskriya*) and quality-less (*nirguna*), seems incapable of offering any guidance in any way. On the second analogy, if mere proximity (*sannidhimatra*) of Purusa is to be a sufficient condition of evolution any development of Pradhana, then, since this proximity of Purusa is *always there* (*nitya*), Pradhana would evolve ceaselessly and there can neither be an antecedent state of equipoise nor a subsequent state of dissolution, and release of Purusa. The analogy of the magnet does not also illustrate the Sankhya case. The proximity is to be brought about and the magnet also requires to be cleansed in order to attract iron or initiate its movement. It does not, therefore, illustrate an unmoved mover, an unchanged something, initiating changes in another. In between Purusa and Pradhana there is, again, no intermediary, a third, to bring them into any relationship. So, the very idea of there being a relation of co-operation falls through. To argue that although there is no actual relationship, still there is potentiality or fitness (*tyogvata*) for such relation will be disastrous. Such fitness being ever-present, there can be no breaking away from it, and so release will be impossible. Alternatively, admission of fitness of Purusa and Pradhana to be related in any determinate way will make their relation a mechanically fixed affair with the result that the entire development will be without any purpose (*arthabhava*)<sup>66</sup>

The next two *sutras* may be taken together from the previous it follows that in the Sankhya set up there is nothing to being about any change in the constitution of Pradhana (*bahyasya ca Kasyacid khovayitvurabhavat*)<sup>67</sup>. So, it follows that there can be no change from the original state of equilibrium of the three constituents of Pradhana, such as, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and there can be no organic relationship (*tangangibhava*) among them due to unequal distribution and the prevailing relation of preponderance and subordination of these elements. That being the case, there can be no evolution (B.S.2.2.8). If, again, the Sankhya, deviates from its postulation (*anyathamunitan*) and holds that the three constitutive elements of Pradhana, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are *not* independent (*tanapeksha*) of one another in their state of equipoise but are even in that condition, interdependent, or that they have that kind of fitness (as would follow from the Sankhya postulation of the nature of the cause from the known nature of the effect), there will be fresh difficulty. It can be seen that the Karika verse 12 does actually speak of the *gunas* as being *anyonyabhibhavasreya* and *tananamithunavrttayah*, that is, the *gunas*, by nature, preponderate over each other, become the support of each other, inter-determine and intermingle with each other. If this is accepted not only the *rajas*-element, but all the *gunas* may be held to be motile (*cala*) and unbalanced in themselves. Now, even, if this version of the Sankhya *guna*, and of Pradhana, their original state, be accepted, then since no conscious characteristics is admitted of Pradhana, but rather such characteristic has been left out (*gnasuktivivogati*) in its regard, this wonderful creation, characterised by intelligent adjustment and adaptation, cannot be explained by the supposition of such a material cause (B.S.2.2.9). If, on the other hand, any conscious character is per impossible, admitted in respect of its material cause by the Sankhya, then, the Sankhya position becomes indistinguishable from the Vedanta position. Evidently, the Sankhya cannot accept that position. So its *gunas*, even though they are admitted to have *fitness* or potency for being unequally distributed in the state of equipoise without there being some further reason, such unequal distribution and combination of them in new formations cannot take place, and if, per impossible, such unequal blending of them ever takes place,

being again, no further reason why the *specific* formations through unequal distribution should, again, relapse into *non-specificity* (*avīśasata*) in the state of equipoise<sup>21</sup>

The last argument of the Vedānta against the Sāṅkhya is that there are lots of discrepancies among the Sāṅkhya texts themselves even in the presentation of their case. Some texts speak of sense-organs, some again, of eleven, some derive the *tanmatras* directly from Mahat, some again, from the Ego, some speak of three internal senses, some again, of one. Besides, the Sāṅkhya doctrine does not conform to the *śruti*s and also militates against the *śruti*s which conform to the *śruti*s. So, besides being vitiated by logical inconsistencies it is vitiated also by contradictory statements and is discordant with the *śruti*s and *smṛiti*s as well (B.S. 2.2.10). In the context of the Vedānta criticisms of the Sāṅkhya, Sāṅkara, at several places, replies to what would be the possible 'objections' of the Sāṅkhya against the Vedānta doctrine. These we shall treat when presenting the Vedānta doctrine in the next chapter.

Sāṅkara's refutation of the Vaiśeṣika system of metaphysics follows next, and this is in consequence of his commentary on seven *sūtras*, from 2.2.11 to 2.2.17. Our thematic presentation, although textual all through out, will have to follow, as before, a somewhat different plan and method for the sake of clarity to keep distinct Sāṅkara's refutation of the rival systems from his pleadings in defence of his own system. In the Vedānta *sūtras* themselves, one comes across, at places, arguments purporting to defend one's own position by pointing out that the opponent's own position is vitiated by the very same logical difficulties (*svapaksadosacca*)<sup>22</sup> to which the proponent's position is allegedly open. Any argument of such nature will sound, unconvincing to a modern mind and we shall refrain from drawing strength from such argument. B.S. 2.2.11, as commented upon by Sāṅkara, has two aspects - one, made out to be an argument in defence of the Vedānta which *allegedly* maintains a certain *disparity* (*vailaksanya*) between Brahman as the Self-conscious (*cetana*) ground and the world-order, an unconscious formation (*a-cetana*), as the consequent, and the other, which is expressly an argument in confutation of the Vaiśeṣika atomism. In our presentation, we shall neglect the first part. Firstly, because that argument is not an argument in refutation of the Vaiśeṣika. Secondly, because we have already considered such an argument in defence in the context of B.S. 2.1.4 and subsequent Sūtras 5,6,7,8,9,10 culminating in the Vedāntic defence of the *seeming* disparity between Brahman and the world-order in B.S. 2.1.13. We have also attempted to bring out Sāṅkara's considered opinion that the distinction between Brahman as the causal ground and the express order of plurality as a system of affects is merely conventional (*lokavat*)<sup>23</sup> and at best, a logical distinction based upon conceptual abstraction which has no basis in reality. Such being the case, the question how the unconscious (*a-cetana*) world-order developed out of or proceeded from a conscious principle (*cetana*) cannot have an unlimited and absolute relevance. We, therefore, pass straight way to the Vaiśeṣika account of the world-order and its Vedāntic refutation.

Vacaspati seems to have followed Sāṅkara's presentation too closely to find in the *sūtra* 2.2.11 an argument, not so much in refutation of the Vaiśeṣika postulation, as in defence of the Vedānta. He also argues that the alleged disparity between cause and effect, (between Brahman and the world-order) is equally present in the Vaiśeṣika theory which derives the voluminous and large compounds from atomic and molecular structures considered as causes, and so the Vaiśeṣika account is vitiated by the very same difficulty (*svapaksadosacca*). An argument of this kind is neither very relevant in the context where the claims of rival metaphysics are to be refuted, nor does it have any great strength as an argument in logic. From the fact that an opponent's view-point is vitiated by the same sort of difficulty it does not follow that one's own stand is logically flawless. In our presentation, therefore, we shall consider the *sūtras* and Sāṅkara's elaboration of them only as far as these serve to refute

the claim of the Vaisesikas to have provided with a transcendental metaphysics. Both the Vaisesika argument and its refutation should be presented in a way which enjoys philosophical relevances even at the present time

Sankara regards the Vaisesika system as much postulatory and conceptualistic as is the Sankhya. Both are based upon inferential reasoning effect to cause. The given order of multiplicities, according to the Vaisesikas, consists of compounds and complexes. Now, since 'compounds' presuppose elemental simples out of which they come to be composed through progressive combination, the Vaisesikas, in this explanation of the physical world, postulated certain ultimate simples called by them atoms (*paramanu*). They did not, however, subscribe to the view that *qualitative* differences can all be explained in terms of quantitative differences in the mode of combination of the primitive simples, and so, they admitted four distinct kinds of atoms having distinctive and definative characteristics, such as, a smell, taste, colour and touch – which were supposed to follow on all compounds of the same kind as the inhering cause (*samavayi karana*). But since, the ultimate simples, the atomic constituents, require to be combined and conjoined together in order to give rise to a compound-product, this combination or conjunction (*sumyoga*) was admitted as a different kind of causal circumstance in the system. This conjunction was named noninherent cause (*asamavayikarana*), since it was taken to be as non-inhering in the effect, that is, as not-showing itself up as it is, in the nature of the compound-effect, which was to become quantitatively different. Then, again, because the elemental atoms were conceived as unconscious and physical, and therefore, incapable of self-movement and self-combination, a third kind of causal circumstance came to be admitted in the system, called the efficient or instrumental cause (*nimitta karana*). Thus, according to this theory, every effect, everything that originates or is created must be due to joint-operation of three fold causes – *samavayi*, *asamavayi* and *nimitta karanas*. The *Samavayi* cause here corresponds to material cause (*upadana karana*, of common parlance but is named differently to meet the logical requirement of the system which distinguishes the inhering from the noninherent and the instrumental causes, and which regards the relation of inherence (*sumavaya*) as one of the six positive categories (*bhava padartha*) or cardinal concepts. The Vaisesika system seems to be an instance of 'descriptive metaphysics' of the contemporary western conception insofar as its seven categories are conceived as the basic conceptual structures of any significant language". Sankara's criticism of the Vaisesika is relevant in the examination of 'transcendental claim' of this form of metaphysics – if the conceptual structures presented in the Vaisesika system can suffice to give an intelligible account of the world of existence or reality. His attacks are mainly directed against the Vaisesika atomism radical pluralism and their radical distinction of three-fold causes.

The Vaisesikas, it can be seen, not only speak of analysability of the compound structures into absolute simples, such as, atoms, so far as the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air are concerned, but they even speak of independent, unrelated and so, absolute existence of the primitive atoms prior to their eventual combination at the time of creation. This, then, raises the question, if the circumstances, suggested in the system, leading to the combination of these independent atoms which existed in their primitive immobility, are adequately explanatory. Which is worth remembering here is that unlike in the Sankhya system, the material cause, the primitive atoms are conceived as immobile and inactive in themselves and so, dependant on an external circumstance, such as, the efficient cause for being ordered into any combination. There is another distinctive feature in the Vaisesika theory. The enjoyment or sufferance of objective circumstances by the individual selves is not apparent but is real and this is conditioned by (acquired) merits or demerits of such individuals in the cycle of existence. The cosmic formation called creation is then guided by a moral principle and is neither

automatic nor is it quasi-mechanical as in the Sankhya. Even, then, there seems to be a lacuna which has not been brought into focus in the discussion that follows. It is that *adrsta*, that is, the imperceptible merit or demerit, may have, relevance for the combinations and compoundings of atoms in the formation of the 'bodies' of the individual selves since those are to be the mechanism of enjoyment or suffering, but *adrsta* cannot be legitimately conceived as any determining factor in the organisation of physical things or objects out of primitive atoms, and so, there seems to remain a demand for some other determinant in the latter case. We shall now concentrate on the salient points of criticism of the system by Sankara in his commentary

Sankara argues: For the primitive atoms, coming to form compounds or wholes through combination, some action (*Kriya*) is necessary. This action being itself an event (*Karya*) will have to be admitted as due to some cause (*nimitta*). Non-admission of such cause would amount to the admission that an event is due to no cause or that no event, such as, the shift of the primitive atoms from their state of pristine immobility at all takes place. This will leave the primitive atoms all uncombined. If, on the other hand, an action (*Kriya*) causing a shift of the atoms from the primitive state of immobility is admitted, it will have to be explained whether such action (*Kriya*) is of the nature of a personal effort (*prayatna*), or mere concussion (*abhighata*), or such as is initiated by what is called *adrsta* (*dharmadharmas*, merit and demerit) in the system. It can be seen that this second alternative is equally abortive. Such being the case, no action and therefore, no such event (*Karma*) such as, combination of the ultimate simples into larger wholes can take place on either alternative.<sup>12</sup> In that state of thing preceding creation, the souls or selves are without their bodies and there can be no effort (*prayatna*) on the part of selves or souls without bodies. 'Prayatna' is conceived in the system as a quality (*guna*) that comes to emerge in the souls or selves when these are embodied already and are associated with the mind (*manas*). At the pre-creation stage, nothing like that is possible. In cases of common observation (*drstam nimittam*) even physical impact (*abhighata*) of two originally immobile element is not found possible without involvement of some personal effort. So in the absence of such effort in the stage preceding creation no observable cause or reason can be found to cause the first and the initial movement in the atoms enabling them to form larger and still larger wholes. If it is argued the combination of atoms takes place due to the operation of such imperceptible causes (*adrsta*) as the merits and demerits (*dharmadharmas*) of the individuals, the question will be where do these merits or demerits reside at that stage? Being qualities by the Vaisesika admission, merits and demerits cannot exist in themselves. If it is argued that there *inhere* in the selves or in the atoms nothing can come out of that. Admittedly merits and demerits are unconscious properties and being so are neither capable of movement or action in themselves, nor can they induce movement or action in other things, such as, the primitive atoms. By the Vaisesika admission, again the selves or souls are not *originally* conscious, consciousness accrues as a quality adventitiously. So, in the pre-creation stage, the selves or souls, being themselves unconscious and inactive, cannot induce any movement in the primitive atoms even if merits and demerits are supposed to reside in them. Again, even supposing that merits and demerits reside or in here in the selves it is not possible to admit that merits and demerits in the selves initiate a change in the original disposition of the atoms which are themselves immobile. The reason is no ostensible relation or connection can be there between the atoms on the one hand and merits or demerits as inhering in the selves. If, on the other hand, it is argued that because these selves are by definition all-pervasive, so some how some connection takes place, then, since all-pervasiveness is an eternal character of the self by the Vaisesika admission, such connection and so relation will always be there and there will be no determinant or regulator (*niyamaka*) for creation and as also for dissolution and creation alone will persist or prevail.



If again, the relation or connection is to be conceived as an adventitious fact and as an event, then, in the absence of a fool-proof condition, the desired initial movement in the atoms and their formation into larger wholes becomes inconceivable. Thus, it is clear that the Vaisesikas are unable to establish any *nimittakarana* (efficient cause) in their theory of atomic composition.

The Vaisesikas equally fail to establish their non-inherent cause (*asamavayikarana*) in the given case. Conjunction (*samyoga*) is supposed by them as the non-inherent cause in the development of larger forms and structures out of the primitive atoms. Out of atomic (*parimandalya*) structures and molecular (*hrasva*) structures, the bigger and the longer structures (*mahat* or *dirgha*),<sup>76</sup> structures come to be formed, according to them, and the original structures or proportions do not *inhere*, do not show themselves in the new and larger compounds. A conjunctive relation among plural atoms is supposed to achieve this miracle. Now, Sankara argues – how does this conjunction (*samyoga*) take place? In cases which are open to common observation, a relation of conjunction obtains between parts of two or several things – only one part being involved in the relation, the other part staying out of contact. Such a relation between parts seem impossible between or among atoms which are partless. So, if the supposed conjunction (*samyoga*) is taken to be whole-sake physical combination then the atoms would coalesce with each other, one merging in the other, with the result that there would not result any increase in bulk or proportion. So, nothing of non-atomic structure will come out of that sort of combination. If, again, the supposed conjunction is to be admitted as partial contact or partial meeting of atoms, the larger bulk might be derived from such combination but only at the expense of the prior postulation that an atom is partless and indivisible. The relation of conjunction, therefore, utterly fails to meet logical requirement of the case. If, again, it is maintained that although atoms do not have any real parts, they may have imaginary parts for the exigency of conjunction between them, Sankara's reply has been that such 'imagined parts' are nothing substantial (*vastu*) or real, and no non-inherent cause can be supposed to operate in the realm of the imaginary and the fanciful. The suggested non-inherent cause, such as, *samyoga* being thus inoperative and ineffectual in respect of the primitive atoms of the Vaisesikas, no ostensible reason can be found for their theories of creation and dissolution of the world-order. The alleged reason, merit and demerit may have relevance in the explanation of enjoyment and suffering of individuals but not as the instrumental or efficient cause they may lead to conjunction of atomic units in creation or to disjunction and falling away of formed wholes in the state of dissolution (*mahapralaya*).

After demonstrating why their suggested *nimitta karana* (efficient or instrumental cause) and *a-samavayi Karana* (non-inherent cause) of the world composition fail to play the role ascribed to them, the argument, next, demonstrates why the remaining causal circumstance, such as, the *samavayi Karana* also in the Vaisesika explanation of the world. Fails equally to serve the purpose allotted to it. This is done by showing logical ineptness and functional abortiveness of the relation called *samavaya* (inherence) as admitted in the system. The Vaisesika view is that the composite structures, which in their aggregate it totality stand for the world-order, have for their *samavayi* (inherent material cause *Karana*) on the physical side, the ultimate simples, such as, the primitive atoms of four kinds, earth, water, fire and air. It is the conjunction of these atoms which goes to the making up of the physical world. These atoms remain or figure as the ultimate *samavayi karana* of the world of composite bodies in so far as these latter 'inhere' in them, the relation called inherence or *samavaya* forming the bond of unity between the two sides. This *Samavaya*-relation is looked upon as an inseparable relation such as exists between a substance and its attribute or quality, an agent and its action, constituent parts and the whole made up of them. This relation, then, is to show the essential relationship between the primitive atoms on the one hand and the physical composite bodies on the



other justifying the Vaisesika claim that the physical world is derived from the primitive atoms which form their ultimate constituents. The entire atomistic hypothesis of the Vaisesika, then, rests on viability of this relation called *samavaya*. A conclusive disproof or refutation of this concept, then, amounts to thorough repudiation of Vaisesika atomistic metaphysics. This is exactly what is done

From the conjunction or combination of two atoms a dyad (*dvanuka*) emerges. This dyad is structurally different, and is dissimilar with its constituent atoms. But this dyad is supposed to inhere in the atoms constitution it, and this relation of inherence (*samavaya*) forms the ground of our acceptance of the constituent atoms as being the inherent cause (*samavayi Karana*) of the dyad. The relation of inherence (*samavaya*), then, has been postulated to explain linkage between an emergent effect, such as, the dyad and its cause, such as, the atoms, although structurally and in bulk the dyad and the atoms are all together similar. It is also by virtue of this relation that the quality such as, colour pertaining to the atoms reappear in the dyad formed out of them. Now, the Vedanta arguments, as stated by Sankara, is: if inherence (*samavaya*) is to link up two such dissimilar as the dyad and the atoms which are incapable of being otherwise linked, then, because the relation, such as *samavaya* is characteristically different from both the dyad and the atom it should require some other *samavaya*-relation to be related to the sides and this second *samavaya* should require another *samavaya* and so on ad infinitum. As this infinite regress of *samavaya*-relation will remain unaccomplished therefore the suggested *samavaya*-relation will fail to show the dyad and the atoms in their desired relationship. This would fail them, to establish the primitive atoms as the *samavaya Karana* (inherent cause) of the resultant dyads, etc. The logical point here is the relation of *Samavaya* is as much dissimilar from the atoms and the dyad as are the atoms and the dyad from the atoms and the dyad as are the atoms and the dyad from each other. The ground, such as, dissimilarity being the same (*samyat*) in both the cases, if there is need for *samavaya*-relation, the very same need is apparently present in the other case also. So the suggested relation of *samavaya* would require other relations of *samavaya* and these in their turn other *samavayas* and so on endlessly before the relation between a dyad and its constituent atoms is forged". If the Vaisesika defence be that *Samavaya* or inherence is found as being or sent in the *already related* and that this their relatedness is inseparable (*nityasambaddha*) and so this relation can neither be looked upon as unrelated (*usambaddha*) nor as dependent on an other relation to be related (*sambandhantarapeksa*), Sankara's reply would be that the same is true of *samyoga* also, although the *vaisesika* would invoke a relation to relate it to its terms. *Samyoga* (conjunction) is also ever noticed in the conjoined and never by itself, yet the *vaisesika* thinks it requires a relation, such as, *samavaya*, to be related to its terms and cannot to related otherwise. So, what is true of *samyoga* should also be true of *samavaya* the cited ground obtaining equality in both cases. If it is argued that *samyoga* being an entity of different category (*arthantara*) and not being the same as the conjoined which are both substances, on the very same ground, *samavaya* may be said to require a relation to be related because it also belongs to a category other than substances, qualities actions etc. The *vaisesikas* should not argue, as they do, that because *samyoga* is a quality (*guna*) where as *samavaya* is not a quality (*guna*) therefore, the former requires a relation to be related to its terms. A relation is needed to relate not because something is a quality (*guna*) but because something is *different* from some other. Since, *samavaya*, as a category, is different from the atoms and the dyad, in order to be related to them, and to being the atoms and the dyad into relation an infinite regress of *samavayas* without any final linking will be the consequences. And with their account failing to explain how a single binary compound can result involving a relation of inherence to the primitive atoms, their explanation of the world-order fails entirely.

The Vedanta argument, which follows next in repudiation of Vaisesika atomism, has relevance for this metaphysical view and so far as it also believes in periodic creation and dissolution of the world-order. It is shown that the conception of primitive atoms as the constitutive material cause, at any count, fails to meet the logical requirements of periodic creation and dissolution of the universe. The atoms may be either self-active (*pravrttisvabhava*) or self-inactive (*nivrttisvabhava*), or both active and inactive, or neither active nor inactive—there can be no fifth alternative. If the former, then, there ill be no cessation of activity and no cessation of newer and newer formations and so, dissolution will be impossible. Contrariwise, if the second alternative is accepted, there will be no creation, and the state of dissolution will persist for ever. The third alternative is abortive on account of self-contradiction. On the fourth alternative, there will be dependence on an additional factor, a *nimittakarana*, such as, *adrsta* etc., which are always there (2.2.14). If these ever-present, efficient conditions are to determine mobilisation of the atoms to enter into combinations, there will be creation always, and no dissolution. If, on the other hand, such efficient causes cannot become efficient, a state of dissolution will persist for ever, and there will be no creation. Thus, we shall have either eternal creation or eternal dissolution as the case may be, but no periodic creation and dissolution, which the *vaisesika* theory seeks to defend. This, then, is another refutation of the theory.

The next argument (B.S. 2.2.15) is directed against the *vaisesika* view that the atoms are the *ultimate* material cause in being absolutely indivisible and so eternal. It is argued that this view militates against the evidence of common experience and also against the *vaisesika* view that the so called atoms, although ultimate simples, have *sensible qualities* like colour touch, etc. Sensible qualities are characteristics of elements or compounds of them (*bhutabhautikas*), which are gross and have volume. Whatever is gross and voluminous is further divisible. Therefore, the two ends of the theory that the atoms are indivisible and that they have sensible qualities run in opposite direction. If the atoms have sensible properties, they must be further divisible and non-eternal. If indivisible and eternal, they cannot have sensible qualities, and cannot be the inherent cause (*samovayikarana*) of compounds having sensible qualities. The *vaisesikas* themselves have adduced three reasons for regarding anything as absolute and eternal (imperishable). These are (1) to be unbased, (2) to be the counterpositive (*pratiyogi*) of the impermanent or non-eternal (3) to be imperceptible and so non-sensuous<sup>21</sup>. It can be seen that none of these reasons suffices to prove the so-called physical atoms as eternal. In so far as they have sensible properties, the atoms must be dependant on some further causes more subtle than themselves. So they cannot be supposed to be uncaused. Next, that which is other than the impermanent, need not necessarily be the so called indivisible atoms of the *vaisesika* imagination. Simply because we can use a descriptive phrase in our languages, it does not follow that anything answering the description should be there in *rerum natura*<sup>22</sup>. It may as well be a fictitious entity and nothing real. A product of analytic thought may as well as be a conceptual fiction and not a real existent. If inaccessibility to sense-perception on account of minuteness be a mark for anything to be eternal, then even the binary atom of the *vaisesika* admission will have to be accepted as *eternal* against the *vaisesikas*' own protestation. It thus seems that of the three reasons for *nityatva* (eternal existence) cited by the *vaisesikas* only that which has no cause and in being uncaused, into ultimate simples or parts not further divisible, since creation *need not* mean 'being compounded into a new structure by the conjunction of constituent parts'. Destruction may simply mean *change of form* or loss of *specific* character, and indestructibility may mean a persistence in the *generic* substantial form without any specific characters attending, such as, solid thee or ice changing into liquid thee or water<sup>23</sup>. But the *vaisesikas* hold the view that even the specific qualities of the primitive and absolutely primary elements such as, atoms, devolve upon the compounds made out of them in order to pass the former

as the *samavaikarana* of the latter. It can be seen that this makes their view quite untenable. Nothing having specific qualities can be regarded as absolute simples.

The gross elements, such as, earth, water, fire and air, are seen to admit of *degrees* in their grossness. Earth has smell, colour, taste and touch, that is, all the *four* sensible qualities, while water has *three* qualities, such as, taste, touch and colour, fire has *two* qualities, such as, touch and colour, and air has the *single* quality, such as, touch and none other. Should we suppose, then, that the atoms of these gross elements also have this variation in the number of qualities or should we suppose that the atoms of each kind have only *one* distinctive quality? both suppositions are beset with difficulties (B S. 2.2.16). If the atoms of certain kinds have multiple qualities, then, such atoms cannot be atoms or absolutely subtle, since increase of qualities is impossible without increase in the bulk or proportion. If, on the other, atoms of a certain kind are supposed to have one specific quality only, then, the presence of multiple qualities in some of the elements cannot be explained and the *vaishesika* theory of atoms as the *samavayi* (inherent cause) *Karana* of the gross elements falls through. If, again, it is held that the atoms of every kind have all the *four* qualities then, the atoms would all become of the *same kind*, and also we should find presence of all the four qualities in each and every element, such as, earth, water, fire and air. But who has ever found colour, taste and smell in air, or taste and smell in air, or taste and smell also in fire, and smell in the water element? the only reasonable view, then, will be that these atoms of somekind are more subtle than atoms of some other kind, and conversely, that some are grosser and bulkier than others. But this goes *against* their claim to be atoms and indivisible. Thus the atomic theory of the *Vaishesikas* is untenable.

The last *sutra* in this series (B S.2.2.17), as itself, is rather simple. It is reiteration of B S. 2.1.12 which rules out systems which are not supported, by Vedic authority and not adopted (*Parigrhita*) or accepted by the venerable (*sishta*). But Sankara explored some new grounds for the rejection of the *vaishesika* view, not content with that specious and, older plea which smacks of an *argumentum ad ignorantiam* verecundiam. In the main, Sankara's argument in this context is directed against *vaishesika* pluralism and their view of effect as an altogether new emergent, not presaged in the cause (*asatkaryavada*).

The *Vaishesikas*, it is argued, speak of six positive categories, such as, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence. These are claimed to be distinct and separate, yet the other five, that is quality etc. are admitted as dependant on substance which is regarded as the support of them all. This their dependance on substance, so much so that they exist when substance is there and do not exist if substance is not there, does not seem to be consistent with their claim that these others are *distinct* and different from substance. It will not do to say that things which are really distinct and different may be shown to be invariably related together as in the case of smoke and fire, such invariable relationship not militating against their distinctness and difference as entities. The reason is that while smoke and fire though invariably related, are *perceived as distinct*, and never in the way one perceives a lotus as its quality, such as, colour. In this latter case, substances, and its quality are not perceived as distinct and physically separable and so, this relation is not on a par with the relation between smoke and fire, which, although invariably found together, are yet perceived as distinct and separate entities. The *Vaishesikas* may argue that although substance, on the one hand, and quality, action etc. on the other are really distinct and different, the dependence of the latter on the former is due to their relation of non-conjunctive union (*ayutasiddhata*) which is a case of inseparable relatedness between distinct nevertheless. Thus, concept of non-conjunctive inseparable relation of distincts is peculiar to the *Vaishesika* system. The *Vaishesikas* call it *samavaya*

(inherence) This is to be an inseparable, and so, a necessary relation, but yet it is to hold between two distinct and different entities, which cannot be physically separated one from the other. Sankara undertakes to examine this ingenious concept of the Vaisesikas closely. He asks 'what does this non-conjunctive (*ayutasiddha*) inseparable relation signify? Does it mean that relation which is due to things' occupying spaces not different from one another (*a-prthakdesatva*), or due to their holding together in a span of time which is not different (*a-prthak-kalatva*)? Or ever this relation mean their having a nature which is not different (*a-prthaksvabhavatva*)? Sankara argues that none of these alternatives seems to be justified. As for the first alternative the Vaisesika view, as stated in the Vaisesika *sutra* 1 | 1 | 10, seems not to support equi-spatiality (*aparthakdesatva*) of a substance and its attribute. According to that *sutra*, substances give rise to substance of different nature, and attributes give rise to attributes of different nature. Such being the case, constituents, such as, threads, give rise to cloth which exists in the threads, while it is the qualities of the threads and not the threads themselves which gives rise, to the qualities of the cloth. These qualities of the cloth, therefore cannot be supposed to exist the former substances, such as, the threads. Therefore, the substance, such as, cloth and its qualities cannot be supposed to have the self-same locus". So, *Ayutasiddhatva* cannot mean having the same locus'. *Ayutasiddhatva*, cannot mean also contemporaneity, two horns of an animal may be contemporaneous, but they are not found to be inseparable or the same. If *Ayutasiddhatva* is to mean non-distinct nature (*a-prthaksvabhava*), it becomes impossible to regard substance and its attribute as different from one another, since they are known and experienced as the same (*tadatmvenarva pratyamanatvat*). It can be seen that the distinction made by the vaisesika betw *samyoga* (conjunction) and *samavaya* (inherence) on this ground of *a-yutasiddhatva* of the latter as fabricated (*mrtaiva*) since the cause-effect relation, which is taken by them as an instance of the *a-yutasiddha* relation betw them. The idea of a cause as pre-existing the effect betw the claim that relating between them is inseparable and non-adventitious (*ayutasiddha*)

If it is argued that the *ayutasiddhata* (whom-conjunctive) relation spoken of is one-sided dependence and *asymmetrical* and that it holds between the effect and its cause, not between the cause and the effect also, the difficulty cannot be escaped. The cause and the effect also, the difficulty cannot be escaped. The cause is an *antecedent* circumstance and the effect cannot be there before it originates as an effect. By any relation in order to take place depends on there being two things already. It cannot take place if only one thing is there and the other is only incipient. Now, if the relation is to take place *after* the effect originates, then, since by such admission, the effect originates without prior involvement in relation to its cause, and enters into that relationship *after* it is originated, this relation between an already originated effect and its cause will be in all appearance a *samyoga*-relation (conjunction) and not *samavaya* as maintained. This, then, will militate against the vaisesika view that, of a relation between cause and effect, we cannot sensibly talk of conjunction and disjunction. If in self-defence, the vaisesika argues that since conjunction as a relation implies activity, such as, coming together, but a newly emergent effect at the moment of its origination remains inactive, so a relation other than conjunction has to be conceived, it can be pointed out, says Sankara, that the Vaisesikas themselves do not follow that rule uniformly since they speak of conjunctive relation of the newly emergent with all pervasive substances such as, ether in violation of such rule. The conclusion then, is that even the relation between cause and effect under the attempted explanation of the Vaisesikas turns out to be a *yuta-siddha*, relation, such as, *samyoga* and not an *a-yutasiddha* relation, called by them as *samavaya*. What Sankara is driving at is that the intimate relation between cause and effect, substance and quality etc. is an instance of *tadatmva* or *anamatva*, it is not a relation between two *distincts* which are inseparable. So, the category of *samavaya*, imagination and not a fact

What is of special interest in this context is Sankara's criticism of the category of 'relation' as such, be it *samyoga* or be it *samavaya*. His stand is. This category is merely epistemic or conceptual, and not metaphysical, since nothing answering its description can be traced to *terum-natura*. This points, he elaborates next, in conformity with his advaitic position. There is no proof, Sankara claims, that anything *exists* as a relation (*sambanda*) quite apart from and in addition to what is reviewed as the related (*sambandhu*). One and the same thing can be diversely spoken of or conceived by reference to its own intrinsic nature (*svarupa*) pitted against its own outer and adventitious characters (*Bahyarupa*). But this conceiving manywise or the vicarious modes of speaking do not render the thing either as many or as manifold. This part of Sankara's observation requires our closer attention. Sankara argues that just as Devadatta being the same person may be spoken of and known as a Brahmin, a father, a son etc., and the same digit may signify different quantum such as, one, ten, a hundred etc. according to its place in an arithmetical arrangement, so also is the case of a related thing (*sambandhu*). Quite apart from its normal substantive reference, it may be viewed as involving variety of relations, such as, *samyoga* or *samavaya*, without implying any separate existence for these relations as facts. What Sankara suggests here is even deeper and far-reaching in import than this. A relation-word does not signify any existential content. It is the related content, when distinguished against its normal reference to its substantive core, that comes to pass as the related, involving an abstract fact of relation between its several aspects. No separate being or existence is even implied for this relation. Devadatta as 'father' is the very same as the substantive Devadatta, but it is in being divested of that normal reference to the substantive and existential core that Devadatta comes to stand for a relation, such as, 'being a father', 'being a Brahmin' etc. The symbol 'I' is by itself a form of drawing and as that it has a kind of existence. When the symbol 'I', on account of its location in a mathematical system, becomes a 'one' or 'ten' or a 'hundred' these latter, viz., one, ten, or hundred, are all relational developments, and it is the very same 'I' which *acquires* such relational names, the relations not being any additional *existential* fact but being the very same existential symbol, considered apart from its unitary itself. In the very same way, a relation, such as, '*samyoga*' or *samavaya* is not to be understood as a separate *existential* fact but as the name of the very relational situation, that is, the related. And it is the related, when considered apart from the existential reference to its substantive itself, that derives the name of the peculiar relatedness, and thus of a relation, such as, *samavaya* or *samyoga*.<sup>79</sup> Separate existence of relation as an addition fact is disproved by the fact that it is never perceived or known as anything separate and existential-never perceived when the thing related is absent. To perceive a relation is perceiving the related, although the related may not always be perceived as related in this way or that-such relational taking being adventitious to itself. Sankara, in this context, is so radical that it has not been possible for his classical commentators to follow him literally. That a relation is nothing but the related considered abstractedly, and that the related with its relation is only a certain mode of regarding or speaking of the *existential* is an essential feature of the Advaita doctrine and a corollary that follows from the B.S. 1.1.14 '*Tadananyatvam arambhanasabdauibhyah*'.

The remaining part of Sankara's criticism of the Vaisesika atomism, of their doctrine of categories and of the relation of *samavaya* may be briefly summed up as follows:

(1) atoms, the selves, and the mind, of the Vaisesikas, their own admission, do not have parts. But conjunction is impossible between or among entities which are partless. The difficulty cannot be avoided by imagining parts which are not actually there. Such a device of solution with the help of imagination solves no existent difficulty. Atoms are impartite, the binary atom is not so. Just as ether (*akasa*), which is formless and partless, cannot be related with the elements, such as, earth



etc in the way a piece of wood is related to wax, so also two simple atoms can to be related intimately with a binary atom and be the inherent cause of the latter. If a relation, such as, *samavaya* is considered essential to explain the relation of supporter and the supported such as exists between a stipulated cause and the supported such as exists between a stipulated cause and its effect, it can be seen that such explanation involves the fallacy or mutual dependence since the relation of supporter and supported between them implies that the relation exists between the supporter and the supported or between a cause and effect. The Vedantic view is that the supporter and the supported, the cause and the effect are not distinct or separate, the supported or the effect only a certain state (*samasthanamatram*) of the supporter or the cause only speakably different, not different existentially.

(2) The fundamental assumption of the Vaisesikas is that destruction is due to *separation* of parts as origination is due to their combination or *conjunction*. But this is not necessarily true. It may as well be that destruction is *disintegration of forms* as origination is *assuming of forms*. Now, resting upon one of their assumptions, the *vaisesikas* regard indivisible atoms as indestructible and so eternal (*nitya*). But since the atoms are limited (*paricchinna*) they are determined by all the quarters and in all the directions. These quarters or directions may be four, six or even ten. In relation to such quarters, atoms therefore, have to be conceived as having several parts. This goes against the notion of their partlessness or indivisibility and therefore, against their alleged indestructibility. Moreover, whatever stands in an ever-decreasing degree of grossness or magnitude is subject to dissolution since magnitude even when minimal is a certain adventitious form and being so, has to be taken as impermanent and destructible. Because of these additional reasons also the Vaisesika metaphysics is unacceptable to the reverend (*sishta*) and its non-Vedic origin condemns it as merely conceptual and fabricated.

Next follows the Vedanta refutation of the Buddhistic metaphysics in course of fifteen *sutras*, from B S 2.2 18 to 2.2 32. The Buddhistic explanation of the world-order its emergence as also resolution, the concept of bondage and that of liberation – all these come in for critical review and refutation. The Buddhists are heretics. They are opposed to the Vedic tradition, and unlike the Vaisesikas, they do not claim any affiliation, direct or indirect, with that tradition. That derive their authority from the teachings of the Buddha who was a rationalist, and claimed a new enlightenment through personal and so, independent investigations. But the Buddhists are divided into three main schools on the question of the nature of reality and enlightenment, and this resulted from, as Sankara opines, different ways of understanding and following up of the Tenets of the Buddha's teachings (*pratipattibhedatvineyabhadat va*), suiting intellectual endowments of the followers themselves. These schools are the *sarvastitvavadins* (those defending existential reality of all things), the *viññānastitvamātravadins* (those those defending existential reality of conscious status only) and the *Sarvasūxyatvadian*), and the Server *Sūnyatva Vādins* (those maintaining voidness of all and sundry). Sankara takes up the views of these schools one after another. He takes up the *sarvastitvavadi* view (common to the *vaibhasika* and the *Sautrantika*) at first.

The Vaisesikas were, Sankara observes, *ardha-vainasikas* as they admitted destructibility or impermanence of half the number of the existential entities, viz., the world of effects<sup>79</sup>. The Buddhists, in so far as they defend the view of impermanence (*anityata*) of everything, even of the causes (*Karanas*) themselves are *sarvavainasikas*. The untenability of their position, therefore, in a way, follows from the untenability of the former view. The Vaisesikas do not defend the view of *emergent grouping* or aggregation (*samudayatva*) in respect of both external objects and the internal reality such as the self, which latter, according to them, is unitary and simple (non-compound) like someothers, such as, *manas*, *dik*, *kala* and *akasa*. The *Sarvastitvavadins*, however, believe in the



emergent origination and aggregation of both the internal order of mental states and cognitions as of the external order of physical objects, which involve grouping up of certain primary elements called atoms (*paramanus*). In this, they see additional logical difficulty, there being no glue, nor any clue, to account for these dual formation of aggregates<sup>40</sup>

To explain,: According to these Buddhists, both the external and internal orders of reality arise through aggregation *samudaya* of parts which are all momentary. The outer order consists of aggregation of physical elements which themselves are combinations of four kinds of atoms, earth, water, fire and air having characteristic qualities, such as, hardness, moisture, heat and mobility respectively. This aggregation accounts for the origin of the physical objects, the sense-organs, and the sensible qualities—which are all material (*bhautika*). On the inner side, there is another form of aggregation—that of mental units (*caitta*) equally momentary. This is distinguishable into five-fold groupings (*skandhas*), such as, *rupa* (sensations), *vedana* (feelings), *Samjna* (conceptions involving names), *samaskara* (impressions) and *Vijnana* (conscious states or cognitions). There is nothing abiding or unchanging in either series. Yet the coming together or aggregation of units in either series, their formations in some kind of 'wholes', is necessary to explain the possibility of these being experience of the kind that we have. So, the question arises: how does aggregation in these two forms of groupings, inner and outer, take place? the Vedanta does not think that any reasonable explanation of this relatedness or grouping has been furnished by the Buddhists. In the absence of that explanation, the theory, therefore, forfeits the claim to be metaphysical theory. The items of both series are all unconscious. It has already been shown, in the context of the criticism of the Sankhya and Vaisheshika views, that nothing unconscious can be self-active. Here the spark of intelligence (*cetana*) which could help accounting for the aggregation or bringing together of the units or parts is itself dependant on prior aggregation (*samudayasiddhyadhinatvat*). The Buddhists, again, do not admit the presence or functioning of any other conscious factor which, as a stable controller, could *enjoy* (cf Sankhya), or *regulate* (cf vaisheshikas). These trains in their emergent formations into aggregates or wholes. If they think that the units in the series are capable of aggregation independently and by themselves, then, such process of aggregation will remain ceaseless and without any termination, making cessation and liberation impossible. Again, it being undecidable if the *momentum* supporting the train (or the series) is different from the units of the train (or of the series) or is identical with them, and, moreover, because the units, being all momentary, are all incapable of exercising any activity or influence, it appears that aggregation of the Buddhistic contemplation can never take place.

B.S. 2.2.19 alongwith the *sutras* 2.2.20 and 2.2.21 shows incongruity of two of the cardinal themes of the Buddhists, such as, the theory of dependent origination (*pratityasamutpada*) and the theory of momentariness (*Ksanabh angavada*). Then together with the earlier *sutra*, we have in these *sutras* a refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine of causation, which is so vital for the Buddhistic metaphysics. The Buddhists do not admit anything substantive and durable either in the external order of physical things or in the internal order of the mental and conscious states. They speak of aggregation or collocation without substantiality, that is, of cohesion without integration. Sankara, in the light of these *sutras*, demonstrates that even this concept of aggregation (*samudaya*), so vital for the Buddhistic metaphysics remains unestablished and unfulfilled on the twin admission of *pratityasamutpada* linked with the other doctrine, *Aksanahangavada*.

The Buddhists admit an interlinked chain of causation in which every preceding member is supposed to give rise to each succeeding member in a rotating series as in a wheel. The whole series is sometimes described at length, and sometimes in an abridged form in the Buddhistic literature but everywhere the first member is mentioned as ignorance *avidya*. Thus, *avidya* is supposed to

give rise to *saṃskāra* (impressions), this to *viñāṇa* (embryonic consciousness with I-feeling), this to *nāmarūpa* (name and form), this to *sūdayatana* (psycho-physical complex), this to *sparsa* (contact), this to *Vedana* (feelings), this to *trṣṇā* (desire), this to *upādāna* (craving), this to *bhava* (will to be), this to *jāti* (birth), this, again, to *jaramarana* (decay and death). The list given by Sankara includes four more items, such as, *śoka* (bereavement), *paridevāna* (lamentation), *duḥkha* (distress) and *Durmanasī* (state of being deprived). Since, these last four relate to mental conditions of survivors and not to the individual himself, we may as well keep them out of account and fix upon the commonly accepted twelve-membered causation analogous to twelve-spoked wheel. This causal chain is called *pratityasamutpada* (dependent origination) in which each succeeding follows upon each preceding in a relation such as between cause and effect. It can be seen that the train, as conceived by the Buddhists, is a growing, accumulating and therefore, an aggregating process, like a moving snowball, which increases in dimension, then falls off and diminishes, and then, again, increases. Vacaspati has explained in details the alleged operation of this Buddhistic law of causation in its two-fold aspects as *hetupanibandha* (concatenation due to apperception), and also how this causal law called *pratityasamutpada* actually operates in the outer sphere of physical things and in the human sphere of the psycho-physical complex the point of the Vedantic contention is whether the Buddhistic view of causation can account for the unitary wholes, such as, the empirical individuals or physical bodies as these appear to be. The Vedanta finding is that the Buddhistic doctrine is designed to account for how each succeeding originates dependently upon what precedes it but it does not account for aggregation (*saṃghāta*), and cannot account for formation of unitary wholes (B. S. 2.2.19), real or fancied. The most interesting point of the argument is, as Sankara explains, even though the first item in the series has been posited as *avidyā* (ignorance) to suggest that it is the merely successive series of distinguishable units which is misconstrued as a unitary whole, this misconception through *avidyā* itself requires there being a unitary whole, say a person, in order that there may happen this misconception. Any misconception, in order to take place, needs an empirical individual an aggregated unity (*saṃghāta*) to be there already. So the series beginning with *avidyā*, *saṃskāra* etc. does not explain formation of this aggregated unity (*Samghata*). This is reflected in the *sūtra* itself- even supposing that the units in the causal chain explains how each preceding gives rise to each succeeding, the causal chain does not contain any explanation how any aggregated unity comes to develop. Moreover, the Buddhists regard all things as momentary. Such being the case, how to find in their system an explanation of aggregation even when the Vaiśeṣika system, in spite of its admission of standing selves as support of all activities and efforts, failed to account for the combination. Among the atoms, regarded by it as permanent? Evidently, there is a circularity of reasoning if it is maintained that *avidyā* etc. Which are to account for aggregation, themselves presuppose some prior aggregation in order to take place. There can be no escape from this circularity by the supposition that in this rotating process which is beginningless, there is emergence of ever newer forms of aggregation, and so, there is one aggregation, which goes before every new course of the causal series and another, which follows upon the functioning of the series. The two aggregation being thus completely different. Nothing can also be gained by the supposition that there is virtually a train of aggregation, one succeeding another, and that the causal chain operates upon such a train of successive aggregations. The reason is it will have to be told if the aggregations which follow remain similar to the preceding ones, or become all together different. Either alternative is inadmissible in the Buddhistic system, because the law of Karma, admitted by them, requires that both alternatives are to be accepted together such as, a man becoming different as a god or a beast, and again, becoming a man, that is, the very same individual becoming different in different lives, and yet continuing to be the same individual there is, again, a greater anomaly, because according

to the system, there is no permanent individual at all to enjoy or suffer in the emergent states of the various aggregations, although such states of aggregation have that very singular purpose, such as, enjoying or suffering in accordance with one's merit or demerit. In the absence of a stable individual the suffering or liberation will be for the suffering or liberation since there is no experiencing individual or subject, this is ludicrous. The admission of a standing or stable subject, again will militate against the other basic theme of Buddhism, such as, the doctrine of momentariness. The conclusion, therefore, is, even admitting that their causal chain of twelve members can account for emergence of each succeeding member from, or conditional upon, each preceding member, there is no explanation in it how an aggregated whole (*samghata*) at all arises.

Next, the Vedanta argues that, not to speak of emergence of aggregated wholes, the Buddhistic causal theory cannot even account for emergence of the very next member from the earlier one, since the earlier, according to the theory, ceases and disappears *before* the emergence of the later (B.S. 2.2.20). This difficulty, as Sankara points out, is due to the Buddhist view of absolute momentariness (*Ksanikatva*) of all existents. Nothing, according to their view, endures more than a moment. Such being the case, it is not possible to establish any causal link between the antecedent and the consequent. Since the earlier lapses before the absence or non-being (*abhava*) of the earlier, This cannot justify the view that the later is *due to* the earlier, or that the earlier is related to it as the cause. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that the earlier as a positive entity and existential fact becomes the cause of the later and the subsequent, then, since some functioning or activity of that earlier positive fact has to be admitted, that fact must be admitted as enduring beyond its alleged momentary being. If, again, this 'being' of the cause is contemplated as the same as *its functioning* (as seems to be intended by the Buddhistic dictum '*arthakriyakaritva*' the being of a thing is its efficiency to produce an effect), even then, insofar as the effect is to be tinged by the nature of its cause in order to be regarded as its effect, the durability of this nature of the cause till the effect comes up will have to be admitted. But this admission conflicts with the doctrine of momentariness. If, in the interest of the doctrine of momentariness, again, this conformability of the effect with the nature of the cause a something relatively durable, is left out of consideration, then, one will have to admit that anything may be the cause of any other thing, or that causal relation is vicarious, and there is actually no regularity and no law.

Moreover, as the Buddhists speak of origination and again, of cessation of a thing, they cannot reasonably hold on to their view of absolute momentariness of things. Origination and cessation in respect of a thing can be regarded in three ways only

(a) Either they are the *same* as the nature of the thing, or (b) they are different states of the very same the things, or (c) they are quite different from the thing. In neither case, momentariness of the thing is established. Origination and cessation, considered as the nature or as states of a thing, proves that the thing is not momentary; considered as differential from the 'thing', they are likely to be taken as mere *subjective ways* of regarding the thing, the thing being unaffected by such changes

B.S. 2.2.21, shows the Buddhistic theory of causation run into Self-contradiction on account of their metaphysical doctrine of momentariness of things. Their causal theory—*Pratityasamutpada* takes the causal relation in a *positive* way, such as, "That being there this happens" But if the doctrine of momentariness is to be accepted, the effect can arise only on the disappearance (*asati*) of the cause since the cause is momentary. In other words, the effect has to be understood as arising *without the cause being there*, and so without its cause. If things could arise without any cause being there, or in the absence of such a case, then anything could arise from anywhere. This, then, goes

against their accepted view (*pratinoparodha*) that everything *dependently originates* upon what goes before. If, again, to escape this difficulty the Buddhists accept that the causal condition continues to stay till the effect arises, it would amount to admitting simultaneity or contemporaneity of the cause and effect, and this would go to contradict their other accepted view—the doctrine of momentariness of things. In both cases there is conflict with some of their prior admissions.

After showing logical difficulties in the Buddhistic theory of causation as also in their explanation of the *origination* of aggregated wholes, the Vedanta *sutras*, next, turn upon the Buddhistic notion of causation as also in their explanation of the *origination* of aggregated wholes, the Vedanta *sutras*, next, turn upon the Buddhistic notion of cessation, and so, upon their doctrine of liberation through Nirvana. This notion also, in all its forms, is vitiated by logical difficulties. There are altogether six *sutras* from 2.2.22 to 2.2.27 in this section. The Buddhists hold that there are three non-composite, non-conceptual, and therefore, formless states of being such as, *pratisamkhyanirodha* (cessation brought about by the negative mode of conscious determination), *a-pratisamkhyanirodha* (cessation brought about by fixing one's mind upon one item only and by inattention to all the rest in the flow) and the *akasa* (ether or sky), which also is devoid of all forms and determinations. The first two are forms of transcendent being secured through getting over the cosmic flux, regulated by *prattiyasamutpada*. It them, the individual, according to the Buddhists, discovers himself and also that which is the root-cause of his sufferings. B. S. 2.2.22 argues that the transcendental states of given descriptions cannot be secured, since there is no getting away from the flux, the stream, which is unbreakable (*avicchedat*). It can be seen that Sankara does not take the Buddhistic concepts here as indicating anything positive. As Dr. Radhakrishnan also finds, Sankara takes the three non-composites (*asamskṛta*) advocated by the Buddhists as *avastu*, *abhavamatram* (negation only), and therefore, as unreal. But, although regarded as non-composite, non-conceptual, and also as the negation of conditioned being, the Buddhists do not regard the unconditioned transcendental being meant by them as pure non-existence, nor do they regard *akasa* (ether or sky) as unreal, a mere negation of form or cover (*avarana-bhava*) as Sankara contends. So Dr. Radhakrishnan has observed "It is true that they are indefinable, but that does not mean they are unreal"<sup>21</sup>. But whatever be, these indefinables of the Buddhists, be they real or unreal, positive or negative being, Sankara's arguments do not seem to be without relevance.

The point of contention is if the Buddhistic scheme of things really provides for any abrupt, if not a natural cessation of the cosmic flux, of the incessant changeful continuum (*santana*), which their doctrine of causation, resting upon their *Ksanabhūgavade*, provides for. The Buddhists claim that there can be two ways of cessation (*nirodha*), that is, getting out of the cosmic flux. Thus, there may be 'cessation through conscious discernment of the *true nature* of things (*pratisamkhyā*), and also by a process of withdrawal and non-involvement, worked by means of inattention to the flow (*pratisamkhyā*). The Vedanta argues that cessation can be achieved in neither of those two ways. The reason is *ex hypothesi* there is no discontinuity nor can there be any such interruption (*viccheda*) in the changeful continuum, already admitted by the Buddhists on the ground of their causal doctrine of dependant origination (*prattiyasamutpada*), resting on *arthakriyakaritva* (being of a thing consisting in its causal efficacy). In this context, Sankara argues—Is the proposed cessation to be of the changeful continuum (*santana*)—that is, of the flow or stream itself, or is it to be of the individual members (*santani*) composing the stream and forming the continuum? The first alternative is abortive, since the continuum is nothing in itself, it being the result of the causal operations of the members forming or describing it. The second alternative is also in-admissible, since no positive entity can completely pass in nothingness and be totally extinct, there remains always the possibility of tracing its identity to what it had been heretofore. Even, in the absence of any clear recognition of what a thing had

been formerly, it can be well inferred that any positive entity will have some *other* mode of being and will for *vanish* in blankness. If, on the other hand, it is meant by the Buddhists, that with the cessation of *avidya* (ignorance) the cessation of the flux takes place, then, since this makes the cessation conditional upon removal of *avidya*, their fundamental that is that everything, *by its very nature*, is momentary and perishable is evidently contradicted. If, on the other hand, the thesis of absolute momentariness of things is defended with full order, then, since things do terminate *naturally* and of their own accord, the flux also would terminate automatically, and the Buddha's instructions in respect of ways and mean of liberation are all redundant and useless<sup>42</sup>

B S 2.2.24 has rather limited relevance. The Buddhists of the *Sarvastivavadi* schools do not, in fact, deny reality of the sky (*akasa*) or ether. They only regard it as formless and undetermined, although real. So, much of what Sankara argues by way of elaborating upon this *sutra* does not become a relevant point against early Buddhistic doctrine. The only point of relevance is that *akasa* has to be admitted as a substance (*dravya*), since the *guna*, such as, sound (*śabda*) is inferentially located in it<sup>43</sup>. Thus, it cannot be held as non-substantial, as the Buddhist might contend, on the ground of its formlessness or undeterminedness. It has to be regarded as positive and not negative. Had the sky been a mere absence, Sankara argues, the flight of two birds in two distinct parts of the sky could not be possible. The view of the sky as non-substantial again, militates against the Buddhistic acceptance of it as an eternal entity, since nothing unsubstantial can be eternal entity, since nothing unsubstantial can be eternal. Moreover, since nothing unsubstantial can be eternal. Moreover, there is, upon such a view, conflict with the Buddha's own teachings, observes Sankara. For, the Buddha himself, when answering as to the support (*sannisreya*) of air (*vayu*), had himself declared that it is *akasa* which houses air and is its support. The upshot of the discussion here is that neither *akasa*, nor the liberated state which, according to Buddhism is to follow upon the so called processess of *nirodha*, can be negatively conceived as states of non-being or non-existence (*abhava*).

B S 2.2.25, 2.2.26, 2.2.27 seem to be intended as final assessment and repudiation of the earlier Buddhistic doctrine, which believes in the *existential reality*<sup>44</sup> of all things although momentary (*kṣanika*), and at the same time, speaks of *unsubstantiality* of the experienced wholes (*samudaya* or *saṃghata*) and cessability (*nirodha*) of the cosmic order of changeful continuum (*santana*). The preceding *sutra* B S 2.2.22, as elaborated by Sankara, argues against any abrupt discontinuity of the flux, as it also argues against any possible reduction of the apparently positive members of the changeful continuum to simple negation or non-being (*abhava*). B S. 2.2.25 introduces a factual and psychological ground in support of that previous contention. The fact of remembrance (*anusmṛti*), an indisputable experienced content, goes to disprove both momentariness and non-substantiveness of the empirical subjects and experienced objects as also their abrupt cessability. Every spate of remembrance is a recall or recollection of the already perceived or experienced by the very *same* subject, the experiencer. It would then be an absurdity to maintain that the perceiver and the person remembering are two different persons, not the same. What does the memory-judgment 'I am remembering now what I had perceived previously' (*tuhamadudraksamidam paśyami*)<sup>45</sup> indicate? Sankara asks, Evidently, both the acts are referred to one and the same subject. Had the experiencing subject in the two cases been different, one would say 'I am remembering what *another* had seen'. But this is not what actually happens. Even the Buddhist nihilists have to admit unity of the perceiver and the remembered in the situation such as, of memory and recognition. They cannot deny this any more than they can deny that ice is hot and glowing. The fact of remembrance, therefore, disproves the view of momentariness of all existents, in this case, the moment of perceiving and the moment of remembering will have to be brought under the apperceiving unity of one and the same person. From the very birth till death, the Buddhists also experience themselves as one and the same individual.



So, where is the theoretical basis of their doctrine of momentariness of things. Even, if it is argued that it is not the same : now of the content perceived and remembered but the *similarity* (*sadrśya*) of the two contents occurring in different times which forms the basis of the memory judgment discussed above, it may be pointed out that even the alleged similarity of two separate contents cannot be cognised if the subject of such cognitions does not remain the same across the allegedly changing occasions. In order to be compared together on point of similarity, again, the two units of cognition must be capable of enduring beyond the moment or moments of their origination. This also goes against the doctrine of momentariness. It is also not possible to regard the two cognitions – perceptual and memory as *one* cognition, since the objective references, such as, *that* which was earlier perceived is the now remembered. *This*, marks out the two cognitions as separate – although connected together in the unity of the self-same subject, the experience. It is not possible, says Sankara, to go against or ignore universally admitted facts of experience for the sake of an ingenious theory<sup>66</sup>.

It is also not true that our taking of things as the *same*, or identical, is due to cognition of *similarity* between them. Cognition of *similars* and cognition of the *same* are different things. One may have doubt whether the externally situated contents are absolutely the same or merely similar. But one cannot have any doubt if as the perceiver and as the rememberer one is really self-identical or merely similar to one's previous self. The unity of the subject, that is, the felt self-identity, then, proves the positivity, substantivity and fixity of the subject. And the indisputability of the fact of remembering what is previously perceived, then, constitutes an argument against the Buddhist view of momentariness of all things and non-substantiality of the experiencing individual.

According to the Buddhists, nothing (positive) emerges without the destruction (or lapsing of) of the previous (*nanupamēdya pradurbhavit*)<sup>67</sup>. This is the corner-stone not only of their theory of causation but also of their doctrine of ceaseless change. This goes to foster the belief that 'being' arises from 'non-being' or non-existence in all cases. To instantiate the point, the Buddhist may argue that sprout can emerge only on the destruction of the seed, and not with the seed remaining as it is. Similarly, curd is formed when milk is decomposed, and pot arises when the lump of clay is kneaded and arranged in a new and altered shape. Mutability of the cause, it may be argued, is a necessary factor in all effectuation. If an effect could arise from the immutable, that would give the lie direct to the theory of causation itself, since any and everything could arise from an immutable cause, and there would be no determinate relation between a *particular* cause and its *specific* effect. Therefore, the Buddhists argue that destruction and consequent disappearance of a mutable cause is the antecedent condition of the emergence of an effect. The Vedānta, in this context, limits itself to showing that what the Buddhists regard as destruction or non-being of the cause is not really so, – there is nothing called pure negation or absolute non-being from which a thing may be supposed to arise as the effect. There is no corroborative instance of this alleged kind. If from *absolute* non-existence or negation of being an effect could emerge, then, sprout could as well come out of hare's horn, and curd could arise from sky-flower. The hare's horn and sky flower are instances of absolute non-being or non-existence<sup>68</sup>. These are not experienced we do not have also an experience of pure negation. It is said that what the Buddhists speak of as cause is not unqualified non-existence (*nirviseśabhava*) but non-existence of a specific sort (*viśeṣa-vatvabhava*), the reply will be that such non-existence of a specific sort is really something positive (*bhava padārtha*), but it is only there negatively regarded or described with reference to some specific situation. Had it been the case that an object has for its cause a non-existence or non-being, that non-existence or non-being would form a constitutive character of that object in the same way as earthiness accompanies all pots and the material composing the seed becomes the material of the sprout. The so called destruction of the seed in germination or sprouting is only apparent, neither real nor absolute. The constitutive



elements of the seed all remain in tact, and these from the antecedent circumstance or cause of the sprout. The Buddhist nihilists themselves admit origination of all elements and of the elemental (*bhūta-bhautika*) from four kinds of atoms which are not negative facts. The thesis, then, that every effect arises from negation or non-being violently conflicts with their own pre-admission<sup>49</sup>. Absence or non-existence being always *specific*. There can be an infinite variety of non-existence. If any such non-existence *abhava* can give rise to desired effects, then, people who are indifferent (*udāsina*) and inactive<sup>50</sup> could get whatever they want without working for it. Nobody would require to make any serious effort, in a certain specific way, to obtain liberation or heavenly life, if all things could develop out of non-existence, since non-existence of some kind or some other, is every where, and in abundance.]

The *Brahmasūtras* from 2.2.28 to 2.2.32 have been taken by Sankara as arguments repudiating the idealistic schools of Buddhism, mainly *yogacara* Buddhism. How the *sūtra* '*Nabhavo upalabdheh*', non-being (non-existence) is not a content of given experience can be made out as an argument against *yogacara* Buddhism, in atleast partial defence of the *sarvastivāda* view of real existence of external objects after so much has been argued against the Sarvastirva schools of Buddhism) is some what hazy. The *sūtra* (*abhava upalabdheh*) could as well be construed as a general argument against all those views which argue that there may be a *vacuum* in our reality-experience, that there may be an experience of *absolute* non-existence or non-being, or of a no-content as a given content. The Vedānta cannot support such contention. Our given experiences are always about existential matters, and even when we deny a content or cognised its absence, we do so on the basis of some other content given as a positive something. There is thus, no experience of an absolute blankness. Understood in this way the present *sūtra* and the *sūtras* which follow could be made into arguments against the two schools of Madhyana Buddhism – the *yogacara* as well as the *Madhyamika*. But Sankara has taken this *sūtra* as instituting an argument against the Buddhist subjective idealists of the *yogacara* school only. The obvious reason is that this school takes the objective reference of cognitions as merely interpretational or projectional and seeks to deny objective determination in our cognitions of specific external objects. If objects are experienced as externally presented and out there, are we justified in ignoring the testimony of 'given experiences and holding that such objects are not so experienced, that they are not really 'given' as external objects but we only project out ideas in outer space, which is characterised by total absence of the perceived objects? The issue raised seems to be: Are we justified in explaining away the testimony of given experiences as to the nature and character of their objects by any ingenious intellectual construction, in absence of any sublating experience of a different nature?

On the ground that external objects, existing independantly of mind, cannot be *proved* as existing in that way, the *Yogacara* Buddhists fall back upon the notion of a ceaseless stream of cognitions, which by internal distinctions among themselves, form the cognitive processes, the cognised objects, and as the cumulative results of their combination, the cognitions or cognitive experiences (*pramāṇa-prameya-phalavayvahara*). They argue, even were it the case that objects external to us actually existed, we could not know them or deal with them except as they are conceived by us, except as they are conceptualised. But this only show that it is logically impossible for the alleged external objects to exist outside the mind and as external to it. What, for instance, can be the pillar or the wall we know? To exist externally as real objects, they should be atoms or their aggregates. But we donot know them as atoms. It cannot be argued that they are atomic, only we ourselves know them otherwise. Nor can we hold that they are aggregates of atoms. If the pillar or the wall, as aggregates of atoms were *non-different* from atoms, they could not be known otherwise, could not be know in the way we know them. If, on the other hand, the were *different* from atoms, it could not be

established that they are aggregates of atoms. All other existential categories, such as, universality, quality etc. are also as they are known and conceived. Their external existence is also unknown to us and so cannot be proved. These subjective idealists also, like their counterpart elsewhere, put in great weight and stress on the testimony of given experiences. Sankara, it will be seen, meets them on their own grounds.

Our cognitions (*jñana*), as they emerge and arise (*jayamana*),— so the Yogacara argues, have the general character of being experiences simply (*anubhavamaitrena*). But the fact that they are distinguishable in respect of their specific contents as cognition of a pillar, cognition of a wall and soon, cannot be explained except on the supposition that cognitions themselves have certain distinctive characters internal or immanent to them, and that every cognition is, so to say, *equi-formal* (*visaya sarupa*) to its content, or that it reflects a content conforming to its own nature. If this equi-formality with its content (*visayakarutva*), or the fact of a cognition embodying the form of its content as integral to itself be conceded, the hypothesis of an externally existing object independent of mind becomes unnecessary. What is suggested by this view is then, that cognitions are their own contents or cognitions apprehend themselves as content, and that there is no need of supposing any alien matter as contents of cognition. Then, again, since an object and its cognition are always *given* together (*sahopalambhanivumena*) and never apart from one another (since no object is given and known except in a cognition and no cognition is given and known without an object figuring as part of its meaning), therefore it stands to reason that a cognition and its content are one and the same (*abheda*), only functionally or logically distinguished so argues the *yogacara* Buddhist. It is not also a fact that even when one of the two, that is, cognition and its object, is not given the other one can be given, in anyway. Were the two, by their nature distinct and different (*svabhevavivakse*), they could appear separately, and nothing could stand in the way of their separate presentation (*pratibandhakarenahhava*) instead of their presentation together (*sahopalambha*). Therefore it follows that objects, externally situated and independent, of and indifferent to cognition. There are none such things. Dream states, magical illusions, and other delusions also exhibit a felt distinction between experience and its cognate content, and it is commonly admitted that no externally existing objects are needed there to explain the dual manifestations of experience in such cases into cognition and its content. In like manner, so it is argued, our normal waking states of cognitions can be viewed as not involving reference to *externally situated* objects. It is not necessary, so this school argues, to assume externally situated objects to explain variety or manifoldness of cognitions (*prahaya-vaicitrya*). The supposition of external objects their variety as *causes* of our multiform cognitions, beside being unprovable, is also unnecessary, since the diversity of cognitions can as well be explained by reference to the diversity of latent desires (cravings). So, according to these idealists, cognitions give rise to cravings, and the impressions of these latter give rise to fresh cognitions leading to new cravings (*vasana*) and the cognitions which emerge on account of them and lead to new cravings, and finally, their impressions in turn determine each other in a rotating process just as seed and sprout mutually determining each other as cause and effect. This then becomes the theoretical ground for the subjectivist Buddhists to deny existential reality of the objects of cognitions apart from the cognitions and outside of them. B. S. 2.2.28, as Sankara sees it, repudiates this subjectivist view and urges that non-existence of the external order of real things (as distinguished from our ideas of them) is no empirical datum—*nabhavo upalabdham*. We do not have experience of external objects as non-existing, but always as existing.

The classical interpreters of Sankara's commentary have scarcely shown any interest in the question. What essential purpose of the Vedanta metaphysics has been served by Sankara's polemical observations against the subjective idealistic position of the Yogacara Buddhists. The issue debated is pre-eminently epistemological and relates to the question if objects of cognition can be denied

an existence outside the cognitive processes and independent of them. In what way is a realistic epistemological theory, supporting independent existence of objects of knowledge, congruent or consistent with the Advaita metaphysics of the Upanisads as interpreted by Sankara? Some modern writer have opined that at the empirical (*vyavaharika*) level, the Advaita defends a realistic epistemology, although at the transcendental level, it discards it. Such a view, frankly speaking, explains nothing. We shall therefore, consider this apparently intriguing issue briefly before presenting Sankara's criticisms of the subjective idealism of the Yogacara Buddhism.

In his commentary on B. S. 1 1 4 Sankara defines cognition (*jñāna*) as '*pramanejanya*' (arising from a valid source of knowledge) and defines *pramana*, again as '*yathabhūta-vastuvisayaṃ*', that is, reflecting or conforming to the *natura* of a thing as it is in the *Adhyasabhasya*, *adhasa* or *avidya* has been defined as '*a-tasmin tadbuddhiḥ*', that is, apprehending that or that nature in an object, which does not have such nature, and is, therefore, characterised by its absolute negation. In course of his discussions in the first four sutra, Sankara has advocated that knowledge or true cognition as *vastutantra* (conforming to the nature of its objective content which is a *vastu* or real existential thing), and has distinguished it from an obligatory act (*kartyavya*), a practical effort, which, according to him, is *purusa-vyapara-tantra*. He has distinguished this *vastutantra jñāna*, although a mental process also from an *enjoined* "mental act (*manasi kriya*), such as, an act of contemplation or meditation (*dhyaṇa* or *cintana*), which, according to him, besides being *purusa-vyaparatantra*, is merely *codanatantra* and *vastu-svabhava-nirapekṣa*". All these things have been said by Sankara when explaining the nature of a *pramana* (source of valid knowledge). That knowledge or cognition in order to be what it is or what it should be, must conform to the nature of its object, and that this nature of the object is to be the determinator of the nature of cognition or knowledge as also of its truth-claim, is substantially different from the view that an object is only so far as it is known (*esse est percipi*), and as thus known, it is the same as the fact of knowledge or cognition". On this point, Sankara, it will be found, has argued that an object is never known as being the same as knowledge or cognition in the sense of being identical with it, but always as something *distinguished from it*, and so, as *other than* knowledge or cognition. Our knowledge or cognition is *of it*, not identical with it. This Sankara has argued on the testimony of given experience or knowledge, and his main argument has been that there should not be any ingenious attempt to construe a cognition into what it is not, no attempt to deny what a cognition *actually imports* or implies by the very form or nature of its self-articulation. Logic cannot take any decision in respect of existential facts or contents, logical difficulties, real or an existential external order, independent of the mind". But for that reason, one should not go to the extreme a distinction between itself and its content. Further, simply because such content is to be the same as *as it is known*, one should not argue that it must be the same as *its knowing*, that is, known and knowing are identical because they always go together.

That cognition becomes *cognitive*, and therefore, a cognition, by revealing its content as something outside of itself and as something to which it has to conform, is necessarily implied in the view which defends *vastutantrata* of *jñāna*. But Sankara does not hold the view that in every cognition its content or *visaya* must be existing already in advance of that cognition—an interpretation which no less a person than Padmapada has foisted upon Sankara when wrongly interpreting Sankara's '*yathabhūta-vastu-visayaṃ*' as '*Yatha bhūtavastu visayaṃ*'. *Dharma* or spiritual excellence is a *bhava-visaya* (what is yet to be), and as that, is no doubt dependent on both vedic injunctions (*codanatantra*) and the executive effort of a person performing an enjoined duty in the appropriate way (*purusa-vyaparatantra*). But *dharma-jñāna* (knowledge of *dharma*, i.e., the knowledge as to where in *dharma* may consist) is neither *purusanatantra* nor *codanatantra*". It is, as Sankara himself puts it,

*bhava-visayaka* and *codanajanya* as knowledge of Brahman or the true self is also *codanajanya* (the revealed authority of the scriptures being the one source, the only source, of both the kinds of knowledge) although *bhutavastuvistayaka*. In Sankara's usage, the two expressions, '*codanajanya*' do not have the same meaning the author of the *Pancapadika* has failed to distinguish the two " Sankara has expressly said that *dharma*, a 'would be fact' (*bhavya*), does not exist at the time when one can have knowledge of it" But he has nowhere hazarded the opinion that knowledge of *dharma* is not knowledge. Or that although knowledge, it also is not *vastutantra* in the sense knowledge of Brahman is so, knowledge in respect of *dharma* also cannot be erratic or desultory. So knowledge of *dharma* has also to conform to a definite issue or content, although such content may be a formal command or proposal is yet to take concrete shape in consequence of certain practices in conformity with the Vedic injunctions. This kind of extension of the meaning of an objective content is scarcely noticed in ordinary realism. Thus, *Vastutantrata*, in the Sankara Vedanta, does not necessarily mean *Bhutavastutantrata*. The object of knowledge need not be ahead of the knowing process in the sense an ordinary realist regards the object as ahead of and indifferent to, or independent of, knowledge.

There is another and a more significant feature in the Advaita account of knowledge. The *Vastutantrata* of *jnana* is not to imply that a cognition is causally determined by the object and its nature. The so called *vritti*, or cognitive mode, is not causally determined by the form and character of the extra-mental object given in advance—a patent realistic obsession which Dharmaraja Adhvarin's account of *Vritti*, as taking the 'form' of the object (*visayakarana parinama*), seems to have aired, the fact is 'Conforming', in the Vedanta context, may also be taken to mean 'rightly representing', provided this 'rightly representing' is understood in the sense of a 'formed' and *logical* demand. This is not to be translated into metaphors like 'picturing', 'resembling', 'having the same form as' and so on. The '*vastutantrata*' of *jnana* is not to be taken to mean, 'object determinedness' of cognitions, if for no other reason, atleast for the reason, that under that supposition all cognitions would have been necessarily and unreservedly true, and the truth-claim, inherent in cognitions in consonance with the *svatah pramanyavada* (theory admitting self-validity of cognitions), could under no circumstance lapse. The *Vastutantrata* of *jnana* really means the 'formal fact and that a cognition in order to be true *has to conform* to the nature of the object, but whether it has so conformed or has not conformed can be decided only if the cognition remain uncontradicted (*abadhita*) forever. Conformation is then a logical demand, and not a demanded substantiated once for all. All conventional modes of cognition, being corrigible ultimately, the demand for conformation remains a formal condition. This is true of all cognitions involving deality of act and content. But every cognition is true *so far*, and is not suspected in the absence of some other cognition contesting its truth or veracity and subverting it. The Advaita position in relation to the Buddhist idealism is, then, that cognitions which seem to deliver or intend external objects do so deliver their objects *as external* it cannot be that the 'given' cognitions are *true* and *real* while the objects they deliver are false, or projected shadows, that is, they are not *really*. As they are presented, Cognition cannot be true and its content false. Whether any of these two is *ultimately* true or not is to be decided on the principle of uncontradictedness (*abadhitatva*) and by that principle alone. Sankara brings this out in the last sentence of his commentary on B.S. 2.2.31 – 'in the absence of a subverting experience of a different kind one is not justified in denying what is evidenced by all conventional sources of knowledge and human behaviours resting upon them'. The test of truth, in the Vedanta epistemology, is not, however, successful workability (*arthakriyakaritva*), not also correspondence, which is the realist criterion. It is not also coherence. It is non-contradiction, which, however, is not the same as the Western Absolutist criterion. Although a true cognition *as a process of knowing* (*pramana*) *has to* and also *does* reveal its content and that, again, *truly*, there is no *absolute guarantee* that such has *really*

been the case in the face of the fact that what is now unreservedly looked upon as a truth, a valid cognition, may ultimately lapse into a detected and palpable error. The negative criterion (non-contradiction) is rendered into 'uncontradictedness' in the Vedānta parlance, and it is designed to meet that sort of eventuality. This provision, let us insist, would not have been there had the Vedānta of Sankara been a realism in the generally accepted meaning of the word.

Yet, the Advaita Vedānta is realism although *not* epistemological realism, as it has been generally misrepresented to be. It is a metaphysical realism, since according to it, *what is there*, and truly there, is Reality as an absolute fact, a self-accomplished (*pariniṣṭhita*), self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*) and an all – enveloping existence (*brahma*), although its several *appearances* in cosmic display may progressively forfeit their reality-claims (although made absolutely) in course of an inward-moving quest for truth. Reality is everywhere we are hammed in all sides by it, and so, no negation of reality can be found anywhere – 'naśato' dr̥statvat<sup>100</sup>. But, this reality may change its forms and appearances, and there is a way in which there may be no several appearances at all, this, then, is the Vedānta stand-point. Since Yogacara Buddhism in denying the external order of *being* creates a partial vacuum, and since the sunyavadis, according to Sankara's understanding, manipulates a total and all embracing blackness, the void, so Sankara combats their views by way of defending his Advaita rendering of the Vedānta metaphysics.

There is another reason why the Advaita in its theory of knowledge should not be taken as epistemological realism in the current sense. All the *pramāṇas*, including the Vedic testimony, are, as Sankara regards them, vitiated by 'ignorance and falsity'<sup>101</sup>. Dual presentation of knowledge and its object is itself a matter of *appearance* only, and has no validity in the absolute state of affairs where there is no duality. Reality, again, is no *objectivity* at all, the entire order of objective presentation is a transcendental appearance merely. It, is the subject misrepresented as an object (*viśaya*). Reality is, to the vedānta, the eternal Subject, the Self. The *śruti*s also describe it as such. Knowledge in its regard to be *vastutantra* or *viśayatantra* has to conform to its *true nature*. What this true nature is the *śruti*s can only furnish a clue thereto, but cannot deliver up. the *śruti*s, after all, is an indirect *pramāṇa*. To be even this indirect *pramāṇa*, it has to abnegate its claim to be a *pramāṇa*. It can never rise up to its declared aim to be 'yathabhūta-vastuviśayam'. The 'vastu' in question is no 'vastu' in the generally accepted meaning, again, the 'Yathabhutatva' in its regard is 'to be the Self-shining Absolute' – eternally self-knowing and self-revealing. It cannot be made into the 'dependently revealed' – the *pramāṇa* – revealed. Such is the peculiarity of the logical situation here. There is the Subject only, the *viśnata* alone. How can this *viśnata* be known as the *viśneya*, so *yajñavalkya* poses the question<sup>102</sup>. All objective representations are basically false. The external order of the seemingly existing objects is also false. But this its falsity is a matter of transcendental *existence*, falsity as an absolute substantive fact. This is no *experienced* falsity, in the absence of an experience of an all together different kind<sup>103</sup>. So, the *sūtra* is: The *vacuity* of the order of external objects the *absolute non-existence* (*abhāva*) of these external objects is *not experienced* or known *nabhāva upalabdheḥ*. Our experiences of external objects are of externally 'given' objects, and not vacuous. The objects presented there cannot be taken as *externalised* internal states of the mind, as the Yogacara argues. The external order of objects is no mental construction. 'It, too, is an experienced fact.

Thus Sankara argues: it is not possible to establish *non-existence* of externally given objects since they are, as a matter of fact, *experienced* and their non-existence is not experienced<sup>104</sup>. Non-existence cannot be a character of what is actually *known* to be existing. It is as ridiculous to hold that the external objects, perceived through sense-contact do not exist as to hold that the food we have eaten and enjoyed has not been eaten or enjoyed, that what we have eaten and enjoyed has been



the eating and enjoying. Pressed in this way the subjectivist Buddhist may argue that it is not that we do not apprehend an objective fact or content but what we are defending is that such object or content is *not other than* (*vyatirikta*) the experience thereof, that it is nothing *additional to* the experience, having a substantive being of its own<sup>147</sup>. It can be seen that this view is just like the Berkeleyan on this point, –the *esse* of an object is its *percipi*. It is indeed remarkable how Sankara meets the point. We observed that in so far as one says that the objective content of a cognition is nothing *other than*, or different from the cognition one admits that *there is something* which is *other than* the cognition and outside it. How else could one say that it is *not* anything *other than*, or *outside*? No body ever knows his cognition as a pillar or a wall<sup>148</sup>. All people know the pillar or the wall as the object of cognition (*upalabdhisayatvenaiva*) and not as cognition. It, in the face of this objection, the subjectivist Buddhist would argue that, although cognition has an objective content distinguished from it, this objective content is (substantially) the *same as* the cognition, that the cognition which is in itself an internal fact, *appears like an external content* in being *externalised* (although there is no existential external order outside of conscious experiences, Sankara would ask how in the *absence* of any external order, and an externally situated object, as per their admission, do these people speak of there being something *like the externally situated* (*bahir vat iti*)? This is really an interesting point. To show the absurdity of the Buddhistic supposition, Sankara argues that no body ever says that Vishnumitra is *like* the son of a barren mother, or that he *appears like* that, since he is aware that the fictitious concept is empty and also not-existent. But when the subjective Buddhist argues that it is the internal act of cognition which looks *as if externally situated*, he must be knowing *what it is to be externally situated*, for otherwise his statement becomes unmaning and non-sensical<sup>149</sup>. Those who like the Vedantist follow the guidance of experience would have said that objects as external, or *appear* were, external as it (*bahirevabhasate*), and not that they appear *like* external objects what is external (*bahirvadabhasata*). Sankara, here, seems to bring out the crucial differences between the Yogacara and the Vedanta approach on this points. Something appearing as if, or as, external and something looking like the external are characteristically different statements. The latter is an indirect admission of knowledge of the *really external*. The Yogacara position thus implies knowledge of the *really external*. The *yogacara* position thus implies knowledge of external objects the existence of which it seeks to deny.

Historically speaking, all species of subjective idealism developed from the logical difficulty that the representative theory of perception faces. Yogacara Buddhism also, as an epistemological theory, developed from logical difficulties of the Sautrantika school, which regarded the extra mental order as directly unknowable and as known inferentially only. So, one of the basic argument of the subjective Buddhist can be that objective contents of cognitions have to be described as what look *like* the externally situated, not because we have knowledge of something of the external order of objects, but because the external existence of such objects of cognition cannot be theoretically established or proved<sup>150</sup>. It is remarkable how Sankara meets the point. He did not attempt to prove the absurdity of this position in the way that Johnson did<sup>151</sup>. On the contrary, he argues that *there can be no a priori determination* of what is possible or impossible. What is possible to exist as also what is absolutely impossible to exist, is ascertained and is ascertainable only in term of one or other source of knowledge and method of knowing. Not otherwise. What cannot be known or ascertained by *any* means of knowledge, perception, inference and all the rest, has necessarily to be admitted as incapable of *being there*, and so, as an impossible assumption. But, in the present context, so argues Sankara, since all our *pramanas* (means of knowledge cognised external objects in one way or another, what can be the relevance of the dialectical issues, such as, whether external objects are the same as they are perceived or different, whether they are the same as our cognitions or different from our



cognition? Logic cannot explain way given facts of experience, or prove that they are *not given*. Had there been no objects at all, we could not speak of our ideas of cognitions parading *as objects*, or as having the *same form* as that of the object (*visayasarupya*) that is, as being equi-formal with objects. The idealistic argument on the ground of *sahopalambha* (being always cognised together and never apart from each other) does not establish identity, non-otherness or non-distinction of a cognition and its content. It actually presents there as *upaya* (means) and *Upaya* (what is achieved through the means), that is, an *interdependant for the exigency of cognition*, nothing more.

Moreover, argues Sankara, the view that the object and its cognition are one and the same, and that they are not two distinct entities falls through if we stop to see that two cognitions, such as, cognitions of a pot and cognition of a-piece of cloth are distinguishable only in respect of their objectus contents, such as, pot and cloth, but as cognitions, they may be of the same kind. Sometimes, again, we may have the same object yet the cognitions may differ *qualitatively*, such as, when we *see* a pot and thereafter, *remember* it. In the first case, cognition is distinguished into two kinds, not in respect of its substantive core (*visesya*), such as, cognition, but only in respect of the objective contents functioning as adjectival and so determinative characters (*visesans*) such as, 'of pot' and 'of cloth'. In the second case, it is the substantives (*visesya*) such as 'seeing' and 'remembering' which stand distinguished but the adjectival (*visesana*) character such as, 'of pot' stands self-identical and so, one and the same. Such evident distinctions between pot cognition and cloth-cognition as between perception of pot and remembering the pot could not be there of cognition and its content were really non-different (*abheda*) or the same. In this, Sankara shows why a cognition and its content have to be regarded as distincts.

Next, Sankara institutes an argument which, besides repudiating the subjective Buddhist theory in this context, rules out the epistemological thesis upheld by William James in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. James there distinguishes between what he calls the 'primary' and 'secondary' intentions of pure experience, where the secondary intention as an act distinguishes the primary cognition as its content, and the distinction of cognition and its objective content turns out as a distinction between successive developments of the self-same core. Here, in his review of the Buddhist position, Sankara argues that the Vijnanavadi Buddhist cannot find an escape route in the supposition that in a series of successive cognitions, the earlier takes the later cognition as its objective content or the latter takes the earlier in that way, and therefore, to explain the distinction between a cognition and its content, it does not become necessary to admit any extra-cognitive reference to an outer world of objects'.<sup>10</sup> These Buddhists, argues Sankara, admitting as they do, momentariness and lapsing of an earlier cognition the very next moment of its emergence, can neither claim that each earlier cognition is related to each later as act and content (or as content and act), nor can they account for the *knowledge of differences and distinctions* among cognitions, each such cognition being momentary and non-existent when the next one turns up. These Buddhists, Sankara points out, cannot also *establish* any one of their pet theories insofar as they do not admit any over-viewing, enduring the witnessing consciousness. For, how does a momentary cognition know itself *as momentary*? How does it know its uniqueness? How, again, is the *interrelation* among cognitions, or their *general* character known? How is *avidya* known as the root-cause of the flux? How is efficiency of their scriptures for providing means of liberation and escape from suffering known—each and every cognition being just its itself and momentary and self-limited mental states?

These Buddhists, while admitting cognitions as *given*, should also admit externally existent objects like pillars and walls as equally *given*. Since both are felt to be given in their characteristic ways, it stands to reason that both should be admitted *as given*. It will not do to say that while the

cognitions are given and are fact as that, the external objects are not felt like that because they are never given by themselves and apart from cognitions of them. The reason is even cognitions are never given without their contents *as themselves*. Cognitions do not cognise themselves any more than fire can burn itself. It is not strange that on the analogy of a burning lamp the Buddhist should admit the self-contradictory idea that a cognition cognises itself as a content because it is luminous *prakasatmatvat* but cannot admit the universally accepted and the never contradicted (*aviruddha*) fact that a content cognises a content as distinguished from itself, nay, even as externally 'given'?" It is an absurd supposition that a cognition, divested of its objective content (*arthavyatiriktamapi*), cognises its bare self only, since no cognition can be active or meaningful in that way in respect of itself, and this involves the patent contradiction of something being both the agent and the patient (*svatmani kriyavirodhadeva*)<sup>13</sup>

But does this not amount to denying self-luminosity of cognitions if a cognition is incapable of cognising itself and has to dependant on another cognition in order to be known? This is a very interesting point. Both the Yogacara and the Vedanta of Sankara defend the notion of self-luminosity of cognition. Sankara, while refuting the Buddhist idealism makes clear the distinctive nature of the Advaita view of self-luminosity. This the Advaitic view has very often been distorted by the *advaitists* themselves. Therefore, Sankara's criticism of the *yogacara* view in this context deserves our serious notice, the subjective idealist, the *yogacara*, insists on regarding a cognition as also its own content, he regards the content as the same as the cognition but only projected outside and misrepresented as an object existing in outer space. The Yogacara may be tempted to make this an issue logically connected with the view of self-luminosity of cognition. In other words, the denial of the fact that the content of a cognition is the very same as the cognition and is nothing distinguished from itself may amount to denial of the capacity of cognition to cognise itself and to be self-luminous in that sense. So, the question here is does self-luminosity of a cognition mean its cognising itself as the content, and can it be that the view that cognition always cognises a content *other than*, and *distinguished from itself*, entails denial of self-luminosity of cognition? Sankara, it appears, rejects both the suppositions. He has already argued that if cognitions are to be taken as given, their objects, if felt or experienced as external, will also have to be admitted as external and as 'given' as that. In other words, cognitions cannot be accepted as 'given' without their contents being given also. This means that a cognition *as such* cannot be its own content or object, it cannot work upon itself as the content, since this involves *svatmani kriyavirodha*. To the argument 'if a cognition cannot know itself *as a content*, but if to be known, it is to depend on some other cognition, does not this amount to denial of self-luminosity of cognition, Sankara's reply will be that the issue has been fundamentally misconceived. Sankara makes it clear that the alleged self-luminosity of cognition does not mean its capacity to cognise itself as its own content and as the only content. Since the issue is rather intricate with chances of getting confused over it, Sankara poses the Buddhist defence of the above view of self-luminosity of cognitions by a pair of alternatives. Thus, the Buddhist may argue that if a cognition in order to be known (in the sense of being known as a content) is to depend on some *other* cognition, that other cognition will also in its turn, require to be known by another cognition, and so on *ad infinitum*, and there will be an infinite regress. Then, again, since all the cognitions in the proposed chain *qua* cognitions are exactly on a par (*samatvat*), and since, even, according to the Vedanta, every cognition is illuminating as a lamp and is, therefore, an illuminator, how can a relation, such as, between an illuminator and the illuminated (*avaharrabhasaka*) obtain between or among cognitions of the proposed series? It not necessary, so the Buddhist may say, to admit the capacity of a cognition to know itself as a content without extraneous aid, in the face of this absurdity? Sankara, in his own inimitable way, brings out what the Advaita Vedanta really means by self-

luminosity of cognitions and why this account is to be accepted as decisive in this case. The so called self-luminosity of a cognition *does not* mean its capacity to cognise itself as the content, nor does this involve a denial of there being a content *other than*, and distinguished from, it. A cognition is an illuminator in respect of its content only and this content, as the illuminated, is always other than itself. But a cognition is also aware of it *as an act*, but this is only in distinction from its content as other than itself. In other words, it is never its own content (*visaya*) and *is not* self cognitive or self-luminous in that sense. There is a further fact, a transcendental reference to which Sankara invites our attention in this connection. The so called cognition or cognitive situation, thus Sankara elaborates, consisting of a cognitive mode and its objective content requires to be illuminated by a 'witnessing' consciousness, transcendent of itself and its collateral content (since *as itself*, it is merely a psychical mode (*antahkaranavrtti*) and not self-luminous). This 'witnessing' consciousness is a transcendent principle of luminosity, not a cognition. It is rather the *cognizer* a transcendental self-positing fact. It is not on a par with any *emergent* cognitive mode, which is illuminated by it. In being thus illuminated by the 'witnessing' consciousness, both in respect of itself as a cognitive mode or act and in respect of its objective content, the cognition or the cognitive mode becomes *derivatively* luminous. It, then, *becomes* luminous in respect of the content, which remains distinguished from it as its object (*visaya*), and also in respect of itself *as the cognitive act*, and thus self luminous. But this its self-luminosity is a derived or 'borrowed' character, and not an original property belonging to it as itself. So, Sankara has argues that both the suppositions of the Buddhist idealist that denial of self-luminosity in respect of a given cognition (that it cognises itself as its content and in that sense it is self-luminous) will entail an infinite process of regress, and that all cognitions *qua* cognition being exactly on a par, the supposition of one cognition being the illuminator of another is, one the very face of it, inadmissible – are absolutely out of place with no relevance on the point at issue (*Itadubhavamapvayat*). In being lighted up and so by being posited by the 'witnessing' consciousness, a transcendental principle, the cognitive situation consisting of the act of cognition and the objective content, remains fixated, self valid and self contained as it were, and there remains no demand for looking for, further explanation beyond the witnessing principle"<sup>13</sup> The witnessing consciousness is not on a par with any emergent cognition. It is the self-luminous principle behind and beyond all that is *derivatively luminous* in respect of itself and its objective content. It remains the transcendental presupposition of the revealed order of cognition and its content, the final explanation why cognition and its object appear as they appear. This self-positing, self luminous principle is neither a cognition nor a content but an absolute reality- principle which reveals the entire cognitive situation and remains the absolutely unrejectable, the self-established"<sup>14</sup> The claim that a cognition is self-illuminated like a lamp and is not dependant on an illuminator, any witness other than itself, Sankara points out, amounts to holding that the cognition is *an enable to no proof* (*aparamanagamyā*), has no justificatory ground beyond itself, and also that it is without a knower-principle which can testify to its presence and being what it is – (*an avagantṛka*)? Sankara explains his meaning by an analogy. Even one thousand candles, burning within massive stony walls that encompass them from all sides, cannot establish themselves as luminous, or as burning candles, in the absence of a witness, a spectator' <sup>15</sup> It is thus an imperative necessity to postulate a witnessing principle beyond the phenomenal cognitions, which latter derive their so-called self-luminosity in respect of themselves and also illuminatedness in respect of their contents from such an original self-luminous principle beyond them both. So Sankara concludes that the objects of cognitions are no less real than the cognitions which reveal them, since both depend on the same transcendent witnessing principle for being the illuminator and the illuminated, and since no cognition ever cognises itself as its objective content but always as an act.

The *yogacara*, as is clear from the above, wants to explain away 'real given-ness' of objects, experienced as *external* to the mind. To him, such objects are the cognitions themselves, and, therefore, mental occurrences, but *externalised* or projected as outside facts. Their externality is not, therefore, due to their actual location in the outward because there is no such world, such externality is due to their *externalisation*, that is, projection by the mind as outside and existent facts, although they are not such. To vindicate this claim, the *yogacara* seeks to place our cognitions of external objects on equal footing with dream-images, illusions and hallucinations. The contents of these latter experiences, it is contended, also are experienced as externally given and as real, although they cannot be imagined to be really so. Therefore, since there is nothing to distinguish our cognitions of external objects from states, such as, dreams, illusions and hallucinations, as experiences involving implicit belief in the real presentedness, externality, even reality of their contents, since as experiences of presentation they all are virtually alike (*pratyayatvavisesat*) why should it be so necessary to admit real and external existence of the contents of our normal cognitions of waking experiences? Sankara, while commenting upon the next *sutra* (2.2 29), meets this *yogacara* point of contention.

It is not true that, as cognitions, our waking experiences of external objects are on equal footing with experiences, such as, dreams, illusions etc. There are certain *characteristic differences* (*vaidharma*) Our waking experiences and dream or hallucinatory experiences are invariably related as *sublator*-experiences and *sublated* experiences (*badhya-badhaka*). The waking experiences become the *badhaka* experiences always, the dreams, illusions and hallucinations become the *badhya* experiences, and not *viceversa*. In this, they are characteristically different. In the case of dream, illusions, etc., there are, again, certain *adventitious* circumstances and defects, such as, dullness due to slumber (*nidraglana*), magical tricks, abnormality in the functioning of the sense-organs, etc. Besides, dream-experiences are reproductive processes like memory and not presentative experiences. Neither is there a direct relation with a present object (*arthasamprayaga*) nor is there any contact with the external senses. That the objects of dream-experiences are all remote or past (*viprayogatmaka*), and have no location in present times is also known to the contenders. Those who consider themselves wise should not deny the testimony of their own experiences for the sake of mere argument. Lastly, what sense can be there in this attempt to prove that our normal waking experiences are to be taken as objectless, or as unsupported by any existential matter (*niralamlanam*), since dream-experiences are like that? When a thing cannot have a characteristic by its own nature, is it not ridiculous to suppose that it should have that characteristic on ground of certain alleged similarity with some other thing which has that property intrinsic to itself<sup>12</sup>? One who is directly feeling fire as hot cannot wish that it is cold on any ground of any fancied similarity of fire with water.

Thus, far no trouble. But Sankara's expression '*Kasyancida-pyavasthayam na badhyate*'<sup>13</sup>, used in the context of our waking experiences of objects like pillar, etc., is, however, somewhat misleading. How can he, without compromising his Advaitic standpoint suggest that our experiences of the world-pluralities, of external objects such as pillars, walls etc. are never, and under no circumstance, sublated or contradicted? This difficulty is not escaped by the suggestion that '*badhya*', in the context, need not be taken to mean 'contradiction', which may be taken as a symmetrical relation, that it stands for the asymmetrical relation, such as, sublation which obtains between the sublator (*Badhaka*) and the sublated (*badhya*), – the *badhya* being naturally incapable of being the *badhaka* in its turn – as *vacaspati* has put the matter<sup>14</sup>. Does Sankara mean to say only that waking experiences are, under no circumstance, to say only that waking experiences are, under no circumstance, sublated by experiences like dream, hallucination etc.? *Vacaspati* seems inclined to look upon the issue in that way. But this is not likely to curb ardour and enthusiasm of those, who acclaim themselves as realists,

even of those, who read in Sankara Vedanta an epistemological realism, which is not there. An explanation in the light of Sankara's texts becomes, therefore, necessary. Sankara, in this context, used the words '*evam na badhyate*' –that is, 'is not sublated in this way'. So, the question arises, what is the *specific nature* of this sublation or supersession? Let us follow the guidance of Sankara's exposition. The objects seen in the dream are sublated and the person fully awake feels the large assembly of people dreamt by him are all false, there is no large assembly of men, my mind was overcome by dullness incidental to slumber and that is how this kind of erroneous cognition could take place. In magic shows also we have sublation in this way. Now, let us ask, what is the kind of sublation that takes place in the above two cases? Evidently, in the way that such objects *are not there*, that is, they *no longer appear*, or that they have *vanished* away all together. Now, this is precisely the mode of sublation in the case of the *pratibhasika*, the *tatkalika*, that is, what seems to appear at the moment. All that Sankara means in the context is, then, that pillar etc., of wakings experiences are never sublated *in this way (evam)*. Not that they are not sublated at all, that they are unsublatable.

If such were his meaning that would bring in a real conflict with the Advaita persuasion, if not a blatant repudiation of Advaita absolutism. Sankara's meaning seems to be that while dream-objects and illusory contents *vanish* altogether as soon as the person experiencing them comes back to *normal* condition, the objects of normal cognition *do not vanish*, all together but are simply understood as *appearances*, as *mere appearances* to be precise. There is a difference between the *pratibhasika*, the *tatkalika*, the merely seeming, on the one hand, and the *vyavaharika*, the conventionally known, the phenomenal, on the other. These latter do not disappear or *vanish*, do not fall off any more than the liberated state calls for a dropping off of the body. It is the sense of *substantivity*, of absolute reality as themselves, which lapses, leaving the appearances to appear as '*mere appearances*'. That there are plural things and beings appearing there is due to the fact that Reality *appears* as them. They are there in the sense that they appear to be there not because a phenomenal subject sees them there in some pathological condition of the mind<sup>19</sup>. They would not also disappear if the alleged pathological condition would be corrected by therapeutic treatment. The alleged pathological condition, if it can be described as that, simply consists in reacting to the plural appearances, already given, *as if* they are not appearances but are substantive realities themselves. The phenomenal subject is itself a part of the phenomenal expressions of Reality, and it does not enjoy the role of a maker of these appearances. So long as the phenomenal knower retains reality-sense in himself, the objects outside also remain invested with the same reality-sense. When the reality-sense, in the empirical person lapses, the reality of the outer objects also lapses, and both turn into the mere or floating appearances. But they are not eliminated all together, as dream-objects or illusory presentations are eliminated. Such seems to be Sankara's meaning, and this accords with the rendering of the Sankara Vedanta we have attempted so far. Sublation in the context of the *pratibhasika* means its total suppression or elimination, making the appearances disappear and *vanish* away; sublation in respect of the empirical (*vyavaharika*) objects means lapsing of their 'reality-sense', leaving them to hold as '*mere appearances*'. – the '*neither real nor unreal*'. So what Sankara means here is that the empirically given things or objects are never sublatable *in the same way* as the dream-objects or illusory objects are sublated. The way they are sublated is very much different, not that these are unsublatable in an absolute sense.

The final and decisive refutation of the subjectivist Buddhists' stand as regards their explanation of external appearances of objects comes next in course of the two succeeding *sutras* 2.2.30 and 2.2.31. In a way the *sutra* 2.2.28 – '*nabhava upalabdhas*' and the *sutra* 2.2.30 – '*na havyonupalabdhed*'



may be regarded as complementary. The former means 'the *absence or non-existence* of things (i.e. outer objects) cannot be admitted since they are apprehended as being there'. The latter, in that case, may be taken to mean 'if they are not *really apprehended* as being there, that is, if their perceptibility as externally given objects be not admitted, their 'being there' (*Bhava*) cannot be accounted for by any other device – *anupalabdheh na bhava*. Their 'being there' cannot, for instance, be explained in the subjective Buddhist way by holding that the diverse external objects which seem to be there are simply projections of our ideas or impressions having their root in the diverse forms of latent impressions of desires (*vasana*) which make up our mind. This rendering of the *sutra* 2.2.30 would have, we think, facilitated, may, even strengthened Sankara's summary dismissal of the Madhyamika view on the ground that what is admitted on the testimony of accepted sources of knowledge cannot be shown to be void or empty by mere dialectical arguments in the absence of the testimony of some other given knowledge of greater strength and validity'.<sup>26</sup> This would have also brought the *sutra* 2.2.30 in a more intimate relation with the *sutra* 2.2.28 which precedes it.

Not that Sankara, in his commentary on the *sutra* 2.2.30 has materially differed from the rendering proposed above. He has struck at the root of the Buddhist contention more directly. In the earlier *sutra* (2.2.29) Sankara examined the Buddhist attempt to place objects of waking experiences, and therefore of cognitions proper, on a par with dream-objects. The Buddhist intention, evidently, was, to provide a common explanation of dream-objects as well as the objects of waking experiences in term of the latent traces of earlier experiences or in term of *vasanasamakaranas* (incipient desires) as the Buddhist would like to call them. The present *sutra*, according to Sankara's version, argues that even the very possibility of *vasana-samskara*, or of latent impressions of any kind, cannot be admitted without prior admission of normal cognitions involving knowledge of external objects – *anupalabdheh*. Does this not amount to saying that even the *vasana-samskara*, by means of which the perception of objects as externally presented is sought to be explained, cannot be possible without there being perceptions of external objects on some earlier occasions? Therefore, cognitions of external objects have to be explained, not in term of *vasana-samskara* but by means of the possibility of there being cognitions of objects as external. The clue to our knowing objects as external lies, therefore, in the very possibility of the circumstance which was sought to be explained away, and *not* in our having latent impressions of any kind, since such latent impressions themselves depend on there being earlier perception of external objects and our behavioural reactions in their regard.

Our desire or infatuation in all its varied forms, Sankara explains, can originate only if we come across objects and cognise them as given. Without there being cognitions of given objects, how can any desire or craving arise in the alleged variety of forms? Sankara asks. The supposition of a beginningless chain, in which some antecedent *vasana-samskara* gives rise to some seemingly external perception of objects (where there are no such objects) and such seemingly external perception in its turn gives rise to new *vasana-samskara* will involve a blind and rootless infinite regress, which will not answer the question how this *vasana-samskara* itself arises. Nor will it explain how cognition of objects as externally existent becomes possible. It will in addition, remove the very ground of all our attitudes and behaviours towards the external world of objects. The implication is that neither the possibility of cognitions of objects as external, nor the possibility of the growth of *vasanavalocitra* (variety of incipient desires) can be explained if the possibility of external objects and the perceptions of objects in that way are to be denied. The positive and negative arguments by which the subjectivist Buddhist seeks to deny actual existence of objects external to the cognition, such as, where there are objects of cognitions there are to be found incipient desires as their causes, and even there there are no external objects to be perceived there can be cognitions of objects as external as in dream-fall



through'. The reason being that the latent impressions of *vasana* (desires) where by the Buddhist wanted to account for cognitions of objects without their being latent impressions of desires but there can be no such latent-impressions where there is no antecedent cognitions of objects. This negative and positive arguments also prove conclusively the real being of objects we cognise. This then falsifies the Buddhistic claim. Moreover, the subjective Buddhist cannot fruitfully explain the possibility of there being latent impressions, their accumulation and configuration, on an other count. The latest impressions called *vasana samskaras* cannot exist in themselves or by themselves. These all require a support, a permanent substratum (*asraya*). But there is no such permanent substratum in their system, all things being momentary (2.2.31).

The so called *Alaya-vijnana* of the Yogacara Buddhists cannot meet the requirement of this substratum or support of the *vasana-samskaras* as claimed because this also has to be taken as momentary (*ksanika*) and fleeting for the sake of consistency with the first principle of Buddhism that all is momentary. What is needed as the support is a stable principle, a universal witness, a connecting principle which being together in one-ness all the three spans of time, past, present and future, and explains the phenomena of memory and recognition, dependent on impression, which are distinguished in respect of space, time and occasioning conditions. To credit *Alayavijnana* with a role of this kind, that is, of a permanent substratum will mean for the Vijnanavadi Buddhist disclaiming their prior admission (*pratinyahanti*) and contradicting themselves.

Sankara's refutation of the Madhyamika *Sarvasunyavada* may appear to be too rash and unceremonious. He refuses to take the Madhyamika with any degree of seriousness. But, whatever Sankara's ground of rejection is not to be taken so lightly. We have already considered this point. No given situation of experience can be held vacuous or false in the absence of another 'given experience', which cancels it. Nothing empirically given can be argues out of existence and its facthood cannot be ruled out of order by any dialectic, however powerful this latter might be. In his very brief criticism, Sankara argues as much. In the absence of the *special* circumstances (*upavada*), delimiting the application and use of a general rule (*Upasarga*), the general rule itself has to be maintained and followed. Sankara has maintained that all the accredited and conventional *pramanas* (sources of valid knowledge) are vitiated with falsity and have to be rejected in the knowledge of the ultimate. But that does not go to show vacuousness of the commonly accepted *Pramanas*, or of the knowledge we come by on their basis, till such knowledge is actually contradicted and negated. Such being the case, the empirically given order outer objects, the inner order of mental states, and our experience and behaviour in respect of them, cannot be ruled out of existence, and reduced to nullity by dialectical arguments as the *Sunyavadi* Madhyamikas have done.

So, Sankara concludes the Buddhistic metaphysics is found to be vitiated all through out (B.S. 2.2.32). It tumbles down like a wall built upon sands. Insofar as it admits of interpretations, realistic, idealistic and nihilistic with equal vigour, it is self-discrepant and utterly misleading.

The next four *sutras* are arguments in refutation of the Jaina Metaphysics. The Jaina system, insofar as it also is a heterodox system like the Buddhistic system, calls for a logical refutation only. The *sutras* - 2.2.33-36 precisely achieve this object.

In spite of its logical rigour, the Jaina labours under the presupposition that since everything we commonly know can be regarded from a wide diversity of angles or stand points, therefore, the thing-itself must be credited with an infinitely variety of aspects *objectively*, that Reality itself must be held as many-sided and many - aspected. The metaphysics of the Jains, therefore, stipulates and drafts the transcendental in the pattern of the phenomenal and the commonly experienced. Under

the sput of postulational thought of this kind, the system goes to the extent of making a virtue of all conflicting views and contradictory statements about the real. It, thus, poses an absolute opposition to the Advaita metaphysics according to which the real is the ever uncontradicted (*abadhita*) and is also transcendent (*vilaksana*)<sup>21</sup> of the phenomenal – the *appearances*. This, possibly, explains why the structures of the Badarayana *sutras* as also Sankara's own observations have been so very vehement and caustic in regard to the Jaina metaphysics<sup>22</sup>.

The *sutra* 2.2.33 states. The supposition of one and the same thing having divergent and even opposite characters is inadmissible, since such is absurd – *naikasminnatambhava*. Sankara elaborates: The Jaina states his categories (*padarthas*) variedly. The categories are *seven* in number in one estimate, such as, the *Jiva*, the *ajiva*, *asrava* (the active outgoing tendency resulting in infatuation) *samvara* (restraining such tendency), *nirjara* (self-mortification leading to self-purification), *bandha* (bondage) and *moksa* (release). Since the last five are different states of the first in relation to the second, the basic categories, then, turn out to be two only, such as, *Jiva* and *A-jiva*. These two, as metaphysical and existential realities, defined by bodies or forms, are next shown in five-fold classification as *jivastikaya*, *pudgalastikaya*, *dharmastikaya*, *adharmaastikaya*, and *akasastikaya* (space). Then, again, intermediate classification of all the categories is worked out in varied ways. Coming to elaborate upon our knowledge of them, the Jaina is guided by his logic such as, *saptabh anginaya*, according to which a definite, categorical statement about an existent is logically inadmissible. We can only have a conditional statement specifying a stand point, and our statements can take *seven* distinguishable forms, such as, (1) may be it is, (2) may be it is not, (3) may be both it is and it is not, (4) may be it is indescribable, (5) may be it is and indescribable, (6) may be it is not and is indescribable, lastly, (7) may be it is, and it is not, and is indescribable. What Sankara finds to be most intriguing is, however, the Jaina admission of applicability of his judgments of seven-fold probabilities in respect of concepts, such as, one-ness (*ekatvam*) and eternity (*nityatva*) in their application to the metaphysical real also. Sankara does not, however, take note of the other classification of the Jaina (*nayas* the seven kind of *nayas*, *four* in respect of objects and their meanings, and *three* in respects of words, such as, *naigamanaya*, *samgrahanaya*, *vyavaharanaya*, *rjusutranaya*, *sahdanaya*, *samabhirudhanaya* and *evambhutanaya*

The point of contention, as Sankara sees it, is whether we can sensibly and meaningfully admit, or speak of, the presence of widely divergent and even mutually opposed characters in what we conceive as the real. Such admission (*abhyupagama*), says, Sankara, is without logical justification (*na yukta*). The reason is – it is supposing the absurd (*asambhava*). The concept of *asambhava*, as introduced here, has a metaphysical bearing – it means the empty, an absolute nothing just as the very same thing cannot be in itself both hot and cold, so there cannot be an assemblage, of opposite characters like existence and non-existence in the same thing. What kind of knowledge or truth can be that which takes a thing as that, again, as not-that, again, as both that and not-that, and also as indeterminable? Sankara asks. Does it not leave the entire thing undecided, and is not this mode of alternative assertion symptomatic of a state of undecision or doubt, and so very much remote from valid knowledge? It may be argued: since every object is many-sided and multiform in its real nature, can we not have quite a manifold of judgments, each relating to an existent aspect of the thing, and therefore all such judgments being grounded in the nature of the thing, and valid? Sankara does not see that the Jaina view can be defended in that way. The reason is – once you admit absolute multiformity (*nirankusa anekantam*) everything, your ascertainment (*nirdharana* also, like the object to be ascertained (*vastutvavisesati*), must be looked upon as unfixed, unsettled and indeterminate with the result that in respect of it also you can say that may be it is, may be it is not, that is may be it is

an ascertainment, may be it is not also an ascertainment and so on. Such being the case, where is the possibility of the Jaina arriving at a view of truth. His ascertainment and decision will thus amount to non-ascertainment and indecision because such may either be what it is or what it is not, or *both* what it is and what it is not, or indescribable and so on<sup>13</sup>. We do not feel that the Jain can ever have a convincing reply to Sankara's criticism at this place. This undecidedness or indeterminateness will also vitiate all their assertions regarding the *nature* of the ascertainer and of the consequence or result of such ascertainment. We may, for instance, say that may be the ascertainer is there and the ascertainment has taken place, and, again, may be the ascertainer is not there and the ascertainment in the way has not resulted. The knower, the known, the knowing, and the result achieved by knowing, that is, the entire fact of knowledge itself being all in a state of uncertainty and absolute indeterminateness, in what way can the teaching of a Jaina teacher or *tirthankara* (founder of faith) be regarded as a fruitful doctrine that can offer guidance to the followers of their faith? Sankara wonders. When the teachings of a spiritual guide do not have any fixed meaning and are not of any determinate nature, do these not amount to the ravings of a madman?

The Jaina speaks of five-fold existential realities (*astikayas*). The logic of seven-fold predication, if applied to these categories, will pronounce their number as five and again, as not-five, that is more or less than five, and also the number may be not determinable or describable at all—*avyaktavyam*. What nonsense is this description of entities or their nature as indescribable? If anything is by nature indescribable, it should be unutterable also<sup>14</sup>. To speak of anything as unspeakable involves self-contradiction. To speak of something in a certain way is ascertaining it in that way, but the Jaina will, again, say that the ascertainment in the way is not also ascertainment in that way. Should we say that right knowledge involves both itself and its opposite, that is, what is not right knowledge? This is a very strange situation. As for the end or goal looked for in the Jaina doctrine, should one say that it is there, and in another sense or another way, it is also not there, that it is eternal and again, not eternal, or that it may even be both, or unspeakable? Their basic categories, such as, the *Jiva* are to be taken *both* as being, and not-being. But how can there be assemblage of opposite characters at one and the same time in any real content? The Jaina account of the physical order as due to collection or combination of atoms, Sankara adds, can be disposed of in the same way the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas has already been disposed of.

One observation before we pass on to the next *sutra*. The *saptabhangi* theory of predication admits seven-fold *alternative* statements about the real and the existent, and these are, according to the Jaina, all valid in relation to *specific standpoints*, not with reference to one and the same standpoint. Each is a *naya* or partial view, which is claimed to be *valid relatively*. Each is, *again*, a *nayabhasa* (fallacious view) if regarded as valid *exclusively* and *absolutely*. Reality itself is claimed to be multiform and many-aspected. The doctrine of relativity of truths has been sought to be defended on the basis of the postulation that reality itself is many-sided—*anekanta*. What the Jaina view insists upon is, then, that the possibility of one *specific* kind of predication should not logically entail the inadmissibility of other and alternative modes of predication, and a single specific judgement should not be acclaimed as valid *exclusively* and *absolutely*. The insistence, then, is that to be regarded as valid and so as a *naya*, and in order that it may not be invalid and so, a *nayabhasa*, it should be stated *conditionally*, and its context should be specified if not definitely, at least by an indefinite participle, such as, *syat* (may be). But, all the same, it becomes pertinent to ask: what would be the nature of knowledge or truth from the standpoint of a *Kevalin* (freed soul)? What would be the absolute and unconditioned and undeterred view of reality? From the Jaina point of view is this to be a view of an existential *objective* order of the plural facts in their interrelation of an objective

order, which is to include spectator himself also as objectivity? Is the kavalī view to be the summative totality of all partial views or is it to be an *integrated* unitary view in which the disinction of the partial is completely merged? If the former, the partial and plural views are kept alive at the expense of the *Kevalitva* of the *Kevalin*. If the latter, the *Kavalajñāna* alone becomes the truth and the relative and conditional truths cease to truths on the ultimate analysis. The Jaina seems to eat the cake and have it too. So the Vedantist criticism does not appear to be just 'an expression of personal opinion' as Professor Radhakrishnan has observed<sup>23</sup>. Then, again, the last *naya* in the *saptabhāgi* seems to be the collective view of all the previous, since it combines within itself all the three moments—'asti naasti' and 'avakhyam'. Since there can be no further specification of the knower's stand point, should we take this one as the final and so the view point of the *Kevalin*? Modern critics seem to have missed the vital point of Sankara's criticism (which is also Ramanuja's). The Jaina himself seems to have staggered at that point when he felt that a conjunctive formulation of the positive and the negative moments together makes knowledge itself as inexpressible (*avakhyam*). What kind of judgment or knowledge does this inexpressible indicate? The problem is not whether truth can be manifold, varied and relative to some standpoint. The problem is — how the absolute standpoint, the truth-absolute and whole, can retain all the partial truths without losing itself and its nature as the absolute truth.

If the assemblage of opposite characters in the self-same existential content suggests the absurd (*asambhava*) and the *syadvada* of the Jains stands vitiated on that account, absurdity of a similar nature, also vitiates their claim that the self *atma* is of limited expansity, and proportionate to the body it is supposed to be housed in (B. S. 2.2.34). The Jainas take the *jiva* (their soul-principle) as *coextensive* with the body which is considered by them as real. Now that the body does not have any fixed proportion and is subject to change and modification in course of diverse stages of life—infancy, adulthood, and old age, the *Jiva* also has to be taken as growing, developing and diminishing in relation to various stages of life. Moreover, since the Jainas believe in transmigration, that is, in the *Jiva*'s assuming different forms from life to life as a consequence of acquired merit or demerit, it sounds strange that the *Jiva*-essence once proportionate to a human body fits well into an elephant-body as also in a worm-body in its other births. What is absurd here is the *Jiva*'s shrinking and expanding and assuming diverse forms proportionate to the various modes of changes in the body and yet retaining its self-identity. The bodies all become different, but the *jiva* is supposed to remain the same identical individual in different stages, although under-going mutapious and changes like the body with which it is associated. If the *Jiva* is taken as of determinate and limited dimension, (*akāśanyam*) one must admit also the possibility of new addition to, as also partial elimination of, its dimension in different stages of its existence. This is plainly absurd. This also makes it non-eternal, mutable and perishable like other perishable things of common knowledge. What is particularly baffling in this Jaina view is that the *Jiva*, which *ex hypothesi*, is of infinite number of parts—*anantavayava* comes to occupy and adjust itself in bodies, tiny as also very big, in different births. The question here is — does the *Jiva* of infinite parts occupy the same space or not? If it does not then, since its infinite parts cannot be accommodated within a limited body either the *Jive* is not of limited dimension or some of its parts must be assumed as getting clipped and lost. If it does, then its infinite parts must be capable of shrinking within an atomic form and, therefore, the *Jiva* is to be partless and atomic in dimension and not proportionate to the size of the body as is the Jaina claim. These inconsistencies also render the concept of the *Jiva* absurd. How can an entity having infinite parts have a limited dimension proportionate to the size of its body which latter may be as big as that of an elephant and again, as tiny as that of a worm in different births?

Nor can the view of the Jiva having dimension proportionate to its body be defended on the supposition that it has natural capacity of expanding or shrinking itself by turn, suiting the dimension of its habitat. The reason is - under such supposition the Jiva will be mutable, sometimes acquiring greater proportion, sometimes again, losing existent proportion, and it will be impossible to determine how much of the Jiva is its *real self*, and how much, again, is *adventitious* and so, not its true Self. How can the Jaina, then, meaningfully formulate its doctrine of bondage and release of the self where the self-hood of the Jiva becomes so indeterminate and variable? Mutability of its dimension, sometimes big and sometimes small by turn, will render the Jiva inconstant and perishable (2.2.35) and this will make a nonsense of the Jaina doctrine of liberation. It, on the other hand, it is maintained that the increase in the dimension is by certain addition *ab extra* it will have to be shown how the outside realm of matter can contribute towards, addition or growth of soul-essence in the Jiva, and how again, the realm of matter can conserve and appropriate to itself the soul-essence which is left of by jive when assuming a smaller form.

The Jainas admit the dimension of the soul, at the time of release, as immutable and eternal. Now, if the dimension of the soul at the earlier and the middle stages be the dimension of the same identical entity, of the self-same soul, it is really unintelligible how the soul or Jiva at the earlier stage and middle stage can be changeful, how it can have a dimension proportionate to its body (2.2.36). These are baffling incongruities which render the Jain view untenable.

The remaining *sūtras* or Adhyaya 2, *pada* 2 are in refutation of the various theistic (rather deistic) metaphysics, insofar as they have attempted to formulate or theoretical and causal explanation of the known order of existence. The *sūtras* seem to be critically examining the group of views which have historically appeared as the *Saiva* or *Pasupata darsan*, the *Naya-vaisesika* and the *Sankhya-Yoga* theism, and the *Bhagavata darsan*, particularly of the *pancaratra* tradition in Vaisnavism. All these accounts have some common features as they have also some distinctive features of their own. The *sūtras* 2.2.37-2.2.41, as Sankara himself has pointed out<sup>14</sup>, argue against all those views which make a clear distinction between *nimitta karana* (efficient or instrumental cause) and *prakṛti-karana* or *upadana karana* (material cause), and take God as the supreme rational principle and the Providence of the world-order. The *sūtras* 2.2.42-45 examine such views which, like the Vedānta, combine the efficient and the material cause into one supreme principle but considerably deviate from the Vedāntic account, and in that way, become self-stultifying and paradoxical. Sankara regards the views under both categories as non—Vedic in origin, and so, as conceptual formulations and therefore, attempts at a logical refutation of them all.

The concept of '*pati*' in the *Saiva* or the *Pasupata* view introduces the supreme principle in the role of an overlord or superintending agency only (*kevaladhīsthātṛisvara*). In *sūtras*, such as, 1.4.23, 1.4.29, the *sūtrakāra* has already defended the view of Brahman both as the material and the efficient cause of the manifest order. The *sūtra* 2.2.37, therefore, is in refutation of the view which regards God only as the rule and the controller of the world-order, and not also its material cause. The ground of refutation is that such a view is vitiated by discrepancies (*a-samānjāsamī*). We have one form of this view in the *Sankhya-yoga*. God is conceived there as the supreme *purusa* (*purusa viśeṣa*) in distinction from the other *Purusas* and their co-lateral material principle *prakṛti*, guiding and regulating them all from outside in their courses. Another form of this view is found in the *Pasupata* cult in which the supreme lord as the efficient cause is conceived as superintending the *Jivas* (*pasu*) in getting release from the fetters (*pasa*) of materiality with which they, as they are in themselves, are enmeshed. We have another variation of the view of God as the efficient cause in the *Nyaya-vaisesika* formulation of the theory. The *sūtra*, Sankara sees, is in repudiation of all these views taken collectively.



The finite creatures, the *Jivas*, are found in diverse grades and orders – some in excellent positions, some not so well-off, and others in very miserable conditions. If God has ordained all these as the Providence, God has to be conceived as ungod-like, partial and prejudiced in his treatment of these creatures, and so, just like ordinary creatures, being motivated or affected by feelings of likes and dislikes. The stereotyped defence that God's dispensation in such cases is dependent on acquired merits or demerits of the individuals and their actions for which the individuals themselves are responsible, cannot work. The reason is that God being the supreme *regulator*, will then, be both determining and be determined in the exercise of His powers by the *nature* of the actions of individuals. This, then, involves the fallacy of inter-dependence (*itaretarasraya*), a variety of *patito principii*. As this relation of mutual dependance between God as the supreme regulator of whatever happens on one hand, and the individual's actions on the basis of which God adjudicates reward or punishment, on the other, obtains at the initial stage of creation as it obtains at any given subsequent stage, this difficulty cannot be escaped by stretching it into an infinite process of regress. It will really be getting into a blind alley without a solution. Nobody ever acts or guides others without some motive of his own. So, God becomes just like human beings. If, on the other hand, God is regarded as indifferent (*udāsina*) as the Yoga system might maintain, contradiction cannot be escaped, since, no indifferent principle can be a regulator and an efficient cause. The idea of God as the supreme regulator (*nijamaku*) and dispenser of human destiny and the idea of the individual's personal responsibility for actions done by them seem to clash, and it is not possible to reconcile the two.

Moreover, God, the *purusas* and the *materia prima* (*pradhana*), being three *distinct* substances, it is not possible to conceive any determining relation among them<sup>127</sup>. Among distinct and separate substances the only possible relation is one of contact or conjunction (*samyoga*). But, since here all the substances are conceived as infinite and all pervasive, such a relation, which is invariably between parts and physical, cannot be there. Nor can the relation be one of inherence (*samavaya*), which can obtain only between a substance and an attribute, or between two entities, one of which is absolutely dependent and *inseparable* from the other. Nor can the relation be taken as causal, that is, as between a cause and its effect. The reason is whether the cosmic order can be looked upon as the effect of God through a requisite relationship of the these substances has remained an unsettled point and so, not yet proved or established (*asiddhatvat*). The Vedantins establish this relation on the basis of scriptural authority<sup>128</sup>. The theorists here cannot look for that kind of support and have to draw upon known instances (*dṛṣṭāntavalena*), which are non-existent in this case. The claim that the literature they draw upon is as authoritative as the revealed scriptures, cannot also be sustained, since authoritativeness of their literature will be dependent on its author being omniscient (*sarvajnu*) and omniscience of the author will, again, depend upon the authoritativeness and infallibility of the literature in question. This is a patent case of the fallacy of mutual dependence *anyonyasraya*. Thus, the relation between the Deity on the one hand, and the world of *Jivas* or *purusas* and the world of matter on the other, seems inconceivable on their suppositions.

Nor can these theorists provide for a suitable objective support, a material matrix, for the Deity to fashion in the way a potter is found to design various things out of clay. The reason is there is no similarity between the mud or clay we know and the *pradhana* or material *prima* envisaged in the theory. The *pradhana* unlike clay is invisible and is also destitute of all sensible properties (2.2.39).

Nor can the *pradhana* be looked upon as an instrument (*karana*) of working. That supposition falls through, since there can be such working with instrument only when the agent strives for realisation of some ends for his own sake, when he looks for enjoyment or gratification of some kind.



But, under the circumstance prevailing here, the Deity cannot have such purpose (2.2.40). It may be noted that Sankara is considerably undecided as to the significance and relevance of these two *sūtra* 2.2.39 and 2.2.40. It may be that Badarayana in exploring the kinds of relation that may be reasonably supposed to obtain between the lord (*pati*) on one hand, and the realm of *Jivas* and matter, on the other, mentions two additional alternatives, such as, matter being looked upon as the objective support (*adhisthana*) and again, as the instrument (*karana*), just to show that even such alternative suppositions do not work.

The *sūtra* 2.2.41 argues that the supreme lord, God turns out to be either limited and determined, and therefore, non-eternal, or non-omniscient (*a-sarvajña*). The reason is, the theory defends three substantial entities distinct from one another, and yet holds that all the three are co-eternal and infinite (*a-paricchinna*). This is self-discrepant as a notion. When ultimate realities are to be three, they will necessarily determine each other. Since all determined and limited things are non-eternal, so all the three must be taken as non-eternal, and God also must be looked upon in the very same way. If, on the other hand, even the *Jivas* and *pradhana* are to be viewed as without limitation, that is, as not limited and fully comprehended by God, then, God will have to be regarded as of limited wisdom and comprehension and not as omniscient. The difficulty here is due to the admission of three kinds of infinities, which are not diverse aspects of the one infinite, and so, not non-different. In other words, the difficulty is due to the admission of three infinities, which are co-eval, again, *distinct* and separate.

The *sūtra* 2.2.42 and the remaining *sūtras* of the *pada* are intended to refute the theistic doctrine as presented by the Bhagavata School. This school is not deistic and does not look upon the supreme principle as wholly transcendent. It is real theism insofar as it defends the view of the Absolute as both immanent and transcendent. Here the material cause and the efficient cause are united into one absolute principle, which is then taken as the one cause of the manifest order. This Absolute, the school calls Vasudeva or Narayana. The Advaita Vedānta is not disposed to quarrel over names. Nor does it feel keen to debate on the propriety of the means of release or communion with the ultimate, advocated by these theists such as, *abhigamana*, *upadana*, *Jya*, *svadhyaya* and *yoga* of their conception what the Vedānta feels disposed to debate about is the acceptability of the causal account of the *Jiva*, the mind and the ego as having *successively originated* as evolves from the absolute ground of their conception. This grossly causal account does not regard the evolutes as phenomenal and apparent modifications of the one unitary principle. On the contrary, it seeks to derive the ego from the mind, the mind from the *Jiva*, and the *Jiva* from the Absolute which does not accord with the *śruti* versions and cannot also be defended by independent arguments. The supreme principle, according to the Bhagavata school, has four *successive* figurations called 'vyūhas'. These are *vasudevavyūha*, *sankarsanavyūha*, *padyumnavyūha* and *Aniruddhavyūha*. The first one is, according to it, the Absolute self (*paramatman*), the second the *Jiva*, the third mind and the fourth ego. What the Vedānta objects to is the view that the *Jiva originates* (*Utpadyate*) from the Supreme in the way that an effect originates from its cause and that it is not the same as the Supreme principle under limitation or adjunct (*upadhi*).

What *originates* from something else is necessarily impermanent and perishable. If the *Jiva*, as conceived in the Bhagavata account, *originates* from the supreme principle as an emergent product or evolute, it is to merge ultimately in its cause and disappear. We cannot, on this theory, then speak about liberation in the sense of self-realisation. Release will mean rather total elimination (*pravilaya*) or self-annihilation. Now, this is a point on which the Advaita Vedānta cannot make any compromise.

Liberation is to stand for self-fulfilment and not self-extinction. This self-fulfilment becomes possible when the Jiva realises itself as the supreme principal itself by getting over its false sense of self-distinction or separate identity due to certain adventitious factor (*upadhi*), which ultimately disappears. The logical necessity for defending such a view is that the Jiva will have to be conceived as unborn unproduced that is, as not having originated at all but having been the same as the supreme ground, only identionally and adventitiously distinguished from that ground. The *sutakara* has himself rejected the notion of origination (*Utpatti*) of the Jiva, of the individual self, is a subsequent *sutra*, such as, B. S. 2.3.17. The Bhagavat view, therefore, fails to provide for liberation or release in any significant way. An emergent effect cannot be significantly described as reaching up to *Karanaprapti*) its cause and being *maintained* as that cause, since, being and emergent evolute, it is bound to disappear and so to, lose itself completely in its cause.

The Bhagavata view that an instrument such as mind originates from an agent (Jiva) – that Pradyumna, the mind originates from Sankarsana, the individual, or that Aniruddha, the ego originates from Pradyumna, the mind, has no basis in the *sruti* text. There is no support for this sort of causal relation where an instrument originates from an agent in our common experience also (2.2.43).

If the preceding four-vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are not taken in the above sense but as distinct divinities with unlimited knowledge, power and vigour, even then it will be inexplicable how one such divinity originates from another. Moreover, what is the use of supposition of plural divinities when the supposition of one such divinity would have been enough. Then, again, if the four discussed above be only four-fold configuration of the same reality, it is not intelligible why the number of such configurations should be limited to only four and should not be infinite (B. S. B. 2.2.44).

Moreover, there are other inconsistencies also (2.2.45). There is confusion between the qualities and the qualified (*gunin*) – virtues, powers etc., are exalted into the status of persons and personalities in the various texts of the Pancaratra tradition. There is disparagement (and belittling) of Vedic tradition also in the protagonists' bid for extolling the importance of their own literature. So, a theistic view like that of the Bhagavata cult also merits repudiation.

## References

- 1 The end of B. S. B. 1.1.1, and B. S. B. 1.1.2
- 2 'Sa vidya ya vimuktaye' Gita – Also see B. S. B. 2.1.27 ('Tatpratipattau phalavagamat' This verification-process is indicated by Sankara as consisting in 'realise ability of the supreme and, such as, absolute freedom and immortality, which then is to be the criterion.
- 3 'ekavijnanena sarvavijnanam sampadyate' B. S. B. 2.1.14 also Chandogya Part II 6th Khanda.
- 4 mahajanaparigritani yuktigadatvasambhavena sarvajnahhasitatvatca ' B. S. B. 2.2.1
- 5 B. S. B. 1.1.5 'sankhyadaystu parinisthitavastu pramanantara-gamyamaveti manyaimanah pradhanadini karanantoranyanumimanastatpara-tayaiva vedantevakyaṁ yojayanti'
- 6 B. S. B. 1.1.2 'Indriya-visayatvena sambandhagrahanat' 'Karyamatramevatugrhyamana. Kimanena kenacidva sambandhamiti na sakyam nisectum'
- 7 B.S.B. 2.1.11
- 8 Ibid. 1.4.28 'Sa ca karyakaranananyatvabhyatvabhyupagamat pratyasaṁsa Vedantavadesya. ...'
- 9 Ibid. 'Atah pradhanamallanivarhananya-yenatidisati-ctena pradhanakaranavadapratishedhanyayakatapena

sarve' anvadikarannavadah api pratisiddhatay vyakhyataveditavyah. tesamapi pradhanavada  
sahdavaacchadbavirodhitvat ceti'

- 10 See sutras I 16-I 1 22. All the *sutras* of the first *adhyaya*, *pada* I beginning with the fifth *sutra* seem to indicate the various criteria of the primal ground of the world-order according to the *srutis*. The *sutras* of the other *padas* of the first *adhyaya* seem to corroborate the same issue.
- 11 See particularly B. S. B. 2 I 27 'na ceyam parinamasrutib parinamapratipadanartha, tatpratipattau phalanavagamat'
- 12 Cf. 'Brahmapuccham pratistha' in Sankara's elaboration of B. S. I 1 19.
- 13 B. S. B. 1 4-1. 'prakaranat. parisesatcca'
- 14 B. S. 1 4 1
- 15 In spite of the Vedanta Sūtras and in spite of what Sankara says in the commentary of Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, the Gita we know, repeat some categories of the Sankhya in many places such as the three *gunas*. But as regards the main items such as, 'avyakta' 'mahat' and 'purusa' the criticisms of the *sutras* seem to be valid, since unlike the Sankhya the *upadana* and *atmata karana* are united in the Gita under our principle. So there is really no support for the Sankhya *smriti*.
- 16 B. S. B. 1 1 5 'Pradhanadini karanantaranyanumimanasiat paralayaiva vedantavakyani yojayanti'
- 17 B. S. B. 1 4 1 'prakarat parisesacca', 'Jadevam urvaparatocanayam nasyatra parakalpitā ya pradhanasyavakasa' *Ibid.*
- 18 B. S. B. 1 4 1, 'Na ceyam Kasmin cit rudha' 'A yugikaivat anyasmin api suksme duraksya ca prayujyate', See also B. S. 1 42
- 19 B. S. B. *Ibid.*
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 'Na hi asvasthanam gam pasyan asvoyamityamudho' dhyavasyati B. S. B. 1 4 1
- 22 B. S. 1 4 3
- 23 B. S. 1 4 4.
- 24 B. S. 1 4 5
- 25 B. S. 1 4 6.
- 26 Sri Bhasya 1 4. 9-10
- 27 B. S. B. 1 4 11
- 28 *Ibid.*, 1 4 12
- 29 *Ibid.* 1 4 23
- 30 *Ibid.*, 1 4 24 and 1 4 25.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 1 4 28.
- 32 Atah pradhanamattanivarhananyayenatidrisati ..... B. S. B. 1 4 28.
- 33 As against the current western view that metaphysics is the product of 'quandary responses of some kind, or is due to arbitrary up-grading of some of the concepts used in our language, the Advaita traces it to some experiential basis which is capable of verification. See the nature of metaphysics.
- 34 'Kesancitmandamalinam etanyapi samyagdarsanayopadeyanitya peksha. ityatatadasaratopapadanaya praayate'. B. S. B. 2 2 1

35. B. S. 2.1.2. 'Itaresanacanupalabdho'
36. *Ibid* 'A- lokavedaprasiddhat tu mabadadinam sasthanvandriyarthasta na smrtiravakalpate'
37. B. S. 2.1.3. 'Etena yogah pratyukteh'
38. Kant -critique of Pure Reason.
39. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja – The Sankhyakarika of *Isvara* Krishna, pp. xvi and 32.
40. B. S. B. 2.2.1. 'racananupathesca hetornacetanam jagatkaranamanumatavyam bhavahi Anyayadyan upapattah ceti 'ca' sabdena hetoh a-siddhim samuccinoti' disproves Dr. Raja's contention.
41. See Sankhyakarika Slokas 15 and 16 in the original and vicaspati's commentary on them
42. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja is mistaken to take the word as 'parinama' in the place of 'parimanat' of the text. See also B. S. B. 2.2.1
43. Dr. C. D. Sharma is mistaken to take the word as 'Karyatah' in the place of 'Saktitah'. His critical survey of Indian Philosophy, p. 154 also footnotes.
44. B. S. B. 2.2.1 'Na hi bahyadhyatmikanam bhedanam sukhaduhkha mohatmakatayanvaya upapadyate'
45. 'Anvayadyanupapattah ceti 'Ca' – sabdena hetorasiddhi samuccinoti'. B. S. B. 2.2.1
46. 'yady drstantabalena evaitatnirupyete, nacetanam loke cetananadhixistitam svatantram kincidvisatapumsarathanirvartanasamarthan vikaran viracayet drstam', B.S. B. 2.2.1.
47. 'Tadva pradhanasyapi cetanantaradhixistitatvaprasanga. B. S. B. 2.2.1
48. Cf. B. S. B. 1.1.2. 'Karyamatrameva grhyamanam. Kimanyena kenacid va sambaddhamiti no sakyam niscetum'
49. See Bhamati B. S. B. 2.2.1
50. The actual expression 'preksapurvanirmitanam' has been slightly amended to suit the exposition. See B. S. B. 2.2.4 last sentence.
51. B. S. B. 1.1.2. 'Nanumanopanyasartham.. '
52. Dr. R. Das apparently has made a complete mess of the Sankara's Philosophy. See his Introduction to Sankara (Published by firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya India, pp XIX-XXVII.
53. 'Na vastu vikalpyate' B. S. B. 1.1.2, 'Jnanam tu pramana janyam, pramanam tu yathabhutavastuvishayam' B.S.B. 1.1.4
54. B. S. B. 2.1.27
55. *Ibid.*, 2.2.2
56. 'Na hi mrdadayo... anadgustguta visistakaryabhimukhapravrttayo drsyante' B. S. B. 2.2.2.
57. 'Na brumo yasminnacetane pravrttir drsyate na tasya seti, bhavatu tasyaiva sa. Sapi cetanaubhavati iti brumahi. Tadbhava bhavat, tadabhava ebhavat. B.S. B. 2.2.2.
58. There are two more illustrations used by Sankara in the context of B. S. 2.2.2. Those two are also illustrations of unmoved mover but not of any conscious principle. The magnet moving iron without moving and the sensible qualities, themselves in active, stirring up activity in the sense- organs. These are to be taken within the context intended.
59. 'Dhenvaiva hyupayuktam tmadi ksiribhavati, na prahina man aduhadyupayuktam va'. B. S. B. 2.2.5.
60. See Karika verse 21 'purusasya darsanartham kaivalyartham tatha pradhanasya etc'
61. ' itatah pradhanam purusasyartham sadhayitum pravaartata itiyam pratiyna hiyeta ' B.S.B. 2.2.6.

- 62 B S B 2.2.6.
- 63 *Ibid.* 2.2.7
- 64 B. S. B. 2.2.2
- 65 It can be seen also that in the first analogy both the factors are conscious agents and in the second analogy both are unconscious and for proper adjustment, dependent on some extraneous conscious agent.
- 66 B. S. B. 2.2.7 'Purvavacca ihapi arthabhavo vikalpayitavyah'.
- 67 B.S.B. 2.2.8
- 68 Sankara seems to have the Karika argument for Pradhana or Abhyatitha from 'Karya-Karanavibhaga and avibhaga' Stated in Karika Sloka 15 in view.
- 69 B. S. 2.1.10., 2.1.29.
- 70 See B. S. 2.1.13., 2.1.33., 2.3.7., 2.3.25., 3.3.30., etc.
71. *Ibid*
- 72 B. S. 2.2.12 'Ubhayathapi na karmaastadabhabah'
- 73 B. 2.2.13 'Jatasca tasya tasyanonyah sambandhah kalpayitavyah iti anavastha prasajyeta'
- 74 Vaisesika sutras 4.1.1., 4.1.4., and 4.1.6.
- 75 B. S. B. 2.2.15 'Na ca sabdantargavivagaranatreka kasyacidarthasya prasiddhirbhavati'
- 76 'Ghrtakathinyavilayanavat murtyavasthavitayanenapi vinasa upapadyate' B S B 2.2.15
- 77 Even supposing that the colour of cloth is equi-spatial with the colour of the threads and the cloth is equi-spatial with the constituent threads which makes the relation of Samyoga redundant, the equi-spatiality of the threads and their colour will have to be first established.
- 78 "Itha sambandhinoreva sambandhisabdapratiyogavyatirekena samyogasamavayasabdapratiyogarthatvam, na vyatirikta vastvastitvena B. S. B. 2.2.17 The point is readily graspable if we consider if 'being a Brahmin' or 'being a father' is anything additional to Devadatta. Are not these the same Devadatta spoken of by other names, not by the name which related to his substantive self? So conjunction, inherence etc. are other names of the conjoined and the inherent
- 79 Cf. Tarkasamgraha Ch. I' Antyam Karyarupam'
- 80 B. S. 2.2.18.
81. History of Indian Philosophy Vol. 1, p. 618
- 82 B. S. B. 2.2.23
- 83 Cf. The Nyaya Vaisesika view- 'Saddagunakamjakasam etc' tarkasamgraha Cf. I
- 84 Insofar as these Buddhists call themselves Sarvastivadvadins.
- 85 B.S.B. 2.2.25.
- 86 Cf. B.S.B. 2.2.25 'Yada hi lokaprasiddhah padarthah pariksakaina parigrihyate tada svapaksasiddhih parapaksadosova ubhayamapyucyamanam pariksakanam atmanasca yatharthatvena na buddhisantanamarohati'
- 87 B S B 2.2.26,
- 88 *Ibid*
- 89 avyupagamamapahnuvanti vinasika sarvo loka akutikriyate' B S.B. 2.2.26.

- 90 B.S.B. 2.2.27
- 91 Enjoined by scriptural injunctives – *codana*.
- 92 B.S. B. 1.1.4. 'kevalacodanajanyatvat kriyāiva tu sa puruṣatantra ca'
- 93 It can be seen the Berkeley does not go to the extreme to equate his 'idea' with the perception of it. He denies its extramental existence but does not look upon the content as a projection of externalisation of the cognition as a mental process.
- 94 Transition from Sautrantika realism to yogacara idealism, from Lockean realism to Berkelyan idealism, had this alleged difficulty as its ground.
- 95 See Pancapadika.
- 96 'Codanajanya' and 'codanatantra' are not synonyms. The Mimamsa regards the vedas as *svārtha* (self valid) and so, dharma-janya also as that.
- 97 Pancapadika p. 93
- 98 B.S.B. 1.1.1. Bhavyasca Dharma Jinjasyo na jñanakata asti etc'
- 99 'Na hi ayam sarvapramāṇaprasiddha lokasya vyavahāṇanyat tattvamandhigamya sakyate apahnotum etc'
- 100 B.S. 2.2.26.
101. See a dṛṣṭasābhāya.
102. Brhmaranyaka.
- 103 B.S.B. 2.2.31. Last sentence.
104. 'Na copalabhyamanasyāvabhāva bhavītumarhati B.S.B. 2.2.28.
- 105 '... Nāhamayam bravimi na kancidarthaṃupalabha iti' Kintu upalabhati vyatiriktaṃ nopalabha iti bravimi, B.S. B. 2.2.25
- 106 'Na hi kascidupalabdhimeva stambh aḥ kudyancetyupalabhate' B. S. B. 2.2.28.
- 107 B.S. B. 2.2.28. '... Yathānubhavam tattvam abhyupagaccha dbhiḥ bahirevabh asata iti yuktam abhyupaganatum. na tu behirvat avabhasata iti'
108. '... bahyasyarthasyasambhavadbahirvadabhasata ityadhyavasitam B. S. B. 2.2.28.
109. Johnson, it is said, proved the existence of a real stone by Kicking it and thus refuting Berkeley
- 110 'Apica dvayojñanayoh purvottarakalayoḥ svasambadanenaivopakṣin a yoritaretare-grahyagrah akalvanupapattiḥ' B. S. B. 2.2.28.
- 111 atyantaviruddham svatmanikriyamabhyupagacchasi aviruddhantu lokaprasiddham svatmayatīnīkṛtena vijñānena bahyorthaḥ anubhuyata iti necchasi, aho paṇḍityam mahaddarsitam ' B. S. B. 2.2.26.
- 112 *Ibid*
- 113 Sankara should have been less abstruse and laconic in his explanation how both the contentions of the subjectivist Buddhists are without any substance- tadubhayamapyasat B. S. B. 2.2.28. Vacaspati does not seem to the point. see Bhamati
- 114 'Saksi-pratyayayosca svabhava-vaismānyat upalabdhyaupalabhya bhavopapattib svaśāntisiddhasya ca saksino sprantyakhyeyatvat'. B. S. B. 2.2.28.
115. '... a-pramāṇagamyam vijñānavagantīrkaṃityuktam syat srasghana madhyastha-pradīpasahasravat', B. S. B. 2.2.28



116. 'Na ca yo yasy svato dharmo na sambhavati, so'nyasya sadharmat tasya sambhavisyati' B. S. B. 2.2.29
117. 'Na caivam jagatitupalabdhm vastu stambhadikam kasyancidapyavasthayam badhyate' B. S. B. 2.2.29
118. 'Na hi badhyameva badhaku bhavitum arhati' Bhamati 2.2.29
119. This would be supporting the Yogacara position.
120. 'Na hi nam sarvapramanaprasiddho lokasya vyavaharo'nyat tattvamadhigomya sakyate apahnotum', 2.2.31
121. B. S. 2.1.6.
122. B. S. B. 2.2.33. 'Mattonmattavat anuypadeyavacanum syat'
123. 'syudasti syannastityadivikalpopanipataadamurdharanatmakataiva syat' B. S. B. 2.2.33
124. 'Avyaktavyasecinnoccyeran', B. S. B. 2.2.33.
125. Radhakrishnan History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I, p. 304.
126. See commentary on B. S. B. 2.2.42
127. B. S. 2.2.38
128. B. S. B. 2.2.38. 'Napi anya karyagamyah sambandhah sekyate kalpayitum, karya-karanabhavasyavndhyapyasiddhatvat'

## The Advaita Metaphysics Through the Brahmastras

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Our treatment in the previous chapter has been more detailed than was ordinarily necessary for a thematic presentation of Sankara's Advaita philosophy. For instance, it was not absolutely necessary to proceed *sutra-wise* when elaborating upon the Vedanta refutation of rival metaphysical systems. Yet the detailed treatment serves one very important purpose. The various arguments, logical and otherwise, used in the polemical treatment of the rival metaphysics, go, to a considerable extent, to throw light upon the logical basis of the Advaita metaphysics, developed and defended in course of the *sutras*, as a whole and Sankara's commentaries on them. It was felt necessary to keep alive these polemical discussions in order to show that the Advaita metaphysics, which this commentary-work aims at working out in the light of the *sutras* and Sankara's commentaries on them, remains consistent with Sankara's criticisms of the alien metaphysics. There cannot be one kind of logical consideration for one's own system and a different kind for other systems.

It can be seen that on the question of the relation (in whatever way this relation is metaphysically construed) of Brahman to the express order of cosmic pluralities, the Advaita thesis has been that the ultimate ground of the world-order we know, has to be taken both as the *upadana kaana* (material cause) and the *nimittakarana* (efficient cause) combined into one<sup>1</sup>. The Sankhya has been repudiated and dismissed on the ground that its *materia prima*, being an unconscious principle cannot be self-propelled or self-motivated *sva-pravrtta*)<sup>2</sup> and that the requirement of conscious and purposive direction in its evolution and involution cannot be successfully met by its admission of a *separate* conscious principle, such as *purusa*, operating from, and regulating from without<sup>3</sup>. The insistence, therefore, was for a ground which combines within itself both the material and the efficient principle. The Vaisesika and other deistic systems (ordinarily called theistic systems) like the Yoga, the pasupaia, the Nyaya and others are, again, repudiated on the ground that these err in the opposite way by holding the supreme causal principle as only *efficient* and quite apart from the material cause which, insofar as it is unconscious, is subordinate yet distinct and separate. The Bhagavata theistic although it combines the material and the efficient principles together is also disfavoured. There are two main reasons for this, as Sankara has pointed out<sup>4</sup>. One cardinal error of this view has been that, contrary to the Vedantic view elaborated in B.S. 2.3.17 that the finite selves, or the so called plural selves, cannot be regarded as having emanated as emergent products from the supreme ground, this theism regards them as emergent evolutes, and so, as non-eternal (*anitya*). The *sutra* 2.2.42 combats and rejects the very notion of '*utpatti*' (new origination) in respect of the cosmic multiplicities

of any form. The Vedanta view, therefore, does not admit a metaphysical division between its categories of cause and effect, – the world of effects, being simply a way of regarding the cosmic multiplicities which are metaphysically indistinguishable from, their so called causal ground, and substantially non-different (*ananya*)<sup>5</sup>. The other error, although not specifically pointed out, is that, from the very nature of the case, liberation or final release can only be the work of knowledge, and not of the means defended in the Bhagavata cult, such as, *abhisamana*, *upadana*, *ejya*, *svadhyaya* and *yoga*, pursued devotedly for hundreds of years<sup>6</sup>, although these may well be auxiliaries.

As for the two heterodox systems—Buddhism and Jainism, there are logical discrepancies of a different kind. Regarding the Buddhistic view, Sankara's observation in connection with the Madhyamika Sarvasunyavada, although rather cryptical, is of great moment. It is not possible to deny unceremoniously the testimony of given experiences, not possible to foist upon the given experiences any new and ingenious construction in the absence of an uncontradicted experience of some special nature<sup>7</sup>. The outer order of objects of experience and the inner order of the experiencer and the diverse mental states are *never experienced* as absolutely momentary. The external objects may have diverse aspects or qualities. They may also be subject to growth and decay. The internal states of the mind may be also changeable and shifting. But their *absolute momentariness* is no fact of conventional knowledge or experience. Nor do the people in general react to them in their conventional behaviour in that way. That there is nothing stable or enduring, that everything is absolutely fleeting and momentary, is therefore, no fact of given experience. The view that all are momentary is therefore, an ingenious conceptual construction. The logical plausibility and conceptual adequacy of the view has, therefore, to be tested by reference to the conventionally given experience in the absence of an experience of the other kind. That atoms, stable or fleeting cannot combine automatically, or by themselves, and given rise to the outer order of physical objects, that any combination as also dissolution requires some conscious and intelligent guidance has been shown in the context of both the Vaisesika and the *sarvastivavada*. *Nirvana* or release is a concern of the empirical individual belonging to the inner order. The *origination* of such an individual (as also of the external objects) has been attempted to be explained by the Buddhists by regarding it as a non-substantial aggregate (*samudaya*) or collocation (*samghata*) of momentary particulars. An attempt has been made to explain away its felt unity and self-identity as an ignorant manipulation. But as the Vedanta criticism has shown, the alleged ignorant manipulation is not a self-explanatory concept, – it presupposes the being of the individual himself as the agent, or as the substantive support<sup>8</sup>. The stock explanation by taking recourse to the idea of an infinite regress of ignorant *samskaras* has been discredited as *andhaparampara* (blind or abortive regress)<sup>9</sup>. The reason is: although an antecedent condition of ignorances may be said to lead up to a subsequent state of similar kind, the series does not contain an explanation how the initial or first state of ignorance can originate in the absence of an individual who is to be the agent or the locus of this ignorance. The very fact of recollection or remembrance of the once perceived, now no longer perceived, also shows that self-identity or unity of the individual can neither be explained on the Buddhistic theory, nor can it be explained away. The various schools of Buddhism have themselves demonstrated the theoretical inadequacies and logical defects of each preceding school, since the succeeding schools have arisen through critical review of the preceding views. The schools of earlier Buddhism who are *sarvastivavadins* cannot consistently explain how both the external and the internal orders can have for their contents existential realities, if all things are really momentary but are experienced as stable or durable wholes. The later schools of Buddhism, again, fail to *explain away*. The external order of objects, as in the Yogacara, or both the internal and external order as in the Madhyamika as mere ignorant constructions. The non-existence of

external objects or their mere projectional character is never apprehended— '*nabhavaḥ upalabdheḥ* ', Their apparent *presentative character*, again, cannot be accounted for except on the supposition of their actual perceptibility as things out there — '*na bhavonupalabdheḥ* '!" The fundamental error of the Buddhist schools, however, lies in their primary assumption that the 'existential' can somehow grow out of non-existence!" Starting initially with this concept of non-being or non-existence in a *relative sense* and contextual meaning, such as, non-existence of an entity in one conventionally known *specific form* (the seed in the sprout, or the sprout in the seed)"', the theorists, next, argue on the basis of its non-existence (*asat-bhava*) in an absolute sense. Thus their faulty extremism is also noticed elsewhere. It is true that things, as we know or experience them, undergo changes. But should we for that reason hold that there is nothing that changes, all that there is, is sheer change? Then, again, from the empirically given fact that there is change, is it not going too far when one holds that everything is momentary? It is the conceptualist's difficulty to explain the phenomenon of change without supposing that the changeable cannot be stable, it must be dying the very next moment after its appearance, must disappear as soon as it appears. But is this not a conceptualistic rendering of the phenomenon of change only, of the outer manifestation of the 'thing', the substance which undergoes modification, and not of the thing or the substance underlying such changes? The idea of change is not intelligible without the concept of changeable *continuity*. This, the Buddhists also admit in their notion of '*santana*'. But how far is this continuum itself intelligible on the assumption that there is nothing that continues except the causal continuity itself, an abstract law of nature itself? This is existence — to define the real in terms of non-being or non-existence in an absolute sense, and to explain the existential as a mere phenomenal appearances, at bottom, a conceptual fiction. Starting given without a root in reality, the Buddhists have attempted to explain it away as a creation of ignorance '*avidya*', simply, out of nothing, may be out of a transcendental void. This is also reflected in their negative formulation of the concept of *mokṣa* or release as *nirvāṇa*, that is, absolute cessation, which materially differs from the Vedantic conception of liberation as realisation of one's true and absolute identity with the immutable all pervading reality, Brahman. The Advaita Vedanta disparages this negativism. It secures logical justification of its own view in its analysis of the very concept of *avidya* or ignorance, is not ignorance taking something as other than what it is not and can never be? Is ignorance the taking of nothing, of a blank void as something? Well, how can there be this taking of nothing as something without there being some one to take it in that way and this some one cannot again be a 'nothing'. If this some one is a 'nothing', then there is no ignorance at all and the entire theory founders in self-contradiction.

The inadequacies of the Jain vies are of a different nature. The Jaina, it can be seen, work out (conceptually) a transcendent order on the model of the given empirical. But unlike the Buddhists, the Jaina believes in the reality and substantivity of both. The transcendent order consists of the same plural facts with their many-sidedness but with certain changes in the dressing and make-up of the Jivas, who may free themselves from the encumbering physical or material elements *pudgala*, which have accrued upon them on account of their unrighteous actions, and which, consequently, hold them down in the scale, and impede their infinite expansivity as also omniscience. The transcendent vision results from certain processes of physical cleansing of the Jiva's person by means of self-mortification in respect of his physical body. The bodiedness *sarīratva* of the Jiva is real, although adventitious, and we must look for some *original sin* (following up a infinite process of regress) to account for it — since *as itself* and in its essential original purity, the Jiva is subject to no limitation what so ever. Ignorance, in the system, is not so much *mis-knowledge* (since there is nothing like that in an absolute sense in their realistic epistemology) as it is wrong doing or mis-conduct. In the

empirically given order, there are many things and many beings, an infinite plurality of them, and each is existentially distinct and separate. In the transcendent order also, there is such infinite plurality of existents – animate and inanimate. The unity or one-ness of the given empirical order is simply a mode of speech, *existentially* and *essentially*, all that we have is a simple *togetherness* of an unlimited many – a position radically opposite to the Advaita position. Taken individually, every existent is many-sided and many-aspected. This is because all our varied knowledges of an existent have to be accommodated as '*nayas*', that is, partial or contextual views, and none is to be rejected absolutely. Truth is, thus, required to maintain itself and defend its claim to be the truth by compromise with all partial views, even with what ordinarily work like errors. This, it does by giving up its claim to be *uniform*, unitary and absolute, and by degenerating into the *multiform*, the *manifold* and the *relative*. Even the so called absolute knowledge (*kevalajnana*) of the Jain conception turns out to be a conjunctive, and therefore, a *loose totality* of the partial truths, – each relative to some stand points conventionally, we speak about things in term of subject-predicate relationship. The subject is *that*, about which we speak, and the *several ways* in which we speak about it being in the predicates. But while speaking, we may speak of a thing in an affirmative way and also negatively. This, on the metaphysical level, seems to have suggested to the Jaina their concepts of the *dravyas* (substances) and the *pariyayas* (modes). This has helped them in developing their view of reality as that which remains permanent and endures *in and through* changes. But what is, on the very face of it, crude and self-stultifying here is, can that which is *negatively* said be made into a predicate intrinsic to any given reality and also be accommodated in the way a positive predicate is accommodated? Then, again, can we combine in the reality all angular views, which are angular only because in none of them the reality itself is presented *as it is* but only as what it *looks like* from particular angles? Is the elephant of the story a totality of a wall-appearance, tree-appearance, snake-appearance-sword appearance and so on? The Jaina seems to be tolerant and accommodating in a wrong way. He accommodates not only the partial but even the contradictories in his scheme of truth and reality but is absolutely intolerant and unaccommodating as far as an absolutist's point of view is concerned. The Advaita Vedanta cannot make any compromise with this relativism which leaves no room for absolutism even as an alternative. This explains the Vehemence of Sanlāra's criticism of the Jaina metaphysics. The criticism has been mainly directed against three *concepts* of the Jaina school. These are (1) that one and the same thing can be the locus of alternative possibilities which are by nature all discrepant (2.2.33), (2) That the self or the soul can have varying sizes and dimensions, proportionate to its (2.2.34), and (3) That the self remains the same and its eternal itself, although, by turns, it increases and decreases in volume, and also undergoes modifications or modal changes of all kinds (2.2.35). Briefly speaking, it is the view of *manifoldness* of reality, *many-wise-ness* of truth, and *infinite modifiability* of what is the same and unperishable, that the Advaita Vedanta considers as aberrations of the intellect, since the very concepts—truth, reality and the self, according to the Vedanta, – lose all assignable sense or meaning in such exposition. To be real is to be self-identical and *not* self-discrepant, to be true is to be uniform, *not* multiform, and to be the self is to be the unvaried, the immutable, *not* to be evermutable and changing. The Jaina, as Sankara finds him, is guilty of violating all canons of logic and significant language.

The twin claims, sustaining the Advaita Vedanta as a transcendental metaphysics, are (a) that it is experience based. Although this experience is of a very extra ordinary nature, vouchsafed by the revealed authority of the Upanisads which under the circumstance is however, and indirect source of knowledge, and (b) that the Vedanta doctrine besides being self-consistent is also free from opposition of logical reason. In addition to the afore said, another ground or condition how shows

itself. It is that the Advaita Vedanta view of truth, its version of the *real* state of affairs, also explains, *instead of explaining away*, how the conventionally known order of *given* experience may be equally *given* as that, and in what way, this dual presentation of reality may be reconciled in the Absolute one without hindrance or opposition. What is more characteristic is that a proper logical explanation of the conventionally known order is to be found in the other and the non-conventional order, since the former has to be understood as the 'appearance of the latter, which is the Reality, or the real view of things. That there is no real antinomy of the conventionally habitual, otherwise called the *vyavaharika*, and the *Paramarthika* in the Advaita, as monitored by Sankara himself, will now be shown in the light of the *sutras* and Sankara's commentaries on them as a whole. It will be also shown that there may have been some unfortunate lapses in the interpretation of the Vedanta of the Vedanta of Sankara by the classical commentators of the two principal schools, due more to their wealth of learning than anything else. Too much learning and erudition may also prove dangerous and may be the harbinger of distortion.

There is no short-cut route to Reality and truth. This route runs by way of the appearances and the untruth, and there are at first to be detected and exposed as what they are, that is, *as appearances* and *untruth*. A dash to Reality and Truth straightway has been discouraged by the Upanisads<sup>14</sup> as more blind and erratic. Right understanding, according to them, consists in grasping the Reality as its appearances, the Truth and the untruth, together in the appropriate way, and it is only when this is done that there cannot be a distortion and so, the missing the mark. Neither the Brahmasutras themselves, nor the commentary of Sankara on them can be said to have preached any form of acosmism or illusionism. The so called world-appearance, the cosmic pluralities of things and beings are not to be looked upon as mere inventions of human aberrations, as manipulations of human ignorance. Nor are these like the dream-images or fantasies of hallucination. Has not Sankara himself said as much in the context of his refutation of the Yogacara and the Madhyamika<sup>15</sup>? Sankara has not employed one kind of logic in refutation of rival metaphysical views and a different logic to advance the claims of his Advaitic protestations. There can be no *apriori* decisions in respect of what exists and what does not. What is a possibility and what is absolutely impossible and absurd<sup>16</sup>. The issue is decidable only on the basis of what is amenable to a *pramana* and what is not amenable to any *pramana* at all. Can it be that all the accredited *pramanas* go to prove that the manifest order of pluralities is just a mirage or a fantasy? Some of our elders seem to have taken rather a too hasty decision in the matter, and consequently, have given a distorted view of Sankara Vedanta. In the context of refutation of the Yogacara, Sankara puts the matter in a guarded way. Those who follow the guidances of given knowledge or experience feel towards the objective order as *given, as it were*, and *not as given like an objective order*<sup>17</sup>. This accords well with the upanisadic statement—'where there is a duality, as it were, there and sees another etc'. But 'where everything has become just one's own self, then whereby and whom would one see? etc'<sup>18</sup>. The word '*yatra*' (where) indicates that there are two ways in the apprehension of Reality: as one facing another and as one finding one's own self. And this becomes because the circumstances, the states of affair become such. None of these two modes of apprehension is without a grounding in reality. The view that while one, the second, is grounded in reality, the other, the first is absolutely rootless, that the dual or plural way of manifestation does not have a mooring in the nature of reality at all, that it is entirely a delusion wrought out by the diseased human mind is neither confirmed by the *sruti*-texts nor is it amenable to reason. Are there two substantive facts, Brahman and the diseased human mind? Is it not more rational or logical to hold that the human mind takes reality as an outer fact because reality itself works in the way of posing itself as substantive pluralities and the human mind or the human



individual himself is one among such plural postures ? It may be that while one phase is the reality-way, the other phase is appearance-way. But is it not absurd to hold that reality cannot and do not have even appearances, that the world-appearance will have to be traced to an altogether different source outside reality and that it is *not* true that Brahman is all and everything and there is no negation of Brahman, the reality, any where ? Is the *sutra* '*Janmadyasya yatah*' a misrepresentation of the Advaita Reality ?

What, let us recall, has been the basis of the Vedanta refutation of systems like the Sankhya, the Nyaya-vaishesika, the Yoga, the Pasupata and the Bhagavata ? The basis of refutation has been that while some of these systems take the fundamental ground of the express order as the material cause only, others take it as the efficient cause only, and the Bhagavata system, while combining the material and the efficient causes into one principle, errs in two ways—first, in regarding the empirical individual or the individual Self as an evolute or emergent product, and second, in showing the emergence of the Jiva, the mind and the successively, one from another or from intermediate causes and not all from the primal ground, the several differentiations of the one fundamental reality. How far a causal explanation in term of *ground* and *consequent* is metaphysical sound or secure, we shall not consider at present. We cannot reach the top, the apex, without starting from the axis. To understand properly the express order of plurality, we have to look for what could be their ground, absolute and final. While doing this, the Vedanta has rejected the explanations advanced by the Sankhya and the other systems. Two issues arise here (a) What has been the ground of this rejection? (b) How is that rejection relevant if the world-plurality is *not there* in some sense or other ? There can be no significant debate on the non-existent or chimerical. It is thus not only absurd but also repugnant to the Vedanta *sutras* and to Sankara's exposition of the Advaita to entertain the view that the manifest order of plurality is just like a mirage or hallucination. Such a view, it will be shown, involves acute misunderstanding of some of the basic concepts of the Vedanta, of the philosophy of the Upanisads, such as, *Maya*, *avidya*, *paramarthika* and *vyavaharika* etc. We shall return to these issues later on. Now, let us return to the texts of the *sutras* and Sankara's commentaries on them.

The basis of refutation of the rival metaphysical systems like the Sankhya has been two fold. (a) These not only have no support of grounding in the *sruti*-texts but these also run counter to the declarations of the *sruti*-texts themselves, in their account of the express order of plurality. (b) These are also logically self-discrepant even as independent conceptualistic systems. This, then, introduces us to the stand that the Vedanta as embodied in the *sruti*-texts contains an explanation of the express order, and that this has to be understood and interpreted in a logical way. Sankara has achieved this purpose eminently. It is fundamentally wrong to take the view that the discussion on this part of the Vedanta issue has very limited relevance, or that the whole discussion has been an exercise in frivolity.

It has been claimed already that a harmonious rendering of the Vedanta texts themselves goes to show that the express order of infinite plurality of things and beings is grounded in an absolute and all-comprehensive reality (Brahman) which is again, the true and the one self on all, —their one substantial self-identity<sup>18</sup>. Thereafter, begins the Vedanta refutation of the Sankhya, the foremost wrestler<sup>19</sup>, as Sankara regards it. The Sankhya is the principal contender particularly because of its great affinity to the Vedanta version of the case. What is the principal argument here? It is that, according to the *sruti*-texts, the ground of the manifest order of plurality is a principle of supreme intelligence, of omniscience, of absolute power and freedom, and of supreme goodness. This principle, it has been stated, reproduced the cosmic plurality out of itself after due contemplation and deliberation

*uksapurvakar*<sup>20</sup> And it is on the strength of quite a number<sup>21</sup> of *sruti*-statements to this effect that the *pradhana*, the primal material cause postulated by the Sankhya is ruled out as '*asabda*', – a word or concept without any mooring in the revealed literature. It cannot be that the primal ground of the cosmic order has been described as an intelligent and conscious principle in the *sruti*-texts figuratively and in a secondary meaning. The reason is this ground has also been described, stated and referred to as the one self *atman*<sup>22</sup>. The two concepts– Brahman and Atman have been frequently, and also significantly, interchanged ruling out the possibility that the primal source of all could as well be an unconscious material principle. There are other reasons as well. Knowledge of this foundational principle of the express order has, again, been advised to one seeking liberation or release from the Bondage of mutilated life (B. S. 1.1.7). This ground principle has also been indicated as the final goal in the progressive quest. The Upanisads stop at this as the ultimate principle and the supreme goal of enlightened life– nothing beyond this has ever been advised (B.S. 1.1.8). It has also been said that nothing remains unknown when this is known and that nothing remains more to be desired or found, when this is reached and grasped<sup>23</sup>. That this supreme principle can become the terminal point has also been indicated by the epithet '*svapiti*'<sup>24</sup> given to it. It is that in which the individual loses his distinction and apartness, to which he gets reduced ultimately, without any residuum, in his self-identity consciousness. This cannot, therefore, be an unconscious material principle<sup>25</sup>. This fact of realisable identity and therefore, 'reducibility in conscious of the cosmic plurality in this primal ground also establishes it as the one ground or source of all, and there can be none other than this. The *sruti*-texts, again, are all unanimous in their description of this primal ground as the self. (B. S. 1.1.10-11).

It can be seen from the text that while commenting upon the *sutra* '*Gatisamanyat*', meaning that all the *vedanta-vakyas*, purported to give a causal account of the manifest order of plurality, *uniformly* speak of a conscious and omniscient principle, such as, Brahman, as the *one* ground of all and everything, Sankara felt it necessary to dilate upon the relevance and use of that kind of discourse. Two essential purposes of the *Brahmasutras* (as also of the *upanisads*) are (1) to show that the seemingly discordant and substantive pluralities can all be accounted for by regarding them all as phenomenal expressions, or manifestations, of one absolute and all-pervading principle, such as, Brahman, and (2) to show that this foundational principle can be also consciously realised (and thereby verified) as the foundational, insofar as this Brahman can be realised as the '*Atman*'– the true and the absolute *identity* of all phenomenal pluralities, including the empirical individuals that ordinarily look upon themselves as distinct and separate. Briefly speaking, there is only one substance, metaphysically speaking, and this *expresses* itself in infinite varieties of names and forms, and therefore, each and every one of these names and forms are substantially united in one self-conscious common matrix– *sarvam khalvidam Brahma*. And that all are one, and indivisible in their substantial identity, can be realised in a conscious way since the substantive principle itself is a conscious principle, the one subject and the self of all and *not an object* which is graspable only as an other'. What is more, in this conscious realisation of one's own identity by way of realisation of one's *very self* liberation or release from the bondage of phenomenal life consists. The *Brahmasutras* starting from *sutra* 1.1.2 onwards are purported to establish the former theme the opening *sutra*, coupled with certain auxiliaries interspersed all through out the texts, goes to establish the latter theme. In course of this dual presentation of the Advaita theme-bringing down all and multiple in their essential *relationship* to the one, and reducing that relation, again, to a transcendental fact of *absolute non-relation* in the *realisable self-identity*, quite another theme, although a side-issue, crops up. It is this that the plural manifestations of the one, consequent upon the *immanent logic of being expressed*

and articulated as plural, that is, as distinct, and as distinguished from one another, should show them up and pose as substantive entities as themselves. This is consequent upon and so, connected with the bid of the one to *become* many. But all this is connected with the way of outer expression of manifestation, roughly analogous to one identical person, an actor, playing a variety of roles on the stage and playing those roles *lively* under temporary forgetfulness of his *true* identity. In our day-to-day life also the same individual functions differently, even as separate individuals, — as a lover, as a master, as a servant, as a father, as a son and as a public man. Although in all these varied functions, his own peculiarly individual or personal consciousness is not completely lost, yet it remains submerged to a great measure, as and when he plays the different roles. This his latent consciousness of self-identity expresses itself as a substantive individuality in each and every separate role that he acts in to articulate their vision of the truth that all is an indivisible and absolute self and that there is nothing else beside, the seers of the Upanisads proceeds analogically in their description that it is the one that has *assumed* the forms of the many and *become* the many without losing itself and its self-conscious nature, although revealing in widely divergent subjects and objects. This mode of presentation is unavoidable in communicating a truth of revelation, in articulating a truth apprehended intuitively. This mode of presentation has been technically called '*adhyarope*'. This is to be understood as a figurative putting of things which is not to be taken liberally. For instance, it is not to be gathered that there were ever two distinct moments when the Absolute was its own solitary self and when, again, it was impelled by the desire to become many and consequent there upon, initiated the process of self-reproduction or creation of the manifest order out of itself. The situation or the state of affairs revealed in the ecstatic vision has to be taken and understood from the stand point of a discoverer, himself an empirical individual. That situation is: here there is no *real* plurality, all is one, an indivisible and absolute, immutable one. This is realised as the truth of fact (*vidya*) in the discoverer's own self-consciousness, developing into one absolute identity-consciousness, articulated as 'He is I' (*so'ham*) or 'I am Brahman' (*aham brahmasmi*). But this is a discovery, this was *not* known as that. What was known and instinctively felt as indisputable prior to this discovery was that the plural, the diverse are all real, and real in an absolute sense,—so was the individual himself, the discoverer before this discovery, instinctively known and felt as a substantive reality. This transition from one stratum of conscious existence to an all together different stratum down grades and devalues the earlier understanding as ignorance (*avidya*). This state of affairs given through this ignorant way of understanding is consequently devalued as '*mere appearance*'. Knowing this '*mere appearance*' as '*mere appearance*' and as not-real is also incidental to the new discovery, to the *vidya*. This is, therefore, a part of the very same *vidya*, although in its negative exercise. *Avidya* does not consist in regarding the appearances as appearances. It consists in regarding the appearances, not as appearances, but as the absolutely real and indisputably so.

The new theme cropping up, in addition to the two previously mentioned *viz*, the manifest plurality is all Brahman and this Brahman is the true identity—the absolute Self of all, is : How the world of plural appearances *could be there shall*, and how these appearances, which are other than the real and also other than the unreal—the non-fact, *could be again, misconceived as the very reals themselves*. The question is about the *why* and the *wherefore* of *avidya*. It is also about the *why* of the '*illusory*' appearances, which means, of '*mere appearances*' mistaken as substantive realities. What is important to note here is that no incidence, no sequence, no phase of being or of the apprehension of being, can be explained, or should be explained, by reference to any factor or condition extraneous to Reality, since Brahman, which is this reality, has no negation anywhere, and nothing is there which is outside or apart from this Brahman. We have already explained this point in chapter

V of this commentary. It is a glaring mistake to explain *avidya* and the wrong view of reality by reference to the human scape-goat, since this scape-goat is also. A manifestation of Brahman, and is *not* any additional reality outside the *all-reality*. The victim of a delusion can not be the agent manufacturing or manipulating it, cannot be its causal ground. That reality is one indivisible absolute self is known in term of self-identity consciousness alone. This is not only *vidya* but this is also called *paravidya* in the *srutis*<sup>26</sup>. There is however, another form of *vidya*, which is called *apara*, that is, an inferior kind of knowledge. This other kind is called 'apara' and yet a kind of *vidya* insofar as it also presents Reality although together with its appearances, and as the *ground* of this world of plural appearances. This also presents non-dual reality but only as the ground, the source, as also the unity of the appearances. This a form of right knowledge (*vidya*) in so far as it beings in the world multiplicities, the cosmic manifestation of the plural, under the principle of an immanent unity, which sustain, supports and also accounts for all. Sankara, following the Upanisads, regards reality in this phase, that is, reality *understood* in this way, as *saguna Brahma*. The other, the *aksara* phase, the immutable absolute Self has been described as *nirguna Brahma*. It would be idle to imagine that Reality itself does not cover both these phases, that the *saguna* is not one phase of the *nirguna*, or that the 'saguna' phase due to some circumstance all together. Outside the one Reality. It is, no doubt, incidental to an *overview*, an external view of Reality and in that way involves duality of the contemplator and the contemplated, but the contemplator that contemplates it in the said way is himself grounded in the Reality as an relational phase of that Reality itself and nothing additional, or extraneous in an absolute sense. The Brhadaranyak<sup>27</sup> expresses this dualism in term of the expression *eva*, meaning 'as it were' in its statement *yatra hivatamiva bhavati*. The expression *bhavati* there indicates 'phasing' of Reality, that is, a phasing obtaining in the order of the Real itself. The other phasing is indicated by 'eva' in 'Yatra tvasva sarvamatmahvabhut' - 'where everything has become just one's own Self', and this is an absolute view of the absolute, the terminal point, realisable by self-knowledge or knowledge of self-identity alone. This is described as *paravidya*, since this is the ultimate phase both the Reality and truth.

Sankara, as the text indicates<sup>28</sup>, slightly *deviates* from the *upanisadic* statement without, as we feel, violence to the spirit of that statement insofar as he takes *apara-vidya* as a phase of *avidya* on the ground that the *apara* view is infected by the dualism of subject and object which is ultimately rejected in the absolute non-dualism of the apex-experience. But it is remarkable that he does not repudiate or summarily dismiss this other, the external view, - the view of Brahman as *saguna*. He does not deny the efficacy or use of this view either<sup>29</sup>. Such a view is incidental to a different attitude and approach, such as, regarding the Absolute as an *object* of worship, as also an *object* of contemplation. This also involves knowledge, and this knowledge is accessible through the *pramana*, such as, the *sastrapramana*, and therefore, it is *pramanajanya jnana*. The terminal knowledge, described by Sankara as '*Brahmavagat*'<sup>30</sup> is, however, no '*Janya-jnana*', not also '*pramana-janya*', since this does not involve duality of newer and known, nor does it hold the self as an *object* to itself. The terminal is a form of lapsing in the absolute identity - consciousness. Although following the diction of language it is spoken of as the Self's knowledge of itself, it is an indescribable identity-consciousness. This is *paramarthika* knowledge, not because it introduces it a separate fact, but because the realisation which it involves turns out as the supreme and -*paramartha*. What he desire to insist upon is that the *paramarthika* and *vyavaharika* are ways of experience, and what is given in these experiences is, metaphysically speaking, the very same reality in different phases or postures, - these phases or postures do not have grounding in an alien fact or source.

The *Vyavahika* is infected by *avidya*, it has been said<sup>11</sup> This *avidya*, according to Sankara, vitiates any dual presentation as subject and object. This then vitiates all the *pramanas* including the *Sastrapramana*. The view of Brahman, the Reality, as *saquna*, also is vitiated by this *avidya*. Yet there is a notable difference in the mode of working of *avidya* at this place. *Avidya* at this level is also the *apara vidya*. The cosmic multiplicities cease to be regarded as substantive entities in themselves, their whole or totality ceases to be regarded as self-complete, self-sufficient and self-explained. All cosmic pluralities come now to be regarded as the varied expressions of a transcendental substance which is the ground of origination, sustenance and disappearance or lapsing of them all (B. S. 1.1.2)—their immanent unity. This becomes truth-vision as well since it paves the ground for the final realisation that the plural, the individual, the separate do indeed find their true identity in the immutable one underlying any yet transcending the cosmic process of becoming of the varied manifestations. It, therefore, subserves one very important purpose. It helps transcendence of the order of mutability and change. This is the reason why it has been said '*avidyaya mrtum tirtva vidyayamrtamasnute*'. So, although this phase of understanding is a form of *avidya* as Sankara has regarded it in the context, it is also the *apara vidya*, the inferior, yet proximate *vidya* as the *srutis* would call it.

The Upanisads or the Vedanta may be understood as a tale of progressive discovery of the ultimate truth starting from the level of ordinary knowledge and understanding. In this progressive movement, the inquirer passes from level to level, both of experience and existence. Every level of existence is dependent upon and defined by given knowledge or experience of that order. A state of existence or being is *as it is known-as*. In course of progressive discovery, there is a lapsing of value of the earlier phase and its re-assessment in term of, as also in relation to, the later phase. The conventionally known *substantivities* turn out to be '*appearances*', with the result that their previous posture (as substantivities) which was once given and known, to be real, come to be regarded now as all illusory. Their postures as substantive realities thus came to be re-assessed as all '*illusory appearances*'. This is incidental to the discovery of them as '*appearances*' of something more fundamental than them all, and this latter is looked upon as the ground and also as their substance of the plural forms now taken as phenomenal modes. All this is by way of an objective movement, from effects or consequents to their causal ground. The objective attitude is still retained in this progressive search for the primal and the ultimate reality base. But this knowledge even in its ultimate and utmost stretch, would be regarded by the Vedanta as *apara vidya*. It remains covertly relational, since it is the *contemplator's knowledge* of the ultimately given. But is not the contemplator himself also a part of the same given whole, which he contemplates as an outer agency, *as it were*? So, the Upanisads bring in a new and complementary approach, unravelling the several depths and strata of the contemplator's subjectivity to which one or the other stratum of objectivity is collateral. The final discovery becomes of the nature of the fact of absolute and unmitigated identity of everything phenomenal-phenomenal subjectivity as also phenomenal objectivity in the transcendental one. This absolute fact of identity them can only be called as the '*Self*' of all. Even in common parlance do we not regard, that as the '*self*' or as '*itself*' with which anything is cognised as identical? The Vedanta seeks to describe this truth vision, which is at the same time reality-experience' by several '*figures*' of language. That Brahman is Atman or that Atman is Brahman has to be understood as a linguistic description of this unique identity experience, which, as an intuitive fact, is literally inexpressible in the form of a relational expression. Yet it has to be expressed in language, if it is to be expressed or articulated at all. This is articulated or expressed as the *non-relational one-ness* of Brahman and Atman.



Next, the question arises – how to express the earlier two phases of experience and existence which have been transcended and de-valued? These cannot be rootless, could not happen and be there, if Reality were not *somehow* amenable to 'being presented', to 'being given' and experienced in such ways. What oddity is there, phase? There is the experience of cosmic pluralities, including one's own individual Self as substantive realities. This is the phase of conventional knowledge and behaviour. We ordinarily do not doubt or dispute this fact or conventionally known existence. We do not doubt or dispute the truth or validity of this conventional experience either. This is one pole. The other pole is the absolute identity-experience in which the plural and the distinct lose all their substantive individualities – and to which they get ultimately reduced in the progressive search for self-identity. No one ever denies that this sort of experience is very much unconventional. Even the Upanisads admit that this is so. 'The self-existent', says the Upanisads, 'pierced the openings of the senses outward; therefore, one looks outward, not within himself. One, withdrawn and contemplative *dhira*, aspiring for immortality, beheld the self introspectively, by shutting up the out-going senses'" The unconventional experience is then dependent on radical change in the direction of the mind – by supplanting the objective attitude by the subjective. Admitting this experience and this state of existence, if not as an already given fact, atleast as a possibility, let us consider how are we to assess the nature of the conventionally given order. The recognition of its *non-substantiality* is tantamount to the admission of it as a 'mere appearance'. The ultimately real must be then taken as capable of expressing *itself* also as the order of mere appearance. Not only that, there must be some principle or law behind conceiving this realm of 'mere appearance' as the realm of 'substantive realities' themselves. These are transitions which obtain in the very nature of one's progressive discovery of the truth. Will it not be foolish to say that such transitions do not and cannot take place? What is wrong, then, in describing the third phase, the phase in which the non-substantivities are taken as substantivities, the 'mere appearances' as realities themselves as *avidya* insofar as its presentation involves radical distortion? The second phase, in which the substantive pluralities are all *de-valued* and regarded as 'mere appearances', (their previous appearances as substantivities now being regarded as all illusory appearances), is also a phase of truth-perception, is it not? Yet, from the view-point of the ultimate identity-experience, that is, the experience of the true self and unnegatable reality, this truth-perception cannot be regarded as truth-experience *unqualifiedly*. In fact, it has a dual character. As that which lapses ultimately, it cannot be the real. But all the same, the ultimately real shows itself up in and through these mere appearances, and as invested with these appearances, as it were. This phase is relative to the objective mode of apprehension. So, the *srutis* take it as *aparavidya*. But from the ultimate standpoint this *aparavidya* may also be regarded as a phase of *avidya*, again. This stands in between the *paravidya* and the *avidya* as gross ignorance (*ajana*). But this holds the key to an intelligible explanation of the other two phases. Can the truth-seer dispute that these appearances or their system *was not there*? Even, after he has realised the supreme truth and has returned from that depth back to himself, can he doubt or dispute that the real did appear, or even does appear *as that* from an outer view, an objective view of it? How to take this *objectively presented* panorama which, in that context, is very much there, and appears as the one integrated whole of the plural appearances which all being to it as its several *expressions* and not as substantivities, just as the waves are to the sea? In saint of fact, this is the very same Reality as *objectively* understood. Can it not be taken as *apara* Brahman, otherwise called *saguna* Brahman, that is, the very, same Reality of identity-experience, the Absolute Self, *now* understood as the objective unity expressing or manifesting itself in the plural forms of becoming? If *paravidya* and *apara vidya* are to be understood as the internal (*svarupa*) view and outer (*tatastha*) view of the very same reality, can we



not take the terminal *nirguna* and the objective *saguna* as only two ways of regarding the self-same reality? These distinctions among the diverse phases or postures of Reality have their grounds in the three-fold phases of experiences, *avidya*, *aparavidya* and *paravya*. The very fact that *avidya* lapses into *aparavidya*, as that, again, into *paravidya*<sup>11</sup> establishes that it is the self-same reality which shows itself up and is known in three ways, that these ways of understanding all obtain in reality in some way and none of these is due to any alien circumstance. And, since the cogniser himself undergoes transformation and a progressive re-estimation of his own nature in course of these transitions in knowledge, the three phases of reality cannot be regarded as simply epistemic, but only as metaphysical, that is, as obtaining in the *nature* of reality itself.

The difference between the *avidya* phase and the *vidya* phase consists in this that in the former, which is a distorted view, Brahman or the true self remains completely hidden in the plural appearances parading themselves as substantivities, misappropriating the nature of the Reality itself. In the *vidya* phase, there is progressive discovery, first that Reality is the *ground* of all cosmic multiplicities, – the indivisible one, the *immanent unity*, which has expressed itself in the infinite plurality of forms, and next, that Reality is the pure, absolute identity or one-ness the one self to which all the plural forms terminate. The first, *apara vidya*, is knowing reality in the objective attitude as the all-comprehensive and all encompassing whole – *Brahman*. The second, the *paravidya*, which alone is *paramarthika jnana* according to Sankara's Advaita, is knowing Brahman as the *Atman*, the realised identity or self-hood of all that there appears or appeared. This alone is the phase of Reality as 'is', all other phases are phases of reality as it *appears*. In one phase, that is in *aparavidya*, Reality *merely appears*, but in the *avidya* phase, it *illusorily appears*. The former has been described as the *maya*-phase, the latter as the *avidya* phase. These concepts '*maya*' and '*avidya*' have been introduced both by the upanisads and Sankara vedanta as 'concepts' necessitated for articulating and distinguishing these several phases or levels of experience – as also of conscious existence. It is plain non-sense to enter into any disputation as to what could be or could not be the *locus* of this *maya* and *avidya*. The critics of Sankara, one and all, did not understand either the upanisads or Sankara's version of the Vedanta. The post-Sankarite defenders of Sankara were all equally misled in so far as they thought that the issues of the controversy were all significant and genuine, requiring some cogent replies. We shall return to this controversy in all sequel and show how the issues raised by the critics were all plain nonsense. One further point we want to raise before we pass on to Sankara's commentary in this section in support of all that has been said. It is this why was the concept of *maya* introduced at the level of *aparavidya* and *saguna Brahman*? the reply to that is – how else could one articulate the difference between the level of *paravidya* and that of *aparavidya*, between Reality as pure identity-experience, otherwise called self-experience or Absolute experience, and Reality as the *objective unity*, the *objective absolute*, which is no experience but is the experienced the knowable and the worshipable (*upasya*)<sup>12</sup> Is it not assuming a kind of disguise when the Absolute subject, the absolute self-experience or identity-experience, degenerates into an objective Absolute (reality being here synonymous with objectivity) and as an immanent unity of all appearances, – incidental to an outer view (*aparavidya*)? Does not an *outer view* also necessitate positing a spectator, a cogniser, a subject in juxtaposition? How else can there be an external or *outer view* of anything pray? May be set that this specialist at the cognising, subject when contemplating the objective Absolute as the *whole*, reality *imaginatively* also includes his own being as an integral part of the absolute whole he contemplates. But can it be denied that the very mode of *objective* contemplation of reality involves a duality, at least inform, if not also in substance? This makes the entire show, the objective presentation of the Absolute, a transcendental *appearance*, and the investiture of forms

and characters (*guna*) to the objective unity by bringing in the entire mass of plural appearances into an integral relationship to that unity, can have its explanation only if the entire panorama is judged in relation to the view-point of the contemplator. Reality, at this phase, presents itself in a dual relation as it were. What sacrilege can be there if this dual presentation, which is also a self-presentation of the indivisible, one is called disguiseful or *mayic* to keep this *apara* view in distinction from the *para* view? The scholastics talk about *upadhis* and *avacchedakas* when articulating the difference between the infinite and the finite, the qualityless and the qualified, the unlimited and the limited. Where do these *upadhis* or *avacchedakas* spring from? Are these not impositions, incidental to an *external* spectator's viewpoint? All these are necessary features of a dual, and for that very reason, an objective presentation of what is, as itself, non objective.

The question as to the ultimate ground of all plural manifestations is an inquirer's question. He is contemplating the primal ground from his angle in an objective attitude. The *vidya* he is likely to derive will remain *apara vidya* even in its utmost stretch. The Vedanta is being guided by a *pramana jnana*, although in the mode of an indirect knowledge, and this is the communicated information delivered by the Upanisads, the *sruti-pramana*. The validity of this informative knowledge is implicitly accepted, firstly, because this is a part of revealed knowledge, which is believed to have been derived in an extraordinary framework of the mind, and secondly, because, logically considered, this informative knowledge about the *wherefore* of things, seems to be more cogent than the several conceptual and postulational accounts, presented by the metaphysicians of the rival schools. The *sruti*-presentation of the case has quite another merit, which cannot be claimed by any inferential *anumanika* and postulational account. It is this that the *sruti*-texts themselves advocate the possibility of a direct verification of the truth propagated by them in one's own direct experience of absolute self-identity in which all cosmic pluralities, including one's own individuality, all terminate, and are submerged in an indivisible one-ness. The *srutis* remain an indirect *pramana* in its regard. The final truth is realised in *paravidya* to which the *srutis* can introduce only but which they cannot generate since what the *paravidya* is to reveal is an eternally obtaining state of affairs which is a matter for *direct realisation* and not knowable as an object. Objectivity is an inseparable feature of all knowability based upon *pramanas*. The ultimate truth is not realised in an objective attitude but only in a state of transcendence, the terminal point of phenomenal objectivity as also phenomenal subjectivity. Realisation of the supreme truth of fact is liberation. But before taking the final plunge in Reality which is Brahman and realising this reality as the one Atman in term of direct realisation it is necessary to show that Brahman is not only the *ground* of all but Brahman is everywhere on all its manifestations. To put otherwise, it is necessary to show that Brahman is the immanent principle underlying all diverse cosmic manifestations. Knowledge of this kind is, no doubt, *aparavidya*, which is, at bottom, a mixture of *vidya* and *avidya*. But this is considered to be an essential step preparatory to *paravidya*.

The *sutras* 1.1.2 to 1.1.4 posit Brahman as the primal ground of all things. The succeeding *sutras* of all the four *padas* of the first *adhyaya* seek to defend this view by showing that the *srutis* uniformly speak about Brahman, not only as the primal ground (the *upadana* and *nimittakarana* combined into one single principle) but also as the immanent cause being present everywhere and in all manifestations. Negatively, the same texts rule out the possibility of the Sankhya account as being either *sruti*-based or *sruti* supported. In course of interpretation of the *Badarayana sutras*, however, Sankara comes to discover a textual inaccuracy in the 12th *sutra* of the first *pada* of the first *adhyaya*. although as a commentator of the *sutras*, he was required to abide by the letters of the *sutras*<sup>15</sup>, he rightly subordinates the letters of the *sutras* to the spirit of the texts and their contexts. The *sutra*

1.1.12 - 'Anandamayobhasat', alongwith the succeeding *sutras* 1.1.13-19, was intended to show that the *śruti* texts themselves declare a conscious principle, very much different from an unconscious principle, such as, the *pradhana* of the *sāṅkhya* system, as the ground of all existence, of all cosmic pluralities. The *Badarayana sutra* 1.1.12, although not irrelevant in this context, errs in two ways, (1) While talking about the *ultimate ground* one has to refer to the Reality *as itself*. But this reality *as itself* cannot be taken as *anandamaya*, that is, an embodiment of *ananda*, whatever that may be. It has to be, as per the *śruti* statement, *ananda*, an equivalent of absolute freedom. The very notion of 'embodiment' brings in the notion of non-ultimacy and limitation. Nothing limited or non-ultimate can be conceived as the ultimate or primal ground. (2) It is not also the fact that the concept '*anandamaya*' has been *abhyasta*, that is, repeatedly pronounced in course of the *śruti*-texts, more particularly, in the Taittiriya Upanisad. The concept or expression repeatedly used there is '*ananda*', and therefore, to be textually correct, the *sutra* should have been worded as '*Anandobhyasat*' and not as it has been worded. If the purpose of the *sutras* be to knit together in the form of a garland, the *vedānta-vākyas* as flowers, as Sankara has expressed<sup>24</sup>, the *sutra* 1.1.12 has definitely erred in that respect. It cannot also be maintained that Badarayana, the *sūtrakāra*, enjoys greater authority than the *vedānta-vākyas* themselves of which he is a compiler. It is indeed remarkable that although disagreeing with the rendering of the *sutras* on the basis of Badarayana's own wording of the *sutra* 1.1.12, Sankara has not shown his any disrespect. On the contrary, fully knowing that Badarayana's wording of the word was textually wrong, Sankara laboured hard (although with doubtful success) to interpret the *sutra* as originally worded as cogently as possible.

We feel, however, that Sankara should not have been as much disconcerted as he has been at the wrong wording of the *sutra*. Nor was it necessary for him to dwell upon inappropriateness of the notion of *anandamaya* so tenaciously. Before entering into discussion on the *sutra* in dispute, did he not himself distinguish between two phases of Brahman as *saguna* and *nirguna*? Did he not distinguish between the *Upāśya* and the *jñeya* aspects? Elsewhere, he is again, going to maintain that the relation of cause and effect, of ground and consequent, is only valid relatively, there being no physical division or distinction in Reality, – such distinction being a conceptual distinction merely while the three-fold phases or postures of Reality revealed in *avidyā*, *aparavidyā* and *paravidyā* seem to have metaphysical sanctity of some kind, a consideration such as reality as the ground of its appearances involves a relational taking of the non-relational. Such relational taking is, no doubt, an aid to the understanding of what is relationally secured by thought as non-relationally united in reality, but it has to be kept in view that while expressing the inexpressible, we have to take the help of certain conceptual devices in order to have a logical grasp of what is supralogical. Our understanding of reality has to be articulated by means of categories of thought as also by certain modes of linguistic usage. This is unavoidable. Who knows, may be that the all-reality, that is, Brahman itself, has provided this arrangement by way of a mode of self-articulation. What is beyond logic, beyond thought and speech as itself, must have provided for all those contrivances insofar as it appears, in order that by a judicious taking of the apparently relational, linguistic and conceptual, one (himself a phenomenal form of Reality) can ultimately reach the goal—which is immortality. Has it not been said that *avidyā* functions in the otherway also, that, by right understanding of *avidyā* as *avidyā*, one can cross the bounds of mortality and rejoice in the life of the immortal spirit<sup>25</sup>?

What about the concepts of '*īkṣitr*' (B. S. 1.1.5), '*Kamayitr*' (1.1.18) – even '*Brahman*', '*Ātman*' etc.? Are they not also conceptual devices to bring home to us certain aspects of the experienced truth supreme? Understanding helps us to grasp the truth by the meanings of these expressions. Expressions are all aids to articulation. It is true that one has to be selective and cautious when

handling linguistic symbols. The distinction between relevant and irrelevant, correct and incorrect, proximate and approximate, as also between what has been called *svarupa laksana* and *tatastha laksana*, can, of course, be made. But to get at the door-step of the inexpressible, the services of the expressions, in some orderly and regulated way, seems to be unavoidably necessary. With the help of such expressions, the *experience* of the inexpressible truth is sought to be articulated, and by a proper understanding of these means, the tools, aided and supported by cognate imaginative vision, one may, again, find an access to the inexpressible experience.

The description of Brahman as the *cause* of the manifest order of infinite plurality seems to be figurative. How are we to take the *sruti* description of world-creation by Brahman, by judicious contemplation (*ikṣana*) and planning? How can we take the *sruti*-statement, — 'he desired that I will reform my own being into the cosmic many or in the manifold'?\*? Whoever saw this happening? Passages like the above, then, have also to be taken as figurative, involving what Sankara himself has called '*adhyopa*'. The purpose of the passages, primarily, is to insist on unity (even in absolute one-ness ultimately) of all being, and secondly, to insist that the manifest whole is *orderly*, teleological, rational, and also perfectly intelligible — which could not be the case, were the cosmic pluralities due to accident, or due to any unconscious principle of fortuitous development. The concept of *vivarta* (apparent reproduction or transformation) introduced in B. S. 2 | 14 — '*Tadananyatvamarambhanas-abhādīvyah*' is calculated to deny the idea of creation, even of evolution, in conventional sense. So the purpose of the *sūtras*, as also of the texts citable in their context, is to establish that *Brahman is all, Brahman is everywhere, Brahman is in everything*, even in every symbol of worship or prayer, — and that this Brahman is, again, the one identity, a realised self-identity (*Atman*) of all and sundry — there is no negation of Brahman or Atman, nor can there be by any.

Considered in the above way, we feel that Sankara could as well concede that, looked at from the phenomenal angle, the author of the cosmic order, that is, the primal ground of it, besides being regarded as an intelligent and conscious agent may also be regarded as one having unlimited freedom and absolute delight (*ananda*) and therefore, as *anandamaya*, because, in the relevant *sruti*-texts the word '*ananda*', component of the word '*anandamaya*', has been repeatedly used. The Badarayana *sūtra* 1 | 12 could, then, be rendered as follows: on account of repeated use of the express order in the relevant *sruti*-texts, the intelligent world-ground, which has already been described as a principle, contemplative (*ikṣita*) and self-conscious (*ātma*), can also be understood as the store of boundless delight — *anandamaya*, provided that the suffix '*mayat*', used in the formation of the word '*anandamaya*', is understood as having been used, not in the sense of a product of the process of transformation (*vikāra*), but in the sense of boundless (*pracūryat*) 1 | 13. If the expressions, such as, '*ikṣita*' '*Kamayitr*' etc. are not inappropriate in the context of the root-principles, such as, *nirguṇa* or *pura brahman*, why should the expression '*anandamaya*' be felt as so very repugnant or repellent? It is not also the fact that these *sruti*-usages of words or concepts, such as, '*āksata*', '*akamayata*' '*ākaravani*' '*atapyata*', '*tadevanupravisat*' and countless similar others, were brought into the texture of the *sūtras* in order to exclude the inferential conclusion (*nanumanapekṣa* — B. S. 1 | 18) that the primal ground of the express order may as well be the '*pradhana*' of the Sankhya conception which is an unconscious and unintelligent principle? The '*a-sahadātva*' (that is, being rootless and without support in the *sruti*-texts) of the '*pradhana*' has been sought to be established in two ways. First, in course of the *sūtras* of *pada* 1, *Adhyaya* 1, *sruti*-expressions which resemble in their word-forms some concepts of the Sankhya system have been shown to have radically different meanings — meanings, which peculiarly fit into the Vedānta context only.

So the essential point of the controversy should have been whether the concept of *ananda* or of *anandamaya*, serves this purpose equally well or not. It seems that the concepts such as, '*ananda*' or '*anandamaya*' achieve this purpose much better than the concept of '*puccha brahma*' or Brahman as the tail-end and so, the foundation (*pratishta*) of the express order. But, all the same, there can be little doubt that Badarayana committed a textual mistake, and that this proved so much taxing upon the vocation of a traditional commentator that Sankara left his task incomplete and felt disinclined to proceed beyond B.S. 1.1.14 in the chain of *sutras* from 1.1.12 to 1.1.19, and to give his own interpretation of the remaining *sutras*.

Had not Badarayana committed this mistake, one very cogent issue of the Vedānta *sutras* in this part would not have gone unnoticed. This issue is that B. S. 1.1.2. introduces Brahman as the source or ground of cosmic pluralities but does not show in what way Brahman becomes that source or ground. Had B. S. 1.1.12 been worded as '*Anandamabhyasat*', it would have been complementary to the earlier *sutras*, since, as per the *śruti* statements, all proceed from *ananda*, in *ananda* all are sustained, and in *ananda*, again, all disappear. The interpretation of B. S. 1.1.14 as also of B. S. 1.1.15 would become more cogent under the circumstance. *Ananda Brahman*, thus, becomes the *spring (hetu)* from which all cosmic pluralities derive their urge for self-expression, self-love, and self-satisfaction (1.1.14) this has also been repeatedly expressed and maintained both in the *mantras* and the *Brahmanas* (1.1.15). The manifest order could not have zest for living, for being as they are, and also as they are sustained, had not *Ananda Brahman* been their ground. This development would be unthinkable and unintelligible had anything other than this Brahman been their ground such as, the *pradhana*, which has a mixed nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. (B. S. 1.1.16) The '*ananda*' which cosmic pluralities display, is not, however, original. It is derivative. They exhibit, *ananda* only by virtue of their participation in the nature of their primal ground, which is *ananda* itself, – primal and original. By realising their absolute identity with this their primal source, the empirical individuals all become fearless." A distinction, therefore, obtains between this original *Ananda* which is to be participated in (*labdhavya*) and the phenomenal pluralities which all participated in it (*labdha*) in one way or another. This also works out in another way. This shows also the essential difference between the primal ground as *Ananda* and the primal ground defended by the Sankhya, such as *pradhana*. The state of equipoise in which the cosmic pluralities are to get dissolved does not ensure this blissful existence. The notion of *pradhana*, both as the ground of origination and as the final goal is, therefore, rejected, since the difference is very much remarkable (1.1.17). The *śruties* declare that the manifold manifestation is there because it is one Reality or the Self *desire*d to become many (1.1.18). This self-unfoldment and self-individualisation, that is, this self-expression in cosmic pluralities can proceed only from free delight, from boundless sportiveness, which, then, is the essential nature (*svarupa*) of the *primal* cause. In the Sankhya account of the evolutionary process, an adventitious condition, such as, the enjoyment of an extraneous principle (although by very nature indifferent and unenjoying) has been introduced. Their *primal* cause of cosmic evolution, *Pradhana*, being an unconscious principle, is incapable of unfolding itself in self-delight. The notion of '*ananda*', as the primal ground, therefore, both excludes the relevance of Sankhya postulation of *pradhana* as the *materia prima* (*nanumanapeksa*), and explains how the one Reality (Brahman) could be the source of its manifold self-expressions.

The *sutra* 1.1.19 strikes a very important note. It is that the *primal* ground advocated by the *śrutis* has also been advised as that which is to be the goal of life, the supreme end bringing in absolute self-fulfilment. Such could not be the case if the unconscious *pradhana* was ever intended by the *śrutis* to be the *primal* ground of the cosmic pluralities. There can be no self-fulfilment by relapsing



or reverting to an unconscious *materia prima*. That alone can be the absolute ground which can account for all the characteristics of the manifest plurality including their urge for being what they are, their unacity for living, for enjoying the life they lead. It is also to be that which can ensure supreme self-fulfilment, a relapse to which does not mean self-extinction. The demand of this situation is fully met by the *sruti* notion of 'ananda' as the primal ground and as being the nature of Brahman. By realising their absolute identity with this Brahman the empirical individuals (*jivas*) gain that stability (*pratishta*) which is free from all tension and wretchedness and is fearless (*abhaya*) and reassuring.

Before we proceed further, a brief discussion regarding the philosophical arrangement of the cardinal issues of the Vedanta in the *Vedanta sutras* may not be out of place. The Vedanta is a *moksa sastra*, and the knowledge it purports to give, is that knowledge which liberates by ushering in an enlightened life in one sense or another. This its capacity is some kind of a crucial instance<sup>29</sup> which marks out the Vedanta from another system of philosophy. The aim or purpose of the entire Vedanta has been indicated in the initial *sutra* '*athato Brahmasijnasa*'. The remaining *sutras* of all the four *adhyayas* are in a sense explanatory, and they explain what may be this Brahman, what kind of knowledge is to be this Brahman-knowledge, and now this knowledge may be progressively developed by following the tenets of the *sruti*-texts and reviewing them as a unitary and systematic whole. Guidance in all these issues has been offered by the Upanisadic texts. The *sutras* have attempted to present the *upanisadic* version of truth in the form of a reasoned argument, and that this has actually been done, Sankara has undertaken to establish in his unique commentary. The Vedanta philosophy is the philosophy of the *upanisads*. Its arguments have all to be defended by express *sruti*-texts. The quotations from ancillary or subsidiary sources may have a supporting role only, but in no case, *primary*. In this respect, commentators other than Sankara have blundered and thereby having mystified the issues considerably. It can be seen that in course of the *Brahmasutras*, the concept of Brahman is being pursued in various ways – as the objective whole, as the indwelling principle (*antaryami*) of the cosmic pluralities, as the invariably sought-for – in the objective attitude of contemplation as the worshipable (*upasya*) and in the subjective attitude as the inner self (*antaratma*) intuitable (*Jneya*), as the absolute reality (Brahman) which is the source, the one ground, of all cosmic manifestation, and finally, as the Absolute Self, the self-shining substance (*satta*), the terminal fact, the absolute identity (*Atman*) or all that is there. In short, the *Vedanta sutras* posit one indivisible reality without a second, an Absolute Reality underlying and at the same time, comprehending all plural manifestations, and then, enjoin (*ishti* or *upadishati*) realisation of Absolute identity with this Reality as the supreme goal of life – *paramartha* insofar as this realisation alone can liberate, can render the empirical individual absolutely fearless, can ensure immortality (*amrtatva*). Neither the *Brahmasutras* nor Sankara, their most faithful and consistent commentator can be shown as advocating parochial extremism in any form. All approaches are approaches to one Brahman since Brahman is absolutely unnegatable, not only because Brahman is everything and everywhere but also because Brahman remains the one goal, covert or overt, in all searches, in all activities, in every expression of phenomenal life. But, although every attitude and approach has some relevance, and no mode of searching, can be absolutely rejected, by the very nature of reality which is to be consciously realised as the one goal, nothing short of intuitive realisation of absolute identity with Reality can hold out an absolute assurance. So, an irrational combination (*samuccaya*) of the various approaches together is as much self-defeating, as a sectarian and parochial espousal of one of them exclusively is sure to prove self-deceiving. The objective search by way of *upasana* and self-surrender has also its relevance insofar as it helps ascertaining the nature of Reality as the objective whole, of



everything that is there. It thus helps in the development of a total outlook. The final goal, the *paramarthika*, is not, however, a reward or gift-promised or granted, it is the self-owned, self-appropriated and the self-accomplished, and involves reversal of the direction of search in the subjective way any consummates in self-transcendences through the true-self-realisation.

The foregoing discussion was intended to show the relevance of the discussion into which the Vedānta sūtras enter next. The sūtra 1.1.19 '*Asmānasya ca tad-yogam sasti*', that is, 'the *śruti*s advise (or enjoin) this Brahman as the goal, the empirical individual is to seek for',— becomes some sort of a connective to the discussions which follow on the next. The sūtras that follow in a way, show that this is exactly what man has been doing in two attitudes — in his religious attitude of worship and prayer, as also in his cognitive attitude to ascertain the nature of his inner self. The sūtras or *pada* 2 and 3 of the first *adhyaya*, and the *śruti*-texts, connected with them become relevant in this way. The *Śruti*-texts of these sections have been traditionally described as '*aspasta lingaka*', that is, utterances or statements which all refer to Brahman not so explicitly or openly, but rather indirectly through some other symbols or forms which, however, can signify Brahman alone and nothing else. These '*aspasta lingaka śruti*s', again, have been distinguished into two categories. The texts, to which the sūtras of *pada* 2 relate, covertly present Brahman as an object of religious contemplation and worship, Brahman, in them is presented as the worshipable (*upasya*), where this act of worship and prayer is looked upon as subserving an end of life. The texts, to which the sūtras of *pada* 3 relate, covertly present Brahman as that which is intuitively realisable (*Jñeya*) in the subjective attitude (as different from the objective attitude of religious worship). Brahman has been advised in the passages of this group as the 'inner reality', or the innermost self of whatever is there. The remaining sūtras from 1.1.20 to 1.1.31 of the *pada* 1 of *adhyaya* 1, it can be seen, relate to the *śruti*-texts of a somewhat mixed character. The object of contemplation in the objective attitude is not, simply an outer reality. It has to be cogitated and contemplated also as the inner reality, the indwelling principle, which is not subject to any spatio-temporal limitation, although it looks like that. Thus, there is the Golden and shining Being (*Hiranmaya puruṣa*) in the solar disc<sup>40</sup> as also in the pupillary globe. It is the very same person, the supreme lord (*paramesvara*) himself. It bears the name '*U'*', as it is transcendent and untouched by any defect or demerit. Contemplation of Brahman in this form has been advised in the *śruti*s for the purpose of worship and prayer. The reason is, as Sankara has explained, the very act of worship and prayer necessitates an objective presentation of the supreme reality in a qualified and determinate form, the Absolute, which is devoid of all determination, cannot *as such* be made into an object 'out there' or 'inside this or that', for the exigency of religious contemplation. That this Supreme Being is not determinate and limited is brought out but naming it as '*Akasa*'. Sankara takes considerable pains to show that this '*Akasa*', spoken of in the *śruti*s, cannot be the fifth gross element (*mahabhūta*) since this '*Akasa*' has been described. There in the same way is Brahman as '*Ananda*' has been described elsewhere, that is, as the source of all things and being, as their sustaining principle and finally, as their ultimate abode (*parayana*) and goal<sup>41</sup>. Sankara insists that there are *śruti*-texts which suggest that '*Akasa*' in the context is a synonym of Brahman insofar as in such *śruti*-descriptions, it has the self-same mark (*linga*) or characteristic. On equal ground, that is, because the very same mark or characteristic has been mentioned in respect of '*Prana*'<sup>42</sup>, '*Prana*' spoken of as the object of meditation as also of inner contemplation is also a synonym of Brahman and is not the vital breath, which it is ordinarily taken to be. It is Brahman, again, which has been described in the *śruti*-texts as the refulgent light (*Jyotiḥ*)<sup>43</sup>, which shines beyond the heavens, beyond the expanse of all the worlds,— higher, lower and the middle, which lightens up all of them and is, again, the self-shining inner self of all creatures. There are *śruti*s, which extol *udgitha*

(chant), as there are *śruti*s<sup>44</sup> which speak of the Gayatri metre as the basic reality and the supreme end. Such *śruti*s are to be understood as actually advising meditation on Brahman by means of the chant (*Udgitha*) and by means of the Gayatri metre since the *udgitha* and the Gayatri metre in those contexts have been invested with characteristic marks of Brahman, the supreme reality. The entire purpose of the Vedānta *sūtras* of *pada* 1 of *adhyāya* 1 is, then, to present Brahman as the one *ground* of all existence. This has been done in the light of the relevant *śruti*-texts which describe Brahman as both the *upādāna* and the *nimitta Karana* of all cosmic pluralities. While presenting Brahman in this aspect, that is, as the ultimate *causal ground* a conceptual distinction had to be introduced between the manifest order of plurality, viewed as a system of effects and what could be regarded as its root and ultimate principle, the absolute ground and support underlying all phenomenal manifestations. In this drive for determining the ultimate principle, the self-supported support of all cosmic pluralities, the *śruti*s deliver a principle of consciousness absolute existence and self-delight as the absolute *prima*. This seems to meet also the logical requirement of the situation. This principle has to be *self-existent* to be the absolute ground of all, has to be a principle of *consciousness* and *supreme intelligence* so that the express order could be a harmonious whole, and it has to be a principle of *self-delight* and *absolute freedom* in order that the manifestation of the order of plural things and beings could be understood as *self-manifestations*, a manifestation of free play of a single principle into all varieties of names and forms. Every one of these considerations is vital for the Advaita Vedānta, and these the Upanisads, as Sankara understands them, unflinchingly support and defend.

That Brahman is the *prima* ground of everything that is there is sought to be established on the basis of the *śruti*-statement that all arise from 'ananda', all are sustained by it, and all, again, return to this 'ananda'. B. S. 1.1.2. does not institute any inferential argument, says Sankara, – it only cites evidence for this truth in the *śruti*-statement. In what way that *śruti* statement may be regarded as an evidence worth the name is explained in the context of B. S. 1.1.12 and by reference to the relevant *śruti*-passages. A reflective analysis through austerities and calm contemplation unravels, one after another, five strata of existence, described in the *śruti* literature as *pañca kosas* (five-fold sheaths). These are *annamaya*, *pranamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijnanamaya*, and *anandamaya kosas*. All these are terminate and so, none is absolutely primary, – although each succeeding is relatively more basic than what precedes it in this arrangement – from the grossest to the more and more subtle. When the fifth level is also transcended, there ends all sheathing, and so, all determination. What, then, stands out is the primary base itself, which, from this reflective angle, is taken as *Ananda* itself. This is another name for absolute freedom and bliss. The very same things also in taken from other angles as absolute existence and pure consciousness. These three – existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and freedom (*ananda*), have been traditionally called *Svarupa* – *lakṣana* of Reality which is Brahman. How should one regard these '*lakṣanas*', and how these are to be differentiated from the other group, called '*taṭastha lakṣana*', we shall consider in the sequel. There is, however, one issue which we cannot afford to overlook or ignore. It is this that, in the Advaita account, there is *only one* fact distinguished conceptually into reality and its several appearances. The appearances, be they 'mere' appearances or 'illusory' appearances, are 'appearances' of the self-same fact. There can be no *real* appearances in the sense that reality is an aggregate or sumtotal of its several appearances. Appearances all *appear* from the objective angle, which is remedially dualistic, but they all *disappear* from the subjective angle, that is, in the experience of absolute self-identity. This latter alone is paramārthika is so far as this is the terminus, the supreme end, – the realisation of which does not leave the scope for any further desire, for any further fulfilment<sup>45</sup>

It may be asked now what is the relevance of the discussions which relate to the *Brahma-lingaka vakyas*— both the *vakyas*, which are distinctly referential to Brahman, and others, which are referential only vaguely and indistinctly? There may be several replies. Firstly, it may be said that these discussions substantiate the claim made in B.S. 1.1.4 'Tattu samanvayat' that the *sruti*-texts in the Upanisad— part of the Vedas, all discuss about an existential reality (*parinisthita vastu*) as the goal of life, and not about rituals, or duties to be done, in the pursuit of *dharma*, the accredited subject-matter of the earlier part. Secondly, it may be said that although it is the intuitive knowledge of a self-accomplished reality as identical with one's self is the principal and the final advice that the upanisads seek to give, they also recommend contemplation of some other forms of existential matters as ancillary disciplines preparatory to that supreme knowledge. This second reply, then, does not admit the claim that the Upanisadic statements, not directly or distinctly mentioning Brahman as their object (matter, are either indistinct *asparśarthaka*) or are concerning Brahman (*Brahmavisayaka*) at all. The third reply, and that which seems to be the Advaita reply is that if Brahman is the *one reality* in all varied expressions, it should be the one inescapable reality and goal in whatever way or attitude we strive for realisation of the supreme end of life. If Brahman is all and everything, if Brahman is everywhere and always, if all phenomenal expressions are finally rooted in Brahman, then Brahman is to cover up all that is distinct and all that is indistinct, and as there are *sruti*-texts which are distinctly *brahmalingaka*, other texts, which seem to have different object-matter, are necessarily to be taken as indistinctly and in-directly Brahmanlingaka, since there is nothing other than Brahman.

Not that the *asparśalingaka srutis* do not have some other forms of necessity and relevance. Reality-experience has been attempted to be developed in three attitudes, the objective, the subjective, and the transcendental. What is being inquired into is the nature of the Absolute reality, which is to be realised as one's absolute identity, and therefore, as the *Absolute self*. Approached from the objective angle, Reality, as an absolute whole, can be regarded either as a neutral and *indifferent* presence, or as a supreme person, — in this later aspect, if reality-experience is to subserve the purpose of attainment of a *spiritual* goal. The objective approach, if maintained on religious and ethical line of contemplation, then, leads up to the notion of an Absolute Self, the Absolute person, to which the inquirer, the individual person, can belong as a part in some sense. This, then, given the *objective* absolute. The subjective approach, however, proceeds through analysis of the various strata of the individual's own being in order to find out that which can be looked upon as the inner most and therefore, as the foundational. This is no attitude of worship or prayer. The urge, here is, for *knowing* or ascertaining the true and the fundamental nature underlying the person's own being. This search, at its ultimate stretch, is for the *indwelling* absolute principle, otherwise called the '*Antaryamin*' — the *subjective* Absolute. This, then, gives the subjective Absolute as *jneya*, that is, knowingly ascertainable, — although in the subjective way or approach. The transcendental attitude or approach is a further development based upon a reflective review of the two earlier approaches, and their discoveries. This is consequent upon the new discovery that the objective absolute and the subjective absolute are essentially one and the same absolute, and the difference and distinction are merely *contextual*, that is, due to the peculiarity of the angles of approaches. This gives rise to the demand to contemplate how and in what way the *essential sameness* of the two absolutes can be realised in some mode of intuitive understanding. The bid for this kind of understanding in an intuitive way and therefore, in term of a 'given experience', leads to the development of the transcendental attitude. The *sruti*-statements which attempt to articulate reality-experience in this transcendental aspect are all clearly and distinctly *brahmalingaka*. All others are *asparśalingaka*, falling under two categories—

those that contemplate Brahman in diverse objective forms and meet the ethico-religious of worship and prayer, and those that contemplate Brahman, in diverse subjectively knowable (*jneya*) forms as an inner content, nearest to the individual himself. Brahman is described in the *srutis*<sup>41</sup> as hidden in the cave, as hidden in all its diverse manifestations. Such being the case, what oddity can there be that the *srutis* which present Brahman in the objective and the subject forms of manifestations should be vaguely indicative of Brahman? Cannot Reality remain hidden in its appearances and cannot it be sometimes even missed in the appearances? If not, why and wherefrom is the veil of *avidya*? Therefore, the so called '*aspaṭalingaka*' *srutis* are also necessitated by the nature of contemplation itself, – by contemplation in the objective and the subjective modes, which deliver up Brahman in term of its appearances only.

We have maintained that the contemplation of Brahman in the objective mode proceeds from ethico-religious demand and that Brahman, contemplated in this objective mode, is Brahman as the *upasya* (worshipable). We have also maintained that Brahman, contemplated in the subject way, is necessarily taken as an inner principle, the innermost self, and that this approach is a *cognitive* approach, resulting in the introspective awareness of Brahman as the indwelling principle. It can be seen, however, that the *sūtras* of *pādas* 2 and 3 of *Adhyaya* 1, traditionally regarded as *upasya brahmahodhaka* (indicative of Brahman as worshipable) and *jneya brahmahodhaka* (indicative of Brahman as a knowable content) respectively, do not abide by such distinction in all places.

The *sūtras* of the second *pāda*, *adhyaya* 1, begin with the contention that the *srutis*, which enjoin contemplation, in the objective mode, of the worshipable intend worshipping of Brahman alone in all such instructions. The reason is in the Upanisadic parlance (*prasiddha*) Brahman alone could be the worshipable<sup>42</sup>. To prove this contention that there could be nothing else which can be the object of such contemplation, Sankara brings in the passages from the 14th *Khanda* of the third *prapathaka* of the Chandogya, commonly known as the section on the *sandilya vidya*, where Brahman is described as *everything that is there*, or can be there. Thus, as it said 'everything (*sarvam*) that is there, is verily Brahman, since it is that from which all things come forth, in which all are dissolved, and in which all breathe? Brahman is called 'Tajja *īan*' in that context and this descriptive either, as Sankara interprets it, means as much. Such being the case, that is Brahman, by that statement, being thus accepted as everything that is there, it stands to reason that in whatever form worship might have been advised here and there, the object of that worship will have to be necessarily taken as Brahman alone and not anything else. It may be the case that the worshipable has been introduced in such cases with some determinate characters and attributes, which run counter to the notion of the indeterminate absolute reality, which is Brahman as the universal matrix. But those determinate qualities and characters will have to be understood as attributions incidental to the attitude and the situation of the worshiper, who wishes for fulfilment of certain purposes (*Kratu*) of his own, and invests the object of his worship and prayer with characters which provide for, or guarantee, the fulfilment of his wishes. So there is nothing unusual in such presentations of Brahman with determinate characters, and the presence of such imposed characters for not militate against the notion of Brahman as indeterminate and unqualified. Moreover, it can be seen that the characters which are attributed to the objects of worship and prayer are of such nature that, under the given circumstances, they can only fit in the context of Brahman as an absolute being<sup>43</sup>. Such attributes do not, as a matter of fact fit into the context of a bodied, and therefore, a determinate being<sup>44</sup>. Sankara, in this context has given a highly illuminating answer to a tricky point. If Brahman is all and everything and if Brahman is omnipresent, can it be said that Brahman is *not* in the body and the so called bodied being (*sarira*) is an absolute other of Brahman? The illumination answer given

by Sankara is: it is true that Brahman is in the body, but Brahman is not *limited* by the body, nor is Brahman there alone<sup>40</sup>. From B. S. 1.2.4. to 1.2.12 the discussion aims at explaining in various ways the difference as also the identity of the two forms of Brahman, determinate and indeterminate<sup>41</sup>. The determinate (*sarira*) is the very same as the indeterminate under adventitious limitations. The determinate does not have any separate reality and, in the way, separate identity. But all the same, in its apparent formation as a bodied Being, the determinate *is not* the indeterminate. *Śruti* texts have illustrated the difference between the two in diverse ways. The indeterminate is the goal of the determinate, where the determinate is an individual. To confuse between the two is confusing between *Karta* and *Karma*, between the seeker and the object of his search<sup>42</sup>. The *śrutis* have showed the difference sometimes by the use of words and expressions which mark out one from the other, sometimes by the use of different case-endings (*vibhakti*)<sup>43</sup>. This has also been corroborated in the *Smritis*<sup>44</sup>.

It is true that, in the *śruti*-texts, the worshipable has been spoken of as having very small dimension (*urbhaka*) and also as located in very limited space (*okas*), such as, *hrdayapundarika*, *sulagrama*<sup>45</sup>, etc. But that should not mislead one into believing that the worshipable advised is to be taken as a limited, determinate, or bodied being. Such apparent 'localisation' serves the purpose of mental concentration and facilitates intuitive realisation in a limited focus (locus) of the Absolute, which is as transcendent of that adventitious limitation as is the all-enveloping and all-pervasive Ether (*Vyomavat*)<sup>46</sup>. It has also been indicated in the *śrutis* that unlike the finite individual, a bodied Being, the worshipable is not an enjoyer of fruits of action, not subject to the law of Karma, but is rather the source of that law. The worshipable is, again, described as that which absorbs (*atta*) all movable and immovable things and beings within its own being. The worshipable has also been described as the unscrutable, that which is hidden in the cave and so, behind its cosmic appearances, and also as that, knowledge of which releases one from the bondage of life. It stands to reason then, that this worshipable can only be Brahman as itself and nothing else<sup>47</sup>.

The foregoing discussions bring home to us the necessity of the following considerations in ascertaining what would be the appropriate nature of the worshipable (*Upasya*) as depicted in the *śrutis*. (a) The *śruti* passages are not to be viewed isolatedly but in harmonious combination together, (b) The context or *prakaraṇa* which constitutes the relevance of the passages and throws light upon their meanings is to be carefully noted, (c) the descriptive epithets, used in respect of the worshipable as qualifying expressions, should be cautiously measured and their implications as regards the nature of the worshipable considered, (d) the relevance and the possible *need* of advising worship and devotional contemplation of God in certain local symbols, or in certain localised areas, should be considered with an open mind, (e) the type of fulfilment, the meditation, should also be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate nature of the worshipable meant in the Upanisads. When all these are done, Sankara assures us, we shall wake up to the realisation that the worshipable (*Upasya*), advised in the *śruti*-texts, is the very same absolute reality, such as, Brahman, and the determinate, specific and localised presentation of Brahman as an 'object' of devotional contemplation, will all be found to be only relative to the objective mode of approach, so characteristic of religion.

The *sūtras* examine four Upanisadic concepts of the worshipable in this connection. These concepts— the person seen in the eye (*akṣipuruṣa*), the inner controller (*antaryāmi*), the imperishable source of all things (*akṣara bhūtaḥ*), the universal soul (*Vaiśvanara*) are all considered in the light of the *śruti*-text which discusses about them. The final conclusion that the *sūtras* established after close examination and necessary circumspection is that the worshipable in all these forms can only be Brahman, the Absolute Being, and not anything else.



The concept of the *aksi-purusa* is introduced in the fifteenth *Khandaa* of the fourth *propathaka* of the Chandhyogya Upanisad. Upakosala Kamalayana is instructed by his teacher Satyakama Jabala that the person, seen in the eye is the Self, which is immortal and fearless. He advises contemplation of this Person as *samadvama* (regulator of all fruits of action), *Vamani* (bestower of all good) and as *bhumani* (the shining principle of all the worlds). The question arises, how can this being who is described as residing in the eye and therefore, who appears to be localised, be the Absolute Being? The reply given is that this local presentation is intended for concentration of the contemplator's minds so very necessary in the attitude of worship. There is nothing to quarrel about this. This mode of local presentation does not suggest, however, that the Being to be contemplated is essentially limited to the location and finite. Nothing short of the Absolute Being, Brahman, is capable of being described as *sanvadyama*, *Vamani* and *Bhumani*. A king of all kingdoms may also be described as the king of a particular kingdom without the suggestion of any absurdity<sup>31</sup>. Worshipping requires contemplation in some definite forms. *Śrutis* have, in many places, advised contemplation of the worshipable, although infinite, under necessary limitations of space, name and form. This does not militate against the idea that the worshipable is, in fact, an unlimited absolute Being. The instruction of the preceptor in this context, Sankara [points out, was to be effect that the worshipable was *prana* which was also *Kam* (bliss) and *Kham* (pervasive like ether) and that what *Kam* is as *Kham* and what *Kham*, again, *Kam*. This precludes Sankara observes, the possibility of identifying the worshipable either with ordinary pleasures (*Kam*) or with the elemental ether (*kham*), otherwise called the *bhutakasa*<sup>32</sup>. That it is the absolute Being, Brahman, which is being advised as the worshipable becomes evident if one looks at the nature of the attainment, the nature of the goal (*gati*), which is to follow such act of meditation. This goal is the very same that one knowing and realising Brahman can attain<sup>33</sup>.

The concept of '*Antaryamin*' is considered next. It can be seen that this concept is actually affiliated to the other concept, that is the concept of '*aksara bhutayoni*'. What is the inner-controller is also the imperishable (*aksara*) source of all elemental composites (*bhutayoni*). We may as well take the *śūtras* 1.2.18 to 1.2.23 together. The reason of their separate mention is that while the concept of *Antaryamin* is introduced more prominently in the seventh *Brahmana* of the third *āhnyasa* of the Brhadaranyaka, the concept of the '*Aksara*', besides being treated in the eight *Brahman* of the same Upanisad, is more elaborately and graphically explained in the Mundaka Upanisads from which quite a number of passages have been quoted by Sankara in his commentary on these *śūtras*.

The Brhadaranyaka texts speak of an indwelling inner-controller of all the worlds (*lokas*), of all gods, of all Vedas, of all sacrifices, of all elements, and of all bodies<sup>34</sup>. Who can be this worshipable described as the in-dweller and the inner-controller? The concept of an inner-controller, Sankara submits, is not commonly understood (*prasiddha*). We do not come across such a notion in conventional thought and speech. But from the various properties (*dharma*) associated with the notion it becomes evident that nothing other than the Absolute principle Brahman itself can be this *antaryamin*. Thus it is described as the *immortal Self*, as the *unknowable knower* of everything that is there, as devoid of any determinate form and colour (*rupadinina*), as that which does not have any separate organs, no separate effects either, but functions through all the organs which are there and is the uncaused causal principle guiding all phenomenal causes and their effects. Since this inscrutable subtle principle is described as intelligent and conscious, and is also designated as the Self (*Atma*), the supposition that this inner-controller and indwelling principle may as well be the *pradhana* of the Sankhya conception, is automatically ruled out<sup>35</sup> since, this inner-controller is described as the one seer (*drasti*) in ever being, and because it is said that there is really no knower,



no seer, other than this one, it is not possible to identify this inner-controller with any determinate knowing individual. The Mundaka texts describe this inner-controller as being also the imperishable root-principles of all things and beings – as the *aksara bhutayoni*. It is described there as invisible, ungraspable, without Gotra, without caste (*varna*), and, again, as eternal, all pervading, and exceedingly subtle<sup>42</sup>. The description of this root-principle, again, as omniscient (*sarvajña*), all-wise (*sarvavid*) and as the source of the Vedas (explained as *apara brahma* in the Mundaka, and of all names and forms, unerringly shows that it is the Absolute being, Brahman, which is indicated in these *śruti*s. So, the *antaryāmin*, the *aksara*, the *bhutayoni* to be worshipped or contemplated are only different descriptions of Brahman, the Absolute principle.

The remaining *sūtras* from B S. I 2.24 onwards deal with the concept of Vaisvanara introduced in course of the Eleventh and the successive *Ahandas* of the fifth *prapanchaka* of the Chandhyogya. The inquiry was initiated in respect of the universal Self. The inquirers all had different ideas about it and they approached Asvapati Kaikeya to give them the correct answer. He explained to them that although each of them was right insofar as part of this reality, the universal self was concerned. They were severally wrong again inasmuch as each considered his partial knowledge as the knowledge of the whole. In this connection, the concept of *vaisvanara* was introduced. All pervasive universal Self was described as located in sacrificial fire under different names and also in the fire located in the stomach which also bears different names and received oblations in the form of food eaten. There arise then, two tricky points in this discourse. (1) With what should one identify this *vaisvanara* – with the digestive fire, sacrificial fire, with the presiding deities of the elements as also of the different regions of cosmic whole, or with Brahman, the indeterminate absolute Self? (2) If *vaisvanara* is to mean the universal, indeterminate, absolute self, what sense can there be in the attempt at localising it in *this* or *that* section (*Pradesa*)? The reply given is – although the expression '*vaisvanara*' means in this context the universal Atman, and so Brahman, the *local localisation*, that is, localisation in *thought*, of the universal Self, the all-comprehensive reality in particular sectors or areas, is not absolutely out of place, since this fulfills the purpose of one mode or *upasana* (religious contemplation), technically called '*Sampad*', which consists in meditating upon a symbol or a limited object as if it were the same as the unlimited and so, the infinitely bigger object. The *sūtras* have attempted to justify this rendering on the authority of sages, such as, Asvāratha, Jaimini and Bādarī besides referring to the relevant *śruti*-texts in support of this contention.

The *sūtras* of the third *pada* of *Adhyāya* I, by and large, guide us to a new mode of inquiry, such as, contemplation in the subjective way. This opens up for the inquirer a new dimension of reality as an inner fact or content which may be known in an immediate way. Reality is, thus, presented as the *knowable* (*jñeya*) and not as the *worshipable*. Brahman, the Absolute reality, has actuality, been contemplated in the *śruti*s both in the objective mode as the worshipable and in the subjective mode as the individual's true and the larger self. Each mode of contemplation, it has been claimed, has its own distinctive kind of fruitfulness, and none is absolutely inconsequential. In the preamble to the so called *Anandamaya adhikarana*, Sankara discussed the type of fulfilment one may come by in the objective mode of contemplation as the worshipable. The objective mode necessitates taking Reality as an objective fact with qualities and characteristics answering to the needs and requirements of the worshipper and so far involves duality of the worshipper and the worshipped. This involves *avidyā* or misrepresentation insofar as the absolutely non-dual is presented here in a relation of duality. This also is a sequence in the nature of Reality itself and no external imposition by an agent having a situation outside the all-Reality, as some traditionalists would suppose. Worshipping (*upasana*) may take different forms with different kinds of fulfilment of ends in view. All forms of *upasana* aim at

advancement (*abhyudaya*) of some kind<sup>20</sup>. Some forms aid 'liberation' by stages (*kramamuktvarthani*, some forms aid attainment of desired fruits of actions, and so on. Sankara has insisted, however, that in all modes of worship it is the very same Absolute Being which is worshipped under different names and forms, and the qualities or distinctive natures which are attributed to it, are relative to the dispositional outlook and ethico-religious demand of the worshippers. The advancement, that one may get in contemplating the supreme reality in this objective mode of worship and prayer is of a varied nature and also admits of degrees. It is worth noting that Sankara does not deny efficacy and use of worship and prayer all together. We shall return to this topic in the next chapter. The more urgent issue in this context is, ascertaining the use and relevances of the other, that is the subjective mode of contemplation which forms the subject-matter of the this third *padu*. Is contemplation of Brahman as an inner content in the cognitive attitude free from duality of knower and known? Can it be that the absolute knowledge which the Advaita Vedanta accepts as the means of final release is just kind of knowledge in the subjective attitude?

It can be seen that the subjective mode of contemplation is complementary to the objective mode of contemplation. The mode of objective presentation is Brahman is all these, Brahman is everything that there is or moves, in being the ground from which all originate, in which all are sustained and into which all, again, disappear. The subjective mode opens up a new dimension by changing the direction of contemplation. Brahman, the ground of everything that is there, is now found to be an inner principle, the linking principle of everything, their very identity. This is brought out by the use of the word '*atman*' as a synonym of Brahman in innumerable passages of the *srutis*. The word '*atman*', as Sankara takes it in this context<sup>21</sup>, is not a descriptive word. Such descriptive word in the context is the word '*purusa*'. '*Purusa*' means a conscious dweller, the resident of a dwelling. The *sutra* 1.3.1 uses the word '*sva*' to signify in which way the word '*atman*' is to be taken. The word '*sva*' is, so to say, an identifying-word, that is, a word which brings together the apparently separate into a self-identity', and so, to a referential 'one-ness'. Sankara takes the word '*sva*' of the *sutra* to mean '*atma*' because it is this word which is repeated in the *srutis* and not the word '*sva*'. This is quite reasonable. A change from the descriptive 'Brahman' to the non-descriptive 'Atman' in the *srutis* is intended to suggest, as Sankara has felt, the '*samadhikaranya*' (unity of focus) of the express pluralities, their absolute identity.

This introduces us to the crucial and the tricky point - how should this absolute identity, the absolute one-ness of reality, its so called '*ekarasatva*' (one-ness of juice for taste, experienced one-ness) be taken to be? Sankara's exposition here has been traditionally interpreted to suggest that the identity or one-ness spoken of here is absolutely *rejective* of Brahman's appearance as the entire express order, and that this world-appearance of Brahman is to be regarded as illusory and false to get at the experienced one-ness or '*ekarasata*' of Brahman. As also previously indicated, we substantially differ from the above traditional interpretation, which we feel, is neither consistent with the texts nor is, again, amenable to reason. Sankara, we make bold to say, was not guilty of such extremism. What he rejects is the view, which by '*sarvam brahma*' (all is Brahman) understands that Reality is manifold (*anekatmaka*) and many-wise (*nanurasa*) just as a tree is understood as the combination of its trunk, branches and roots. The distinction of a tree into trunk branches and roots is incidental to an *outer* view of the tree, it involves no knowing of the tree as *itself*, that is, in its self-identity. In a similar way, knowing Brahman as distinguished in its many appearances, even as the unity of these differences, is not the right form of knowing - not the knowing of Brahman as the *ananta* (support or absolute one-ness) of all, not knowing Brahman as itself<sup>22</sup>. When it is said that Brahman is to be known (*vijneya*) as Atman, it is not meant, says Sankara, that Brahman as

characterised by the world of effects in their distinguished totality is all that is to be known. Such world of plural effects, distinguished among themselves, is incidental to *avidya* (mis-knowledge). Right knowledge consists in transmuting and transforming (*pravilapayanatah*) such phenomenal effects (effect-phenomena *karyaprapanca*) into the absolute one-ness (*ekameva-ayatanabhutam*) of the Self (Atman) and knowing it as of one non-dual taste (*ekarasam*). The pertinent question which arises here is 'does this knowledge of Atman or Brahman involve summary rejection or cancellation of Brahman's appearances?' The reply that has been traditionally given is that it does so involve. Right knowledge (*vidya*) involves knowing Brahman in a way absolutely different, and introduces one to the so called *svarupa-laksana* of Brahman. All this, however, is only a half-truth and like all half-truths, it is more misleading than the false. So not the *srutis* themselves advise taking *vidya* and *avidya* in their necessary distinction to get at the truth? Do they not denounce those who take an isolated and abstracted view of *vidya*? It can be seen that Vacaspati also does not, in this context, opt for *absolute rejection* of what is imposed by *avidya* (*avidyaropita*). What is to be rejected is the substantive and distinctive appearance of the plural, that is, the appearance which shows the plural as substantive realities in themselves. Thus, Vacaspati says, 'Whatever is imposed by *avidya* is substantially (*paramarthatah*) Brahman itself, not that Brahman is the plural appearances'. This is unexceptionable.

When elaborating upon the *sruti*-statement '*Tamevatkam janath atmanam*' (Mundaka 2.2.5)– 'know that self alone' in the context of B.S. 1.3.1., Sankara uses the expression '*tuvama ekamaya tanubhutam atmanam janatha*'. Again, he expresses '*ayatanabhutasya eva ekarasasya atmanah vijneyatvamupadisyate*'. Let us ask what is precisely meant by this '*ekamayatanubhutam atmanam*'? Does Sankara, or for that matter any relevant *sruti* text anywhere, mean that this self which is to be one *ayataka*' (abode, shelter, support ground) in an empty abstraction? Sankara introduces the analogy of an '*asana*' (seat) in which some one is seated and says that when we call for the seat when some one is seated, we do not call for the person but for the seat only. This is rather a rough analogy if we keep in view the fact that Brahman, which is, being described here as '*atman*', is a peculiar kind of '*asana*' from which the sitters cannot be thrown away or ejected all together, there being no other seat or support for such sitters anywhere else. As everything that is there, is supported on Brahman or the Self, is not the contemplation of the support (*ayataka*) here the contemplation of the support in which all are supported. Moreover, the relation of an '*asana*' (seat) to a person seated is external. Is the relation of Brahman to the world so blatantly external? What can, then, be Sankara's meaning? His exact meaning can be found if we consider, one after another, two alternative ways of contemplating Brahman *as all and everything*. These two ways may be described in the light of Sankara's own texts as contemplating in the way of *nanarasata*<sup>46</sup> and contemplating in the way of *ekarasata*. If this '*nanarasata*' and '*ekarasata*' are both taken in the context of Reality as a whole, the first would imply an identity-in-difference, which is basical to the *bhedabhed* –way of taking the reality, whereas, the second is the distinctive feature of Sankara's Advaita. According to the first, Reality experiences *expresses* itself in manyways without losing its self-identity, just as one and the identical individual, the very same person, may execute diverse functions, each one characteristic of his own peculiar personality. This, as we have explained already, is contemplating Brahman in the *objective mode*, so characteristic of ethico-religious approach. This does not give '*ekavasata*', here we have *nanarasata* instead. Sankara felt that this was *not* the final *truth-view* (*vidya*) contemplated in the Vedantic texts. The Upanisads clearly and unequivocally speak of '*ekarasata*', that is, Brahman or *Atman* being the One juice (*rasa*), one bliss (*ananda*), One non-dual enlightenment (*prajnana*). So the question arises how is this '*ekarasata*', this undivided experience, (let us say for the purpose of this specific presentation) *as a distinct fact and experience*,

secured ? Sankara is of the opinion that this is secured in the contemplation of '*amavaikamayatanaabhutam atmanam*'. Self-experience is different from experience as *other* or in and through others, even where these 'others' are diverse expression of the one. This necessitates *vamanadhikaranyā* – the diverse being *reduced* to the focal point of their *adhikaranyā* (locus or support or base,) otherwise called the '*ayatana*'. The express diversities (*prapanca*) are bracketed off thereby (*prapanca vitapananartham*), kept in suspended animation as it were. These are, in that situation disregarded and, in that sense, excluded, but not physically eliminated – as the traditionalists would like to take them. The very next *sūtra* 1.3.2. and Sankara's commentary on it being in a remarkable point scarcely noticed by the traditional interpreters. It is that we do not know Brahman as *Atman*, simply on the basis of *śruti*-sayings or *śruti*-description of Brahman as *that*. The more intimate and the crucial fact, however, is that release from bondage has been advised in a specific way, and this is realising Brahman as one's very Self. That Brahman is also the *Atman*, the Self of all, the *foundation* of all, the *basic reality*, the *substance*, the *identity* of all, is established from the fact of direct realisability of Brahman as *one Atman*. That there is no separate selves – substantive and plural, is also proved to be the essential truth of fact from this ultimate reducibility of the individual selves, – all apparent, to this *one* Self. That all are one indivisible Self, that reality is an absolute identity, that the appearances are 'mere' appearances, *not* substantivities, *neither* real *nor* unreal, is also established in course of the very same realisation. That this is taking the '*asana*', where Devadatta sits<sup>47</sup>, without *involving* Devadatta in the process. This is the true meaning of Sankara's analogy. There has been no call for *blowing up* Devadatta magically. *Which knowledge cannot achieve*. Knowledge may *disregard* appearances, *ignore* them even where they are there, to secure a view of reality *as itself*. Sankara has not brought in a blank absolute, his system does not involve any magic. It will be shown that '*māyā*' and '*avidyā*' are '*expedients of explanation*' and that Sankara really does not introduce a magician Absolute in his system. The fact is truth is, at times, stranger than fiction, and Reality or truth, advocated by the Upanisads, is of such a nature that it can be rendered in intelligible by *suitable analogies* only. The concepts of *Māyā* and *Avidyā* are analogies of this kind, and it is foolish to debate upon what could or could not be their locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*), – as Ramanuja and others have argued in oppositions, and the post-Sankarites have argued in defence. The entire thing has been an exercise in ignorant futility.

As we have already stated, the *sūtras* of the third *pāda* change the direction of the quest from the outer objective way to the inner subjective way. But a mere advice for contemplation in this inner way does not deliver *tattva-jñāna* in the ultimate sense. The *śrutis* are here an *informative* knowledge in a new direction. The seeker of liberation (*mumukṣu*) is introduced to a new dimension of enquiry. The *śruti* is *indirect pramāṇa* and gives a knowledge of information, not of direct realisation. It is nonsense to talk about *Śrutis* to give direct knowledge of self-realisation. This last is to *follow upon* the knowledge of indirect information and it is to follow at the end of necessary contemplation by the individual himself. The instruction of the Acharyas and *śrutis* are, to be sure, necessary prerequisites. To lead to the goal such pre-requisites depend upon pre-requisites of the individual himself.

Brahman as the *Atman* is next introduced by the *sūtra* 1.3.8 as the '*bhūma*', It is only when Brahman is regarded in the way of self-identity, *as itself*, as the '*ayatana*' of all and everything, we are introduced to this '*vision beautiful*'. *Bhūma* is described in the *śruti* as that, where in there is nothing else (*anyat*) to be seen, heard or known. The opposite, that-where in there is something else to be seen, heard or to be known, is the limited (*alpa*). It follows, then that this is necessarily *ekarasa*, and this concept can only be applied to Brahman as '*ayatana*' of the cosmic pluralities provided that these pluralities no longer appear in self-distinction but are all *submerged* or dissolved in the

self-identity of Brahman as itself, as Atman. The *śrutis* declare that there is *sukha* (happiness only) in the *Bhuma* (limitlessness). There can be no proper happiness (no freedom and absolute relief) in any determinate condition where pluralities show themselves. The *sūtra* under consideration indicates this *bhuma* state as beyond *susupti* (dreamless sleep). This seems to give an idea as to what the state of *ekasata* is to be. In the dreamless, a negative condition, all varieties appearing in the waking and dream states are suspended and happiness in the sense of a feeling of relief, incidental to lapsing of all agitational pulls, is experienced. In the state beyond this *susupti*, there is to be an experience of unbounded happiness, of bliss or absolute freedom, and this is Brahman as itself, that is, the state of absolute self-identity experienced by the liberated in the realisation of Brahman as the one Atman. This, then, is a *positive* state, and this one reason why it is called *reality-experience*<sup>1</sup>. The point to settle, in this context, is can this state be contrived to mean a *negative* state in which the multifarious presentation of cosmic pluralities (*prapañca*) is *physically eliminated*, all together rejected and thrown out? It seems that there can be nothing more absurd than this, – although this is the view which the traditionalists, all men of unimaginable erudition, have attempted to defend by logical hair-splitting. One analogy from the *śruti*, quoted by Sankara himself, will suffice to prove the legitimacy of our contention. Thus it is said 'As a lump of salt would dissolve right into the water, without there being any interior or exterior, and the entire would be all salty, so, lo, verily, is this atman, without interior or exterior, just a mass of pure consciousness (*prajñana*)<sup>2</sup>. It appears that the illustrious traditional interpreters were all seized with the wickedness to render expressions such as *anuvinasyati*<sup>3</sup> as meaning *destruction* or annihilation of the *prapañca* in the Absolute one, we would, with all humility, ask them to compare this '*anuvinasyati*' with '*abhissamixanti*' in the *taittiriya*. The apprehension that the Absolute would get saturated by the modalities of the cosmic many is foolish. Did not all such modalities *arise* from the Absolute, was there any separate ground or source? Does not all salt arise from the salty main? Do the separate lumps of salt, then, change the taste of sea-water? Was sea-water ever other than salty? It is very characteristic that Sankara when speaking of dissolution of *prapañca* uses the expression '*pravatopana*'<sup>4</sup> and not *pravilopana*, even though '*vilopana*' would not have been totally inappropriate to suggest 'non-appearance in distinct form'. In the context of Sankara Vedānta, therefore, 'appearances do not appear' should mean that they do not appear as *appearances*, do not appear as substantives either. It does not mean their substantial annihilation. Substance remains unaffected and this substance has to be contemplated as '*āyatana*' and '*bhuma*'.

The *sūtras*, next, introduce us to the notion of '*aksara*', which Yajñavalkya, in reply to Gargi's question, maintained as that across which '*akasa*' (which supports all else) is itself woven, ward and wool<sup>5</sup>. This is described as the imperishable (*aksara*). It as the *śrutis* say, consumes nothing soever and no own soever consumes it. At the command of this Imperishable, Yajñavalkya tells Gargi, all objects of the manifest order behave in a well-regulated way, and all things are as they are. The *sūtras* 1.3.10 to 1.3.13 explain why this Imperishable (*aksara*) has to be taken to stand for the supreme Brahman, and contemplated as that. Negatively, the *sūtras* explain why '*aksara*' in the context of the above *śruti*-texts, cannot be taken to mean the alphabet (*Varṇa*) or '*pradhana*', the unconscious immanent material cause discussed in the Sāṅkhya view. It is true that there are *śruti*-texts<sup>6</sup> where the word '*aksara*' has been used to designate the *pranava* or '*omkara*'. But that does not mean that the word '*aksara*' cannot be used to mean Brahman as itself. '*Om*' has been accepted as a symbol for the contemplation of Brahman, both in the '*para*' and the '*apara*' aspects. Therefore, if one takes *aksara* to mean *pranava*, it does not make any substantial difference. It can be seen that it is the fourth quarter of the *pranava* which corresponds to the Brahman in the *para*-aspect. And this is Brahman as itself, that is, Brahman as the '*Atman*' but since, the word, in the context of the



Bṛhadaranyaka means the imperishable (eternal) and all-pervasive *sarvavyapi*, *aksara* means Brahman as itself, that is, as the *ayatana*, the *bhuma*, the *atman*. It can be seen that there is a logical link among these various descriptions of the ultimate reality, since it is not as the express order, which is mutable, but as the substance and support of everything, that Brahman can be described as *aksara* and also contemplated as that

But this ultimate reality, the substance and support of all, is not any far-off object. The previous descriptions might mislead us into believing that it is so. But we are dealing with a reality which has no inside and no outside. Are not all things woven warp and woof across it? How can anything be without it? Does not the eternal, the all-pervasive and the all-enveloping, cover all, and pulsate through all its apparently determinate parts? This aspect of the truth is next brought out in the notions of '*dahara*' and the '*angusthamatrapurusa*'. Both of these are small and limited in appearance, no doubt. The expression '*dahara*', literally, means "of small measure - *clpa*'. The '*angustha purusa*' is also like that. But, as the *sutra* 1.2.7 has already brought to light, contemplation in small and limited space does not mean that the *thing contemplated* is also small and limited. From the contexts, and as also considered in the light of the explanation of the nature of the worshipable reality that has been given in successive statements, it becomes clear that both '*dahara*' or '*duharakasa*' and '*angusthamatrapurusa*' are emblems of the very same Absolute, their presentation in the given way as also the contemplation of them in such forms is incidental to the fact that in such forms only, Reality can be immediately contemplated is a human affair". So also is the urge for knowledge and liberation. Of course, one should have necessary qualification for this contemplation so that contemplation may be effective and fruitful. It is in this connection that the question whether gods who are above human beings and *sudras* who form a part of the human species are qualified for this kind of knowledge has been raised and discussed. It has been argued that the *sudras*, who do not have initiation and are not, therefore, qualified for Vedic studies, are, for that reason, disqualified. This restriction of qualification or *adhikara* need not, however, be construed as a measure involving racial discrimination. It can be seen that it is not so much the express caste-label as the type of mental disposition and value-sense, involving gross worldly mindedness and disregard for truth, which seems to have come in for censure. Jabala Satyakama, as we know from the anecdote, is accepted by his preceptor as a Brahmin although his *gotra* is unknown, simply because he did not shirk from telling a truth of which very few would be capable. The *Ksatra* king Janasruti, on the other hand, is admonished by the sage Raikva as a *sudra* for no other consideration than his bringing rich gifts to that sage in the belief that such gifts would work as an inducement for imparting *brahma-vidya* to him.

Towards the end of the third *pada* of Adhyaya, there are good many *sutras* which being in a medley of notions mentioned in the different *sruti*-texts as the symbolic forms for the contemplation of Brahman. This, then, gives rise to the question, if it is the Supreme Brahman which is advised for contemplation under such forms and symbols or some thing else. Sankara has, in this connection, given us a guidance which is remarkable indeed. Thus in his commentary on B. S. 1.3.19 he has expressed that if the *end* or goal realisable through any such contemplation is to be *liberation*, that is, release from the bondage of life, there should not be any doubt or confusion on the point since it is only by contemplating and finally *realising* Brahman, the Supreme Self, as the one reality and one identity of everything phenomenal, that liberation can be had and through no other means-external, or internal. Even where some inner form or principle has been advised in the *srutis* for contemplation in the subjective attitude as one's self, there should not arise any confusion as to whether it is the *jivatman*, that is, the self-sense associated with the individual's own body and the sense-



organs which has been advised as what is to be contemplated and known or it is the supreme self, such as, Brahman. In the Vedanta, and according to the Upanisadic teachings, says Sankara, there are no two selves or plural selves. That alone is the true self the realisation of which ensures immortality and absolute fearlessness (*abhaya*). This is the truth of fact which Sankara in the concluding sentence of his *Adhyasabhasya* projected as the one object and aim of the *Satirakamimamsa*. The dichotomy of the Absolute Self and the individual Self, does not make any sense in the Vedanta context. Thus Sankara expresses 'it is the one supreme lord (*paramesvara*) immutable, eternal and of the nature of consciousness (*viññanadhātu*), who under the guise of *avidya* (*avidyamāyaya*) appears (*vibhāvayate*) in many forms, such as, a magician would have done (*māyavivat*), there being no other, no second such conscious principle (*viññanadhātu*) anywhere'<sup>14</sup>. A little below Sankara further explains 'in the Supreme Self which is one unattached, immutable and eternal, and which is by nature, eternally pure, enlightened, free and the Truth itself, just the opposites kind of formations, such as, the plural individuals, come to be in is constructed (*parikalpita*) almost in the same way that various forms of Kimpurities and bottom etc come to be misperceived in the formless, colourless *ākāśa* (sky)<sup>15</sup>. From this Sankara derives two essential points of his argument - (a) the *existential difference* of the Supreme Self from individual selves and plural appearances, and (b) the essential *non-difference* of the individual selves and plural appearances from the supreme indivisible and unitary reality. This is done without prejudice to the conventional belief of mankind in the substantivity of the plural individuals and their mutual distinction. The question that arises in this connection is, in what way should one understand this *imagining* or ignorant manipulation of, pluralities in the immutable and indivisible *one*? If the cosmic appearance of pluralities is a matter of ignorant manipulation (*parikalpita*), who, or what factor, is responsible for this?

The Sankarite expression '*Vibhāvayata*'<sup>16</sup>, used in this context, is indeed very significant. It will be idle to imagine that this manipulation of the plural and mutually distinguished names and forms has any source *outside* the All-reality, such as, Brahman. As we have consistently maintained all through out, this is no case of ignorant human manipulation, *independent of the kind of sequence which obtains, atleast, in one of the aspects of the All-reality itself*. Not that as human individuals we do not look upon our bodies, senses and our individual feelings based upon our 'ego' as very very real and true. But the fact to be calmly contemplated is this: if we superimpose the not Self (*anatma*) on the True Self (*atma*) and superimposed that blurred and individuated self, as vidyārany<sup>17</sup> would like to put it, upon the not-self, it is *not because* we are the original sinners, doing a thing out of our own choice, but, only because this kind of action and reaction has already been provided by the Reality, engendering a spell of ignorance and confusion antecedently, and we only mimic the roles that have been provided for us. The Vedanta, it can be seen, is a systematic and critical assessment of all kinds and dimensions of felt experiences.

Besides the kind of experiences we normally and conventionally have, there are the experiences of an all together different nature which the Upanisads have attempted to articulate in verbal symbols. Experiences, roughly speaking, explore four dimensions of conscious life—the waking, the dream-state, the dreamless state, and the transcendental state of ecstatic experiences. All these are actually there. In the light of the *śruti*s, the Vedanta, as a philosophical system, attempts to give a *connected* and *cogent* metaphysical account of these all.

To facilitate an intelligible account of the states-of-affairs which obtain in some way or other, and are revealed in experiences of different levels, a medley of analogies and specific sets of metaphors have been used in the Vedanta presentation of the case. All these happen to be conceptual innovations

designed to function as 'aids' to proper comprehension of the theme which is being articulated. Not only Sankara the commentator, and Badarayana, the Sutrakara, but even the *śrutis* themselves take the help of analogies and metaphors to bring home to the listener the truths of facts, which would all remain uncommunicable and unintelligible if not expressed in the way they have been expressed. There is thus, the danger of misrepresentation and misunderstanding if every expression is interpreted *literally* or *entitatively*. To hasten our understanding, the theme of Brahman has been presented in the *sūtras* in a graduated measure. To our conventional understanding and top philosophy of common sense, what is, there, is simply a state of inter-related facts, plural objects and plural individuals, – all separate and mutually distinguished. There all are looked upon as substantive reals. An attempted causal explanation by reference to any supposed first cause, primal source, or ultimate ground – (whatever logical ineptness or inadequacy it might be shown to involve judged in the Kantian way) achieves one very essential purpose. It shows the pluralities, all connected as events or moments of some underlying principle and helps understanding of them all as belonging to a system. Where such causal account is based upon *postulatory reason* and inference, there remains the scope for alternative theorizing, and there can be no final adjudication as to which particular hypothesis gives the truth-view and so, can be accepted as unrivalled and decisive. Sankara has argued as much in the Tarkapada, of his commentary. The Vedanta case, as we have explained, is, however, different. The causal account which it endorses is not postulational. It is based on express *śruti*-statements which embody revealed intuitions<sup>79</sup>. What is the deliverance of this revealed testimony? It is like 'Whatever is there, that all is Brahman', and that this is to be contemplated tranquilly as '*Tajjalan*'<sup>80</sup>. From this great Being have all these been breathed forth<sup>81</sup>. In the beginning, this (all) was just one pure existence (*being*) without a second. It be thought to itself 'would that I were many. Let me procreate myself'. All (*bhūtaṇi*) arise from *ananda*, in *ananda* all creatures (*jātāṇi*) conduct themselves and live, and when disappearing (returning), they again, enter into this *ananda*<sup>82</sup>. Whereby what has not been heard of, becomes heard of, what has not been thought of, becomes thought of, what has not been has not understood becomes understood<sup>83</sup>. Just as by one lump of clay everything made of clay may be known the modification being merely a verbal distinction, a name only<sup>84</sup>, and the reality being just the clay, – All these, and a host of similar other statements, go to suggest the development of the pluralities, distinguished in respect of their names and forms (*nama-rupa*), out of one primal source, which, *as itself*, is indeterminate, nameless and formless, and has to be cognised by a series of negations (*apavada*) of everything determinate and definable. A lay interpreter may be misled into thinking that these statements of the Upanisads are narrations about a process of creation or evolution *in time*. But such is absurd on the very face of it. How can one place himself in the ultimate beginning of *all* things, being himself an event in the very same emergent process? The absurdity of the supposition of a *first* beginning *in time* was known to these ancient people, and this becomes clear even from a cursory look at the hymn of creation<sup>85</sup>. In what way, then, was the primal beginning of things, determinate with names and forms, ascertained, if the very talk about such first beginning is ridiculous and absurd? This leads us to different view of the approach, made, to a retrospection, not horizontal but vertical. This mode of retrospection, which is in essence a reflective process in depth-analysis, is not *ordinarily* given to us. There is the need for some special training. This demand for special training need not create the impression that the process involved is too esoteric. Do not the various analogies and metaphors used, suggest that an attempt was being seriously made to make intelligible what is ordinarily not so? The method followed is analogous to critical reflection, analogous even to the transcendental reflection which Kant used in his three critiques to bring into clear relief what he thought to be the conditions *a priori* of our triple forms of conscious experiences.

The Upanisads have frequently been described as *rahasyavidya* (secret knowledge)<sup>36</sup> That description may be correct once we consider the kind of supersensuous intuition which is involved here in the discovery of the truth, once we consider the type of truth-perception the statements all struggle to put forth. But it will be a misrepresentation a rancour and calumny if it is maintained that an attempt was ever made by the *seers* of the Upanisads to improvise screening and shielding a 'dogma' on the plea that the truth spoken of is a matter of blind animal faith, and no matter for ratio-cination or rational contemplation. If the truth, spoken about, has been described as subtle, inscrutable, incomprehensible, beyond thought and speech, it is because it is comprehended, as incomprehensible, because it is *known* as literally unknowable, it is because what is to be realised in an immediate way cannot be adequately expressed in term of conventional mode of knowledge and speech. A truth of realisation is such a content that it creates its own modes of self-expression in thought and speech, and refuses to remain in concealment. But the fact is 'its modes of self-expression in thought – concepts and linguistic symbols tend to keep it concealed in their meshes, in their cover, if no attempt is to tap them in the proper way – to get at their meaning and purport. The exhortation one comes across the passage 2.5. of the Svetasvatara and the passages such as 3.8 to 3.21 of the same Upanisad will clearly testify to the inspirational character of most of the upanisadic verses – to the spontaneous outpourings of truth-realisation, which refuses to lie quiet and dormant, and erupts with the force of an awakened volcano, as it were.

The Upanisadic tracts are, partly, such out-pourings of minds possessed by truth-realisation and partly, narratives of realised truths presented in the conversational form. Infants these supplement one another. As the *sutras* raise philosophical issues out of them, a commentator, like Sankara, elaborates upon the themes raised by those *sutras* with an eye to a systematic presentation of whole – the philosophy of the entire Vedanta. In this, every commentator should be allowed certain latitude to use analogies and metaphors, to improvise terms and concepts, which in his opinion, help clarification of issues. A commentary has to be a 'constructive interpretation' if it is not to degenerate into a verbal rendering of the words and expressions of the text.<sup>37</sup>

The Vedantic truth has been conveyed through two propositions. These are (1) All that is there is Brahman, and (2) *Brahman is Atma*. As regards the first, one may ask 'how is this known? Regarding the second also, the very same question may be raised 'how is this known? The reply that these truths are accepted on faith or are known on the testimony of the *srutis*, which embody revealed doctrines, does not carry us very far. The Question will be 'how do the *srutis* themselves know? What credentials are there to back the claim that the *srutis* might have known these truths even as a possibility? The merit of the Vedanta doctrine as expounded and elaborated by Sankara is that a *prima facie* case has been made in support of this *sruti*-claim to the *knowledge of truth*. That all that is there is Brahman and that one self-identical principle has manifested itself in diverse forms which make up the world are equivalent statements. This is known by progressive expiration of what may be decided upon as the substance, the '*ayatana*' the absolute ground of all things by reflective analysis of a special kind. This is done in a state of calm contemplation (*tapas*). Five state of existence is traversed one after another and transcended the *annamaya*, *pranamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijñanamaya*, and *anandamaya*. By this kind of bracketing off the various strata of existence it is found that each succeeding is the inner reality and support of each preceding. The final vision obtained is that the ultimate base is '*ananda*', the boundless and the absolutely indeterminate and free, while all others are determinate, qualitative, specified, limited and bound in varying degrees. This knowledge of truth has been passed on to us under the name '*Bhargavi Varuni Vidya*', as Bhrgu succeeded in getting at

this truth under the guidance (indirect) of his father and preceptor Varuna. This discovery, as we all know, was to be made by the individual himself by his own effort and all that the guide did is asking the inquirer to persist more and further in his effort by means of calm contemplation, indirectly suggesting that what he had so far known was *not* the truth (*neti, neti*). It is remarkable also that when the final truth of fact was revealed that carried its own confirmation and there was no urge for seeking confirmation from the mouth of the guide or preceptor. The *Bhargavi varuni vidya*, the *Sandityavidya*, the *Uddalaka svetakatu vidya* the *Yajnavalkya-Maitreyi*, *Yajnavalkya-gargi*, *Yajnavalkya-Janaka vidya* or the *vidya* propagated by Pippatada in the progressive instructions to his disciples and so on, illustrate the progressive exploration of the ultimate reality-principle underlying all cosmic expressions, living and non-living. The Yama-Naciketa discourses in the Katha, the Brahma Atharvan instruction in the Mundaka, the Balaki-Ajatasatru episode in the Kausitaki, the Sakyayanya—Brihadratha episode in the Maitri, and countless others, all illustrate this progressive exploration of the ultimate ground of all things. The point of singular interest in these narrations is, however, that no where was there the *bid for discovering a root-principle, historically primitive* from which a creative or an evolutionary process could be supposed to *have begun in time*. There is a gulf of difference between the logically prior and the historically or temporarily prior, as also between a *necessary* presupposition and a contingently prior event. The ultimate ground of all cosmic pluralities described in the Upanisads is the logical prior, a necessary or transcendental presupposition. No temporal sequence of priority and posteriority obtains in the relation of this kind between the ground and what is talked of as its phenomenal appearances. Time -relation may very well be imagined as obtaining among the phenomena themselves but not between the reality and its phenomenal expressions.

There is some important reasons at the back of the above conclusion. There is wide difference between the *supposition* of the *historically first* cause, even between an inferential postulation of what can be reasonably admitted as the prime matrix of prime elements, and what is *transcendentally deduced*, reflectively ascertained through a gradual process of bracketting off, or *known* as ultimate through an exploratory process of successive negations (*neti neti*), which, in the Vedantic usage, goes by the name '*apavada*'. The former is the way a hypothesis or a postulate functions. The latter is the way that the Vedantic investigation has taken to discover the ultimate ground, the basic unrejectable *prius*. That reality, (Brahman) is *not annamaya, pranamaya, manomaya, vijñanamaya*, even *anandamaya*, that it *is ananda* itself, that it is *not the vikaras* (modifications), but is the *aksara* (immutable) or *Kutastha*, the substance and truth (*satyam*) underlying them all, that it *is pure*, formless, indivisible being itself (*sat*), that it *is the self-shining, self-luminous consciousness itself*, the *svuprakasa* (self revealing) behind and beyond the dependently revealed, – the manifested, that *is not the objectively presented or 'given'*, but *is the transcendental subject, the witness (saksi* of the world of mutable pluralities—all these truth-visions have been arrived at in the latter mode of progressive exploration of the given order of experience. It *cannot be said* that the given order of pluralities, of distinguishable subjects and objects, are *not so given*. The Vedanta of Sankara did not make this as any point of contention. What it was looking for, is : what can be that *which is so given in the varied way* ? It is the same *as it appears* or *it appears as it appears*, and *is more than the appearances* ? It can be seen that in the transcendental analysis which the quest for Brahman involves, the appearances are progressively sorted out as *appearances*, and while their reality-claim, their claim to be the ultimate prius, is rejected, they are *not rejected as appearances also*. This is the reason why at the end of the investigation as to what is Brahman *as itself*, and the discovery that Brahman is *ananda*, there is *re-acceptance* and attempted accommodation of all the five strata

of appearances in the praise and commendation of the grossest among them, the *annam*<sup>74</sup>. Thus, in the final view or assessment, there is *extradition* and *accommodation* side by side. The reason .s. That Brahman is Brahman, that is, that Brahman is *all* and *everything* is to be meaningful in two ways (1) Brahman is the *substance*, the immutable *core* of everything that appears there, and (2) that Brahman encompasses and covers up everything since all are *its* appearances, and the appearances do not have any alternative locus or mooring for themselves. Such a relation between Reality and its appearances, between the primal ground and its phenomenal expressions, cannot be justifiably viewed in a relation of temporal sequence between an antecedent fact and its consequent. This seems to be the reason why the emergence of cosmic pluralities, the so called creative or evolutionary process, is described as *beginningless* (*anadi*), and not because there is to be an infinite process, blind (*andha*), or enlightened as in the classical illustration of rotatory causation between the seed and the sprout (*vijankuravat*), which even Sankara has introduced at some places.

It may be argued. Do not the *srutis* themselves speak of temporal sequence, indicating Brahman or Atman as the historically or chronologically the very 'first' thing in the order of being and becoming? How should one take uddalaka's extortion to his son, Svetaketu<sup>75</sup>, *Sadeva, sanmyo, idamagra asit ekamevadvytiyam* (in the beginning, My dear, all this was 'Sat' (existence or being as such) only? How should one understand the Aitareya<sup>76</sup> statement '*atma va idameka evagra asit manyat kincana misat* (The self it is that was there in the beginning, none else ever winked)? How, again, to take the Brhadaranyaka saying<sup>77</sup> '*Atmaivedamagra asit purusavidhah* (in the beginning, this was the Self only in the form of a person)'? Does not the word '*agra*, meaning and what was before' suggest that there was an ultimate or first beginning in the cosmic process as such? Our reply to that is such literal rendering here would be ridiculous, giving rise to fundamental distortion of the issues involved. What can be the sensible meaning in saying that in the beginning there was X? It x was there *already* could that be any *beginning at all* any *absolute beginning*? Or can it be that the meaning is that the *beginning itself* began with X as already given there alone? If so, what sort of a beginning is that? Does 'beginning' here mean *beginning of the world* as a cosmic process of evolution or creation? Does it mean that X was there, but Y, the cosmic order of plural appearances, or the order of plural things and beings, *was not there*? Does it mean that a '*That*' the ground, was there, but the '*this*', – the *consequent* was not there? It can be seen that this would be supposing the absurd. How can the '*that*' be a *ground* if what is called the consequent was not already *grounded* or *flowing from it*? Does a ground require to be there *at first*, and *there after*, start functioning *as the ground*? It can be seen that the sequence here is only a mode of speech, nothing factual. This is only a conventional usage to suggest that X *is the ground* of Y, that Y arises from x, or it is x which has *become* Y or has *appeared* as y, – more correctly, it is x which *appears* as y, not what *has appeared* or *appeared* as y. The entire thing is a linguistic mode of narrating or describing a relation. It can be seen, then, that when the Vedanta speaks of creation or evolution as a beginningless process (*anadipravaha*), it speaks *literally*. The suggestion is not that the world-process is of unknown or unascertainable beginning, but that it *has no* beginning at all, and that any 'demand for tracing any historical beginning is, one the very fact of it, absurd and without relevance. In a situational analysis of the several depths of existence, some strata are found to be logically prior to others insofar as the latter involve or *presuppose* the former. To put opposite wise, some strata seem to show the 'inner' arrangement, the substance (in a relative sense) of the others. So the relation between them is not one of temporal Priority or posteriority at all. Such being the case, when the *srutis* declare that the primal Being (what was alone there) be though<sup>78</sup> to itself 'may I be many, let me procreate myself into many names and forms', it will be exceedingly foolish to take such statements literally. The



description or narration in such a mode or manner has to be taken as a 'necessary misuse' of language which serves the limited purpose of safe-guarding against mistakes and confusions of a still graver nature. In the Vedantic parlance, such descriptions, have been rightly interpreted as *adhyaropa* the narration of an 'as if' fact or sequence. All that is intended by the Speaker or narrator in the above context, is that the plural facts, having distinct names and forms, – the 'many', are neither to be absolutely rejected as *not being there* at all in any sense, or in any way, nor should we look for some alternative ground for them, that is, look for some cause, *other than* the Absolute one to account for their being there. But, we are to understand that they are there because, reality itself, *as it were, wanted them all* to be also there, that is, because reality, *in some way*, expresses or manifests itself in the variety of forms *without detriment* to its self-identity. It is to exclude tenability of rival metaphysical doctrines regarding the ultimate ground of the express order of cosmic pluralities that the *srutis* introduced metaphors such as *Ikṣita*, *Kamayihā*, *antaryamih*, *srasta*, *purusa*, etc. The intention was to lead us to the notion of a ground which way to be both the *Upadana* and *mnistakarana*, both the material and the efficient cause, combined into one *absolutely sufficient* ground. To get at this the reality itself in its absolute immutability (*Kutastha*), that is, at the reality as the substance, as the true and absolute identity of all cosmic pluralities, it was necessary to proceed by way of *apavada* (series of negation – 'neti' 'neti'). But now to cover up the whole, to assimilate the plural, that is, all that there seem to be, the opposite movement, by way of *adhyaropa*, becomes, necessary as it facilitates easy grasping of the situation. All is Brahman, and Brahman is all and everything that seems to be there – these are readings of the self-same situation but the techniques that facilitate understanding of his truth of fact have to be different. Sankara had the rare genius to discover these clues to harmonious interpretation of the *sutras*, and also the *sruti*, texts to which the *sutras* refer.

But the statements regarding the absolute truth of fact such that Brahman is *all* and everything, and that all that seems to be there, is *essentially, substantially* and *truly* Brahman and nothing else, need further substantiation, even further elucidation. This is facilitated by the other Vedantic statement, such as, *Brahman is Atman* or, as expressed otherwise, '*atma ca Brahma*'; Apart from the fact that such is what the *srutis* declare, there is to be found a necessary logical, nay, even a metaphysical point, also, let us ask: what can be a logical as also an existential, and so, factual, clue, to the understanding of a fact of *absolute identity*? That a mango is a mango, that A is always A, is a tautology. But even the ordinary *empirical* fact that 'I am myself' is not a tautology. 'I am what I am,' is a tautology. But that I am *myself*, a *felt* identity, is an empirical datum, not a mere repetition of usages or expressions. The Vedantic proposition 'All is Brahman', of 'Brahman is all' was not intended to be a tautology, verbal or logical. It was intended to be an *experience*, an absolutely uncontradicted experience in the long run, – an absolute *truth-experience*. To be identical is to be *itself*. The concept of the 'self' is thus necessarily involved in an attempted *explanation* of any fact of *identity*. The *identity*, of all with Brahman which the statement 'all is Brahman' implies, is realised in the realisation of Brahman as the *Atman*, as the one Self, of all and everything. From the viewpoint of the empirical person himself, such mode of that. Thus, that Brahman is Atman, or Atman is Brahman, is a necessary aspect of the truth that Brahman is all, and all is Brahman. In other words, the type of relation which is intended to be conveyed by Brahman is all, and all, again, Brahman, becomes logically clear and metaphysically established when it is pointed out that Brahman is really *Atman Atma ca Brahma*.

That Brahman is Atman, as described in the *sruti*-texts, is arrived at by a process of reductive analysis, reducing all appearances to their ultimate base (*ayatana*), immutable (*Kutastha*), self-



dependent and absolutely indivisible (*ekarasa*)<sup>21</sup> That Atma is Brahman, that (*Tvam*) is 'Tai', that the limited 'I' gets a radical transfiguration in the one and absolute Self, is ... realisable in an empirical and immediate way in Self-realisation. The *śrutis* provide a glimpse into the 'fruitfulness' of this latter process of lapsing into the indeterminate, and the 'factuality' of this latter process of lapsing into the indeterminate, and the 'factuality' of the opposite process of growing into the determinate progressively. In its analysis of the *four strata* of conscious being, the waking, the dreaming, the dreamless state, and the transcendental state called the '*turiya*'. We shall review briefly this analysis in the contexts of relevant *sūtras* of the third Adhyaya. But before that we shall attempt a brief survey of the meanings Sankara himself intended to ascribe to the concepts, such as, *Māyā* and *Aviśyā*, *Saguna Brahma* and *Nirguna Brahman*, *Tatastha lakṣaṇa* and *Svarūpa lakṣaṇa*.

It has been our contention all through out that the *śrutis*, the *sūtras*, and the commentaries based upon them, may use homely analogies and metaphors to render themes intelligible if these are unintelligible otherwise. In purely logical elaborations also, symbols and notations are freely used without the danger of these being accepted as facts in themselves. It is not a fact that the word '*Ātma*' nowhere occurs in the Upanisads. Whether the word has been used there in the sense or meaning that Sankara has given to it is an irrelevant point for the uneducated vulgar to quarrel about. The relevant point is, if the Upanisadic theme is capable of being brought out as a whole, and intelligibly presented, with all its niceties and insightful depths remaining unimpaired, without the use of this concept. It will be seen that those who took exception to this concept being need, understood neither the Upanisads as a whole, nor Sankara's meaning of the concept (*Ātma*). Not that all classical interpreters or protagonists of Sankara Vedānta themselves correctly grasped what the master was about. Here we shall not make a catalogue of the mistakes committed by many of them. Sankara's Reality, or for that matter, the Absolute of the Upanisads, which is Brahman is exceedingly peculiar in several respects. It not only *is there*, but it also *makes itself known* in different phases. Since this knower, on the ultimate analysis, is not, again, a separate fact having a location outside Reality, this knower, in one respect, turns out to be the Brahman itself, and 'this knowing' turns out to be a part of Brahman's self-revelation. This revelation, otherwise called 'manifestation', has several phases. (1) There is the *ignorant* knowing, in which the plural subjects and objects pose as substantive reals in themselves, and are apprehended in that way, and Brahman, as itself, hides 'himself' in outer and phenomenal forms. This may be called the phase as *ajñāna* (ignorance), – the *make believe*. This makes room for this second phase (2) when all phenomenal pluralities are looked upon as *effects* of Brahman as the cause, or the creator. This, then, is the phase of dualism while the other one was of unmitigated pluralism. Brahman, at this phase, may be looked upon in two ways, that is, as the (a) *nimitta kāraṇa* only, that is, as an intelligent agent, designing the order of pluralities out of a matrix, – a material stuff somehow related to Him, and next, (b) the *nimittakāraṇa* and the *upādāna kāraṇa* may be assimilated into one, and even then, Brahman may be looked upon as the cause, in the sense of being the *ground*, of all. This causal way of looking at Reality also retains the earlier dualism, although in form only (without substance) since, it is Brahman that is to be looked upon *as what has become the world*, and has become that in the literal sense. This is a form of monism in which the plural are looked upon as integral parts of the whole which is Brahman itself. Here the '*becoming*' is accepted as *real* becoming, although beginningless, and both the whole and its several parts shine in the glare of the very same reality-sense. A metaphysical position like this resembles Ramanujā's *Viśiṣṭādvaita* with *pariṇamavāda*, providing for its conceptual framework. Sankara's Advaita is farthest removed from this in the sense that it transcends all the other stipulations, which are only relative to standpoints, and without ultimate validity.

As we have already said, neither Sankara nor the Vedanta texts he comments on, stops at the *objective Absolute*. Here we have an absolute reality, which, though in a sense, *all and everything that is, or appears there, is not*, again, *as itself*, all that appears, - That is, is not the appearances. What appears, undoubtedly does so appear, but the *appearances* are not the reality *as itself*. If appearances also pose as being *real* appearance in one phase, and pose as realities themselves in a further distorted phase, it is neither the fact that the appearances, even *as appearances*, are *real*, nor that the appearances are not even 'appearances', and so, are nothing at all. Coupled with Reality as objective appearance, there is another and a distinct phase where Reality is its absolute, that is, its *self-identical itself*—an experiences unitary (*ekarasa*) Self-identity, the Atman.

In Sankara Vedanta, as in the Vedanta of the Upanisads, there is neither a *summary rejection* of anything, of any phase of *given experience* as absurd and improbable, nor is there any blind and irrational assimilation or synthesis of *all the phases* in a *conceptual* unity. Experience, and not conceptual thinking, is the ultimate determinant of both reality and truth. And is not Reality itself an *experience* and the ultimate truth? The *realisability* of Reality (*Brahman*) as an absolute identity-experience (*Atman*),— as an experience absolutely unitary (*ekarasa*)<sup>22</sup> and comporting to the sense of absolute existence and limitless freedom (self-delight), makes a whole world of difference in the final assessment of things. Were not Reality realisable in the above way, and had not the Upanisads themselves supported that doctrine of realisability of *Brahman* as *Atman*, Sankara's claim that the *śrutis* uphold the Advaita as the *culminating truth* (Vedanta), and also that this Advaita framework *alone* provides the basis of final release and liberation would fall through. That the Absolute Reality (*Brahman*) is *also* an Absolute Self, alongside *other* and affinity selves, is essentially non-*advaitic* in its formulations whatever name you give to it. The Absolute Reality is called *also* an Absolute Self, in all such formulations, on the strength of an *analogical* construction merely,— the so called individual self-hood, a direct content, forming the model is an imaginary construction of stipulation. The stand of the Upanisads as also that of Sankara is furthest removed from this. Reality (*Brahman*) as *itself* (*sva*) is the *Atman*, the *absolute identity* of all that is there, and therefore, *the one Self of all*, - not one Larger Self among other selves<sup>23</sup>. To be *Brahman* is to be all-comprehending, all enveloping; to be the *Atman* is to be the felt, that is, to be the realisable absolute one-ness, the pure identity (*ekarasa*). When *Brahman*, comprehending all that is or can be there<sup>24</sup>, is 'again', described as the *Atman*, what else can this Atmanhood of *Brahman* signify or import except the realisable *one true* and absolute *identity* (Self) of all that seem or seemed to be there? It can be seen that it is this aspect of *Brahman* as *Atman*, this realisable self-identity, the absolute one-ness in *Brahman*, which is *specifically* taken up by Sankara as the '*paramarthika*' '*Paramarthika satya*' in the Advaita terminology does not mean any other thing. An indifferent real content, an objective fact, however imprevisible or uncontradictable it may be, cannot meet the requirement of a '*paramarthika*' reality. Sankara has made this amply clear in his commentary on B S 2 | 27. '*Paramarthika*' is not a neutral concept, is not an *indifferent* objective existence. It is a valuational concept, that is '*paramarthika*' which supremely and so, absolutely *fulfils*<sup>25</sup>. This seems to be a vital point of Sankara Vedanta. What makes X '*paramarthika*' is not *simply* its so called absolute unrejectability or final (terminal) unrejectedness. How is such unrejectability or unrejectedness capable of being proved or established? The '*paramarthika*' is not a negative concept, the '*paramarthika*' is not the residual which is likely to remain unrejected after rejection of all else. The concept has a positive meaning in the Vedanta. It is that which is *incapable* of being rejected and is unrejectable since it fulfils entirely, is the goal final or all striving and quest in being the fact of liberation (*mukti*), that is, absolute freedom and bliss itself. Liberation, as absolute release in the Sankarite and the Upanisadic sense, is not to be met at any stage other than the state of absolute identity-experience,

is not to be met in the realisation of Reality or Brahman as *this* or *that*, but only in the realisation of Reality or Brahman as *Atman*, since Brahman, *as itself*, is ever and eternally the '*Atman*' only. The very first *sutra-athato Brahmajijnasa*' points to this mode of realisation only, and there can be no shifting away from this preliminary commitment as far as the Advaita is concerned. It can be seen that even that concepts '*Vyavaharika*' and '*pratibhasika*' have a valuational core. The '*Vyavaharika*' is not simply the conventional, or that which is not contradicted in the state of empirical living (*samsara dasa*), it signifies also that which *satisfies* and *fulfils* requirement of empirical living, while the '*pratibhasika*' does not fulfil this requirement but merely seems to be there.

But if it is *Brahman as itself* (that is, Brahman as the *Atman*), which is absolutely real and is '*paramarthika*', how are we to accommodate the objective Absolute, that is, Brahman, as the cosmic whole of all that are there or can be there, that is, Brahman involving and comprehending infinite pluralities? Connected with this question there is another more intricate and puzzling, how does Brahman or Reality, which, *as itself*, is *Atman* and a unitary absolute experience (*ekarasa*), become, again, the cosmic whole of multiplicities even if all these multiplicities are regarded as non-substantive appearances? In short, how are we to regard the 'being there' of all pluralities even as *appearances*? But this is not all. The word-pluralities do not *appear* as appearances and non-substantivities. These '*parade*' not appearances but as *realities themselves*, and we habitually regard them and react to them in that way. According to the Upanisads also, these are three distinct phases in which Reality is apprehended, although these phases are not to be regarded as equally real or sacrosanct.

It is not the stand either of Sankara or of the Upanisads that the nature of Reality, or the so-called *phases* of Reality have been arbitrarily postulated without there being corresponding experiences which testify to them. In Sankara Vedanta, there is no absolute repudiation of any content given in some form of experience, nor is there acceptance of anything as real or reality unsupported by a corresponding experiences. If Brahman, *as itself*, is taken as *Atman*, as immutable (*kutastha*), as eternally self-accomplished (*parinishta*) as *nityabuddha*, *nityasuddha* and *nitya muktasvabhava*, and finally, as *paramarthika* and absolutely real, it is because it is because it is so, and is capable of being realised, being experienced, as that. Had not *Brahman as itself* been eternally that, the terminal experience reached in course of *reduction ad absurdum*, that is, in course of *apavada 'neti'*, '*neti*', could not lead up to that. But Brahman or Reality is, as well experienced as the totality of the express order of cosmic multiplicities - *sarvam Khalvidam brahma* - all this world is verily Brahman - both distributively and collectively, since *Brahman* is the *one* reality everywhere, and there can be no negation of Brahman or Reality anywhere. And the same *sruti*, which describes Brahman as being everything and everywhere, advised also calm contemplation of *Brahman as Taj-jalān*<sup>6</sup>, that is, as the ground from which all issue forth, in which all are sustained, and into which all, again, disappear. How to accommodate this phase, called *apara Brahma* in *para-Brahma* or *Brahman as itself* the *Atman*? In other words, how does *Brahman* which, *as itself*, is pure and absolute *Self* - pure identity, become, again, the ground of all appearances, sustaining, and also being the repository of the cosmic multiplicities? How is Brahman's immutable itself (*kutastha satya*) related to the world of mutable pluralities, how does the immutable become, again, the system of mutabilities? But this is not all. There is another phase also, where the mutable pluralities alone seem to be the realities themselves in spite of their temporal being, in spite of their mutabilities. All these *parade* as the only *reals* that are there and the so called immutable Reality remains completely hidden and unknown. How to connect this third phase with the other two? The Vedanta cannot deny any of these phases, nor can it hold that there are, as a matter of fact, no experiences of these several kinds,

although the first, the *paramarthika*, supersedes the second and the second as the more integral view supersedes the third. The question now is, how are all these three phases accommodated and reconciled in Reality, how can Reality stand in all the three 'poises' – as itself, as the ground of its appearances, and also, as the appearances parading as substantive realities themselves?

To reconcile all these demands of the above situation, apparently incompatible, was not an easy task. It required a genius of Sankara's stature. Sankara's '*mayavada*' is not the 'Achilles's heel' of the Advaita system, as some of the greatest among intellectuals of the land have complained. In fact, there has been only one Sankara and only one genius to interpret the Upanisadic doctrine as it stands in its varied facets. All other commentators have worked by compromising some facts to some other facts of the doctrine. The Upanisadic doctrine has been maimed or distorted in all the commentaries save Sankara's own. This is the vital point and we cannot ignore it. The facts are, it cannot be said that, according to the Upanisads, the '*Jivas*' have a different form of identity, that is, an identity of their own, or an independent locus for themselves outside or quite apart from Brahman. It cannot be also that, according to the Upanisads, the world of plural facts, forms, or appearances, have a base or substance other than the Brahman itself. It is not also true that the Upanisads 'do not actually say, or have never said that Reality conceals or hides itself in the covering of all its various appearances', although *as itself*, it is self-shining, self-manifest and self-established. Does it not follow, then, that although Reality of Brahman, *as itself* is absolute one-ness and self-identity – the *Atman*, there is the need to understand it in *another way* also, as preparatory to that final realisation, a '*latustha*' (approximate and outward) view in order to complete one's understanding and comprehension of Reality? Does it not look evident that there is no short circuit to the '*paramarthika*' (the supremely fulfilling view), and that the way runs through proper understanding and assessment of the world-appearances, of the 'many', in their two-fold phases – as the 'mere appearances' and as the 'illusory appearances' – both unified and *somehow* united to the one absolute fact as their *ground* and transcendental identity? What would, then, be the correct mode of interpretation of Reality in all its three phases? Should we reject outright such narrations and descriptions, the epigrams, oxymorons, the varied metaphors and analogies bristling in the Upanisadic passages as all spurious nonsense? Can it not be that truth is not always the 'obvious' – that truth is not the common place? The Upanisads claim to propagate the truth extraordinary and final – the one truth, which summarily rejects nothing but rearranges all conventional truths, which, although all *de-facto* errors from the ultimate view-point, are yet undisputed truths from the standpoint of their several contexts.

The three phases of Reality-experience, according to the Upanisads, then, are: (a) Brahman as the *Atman*, that is, Brahman as the immutable itself (*Kutastha* or *aksara*), which is undifferentiated (*ekaratas*) pure identity, (b) Brahman as the order of *becoming*, the unity as also the *ground* of cosmic appearances, of the manifold manifestations, and (c) Brahman as '*hiding itself*'<sup>21</sup> in cosmic *multiplicities*, in consequence whereof, the multiplicities themselves parade as *substantive reals* and *not* as appearances. Sankara attempted to make intelligible all these several phases of Reality-experience – the transition from (c) to (b) and finally to (a), which alone is regarded as '*paramarthika*', since it alone ensures liberation and absolute freedom. Such is the view of the Upanisads also,

There are several things which cannot be left out of view without detriment to the philosophy of the Vedanta, that is, without distortion of the philosophy of the Upanisads. That Reality, which is Brahman *is such and such*, or that it can be and can express itself as *such and such*, is no arbitrary stipulation. Reality or Brahman has to be taken in this or that *because there is, or can be actually an experience in this or that form*. It is, thus, a cognate experience of Reality which warrants, nay, necessitates taking of, or understanding of, Reality in this or that phase. There is another singularly

important fact or facet. As Reality, in all its phases or facets, is somehow *one* and *non-different*, every experience is somehow, or in some sense, Brahman's *own experience*, and every form that Brahman's 'being', 'becoming' or 'pseudo-being' involves or entails, has to be regarded as Brahman's self-expression, real, playful or apparent. There should not be any attempt to explain, or account for, any phase by reference to anything extraneous, such as, a human subject's arbitrary or foolish manipulation *ab extra*. The reason is there is no such *independent* subjective agency, no opposite number *vis-a-vis* Reality, in the Vedanta system.

Sankara's concept of '*Māyā*' becomes a significant metaphor in the logical explanation of the *link* or the *link-phase* between Brahman as the immutable one (*Ātman*) and this world of plural manifestations, which, although appears as an unmitigated plurality of subjects and objects, can be experienced and realised as the absolute non-other (*ananya*) of that immutable reality. The concept is to show how the '*paramārthika*', the pure 'undifferented identity', can as well empirically *become* infinite plurality of separate and distinguishable identities, and yet remain self-identical at the core,—that is, how Reality may be alternately experienced both as *Ātman* and as *Brahman*. Rival commentators of the *Bhādarāyana-sūtras*, have regarded Sankara's concept of '*Māyā*' as an innovation arbitrary, and without any support in the Vedanta texts. This concept, according to them, has reduced the Vedanta to 'illusionism' insofar as the reality of the express order of plural subjects and objects has stood denied at the end with the result that such vital issues of the Vedanta as bondage and liberation have become unmeaning. In an earlier chapter, and also in this one, we have attempted to show that the crucial issue between Sankara and his opponents has been if the Upanisads, in their ultimate stretch, stop with an '*objective Absolute*', which is somehow the synthetic unity of the plural manifestations, or if these go beyond it to articulate the notion of a transcendental Absolute beyond the subjective and objective—which is undifferented (*ekarasa*), and in which, 'Reality' experiences itself as one pure self-identity (*Ātman*) and the *Jīvas* experience their immutability and immortality? The point is: can the Vedanta go without the Sankarite conception of the '*paramārthika*', in which the empirical individuals realise their absolute identity with Reality as the immutable, eternal one? Can we look upon the '*paramārthika*', as the transcendental world-ground only, and as an identity *other than* the identity of the distinguishable particulars,—an objective absolute transcendent of them all, — to which they are all subservient but which is *not* their immutable, the one realised self-identity? As for the charge that the concept of '*māyā*' is arbitrary, an unauthorised innovation of Sankara, it can be said that the word '*māyā*' actually occurs in several places in the *śruti*-texts, as it occurs also at several places in the *Bhādarāyana-sūtras* themselves, or are implied therein. Besides, as Sankara felt, the several phases of reality—experience which the Upanisads themselves uphold and propagate, cannot be fitfully elaborated without the help of the concept of '*māyā*' and the analogy it involves. Even if the *śruti*-texts themselves have not utilised this analogy, this figure of speech', in the way that Sankara has done, that does not really matter. The *śruti*-texts, by and large, are inspirational and exultory. They were never intended to be a full-fledged philosophical argument. So, if in one sense, the concept of '*māyā*', on account of the logical use that Sankara makes of it, is a Sankara innovation, in another sense, that is, in so far as the Upanisadic doctrine badly needs it for a coherent presentation of its several themes, it is also of the Upanisads' own. We may now turn to Sankara's usage of the concept.

Let us initiate our discussion from the side of experience. Our conventional experience reveals a world of *plural* subjects and objects and these cannot be simply brushed aside as mere nothing. Ordinarily and habitually, we regard all these plural subjects and objects as *substantiva realities* in themselves. But all these may turn out less substantial or impervious if regarded through their



interrelation, also when regarded in the light of the cosmic whole. These may, then, even seem to be the several 'moments' of a dynamic reality, unfolding itself in diverse forms and configurations. These two stages may roughly be identified as levels of commonsense knowledge and science. The transition from common sense to the level of scientific explanation may be articulated in terms of the concept of *parinama*, that is, the term of the concept of evolution—emergent or otherwise. But this is purely an *objective reading* of what is there, an assessment which keeps the subjective factor the knower or the assessor, in the background. The entire perspective undergoes radical transformation if the epistemic factor is brought into the display, and through progressive exploration of the several strata of one's own conscious being, one comes to discover a certain *relativity* between the various strata of subjectivity and their cognate forms of objectivity. This, then, takes away the sense of absolute validity of any given level of experience, — its self-definiteness and imperviousness. Let us now bring in the episode of realised (or realisable) absolute identity of the empiric form of individuality with a reality, immutable, indeterminate, infinite and non-specific (*nirvisesa*) that the *srutis* all declare to be the absolute *truth of fact*. The *srutis* have given expression to several cardinal themes which have to be reviewed together. Thus, all these (the actual and the possible taken collectively) are, *indeed*, Brahman, and nothing else beside. The plural form<sup>91</sup> are only *speakingly different*, mere modes of speech (*vacurambhanam vikaranamudhavum*), the reality in them or underlying them all, is their substantial one-ness.<sup>92</sup> This of course, is reducing all empirical pluralities, the world of plural appearances, to certain non-specific non-relational, indeterminate, immutable matrix. This unity could as well be an objective *materia prima*, and the plural forms its varied transformations (*parinama*). But it is the last part of Uddalaka's teachings in the same context which makes a world of difference and negates the, concepts both of evolution and real transformation. *That thou art (tat tvam asi)* and *that one is the Self (Atma)*. The identity spoken of is not material identity as it is ordinarily understood. In such a form of identity, there can be no *conscious reality*— or identity, no *self-realisation*, no absolute fruition of all desires, no absolute fulfilment *paramartha*. Sankara has stressed this point at the end of his commentary on B S 2.1.27. This necessitates introduction of the concept of *vivarta* (apparent modification) in the place of *parinama* (real transformation). The immutable one-ness and absolute self-identity of Reality that the Upanisads speak of is *not* the product of an act of stipulation, an artful construction of thought. This is vouchsafed by *reality* and so this is itself an experience, no mere postulation. Not only is all this the Brahman, but this Brahman is also the *Atman*, the absolute Self-identity realisable. Now is this realisable absolute self-identity to be explained if Reality is not *admitted* as having such immutable unitary nature, if Reality is not, as a matter of fact, non-dual and unitary (*ekarasa*) in its true nature and that, again, *always*? But, if this unitarians and absolute identity is admitted as a fact, and is *also experienceable*, how are we to regard the episode of its *becoming many and diverse* and *being also experienced as that*? The concept of *anirvacaniamaya*, of an indeterminable apparent fact-hood neither real nor unreal, alone can resolve this conflict of experience and conviction. So 'Maya' is a necessary explanatory concept of the Vedanta and no arbitrary innovation which could be logically dispensed with and at the same time the philosophy of the Upanisads meaningfully presented.

There is one simple fact which even the expert commentators seem frequently to lose sight of in their interpretation of the Vedanta and Sankara's own view of the Vedanta in particular. It is this that *whatever is*, or, in some way, *appears* is Brahman and nothing else beside. The *iva*, the empiric individual is no collateral fetch. If it be the product of *avidya*, and if the express order of cosmic multiplicities be a display of *maya*, they are so because the one non-dual reality informs itself in such ways without any extraneous aid or condition. What has to be clearly borne in mind is that although the concepts of *upadhi*, *avacchadaka*, *pratibimba*, *bimba*, etc., as illustrative concepts, are



very helpful in presenting the Advaita Vedanta to the commoner, subject to certain necessary limitations, neither the *pratibimbaravada* of the *vivarana* school nor the *avacchedakavada* of the Bhamani school given an exact account of the Vedanta of Sankara's meaning. Without entering into fruitless controversy and logic chopping let us put straightly that it is the *anirvacaniyata-vada* which precisely brings forth Sankara's meaning and that all other illustrative concepts in use had their orientation in the logicism of the Nyaya school, or are metaphors borrowed from popular understanding. It is the *anirvacaniyata* (indeterminableness) involved in the cosmic manifestation of reality as also in the varied modes of experience of that reality (with latter will have to be understood as Reality's experiences of itself in different phases) which makes Sankara Vedanta singularly attractive. But Sankara's Vedanta is the Vedanta of the Upanisads and not his personal philosophy. From the beginning to the end we have the story of one non-dual, immutable, self-complete, eternally accomplished Reality expressing and experiencing itself *playfully* in many ways and many forms without its absolute one-ness being ever dissipated. This playful manifestation as 'many', even the parading of this 'many' as substantive realities in themselves by way of *avidya* or ignorance are co-eval with the pure and absolute selfidentity of the core Reality and in that sense beginningless (*anadi*). One basis of this kind of philosophic formulation is undoubtedly the varied expressions in the Reality-experience itself. There is no *absolute* negation of reality or reality-experience, yet there are phases of this reality-experience which are sublatable and are sublated while the absolute experience of one undivided self-hood remains the absolute and (*paramartha*), the final terminus never sublated. The *srutis* themselves have instituted two methods – *adhyaropa* (elaboration by means of the as if facts) and *apavada* (negation of the apparent and the as-if facts) to bring home to us the immutable one-ness of Reality and absolute experience in spite of the seemingly diverse modes of manifestation of the one and their cognate experiences. How is this transcendental oneness, the immutable undividedness of Reality explicable without the supposition that, the apparent forms of diverse presentations are a matter of 'guise' that there is a 'cover' of the apparent under which Reality as such remains hidden or concealed? Since this 'guise' or 'cover' cannot be accepted as an additional fact, what absurdity is involved in the figurative usage of this cover and the covering as '*maya*'?

What is this '*maya*' then, is it a kind of *Sakti* (potency or power)? Nothing can be more incongruous with the *anirvacaniyatavada* of Sankara. The conception of Reality itself as a person, even a superperson, the lord is incidental to a standpoint vitiated by dualism and ignorance. The conception of '*maya*' as a *sakti* of the lord is likewise. It leads to total misrepresentation of the cosmic panorama of the many and the diverse. These then turn out to be 'real creations' of a mysterious power although at bottom deceitful and frivolous. Can a fact described in term of the indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*) be determinable in term of even magical creation? This looks absurd on the very face of it. The concept of '*maya*', it has to be clearly kept in view is merely a '*make-shift*', a convenient rhetoric to make conceivable a certain transition from one level of experience to another, say, from the level of our conventional experience of cosmic multiplicities as substantive facts to the absolute experience of one unitary kind which involves no determination and distinction. The personal and the distinguished, the subjective and the cognate objective distinctions and differentiates all disappear in the Absolute experience when the level of experience which sustains them all is transcended. How can the lack of real being or real creation be relevant or meaningful in such a situation? Yet alongside the realisability of that eternally self-realised one-ness there hangs on the not-yet enlightened realm of the diverse and plural appearances. Why light should have a veil of darkness shrouding it, why *vidya* should have a veil of darkness shrouding it, why *vidya* should have a necessary counterpart in *avidya*, why Reality should have also its varied appearances need not be construed as an insoluble

enigma since the one would not have been a meaningful concept without the other. Yet what sense can there be in the view that since these two are coeval aspects, therefore they are collateral and enjoy same status and standing or one is the creation artful or otherwise, of the other. It is more redeeming to accept both together as two sides of the same coin with the proviso that one is the Reality itself and the other, its mere appearance which is ever prone to be misconstrued as the reality itself. So Sankara's concept of '*maya*' is, as Professor K.C. Bhattacharya has observed, a logical pendent<sup>9</sup>, or if you so like, a theoretical but essentially a rhetorical device to bring home to our mind the full meaning of the Absolute of the Upanisads, the All-reality and again, the only true and the Absolute Self.

A little digression and that on a critical review on the Vedantic conception of the 'Self' may help in settling issues that have cumbered the classical exposition of the Advaita Vedanta. Traditionally, the 'Self' has been equated with the *felt* personal one-ness or unity associated with the imperious and the apparently indubitable 'I', which, for all philosophical purposes, is the ego in the Indian terminology. This ego is named '*ahamkara*' since the felt personal one-ness is of the natural form (*akara*) of 'I-ness'. But this is an identity in the sense of a certain felt one-ness *in and through* differences of aspects or functions. This is also felt as a stable and undeniable core and so as a substantive reality or substance as distinguished from its variable features which latter are called its qualities or attributes. The idea of substance litter as a support or welder of qualities or as the integrated unity of diverse qualities or functions seem to be largely due to, and derived from this felt personal identity in the I-feeling. To be the 'self' has of course meant to be one's self where this 'one's self' has been construed to stand for one's own 'person'. Now, although this is the usual rendering of the notion of the Self in the parlance of traditional thinking, the Advaita Vedanta, at the behest of the Upanisads themselves, seem to have deviated from this sort of understanding of the concept. The reason is: the Upanisads for one thing and in that respect infallibly and consistently, have advised all throughout to look for the *true* and the *proper* self beyond the already known empirical person, named by it as the *jiva*. What can be this 'Self' then, beyond and absolutely remote from this felt personal identity or one-ness of the 'I'? The non-Advaitists, it can be seen, have followed the easy path in so far as, they have 'postulated' a bigger and a larger '*personal self*' to be that absolutely true self on the analogy of the felt personal egoistic self. And this like this latter that is, the felt personal 'I' is to be a unity in and through differences. The differences are to be regarded as adjectival to the unity as they are done in the context of phenomenal or empiric personality. Thus in the non-Advaitis stipulation, we have two quantitatively different selves. The Absolute Self which is *one*, and the finite selves which are *plural*, but both are to be felt unities and both are 'persons'. It can be seen that this supreme or the Absolute Self is a thought-construction on the analogy of the empirical individual selves and persons. We shall not look into the logical incongruity of this dual rendering of the concept of the self. We shall address ourselves to the cardinal point of the Self, the true Self, which is to be other than 'this' and also other than 'that', and which the Upanisads all struggle to lead us to by a series of negation (*apavada*) - *neti neti* 'atma' is anything 'personal', - if it is, even remotely, analogous to the known empirical person. It can be seen that Vacaspati, in the introductory remarks in his '*Bhamati*' posed the very same question by way of presenting the *purvapaksa* viewpoint<sup>10</sup>.

What is to the 'Self', according to the Advaita and Sankara? It has to be seen that the Advaita 'Self' is not to be the stipulated or postulated, Absolute Personal Unity, the - Supreme person of the non-Advaitists. It cannot be anything similar or analogous to the felt conscious unity and personal

identity of the empirical individual regarded as a substantive entity. The 'Self' in the Advaita terminology is a functional and a valuational concept. This has been brought on by making a distinction between the *true* and *absolute* Self which is to be one without a second and the *pseudo-selves* which are many and infinite in form and appearance and from which there is to be a sustained attempt of progressive withdrawal in term of 'neti, neti' 'not this', 'not this'. The 'Self' has been projected in the very first Brahmasutras as the object of the ultimate quest (*brahma-jijnasa*) - the *sanctum sanctorum* to be reacted, the *summum bonum* of life (*parama purusartha*) to be realised. The self of, say 'X', is that with which this 'X' can be truly identified, to which this 'X' can be reduced without a residuum, vouch safed by a feeling of absolute fulfilment which leaves nothing more to be hankered after<sup>121</sup>. The Self is the one supreme value (*paramartha*) to be realised. The 'Self' in this meaning is the all-fulfilling *pure and absolute identity* which is rejective and resolvent of all differences. The finding of the true and the one self is for the Advaita the absolute resolution of the state of puzzlement and confusion, an absolute escape from the state of ignorance, disquiets and tension to the state of absolute enlightenment and blissful rest. Brahman, has been described as this one true and absolute self, the one absolute identity of all, since the phenomenal plurality is all a *matter of appearance* only which ignorance shows off as different, even as substantively real, while right knowledge (*vidya*), again, shows as non-different (*ananya*) and finally, as absolutely one with Brahman. Brahman as the realised absolute identity of all that is there is thus the one Self-Atman.

The entire plan of philosophic wisdom has thus been drawn up on the basis of the different phases and strata of experience gone through, and there is no postulation or thought construction anywhere as far as the Upanisadic philosophy (which is also the Advaita view of the Vedanta) is concerned. What could be '*maya*' then, in this arrangement? The only cogent explanation will be that '*maya*', is a descriptive epithet or expression merely—neither a potency (*Sakti*) of Brahman, in which case it would be in some sense *real* nor is it an absolute non-occurrence, a 'nothing', in which case it would be unreal. It is neither real nor unreal and in that sense (metaphysical) *indeterminable*. It is only *epistemic* in the sense that in one phase of experience, it seems to be there as a fact cognate to that experience, but in a possible altered phase, such as in the absolute experience, it no longer seems to be there but simply melts away or is lifted, — the phase of experience sustainingly it having been completely transcended. As for *Avidya*, it is indicative of that phase of experience where the world of appearances, the multiplicities of subjects and objects projected through the *mavic* phase of experience, are not taken or understood as *mere appearances* but are accepted as *substantive realities* in themselves with the result that the true reality — the absolute and indivisible one, is completely lost sight of. this has been figuratively described as Reality *hiding himself under the veil of nescience*, and also as Reality, which is one without second, assuming the *guise* of the system of cosmic pluralities. There can be no sense in confusing descriptive epithets, which are relative to epistemic phases, as metaphysical facts or entities. Sankara did not commit such mistakes. Both the Upanisads and Sankara in his commentary made uses of a whole host of analogies and metaphorical expressions which were intended to bring home to the lay man a certain transition from our conventional level of experience (which is vitiated by *avidya* to the enlightened level which removes all tension and stress of life and in that sense, liberates. It is really unfortunate that the traditional interpretation of the Vedanta has so long, in one way or other, looked for literal meanings of verbal idioms, forgetting the oft-repeated words of caution of the Upanisads themselves that Brahman as *Atman* is beyond thought and speech (*avanmanasogocara*) and the state of affairs intended to be communicated cannot be literally described.

The nearest approach to the intended meaning of the Upanasadic expressions may, perhaps, be made by taking all expressions which stand for 'verbes' as 'impersonal verbs', as in 'it rains, water

follows, the wind blows, the sun rises, the moon shines etc' etc. In a context where all 'becomings' are *apparent* becomings, all 'changes' are only shiftings in the mode of apprehension or experience, in what way should one understand Brahman's *becoming* the world of plurality and yet retaining absolute self identity together with its essential immutableness and eternal self-accomplishedness? Yet the 'becomings' and 'changes' are *not* 'non facts' or 'no occurrences' in the absolute sense or meaning. In that case, there could be no resurrection, no transition from *avidya* to *vidya*, from darkness to light and therefore, no *liberation* from the *bondage* of life. So, if, in one sense, there is no *real becoming* and no *real change*, in another sense, neither is this *becoming* and this *change absolutely unreal*. If this neither real nor unreal be an indeterminable enigma in the metaphysical sense, it is, again, an inalienable feature of existence which conscious experience traverses in its bid for the realisation of supreme value (*paramartha*), – absolute freedom and fulfilment, progressively withdrawing from pseudoselves and empty values. How can this unreal-real phase, this very much real feature which turns out to be, or may turn out to be, *all apparent*, be described except on the analogy of '*maya*' in order that the *experienced* transition from *avidya* and darkness to *vidya* and light can be significantly articulated in language? So, '*maya*' of Sankara Vedanta is simply a descriptive epithet, an epistemic postulate which is metaphysically innocuous. This is the reason behind naming it '*anirvacaniya*' and this *anirvacaniya* is a necessary counterpart of Reality and it in one sense, it is very much there, in another sense, it is only *seemingly there* since it does not exist for one who can see through it, for one who knows the Trick.

Now that one who can see through the Trick and one who cannot do so represent two aspects of Reality-experience (if the seer and the one who does not see are not to be other than Reality and independent of it), the unavoidable conclusion will be that it is the one and the same Reality-fact which gives itself to '*maya*' and again, to '*avidya*', while remaining self identical, that is, its absolute self and changeless at the core. How is Reality realisable as that is, *as reality* is there be nothing 'seeming', if there be nothing that is neither real nor unreal and also an experience in which this enigmatic situation is also given? Can there be any conclusive proof regarding any state of affairs, regarding anything which we believe to be absolutely real, without there being an *experience* corresponding to it? And how is again, an experience of the absolutely real, of the absolutely fulfilling, of a value realised as the supreme value be there without there being also an experience of the apparently real, and of apparently satisfying values? The Vedantic reality is not an unknowable *ding-an-sich*, a necessary postulate of thought only, nor is it an objectivity from which experience has to be distinguished and kept apart as a subjective act. This Reality is self-revealing, self-experiencing and self-positing, and although non-dual and *one* without a second, it *is* and also *appears*, and again, playfully *disappears* when its appearances assume the role of substantive facts and so of reality itself. The peculiarity of the situation is that the indeterminable realm of appearances, the seeming, hangs on to the Absolutely real as an epistemic fact, – a playful posture without having any determinable metaphysical status. '*Maya*' is the only suitable descriptive epithet which can picturesquely show off this 'mere appearance' and help logical understanding of the absolutely real which is to be transcendent of it. It cannot be argued that '*to be there*' both the 'seeming' and the 'absolutely real' should have similar metaphysical states. The only condition that the 'seeming' has to satisfy in order to be there is that it should *seem to be* but *should not be* there in an absolute sense. And such is the case of the indeterminable world-pluralities taken as an objective appearance. Reality which is Brahman in its entire comprehension, and *Atman* in realised (or realisable) pure identity-consciousness, although nothing objective and *realisable* as that, has presented itself as the *seeming* objective appearance. Were not such the case, there could not be the seeming *objectively presented*

reality as the system of plural appearances. Not only that, the plural appearances, again, could not parade as self-dependent realities as themselves had not Reality or reality-sense shed off its immutable non-dualness, had it not receded into the background or into concealment, enabling the plural appearances to float as realities. All these become connected episodes of the very same drama as and when there lapsing of reality-sense of the plural, when even their role as appearances turn out to be a fact of *mere appearance*, neither real nor unreal, and there is *realisation* of absolute one-ness and identity in Reality as the absolute fact. This is the Advaita doctrine of the Upanisads. In it we have transition from one mode of experience to another and finally to absolute experience in which Brahman-Atman is realised as that. As this terminal experience has nothing 'personal' about it, as all personal factors are down in it, the Brahman of Sankara is no person, supreme or otherwise. We cannot, therefore, speak of it as the Lord God of religion and so 'maya' has no where been understood by Sankara as a kind of *Sakti*, except figuratively or in a pickwickian sense.

The concept of the '*anirvacaniya*' *maya*, as thus understood, seems to be enough for a logical and intelligible account of the Advaita of Sankara. That being the case, the *avacchedavada* of Vacaspati and the *pratibimbavada* of the Vivarana school seem to be gratuitous. The conception of *Jiva* or the finite self as a reflected image of the Absolute which is Brahman is misleading on several counts. In the first place, it is one-sided and inadequate and smacks of anthropomorphism, since very much like the non-Advaitists, it *projects* the Absolute Self on the analogy of the empirically given individual selves and as having the same form and unity as it known to characterise one's own 'personal' consciousness and individuality. Brahman is conceived as a 'self' very much like the individual self, for how else the formless which is Brahman could have reflected images in the form of the individual selves? Then, what of the plural physical objects, the so called 'things' of the world? Are they also reflected images of Brahman or do they fall outside of Brahman since the privilege of being the 'reflections' or *Brahman*, of Brahman defined as self-shining light, is allowed to the *Jivas* exclusively? This is like the Biblical view that God created man in His own image. But can the Brahman of the Upanisads afford to be so very partial, parochial and anthropomorphic? If *all these* (the *bhuta* and the *bhavya* - the actual and the possible) be Brahman and nothing else, why should the physical things and inanimate objects be excluded, why the so called '*Jadas*' (inert or dependently revealed) be cast aside as socially untouchables? The distinction of *cetana* and *jada* can obtain only in the realm of appearances - the *jada* being the necessary correlate of the self-conscious, conceiving itself in the objective mode as 'being there' (*idam*). As far as Reality *as itself* is concerned, there can be no such division and distinction - the transcendental reality being, by nature, beyond epistemic determination. In the second place, the mirror theory, besides being scientifically inept (since, what is needed in the case is a medium of *refraction*, not of *reflection* has to take '*maya*' as a collateral reality, capable of infinite modulations by itself, in term of which it can subserve the purpose of a medium of refraction as real as the luminous orbs which is to be Brahman itself. - Brahman conceived as self-luminous *Atman*. This militates against non-dualism of the Vedanta and is indistinguishable from the dualistic Sankhya of the *Ārīka* in essence. The reflection-theory, again, can scarcely avoid Brahman's 'being many' as a real occurrence of some sort. The classical commentators of Sankara's Brahmasutrabhasya, by and large, are guilty of running with the deer and hunting with the hound, and little wonder, therefore, that they should be assailed by the arguments of an astute logician like Vyastirtha<sup>14</sup> of the dualistic school. In the third place, the fact of '*anirvacaniyata*' of the phenomenal order, so vital for the Advaita Vedanta and an issue on which Sankara has insisted so tirelessly, remains practically unattended. Again, since no mirrored image can ever realise its self identity with the original and since 'mirroring' does not tally with



Brahman's going into hiding or concealment, the reflection theory seems to fail entirely. Finally, B. S. 3.2.11 and Sankara's own commentary on it seem to offer an unfailing guidance in the matter. The *sutra* argues that even extrinsically or in a situational relation itself, cannot have a dual character (*ubhayaalinguta*), and that this maxim will have to be scrupulously followed every where *evam sarvatra hi*). Brahman as itself is *nirviseṣa* (without determination and qualityless). It cannot be spoken of being *saviseṣa* (one having specific character) also and thus having two-fold or dual nature, even extrinsically. The Vivarana school, the exponent of the theory of *pratibimba* (reflection) utilises the concept of '*maya*' as a form of *upadhi* (external determinant) while the *avaccheda* theory of vacaspati uses '*maya*' or '*avidya*' as a limiting concept (*avacchedaka*). But Sankara himself seems to have found no favour with either of these uses. He has argued that nothing can be other than itself by being associated with any extraneous determinant or condition<sup>14</sup>. Even the very supposition that a thing can become quite other than itself by being determined or conditioned by *upadhi* or similar items is *ignorant* at the core. what does Sankara mean in this context?

All the Sankara means seems to be that *savisesata*, that is, Brahman's being the integrated totality of word-appearance and also being distinguished in many forms and features is merely epistemic in nature and not metaphysical or real. This epistemic order of make believe is also 'given' in experience and sustained by it. But this conventionally given and habitually taken-for-granted order ceases to be there for one transcending that level of experience and participating in the Absolute experience of pure self identity. This is no denying of the matter-of-factness of Reality's appearing as the system of world-appearances. This is also no denying of the matter-of factness or 'being-there-ness' of the conventional order of many subjects and many objects distinguished from one another as apparently self-dependent and self-existent pluralities. Had all these not been 'given' and in that way been existent in some sense, there could be no experience of them as that. Not that this their 'given-ness' and empirical or epistemic facthood is a matter of human manipulation or the simple product of human ignorance. The real fact is: this so called ignorance or *avidya* as well as the *mayic* presentation of reality as an integrated totality of all appearances, also obtain in Reality, although as the *avidya* or *maya* presentations, and basically epistemic and not metaphysically real. This *maya* or *avidya* order is not only beginningless (*anadi*) but is also interminable (*ananta* or *ananta*), if to be terminable is to mean terminable for *all conscious beings* and all at once, that is, terminable in an absolute sense. These *mayic* or *avidya* orders cease for one transcending such orders in a new kind of experience. This possibility of eventual transcendence as well as of realisation of absolute and pure self-identity in Reality is at once the ground and the proof of Brahman being all the Reality, and this Reality, which is Brahman, being also the *Atman*, – the terminal point, the final goal and the supreme value (*paramartha*). The Vedanta conception of Brahman as all reality, as the true self (*Atman*) and as the supreme value (*paramartha*) is not a matter of postulation or a traditional fad and dogma. It is a fact of *realised experience*. The very same real order is realised in one way only, and, again, known and reacted upon in several ways all these are several ways of manifestation of Reality

all these are, again, the several ways of knowing, understanding and finally of realising Reality. But the several ways of manifestation and finally of realising Reality. But the several ways of manifestation and the several levels of experience do not stand on a par. There is culminating experience as there are several modes of way-ward experiences. Peace and disquiet, fearlessness and fearfulness, immortality and mortality, enlightenment and crass ignorance – all obtain in Reality. So, it is truly said – 'all these are, indeed Brahman and nothing else. Tranquil, let one contemplate it as *taj ja tan* – as that from which all come forth, into which all dissolve and in which all breathe'

<sup>14</sup> But how to describe the Absolute Experience and the domain unfolded in habitual experience



and in the intellectual build up ? The answer is that the former is Reality itself the pure Absolute Self-hood, the Supreme value, – the other, the different phases of the Indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*) – neither real nor unreal. The concepts such as 'maya' and *avidya* are introduced to rationalise our standing in the various phases of the Indeterminable, which is not an additional fact or coeval reality alongside Reality itself, but is only its appearance which has to be known as 'mere appearance'. This *anirvacanīyatavada* seems to being out the intended meaning of Sankara's exposition of the Advaita Vedanta.

It is, indeed, astounding that almost all the classical commentators and interpreters have erred in reviewing and understanding the themes of the Upanisads and the Vedanta in an objective mode of contemplation more or less. But are the Upanisadic revelations only an inchoate narration, of the several phases of an *objective reality* which is 'out there in space' independent of and unrelated to the several modes of experience of the narrators whose out-pouring of the heart they are, and whose ecstatic delight they embody ? If not so, the several modes of manifestation of reality which is Brahman will have to be understood as also the several modes of experience of that reality by one who is at one with that reality at the bottom, and not a separate or isolated fact. The inability to grasp this point of truth has inadvertently mislead most of the classical interpreters into thinking that the Brahman-doctrine of the Upanisads and the Vedanta is a narrative of the various phases of a reality, *wholly transcendent and objective*, which under *maya*, and objective dressing all its own, appears as 'this' or 'that', and that ignorance or *avidya*, which is peculiarly human, the proverbial scapegoat, misconstrues the objective reality still further, losing sight of its true nature all together. These classical interpreters, it can be seen, in spite of their incredible erudition, have singularly failed to present Sankara's own doctrine of absolute non-dualism in such ways as are immune from the charge of dualism – nothing can be gained by hunting with the hound and running with the deer! where, for instance, will the Vivarana place its '*maya*' and '*avidya*' which are '*upadhi*', and where will, again, Vacaspati place his '*avacchedaka*' the limiting concept – if this 'limiting' is not understood as a mode of '*self limiting*' of Reality in its display in the *Anirvacaniya*? Man's losing the true Self in the various modes of the not-self, and there after, regaining and re-discovering that true Self in the one all-comprehensive reality, is not an isolated episode. Since all is Brahman and the human scape-goat does not have a *locus standi* outside of Brahman, this human episode is an episode in the total life of Reality, which is Brahman, and in fact, this so called human episode alone establishes theoretically, and also concretely, that Brahman is all these – the *nitya* (eternal) as also the *anitya* (temporal), the *bhūta* (self accomplished) as also the *bhavya* (ever accomplishing). In a previous chapter we have established that Sankara's concept of '*adhyasa*' has to be understood as a '*figure of speech*', seeking to explain and illustrate the fact of *avidya* which is 'given' and does not involve human manipulation in the shape of an illicit Superimposition *ab extra*<sup>17</sup>. The concept of '*maya*' has similarly to be understood as an analogy and a rhetorical phrase where with our understanding of Reality as the objective whole of the phenomenal appearance of pluralities can be fitfully facilitated. That '*maya*' is a *sakti* and that Brahman is invested with it or that this '*maya*' has to be understood as a kind of *upadhi* or *avacchedaka*, involve the mistake of confounding the figurative with the literal. It is to make intelligible how the one Reality comprehends all in its several phases, which are illustrated in the different modes of reality-experiences in a graded way, that the various metaphors and analogies have been used by Sankara, conforming to the analogies and the total spirit of the Upanisadic texts themselves.

Transition from one mode to an all together different mode of apprehension of the self-same fact is not an easy matter. The task becomes most of difficult when the transition is to be effected

from a purely subjective mode to a purely objective mode, and thereafter, to a transcendental mode, which some how (as *anirvacantiya*) houses all the earlier modes as outer and merely *apparent* phases of itself. That Brahman is all (*sarvam*), and again, that Brahman is indivisible one (*advaita*) as the eternally realised and as also the realisable Self-identity (*Atman*), is, indeed, a very difficult theme. The Upanisadic texts, which embody the Vedanta, are an indirect source of knowledge, although in them, there is the demand for transporting that knowledge, which is mediate and *informative*, into an intuitive knowledge, which is not only to be immediate but also *transformative*. All commentators of the Brahmasutras, with the solitary exception of Sankara, have missed an essential thread and it is *in what way this knowledge is to be transformative*. The demand was for a transition from an objective mode entirely – the mode which gives *pramana-janya jnana* (derived or acquired knowledge) to the transcendental mode in the shape of realisation of self-identity with all that is Brahman. What is to be the goal is, as Sankara himself puts it (*brahmanvagati*) (findup in Brahman the true and the absolute self-identity) and for this, the Vedanta (or the upanisads) is to be the *pramana jnana*, that is, contributive knowledge<sup>10</sup>.

That a proper understanding of the Brahman –theme of the Vedanta necessitates taking of Brahman as *Atman* and Brahman as all this (*idam sarvam*) that is, both the actual and the possible (*bhuta* and *bhavya*), in other words, taking Reality as also its *anirvacantiya* appearances, –*not as an integrated whole* however, but as distinguishable phases- one leading up to the other, seems to be the teaching that the *srutis* impart. This seems to be the meaning of the maxim that an understanding of the phase of *avidya* is an essential step to getting at the phase of *vidya*, and that without that preliminary understanding of the *avidya* phase, any short shrift to the *vidya* phase is bound to be disastrous and abortive<sup>11</sup>. In view of this, the *srutis* speak of two forms of Brahman, the *para* (final and ultimate) and the *apara* (proximate and outer) as also of two forms of *vidya* (truth-vision)<sup>12</sup>. It is, indeed, remarkable that *vidya* or true knowledge which is to reveal a content as it is as distinguished from what it is not and which, according to Sankara<sup>13</sup>, admits of no *variation* or degree has been distinguished into two forms– *para* and *apara*. But there is really no anomaly if we remember that while *para vidya* means absolute knowledge and relates to *para* aspect of Brahman and *shows* it as such, the *apara vidya* is the knowledge of the *apara* aspect of Brahman which stands for the *objectiva* totality taken as equally undivided and immutable whole of the express order *as it is*, that is, as the integral one-ness of all appearances. It is the *way of viewing* or regarding Reality which makes the difference but since the *ways* or perspectives of viewing the one Reality also obtains in the episodic display of Reality both *para* Brahman and *apara* Brahman as also *para* Vidya and *apara* Vidya figure as distinguishable aspects which, in some in explicable way, coexist without coalescing, without forming an integral unity.

It is, indeed, characteristic that the *srutis*, under expositional necessity, speak of Brahman in two ways– *Tat Brahman (tadaksara)* and (*etadbrahman (etadaksara)*)<sup>12</sup>. The expositional necessity consists in this that without the help of the proximate and the *objectively* presented, one cannot get at the remote, the transcendental, nor can this latter be other way indicated or pointed to. This has been called the *arundhatinyaya*<sup>13</sup>. The *apara Brahman* or *etadaksara* is pure epistemic necessitated as it is by an *objective* mode of description as also of contemplation. The passage is to be from the *objective* (which is juxtaposed to the subjects awareness or conceiving) to the *transcendental* (where the subjective – objective relation disappears or is transcended). It can be seen that most of the *sutras* such as, 'janmadyasya yatah' 'sastrayonitvat', 'iksaternasabdham' etc etc have been drafted in the objective mode of speech where there is the demand to concentrate upon Brahman as the *ground* or *cause* of all things that appear to be there. As an indirect from (*paroksu*)

of knowledge, the *śrutis* necessarily follow an apparently objective mode of speech to present Brahman as the *object* worship (*upasya*) and *object* of contemplation (*Jneya*). This objective modes of presentation are, however, interspersed with the caution that all these are *a-tadvaçana*’, that is, relative to *etadbrahma*’ and not indicative of *tadbrahma*’, which of necessity, is describable in the objective mode of speech, since it is *a-visaya*’ (not an *object* of thought)<sup>14</sup>. It can be seen that while speaking of *para Vidya* as that wherewith *tadaksā*’ is comprehended, the Mundaka resorts to all negative expressions<sup>15</sup> to indicate that the transcendental, being unobjective, cannot be spoken of in the same mode of speech which describes the *’etad-brahma*’, which latter constitutes the limit of speech and relational thinking. But the *’etadbrahma*’ cannot stand by itself, is not *sui generis* and in the final assessment it has to be conceived in term of the *’tadbrahma*’<sup>16</sup> as having originated from the *’tadbrahma*’, although in a pickwickian sense.

The very fact that this *etadbrahman* is negated ultimately<sup>17</sup> or is substantially reduced to *tadbrahman*’ proves that the *’this*’ Brahman’s – that is, Brahman presented as an *objective* integral unity of all appearances is consequential to that *objective taking* of it and so, it is epistemic only. There has been a good deal of logical exercises in the classical expositions to show how the *adat-aspect* can be regarded as the *’mere appearance*’ of the *Tat*’- Brahman. Moreover, since the *śrutis* speak of Brahman in both the forms or aspects and elaborate upon both, the problem that has agitated the minds of the believers is how to accept veracity of one set of *śruti*-statements while denying veracity of the other set<sup>18</sup>. The difficulty is resolved once we subscribe to the view that while all determinate positive assertion are related to an *objective taking* of Reality as the system of all pluralities – actual and possible, which all seem to be there, and may be indicated as *’this*’, the other group of expressions involving a negative tone refer to the transcendental *’tat*’, which can only be grasped in an immediate intuition of *’all being one*’ in absolute self-identify. And since this latter embodies the *inner view*, this is *para vidya*. But the *apara vidya* is also a form of *vidya* or knowledge in so far as it is fitful representation of the very same Reality *objectively enlarged*. But while *paravidya* relates to the metaphysical, the *apara vidya* relates to the epistemic since the objective presentation of Reality is incidental to a dualistic standpoint and in an appearance, insofar as the non-object (*avisaya*) is regarded into as an *’object*’ *visaya* given out there. Categories such as, *upadhi*, *uvacchedaka* etc, used not only by the classical interpreters but also by Sankara himself, are designed to intelligize and articulate the nature of Reality in its objective presentation. The ultimacy of Reality as an objective presentation, however, stands denied at the end, and its relational epistemic states becomes very clear when we adhere to the Sankarite maxim *’upadhinamca avidyapratyupasthapitatvat*’ – that is, conceiving Reality under the forms of *upadhi* etc. begs *avidya* (ignorance) as its necessary precondition. Even, then, this *avidya* initiated presentation is not to be taken as a human artefact. Nor does it melt away *absolutely and for all*. It is not a mere nothing. It is the appearance of Reality, which is *not* as it appears. For one having intuitive realisation the appearance ceases no doubt as and when that one realises it as *’appearance*’. But the appearance as Reality appearing as this or that is, again, a perennial feature<sup>19</sup> since it can have no cause or ground outside Reality, since Reality is again, all that is there. The appearance has to be known as *appearance* to be circumvented or eliminated since this appearance poses as the Reality itself and is mistaken for the real?

While elaborating upon *apara vidya*, the *śruti* text observes that this the kind of knowledge that the vedas in its different parts together with the auxiliary disciplines called the *vedangas* impart. The context is silent about the role of the Upanisads. It simply state, that *para vidya* is that wherewith *tadaksāra* is comprehended<sup>20</sup>. Commentators are not very clear if the Upanisads are to be included

in the Vedas or not because the Upanisads are supposed to be the organ of *para vidya*, not of *apara vidya*. The distinction, such as, *tadaksara* and *etadaksara* which has been made in the context and also in other *srutis* seem to suggest that the Upanisads, in one way, leads up to *para vidya* which dwells upon Reality regarded in the objective mode as well as the ground of all phenomenal pluralities, that is, as the objective Absolute (*etadaksara*). As an indirect form (*paroksa*) of knowledge the *srutis* (upanisads), at first, show the unity of all in Brahman (since the world of effects is non-different from their ground or cause) and thereafter, by calling upon the phenomenal to realise its absolute self-identity in Brahman (regarded as the one, indivisible reality transcendent of appearances), they become the organ of *para-vidya*. *apara vidya* is thus a necessary step to *para vidya*, although in the *para* there is substantial change in the mode of comprehension, and in the direction of the mind.

This *apara* Brahman (*etadaksara*) is the very same as *Saguna* Brahman. The *Saguna* Brahman is the *objective* Absolute. This can be an *object* of contemplation and worship, while the *Nirguna* Brahman, being *unobjective* (*avistaya*) and transcendental, cannot be made into an *object* of contemplation or of worship and devotion. As B.S. 3.2.11 and B.S. 3.2.22 point out Brahman in its *true* nature is not and cannot be both *nirguna* and *saguna*. Yet *sagunata* of Brahman is not a mere fiction of imagination. It is, so to say, the objective posture of the very same reality. What is indeed saying, the very same thing – it is Brahman as *objectively regarded*. As thus, regarded it necessarily implies dualism of the contemplated and the contemplator, the worshippable and the worshipper, the controller and the controlled, *Isvara* and *Jiva*, the Infinite and the finite, while the transcendental mode in which Brahman is *nirguna* is unique, the objective mode may be several, even infinite, suiting attitudes and temperaments of individuals, regarding Brahman objectively as an outside entity. So there is non-dualism and dualism, *abheda* (non-difference) as well as *bheda* (differences). But as against all rival schools or interpreters, Sankara does not accord to these aspects, *abheda* and *bheda*, *nirgunata* and *sagunata* equal status, and rightly so. The reason is while the former is the *para* – aspect, the latter is the *apara* – aspect, and does not ensure final release from bondage of phenomenal existence, does not ensure absolute freedom, peace and rest. Moreover, that which is relative to the objective attitude and involves dualism of subject and object, contemplator and the contemplated, the worshipper and the worshipped is not the absolute standpoint, and this can be transcended. But there is no further transcendence in the non-dual union of the subject and the object, in a state where all divisions and distinctions disappear. So, as categories of thought *para* and *apara* remain distinguished in the Vedanta philosophy – and the *sutras* refuse to admit that the *para* becomes the *apara* even under extraneous condition or limitation<sup>11</sup>. But why so? the reason which Sankara has worked out and is convincing is that this becoming the *apara*, *savisesa* or *saguna*, just like Brahman's becoming the *jivas* and the *jadas* is not *real becoming* and does not involve real transformation. This becoming is *apparent*. It is due to *maya* or *avidya*. In case it were real becoming there could not be ultimate lapsing of the division and differentiation, as there could not be that transcendence where in the pure and absolute self-identity in the non-dual reality is realised as a matter of fact. To illustrate non-essentiality or purely external 'look' of Brahman in the *apara*-aspect, various analogies have been introduced<sup>12</sup>. When concepts such as '*upadhi*' or '*avacchedaka*' are introduced to illustrate how the non-dual self-shining *nirvisesa*, can be *savisesa* and can also be the plural things and beings and go into *hiding*, the meaning is not that Brahman as itself actually assumes such *guises*, or uses the '*maya*' or '*avidya*' as real implaments or artefacts to go into hiding. The whole thing is a set of *figurative devices* which the seers of the Upanisads and Sankara their one faithful interpreter, employed to articulate how from conventional pluralism and dualism a transition to absolute non-dualism can be shown as theoretically possible. Not that the non-dual reality even becomes (in real

sense) dual and plural, non-dual reality even becomes (in real sense) dual and plural, not that Brahman which is self-revealed and is the *Atman* of all that is there, ever ceases to be that. But all the same, the felt bounder with its constraints and the living experience of the enlightened and the liberated, which is absolutely fearless and composed, cannot be explained without the analogies of the several hurdles which have to be surmounted at the various steps and stages of the pilgrimage.

There is no short circuit to the supreme knowledge. So the *srutis* dilate upon different phases of the Absolute, which is one non-dual reality, and again, follows the *arundhati nyaya* to progressively lead us top to what they advocate as the ultimate truth of fact. Their exposition, of necessity, follows two diametrically opposite courses— showing with the help of analogies and metaphors how the indivisible one by way of outer manifestation, which is all apparent, becomes several, and showing also the different stages which are involved in the conscious realisation of absolute self-identity on the part of the apparently distinguished and fragmented. The basic motive is to guide from darkness to light, to transport from mortality to immortality, from the bondage of an outer life of embodied and constrained existence to the life of enlightenment, freedom and tranquillity without there being any material or physical change anywhere. In knowledge which is inadequate and distorted we suffer bondage, in knowledge which is complete and re-assuring we are liberated. No physical change is involved in this re-generation and that is one reason why the physical limitation and constraints have to be looked upon as unsubstantial and immaterial. Although Reality, according to the Advaita view of Sankara is not without appearances (in fact, without appearances there could be no way of knowing and realising Reality as *that*, much in the same way that *vidya* could not be *vidya* without there being *avidya* which it dispels), the appearances have to be taken as 'mere appearances' un-substantial and merely epistemic (not metaphysical). The appearances are regarded as *anirvacaniya*, these remain there or seem to be there without affecting or determining Reality in any way. This is the nature of Reality, which is Brahman which is veiled by appearances which are unsubstantial have been brought out by two analogies in The Kenopanishad<sup>12</sup>. When there is a sudden flash of lightning the entire atmosphere together with the darkening clouds floating in it becomes transfigured in refulgent light. Such is realisation of Reality, which is Brahman - the entire realm of appearances is lifted or transfigured. The other analogy is the winking of the eye, with the winking the vistas open to the vision disappear and appear again, thus showing their essential relatedness to vision, so it the world-appearance ; it is relative to the dualistic standpoint, to a perceiver situated outside and in distinction from it. Its *esse* is its *percipi* but as and so long perceived it seems to be very real. This is why it is called neither real nor unreal.

## References

1. B S. 1.4.23 and 1.4.29
2. B S.B. 2.2.2., 2.2.6., 2.2.9
3. *Ibid.*, 2.2.4
4. *Ibid.*, 2.2.42
5. *Ibid.*, 2.1.14
6. *Ibid.*, 2.2.42
7. B S B. 2.2.31. 'na hi anyam sarvapramanaprasiddha lokasya vyavaharo anyat tattvainandhigamya sakyote apahnotou'
8. B S B. 2.2.19

- 9 B.S.B. 2.2.31 'Anadivepi andhaparampara-ayayena anpratisthaiva-navastha.'
- 10 *Ibid.*, 2.2.28
- 11 *Ibid.*, 2.2.30
- 12 *Ibid.*, 2.2.26.
13. *Ibid.*, 2.2.26 See Sankara's comment on the Buddhist content- 'nanupamrdya pradurbhavo'
- 14 Isapanisat verses 9-15
- 15 B.S.B. 2.2.28-31 'Na hi ayam sarvapramanaprasiddho lokasya vyavaharonyat tattvamanadhigamya sakyate apahnotum etc.
- 16 B.S.B. 'Yatah pramanapravrttipurvakam sambhava-sambhavaradharyete etc.'
- 17 *Ibid.*, 'Yathanutbhavam tattvamabhupagacchadbhik vahirevabhasata iti yuktam abhupagantum, na tu vahirvadabhasata iti
- 18 Br. Aranyaka 4.5.15. B.S.B. 1.1.1-4
- 19 'Pradhana malla' B.S.B. 1.4.28, 2.1.12
- 20 B.S. 1.1.5
- 21 Chandogya 6.2.1-3, Taittiriya 2.6.-7; Svetasvatara 5.13. Atareya I. 1.1-3 etc.
- 22 B.S. 1.1.6 'Gaunascet na nima-sabdai'
- 23 Sankara puts this beautifully when he says 'yatah param kinced akamksyanasti' B.S.B. 2.1.14
- 24 B.S.B. 1.1.9.
- 25 Compare Sankara's commentary on B.S. 2.1.27. When elaborating upon the notion of *paramarshika* and the way in which the realisation of it fulfils the supreme end of life.
- 26 Mundaka 1.1.3-5 '... die vidye veditavye, para caivapara ca, tatrapara Rgvedo yayurvedah samavedotharvavedah siksa Kalpovyakaranam niruktam cchando jyotisamiti. Atha para yaya tudaksaramadhigamyaite'
- 27 Br. Aranyaka. 4.5.15
- 28 B.S.B. 1.1.11 'vidyavidyavisayabhedena Brahmanah divirupatam darsayanti vakyani'. See also the subsequent passages.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 B.S.B. 1.1.1. *Pramana-jnana* itself does not amount to *brahmaragati*, it paves the way for that ultimate realisation by extirpating without residue the seed of mal-apprehension called *avidya* - *nimsesasamsaravig avidyadyanarthanivartanai*. Also, 'anubhavavasanatvat brahmavijnanasya' B.S.B. 1.1.2
- 31 See Adhyasabhasya
- 32 Katha Ch. 2. First valli, verse 1
- 33 This is what is called 'Svam apito bhavati' B.S.B. 1.1.9.
- 34 'Tatravidyavasthayam Brahmana Upasyopasakudak... sarvo vyavaharah' B.S.B. 1.1.11
- 35 It can be seen that unlike Ramanuja Sankara did not make such commitment. He, on the other hand, promised a self-consistent and harmonious of the Vedanta texts. See Adhyasabhasya concluding sentence and compare with Ramanuja's 'sutraksaranam vyakhyasyante vide Sri Bhasya. Introductory remarks
- 36 B.S.B. 1.1.2



- 37 See Isopanisat. Verse 11
- 38 B.S. 1.1.48, Taittiriya 2.6., Atareya first khanda, Brihadaranyaka 1.4.1, Taittiriya. 2.4.
- 39 In the western philosophy Bacon speaks of that instance or circumstance as crucial and decisive which marks out a valid hypothesis in the midst of rival claimants.
- 40 B.S.B. 1.1.20.
- 41 *Ibid.*, 1.1.22 – ‘Akasastalingat’ Relevant srutis can be found in chandogy 1.9., Taittiriya 2.7, 3.6. etc
- 42 B.S. 1.1.2. – ‘Ataeva Pranah’.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 1.1.24.
- 44 B.S.B. 1.1.25-31
- 45 B.S. 2.1.14
- 46 *Ibid.*, 1.2.1 ‘Sarvatra prasiddhopadesat’
- 47 *Ibid.*, 1.2.2
- 48 *Ibid.*, 1.2.3
- 49 ‘Satyam sarire bhavati, na tu sarire eva bhavati’ B.S.B. 1.2.3
- 50 In the texts, however, the discussion centres around the Jiva (individual Self) and Brahman (The Absolute Self) But because the context is that of worshipping, and no one worships himself, the ‘sarira’ (bodies being) has been accepted in a wider meaning, that is, any determinate Being
- 51 B.S. 1.2.4
- 52 *Ibid.*, . 1.2.5
- 53 *Ibid.*, 1.2.6.
- 54 The meditational lotus situated in the heart ‘Salagram’ is a symbol of Lord Visnu in a piece of stone, used in daily worship
- 55 B.S. 1.2.7
- 56 *Ibid.*, 1.2.8-12.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 1.2.14
- 58 B.S.B. 1.2.15.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 1.2.16.
- 60 B.S.B. 1.2.18 ‘Atra adhidaivatamadhilokamadhivedamadhiyajnamadhi bhutamadhyatmanca kascidantaravasthita yamayita antaryami iti sruyate’ B.S.B. 1.2.18. atra adhidaivat amadhilokamadhivadamadhiyajnamadibhutamadhyatmanca kascidantaravasthita yamayita antaryami iti sruyate’.
- 61 B.S.B. 1.2.19
- 62 Mundaka 1. 6-7
- 63 B.S.B. 1.1.11 B.S.B. 1.3.1 ‘na karyaprapancavisiste vicitra atma vijneyah . avidyokrtam karyaprapancam vidaya pravistopayanastamavaikamayalana-bhautamatmanam janithaikarasasrita.
- 64 Isa. B-IIi
- 65 ‘Yet sarvamavidyaro pitam tat sarvam paramasthatah-Brahma na tu yad brahma, tat sarvamityarthah’ Bhamati 1.3.1
- 66 ‘Nanarasata’ and ‘ekarasata’ may be interpreted as ‘ of varied tastes or experiences’ and of ‘one taste

or undivided experience'.

- 67 B S B Yatha yasminpaste Devadattastamanaya ityukte asanamevannyati na devadatlam, tadvadayantano bhutasyaivaikarasasyatmano vijneyatvamopadisyate"
- 68 Br aranyaka 2.4.12.
- 69 *Ibid*
- 70 B.S.B. 1.3.1
- 71 Br Aranyaka. 3.8.8.
- 72 See prasna Upanisad 5th question, also Mandukya Upanisad.
- 73 B S 1.3.25
- 74 B.S.B 1.3.19.
- 75 *Ibid*
- 76 B S.B 1.3.19
- 77 Yadyapi atmanoimanoranyonyasmin----- anyonyatadatmyadhyasah samanah tathapi atmanah samsrstarupena eva adhyaso na svarupena iti satyatvam' Vivaranapra-msyasamgraha.
- 78 Sankaramakes this claim again and again. See B S. 1.1.2, 1.1.3.
- 79 Chandogyas 3.14.1
- 80 Br Aranyaka 4.5.11
- 81 Chandogyas 6.2.1
- 82 Taittiriya 3.6
- 83 Chandogy 6.1.3
- 84 *Ibid* 6.1.4
- 85 Rgveda x. 129.
- 86 Deussen- The Philosophy of the Upanisads, pp 16-17
- 87 A remarkable effort in this line was made by Prof K C Bhattacharya in his 'studies in Vedantism and other essays, the full value of which is yet to be appreciated by the general mass of Indian scholars. His 'subject as freedom' is another masterpiece showing the method of progressive exploration of the nature of Reality as freedom on modern lines of logical analysis.
- 88 See the last section of Taittiriya Upanisad.
- 89 Chandogyas 6.2.1.
- 90 Aitareya 1.1.1
- 91 Br Aranyaka 1.4.1
- 92 Chandogyas 6.2.3, Taittiriya 2.6-7. Aitareya 1st Khanda., B S B. 1.3.1
- 93 See B.S B. 1.3.1 Chandogyas 6.8.-16 'Tamevankam Janatha atmanam' Cf B S B 1.3.1
- 94 'Tatpratipattan phatavagamat' B S.B. 2.1.27 (cont. 77). Also, 'natah parem Kincidakam-ksyamasti' B S B. 2.1.14.
- 95 'Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma' Chandogyas 3.14.1
- 96 Sarvam Kavidam Brahma Chandrgyas 3.14.1

97. Katha 1.2.12, 1.3.12, 2.2.9-14, Mundaka 2.1.10, Svetasvatara 6-10, 11, etc.
98. 'Esa sarvesu bhutesu gudho atma na prakasate' Katha 1.3.12
99. Svetasvatara 3.1. *jalavan*, 4.10. *Maya* and *Mayanam*, B.S. 3.2.3, 2.1.28, 2.3.29
100. B.S. 2.1.14
101. Studies in Philosophy Vol. 1,
102. The Bhmati—Tikaprarambha. Vacaspati raises the point even more forcefully when he playfully pleads the case of our ordinary conception of the self as the felt personal individual, the empiric unity in 'I', by saying that thousands of scriptures cannot render a pot into a piece of cloth—*'na hyagamah sahasramapi ghatam patayi tumisate'* The case, however, becomes different if what we ordinarily know as a 'pot' is really not a pot at all, if our ordinary knowledge is vitiated by ignorance.
103. 'Nriah param kincidakamksyamasti' B.S. 2.1.14.
104. See Vyasa, ritha
105. 'Na hi upadhiyogat api anyadrsasya vastunonyadrsasvabhavah sambhavati upadhinancu avidyapratyapasthapitatvat' B.S.B. 2.11
106. Chandoyogya 3.14.1.
107. That the classical interpreters of Sankara have all erred on the point has been shown in Chapters III, IV, and V
108. See Sankarabhasya—'Jnanena pramanena avegantum istam Brahma. Brahmanavegatitih purusarthah' B.S. 1.1.1
109. 'Avidyaya martyum tirtva vidyaya amartomasnuta', also 'Andham tamah pravisanu ye nvidyamupasato, tathah bhuyah iva ic' tamo yau vidyayam ratah' Isa 9-11 Cf Bhadaranyaka 4.4.10 and Maitri 7.9
110. See Mundaka 1.1.4 and also Maitri 6.22-23.
111. B.S.B. 1.1.2 also 1.1.4.
112. Mundaka 1.1.5. —1 Br. Ar. 2.3.1-6.
113. *Ibid.*,
114. B.S. 3.2.12 'Na bhedaditi cet na, pratyakam a- tadvacanat' also B.S. 3.2.4 'Anrupavadeva hi tatpradhanatvat'
115. Mundaka 1.1.6, see also Kena 1 & 11
116. Mundaka 1.1.9 Katha 1.3.13-16
117. B.S. 3.2.22 'Prakritatvatvam hi pratishedhat tato braviti ca bhuyah and Sankara's commentary
118. Na hi vedavakyanam kasyacidarthavatvam kasyacidanarthavatvam iti yaktam pratipattum, pramanatvavisesat' B.S.B. 3.2.15.
119. See B.S.B. 3.2.21 'Evamayedit' tasmnvidya svayamevot padyate' taya cavidya bethought tatasca avidyadyastah sakaloyam-namarupaprapancah svapnaprapancavalpra viliyate'
120. Mundaka 1.1.5
121. B.S. 3.2.11 and 3.2.22
122. B.S. 3.2.25, 3.2.27- 'Ubhayavyapadesat tvahikundalawat' B.S. 3.2.28-29
123. 'Yadetadvidyuto vyadyutata itunnyaminisada' Kena. 4.4

## The Jiva and Brahman: Bondage and Liberation

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All is Brahman, and this Brahman is the *Atman*, there is nothing else beside this all-comprehensive 'Reality-Self'. This Reality, which is the absolute and *pure* identity of all that appears, is not as it appears but none the less it *does appear* as it appears. Why it appears as that which *it is not*, has no answer other than that such is, indeed, the fact of the case—also such is necessarily demanded by a situation in which there is to be a transition from appearance to Reality, from non-being (*asat*) to Being (*sat*), from the darkness of ignorance to the light of enlightenment, and from mortality to immortality. This is no dogma. What the *śruti*s, the Upanisads, advocate as 'revealed truths' of fact are capable of being known and realised as the absolute truth of fact. Indeed, this possibility of realisation, here and now, constitutes the final proof (*antah pramanam*)<sup>1</sup>, the proof immediate and direct, of all that is said, and has been said by the 'seers' of the Upanisads. The proof of the pudding is, indeed, in the lasting. The Advaita Vedanta of Sankara issues forth as a demand that this truth be tasted. This is in conformity with the *śruti* exclamation and exhortation: 'Harken all, begotten of the Immortal, I do join in the ancient Brahman with adoration. May my verses spread forth like suns upon their courses and reach even those who ascended to divine stations'<sup>2</sup>. Also, 'arise and awaken, be enlightened receiving answers to your questions. This, indeed, is a difficult path to traverse: those, who have seen, describe it as sharp as is the razor's edge'<sup>3</sup>.

Difficult, indeed, it is to 'see' the truth, shrouded as it is in mystery, which latter is constituted by the veil of ignorance. It is difficult because ignorance with its resultant infatuation is cumbering and wholesome<sup>4</sup>. There is no wonder, this is compared with living-death, while the life of truth-vision is called immortality. It is not for nothing that the *śruti*s declare "This Atman is not graspable by mere instruction, nor by intelligence, nor by much learning. This is obtainable only by the one whom the *Atman* chooses, and to whom it reveals its own form"

This – "The Atman choosing some one and revealing its own form" is not only figurative, but incidental as it is to the mode of use of conventional language, this of necessity, implies a certain dualism. In this, the Upanisads seek to describe *in language* that which cannot be so described literally. Some one's intuitive knowledge of Brahman, *under conditions which blow off that some one as a separate fact*, is Brahman's revelation to some one as 'self' –revelation'<sup>5</sup>. The eternally self-existent is realised a –new in this self-realisation. It is, in that, realised as the one self, the one Self-identity of all. But this, in another mode, again, is not realised *as that* when it is known and

taken as other than itself, that is, when it is not only confused with its appearance but the appearance is taken for all the reality, discrete and plural, that seems to be there. This is the mystery shrouding the truth.

While giving expression to the vision of a reality which appears as other than itself, and so, *is not* as it appears, yet, all the same, *appears* as it appears, the 'seers' of the Upanisads use language which frequently transgress the so-called logical rules of language. In places, we have ejaculations only which are expressive of delight of a state of ecstasy but are not statements of fact'. A patient and receptive mind will, however, find all throughout unmistakable signs of the under-current of incessant struggles on the part of the seers of the Upanisads, expressing in language which cannot fitfully be expressed in the diction of our conventional speech. Analogies and metaphors, epigrams and oxymorons, onomatopoeias<sup>8</sup> and pathetic fallacies, personifications and other modes of rhetoric have been freely used to bring home to us a truth which is at once known and yet unknown in its *specific* character<sup>9</sup>. Thus, when it is said, Brahman is *such* and *such*, Brahman does *this* or *that*, Brahman is to be known in this or that way, Brahman is to be worshipped or meditated upon in this or that way, Brahman is partless, yet its one quarter (pada) covers up all the things and beings and the remaining three quarters form the immortal in the sky,<sup>10</sup> – we have statements in the *objective mode* of speech, suggesting as if Brahman is an *object (visaya)* out there. Then, for instance, we have 'that which is, invisible, ungraspable, without family or caste, without sight or hearing without hand or foot, eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent exceedingly subtle, this the Imperishable the wise perceive as the source of all that is there (*bhutatani*)'<sup>11</sup>. The same objective mode is retained but what is described as the *source* of all, is, in essence, very much other than the given and known, and is admitted as ungraspable. The description takes a new direction when this root principle. The light of lights, this Brahman without stain or parts, is spoken of as capable of being known only by *one who knows the Self*<sup>12</sup>. Then we have 'in the beginning (before manifestation of the plural) all this was the Self (Atman). Nothing else stirred (winked). He be thought 'Let me now create worlds'<sup>13</sup>. But this *creating* of worlds, again, has been described elsewhere as *bethinking* 'would that I were many; Let me procreate myself'<sup>14</sup>. The seventh *prapathaka* of the Chandoyoga, again, describes in what way this Self is absolute Plenum (*bhuma*), how it is the acme and in what way, again, it is all-pervasive, all-begetting, all-supporting and has no negation of itself. the anecdote of progressive instruction of Indra (and Virocana) by prajapati begins by describing the Self (Atman) as the one Real and holds out that it is the knowledge of this Self which enables one to conquer all the worlds and to gain fulfilment of all desires. The anecdote also ends with the same pronouncement that he obtains all worlds and all desires who has found out and who understands the Self (Atman)<sup>15</sup>. The Katha verses seem to have one single purpose and this is presenting the Self as the indwelling principle of all outer manifestations. 'The bodiless among bodies, the stable among the unstable' says the Katha, is this great, all pervading Self and the wiseman, on recognising it, sorrows not'<sup>16</sup>. This *Atman*, the Reality, says the Katha remains concealed in all plural things and beings and is not accessible in the plural appearances in its immutable absolute form. To get at the self, at the Reality as it is in its own nature, it is necessary to go beyond the objective mode of speech, thought and understanding and this, of course, is a very difficult and exacting enterprise. Thus, the Katha says 'one has to reduce thought and speech to the understanding-Self (knowing subject), then bring this under reduce it to the Great Self which is the objective unity of all appearances, – of all apparent duality and plurality. Finally, this the Great Self – the objective unity of all appearances, will have to be brought under and reduced to the Tranquil Self (which is transcendent of all becoming)'. There are two verses, one following the other, which unmistakably point out to not only what the Vedanta Brahman is to stand for and what kind of knowledge is to be the means of liberation but also to the

relation (if it is at all describable in that way) between the *one* Reality and its *Plural* appearances. Thus, 'the inner-Self of all that is there, is the one controller, who makes its one form many-wise. The wise who perceive it as the 'Self' situated within Oneself enjoy eternal happiness and not other. It is eternal amidst all fleeting, the conscious principle underlying all that are (apparently) conscious; it is one among the (apparent) many and bestows all objects of desire. The wise, who perceive it as the Self residing within, alone have eternal peace, and no others'<sup>18</sup> There – after, we have a remarkable verse which pundits generally misconstrue. In it there are two key-expressions, such as, *Bhati* (Self-shines) and *vibhati* (dependently shines as in reflection), which also recur in the immediately following verse where their meanings have been very adroitly<sup>19</sup> distinguished. What the Katha seeks to bring out in this verse is the puzzling situation which one faces when one is called upon to describe Reality as itself, in distinction from Reality as appearing in appearances. In fact, it is hazardous to describe Reality *with* and *without* appearances in the objective mode of speech, since Reality is not without its appearances although the appearances do not show or signify Reality as itself, that is, Reality *as* reality and not appearance. Such being the case, the verse intends to say that Reality, which is the Self, can only be immediately felt and so indicated as 'That is this' (*tadeta!*), and any further and more specific statement about it is always vitiated by incompatible alternatives such as become usual in describing the indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*). The Katha verse, the meaning of which we have attempted to analyse in the foregoing, is "the highest indescribable happiness (of Self-realisation or Reality-experience), they (the wise) recognise as 'That is this' (in an immediate way). How can I specify in knowledge (*vyanyam*) whether it self-shines (*bhati*) or dependently shines in reflection (*vibhati*)?"

The difficulty the seers of the Upanisads faced in communicating in language their vision of the truth is due to the peculiar nature of that truth itself. How the all-comprehending Reality (*Brahman*) is *also* the one indivisible *felt* and *realised* identity (*Atman*) of all is not easy to grasp even theoretically. Most of the erudite annotators of the Advaita view through ages, like the commentators of the non-Advaitic schools, have *drafted* the concept of this '*Brahman-Atman*' in the pattern of the felt individual identity commonly regarded and spoken of as the personal identity of the so called finite self. Much of Sankarite literature also bristles with expressions such as *Jivatma* and *Paramatma*, the limited Self and the *supreme* self. How such expressions conform to the tenets of a doctrine, which regards the Self or *Atman* to be one non-dual principle, partless and indivisible, baffles us. The usages such as *Jiva* and *Isvara Para Brahman* and *Apara Brahman*, *Prajna*, *Tajasa*, *Dehin*, *Hiranyagarbha*, *Vasavanara* or *virat* are quite in order. It is also true that to bring home to us the incommunicable truth the seers have frequently taken the help of homely analogies, have brought in facts or situations of common experience for the purpose of comparison and elucidation. But sagacity requires that neither should the analogies or metaphors be rendered literally, nor should that which is spoken of as transcendent, and unknown in the objective mode, that is, as *visaya* (objective content), be interpreted in terms of the objectively given 'known'. The Advaita, to be sure, calls for understanding in the reverse mode – all are to be understood in terms of Brahman alone and the Brahman has to be understood as the one non-dual *Atman* – and not as one *Atman*, elevated as the Supreme Self, along side a host of plural finite selves. There is not to be any depicting in reverse direction, no *personalisation* or personification. There must not be any confusing the *meant* with the widely diverse modes of *objective* descriptions no confusing the intended with the given characters of any symbol. It is for this reason that Reality, which is Brahman-*Atman* has been spoken of as beyond all thought and speech<sup>20</sup>.

What, for stance, is the relevance of the Vedanta analysis of the three states of the mind such



as, waking (*jagarita*), sleep (*svapna*) and dreamless sleep (*susupti*) and of the fourth (*turiya*), which is not commonly experienced and is described to be beyond the mental (psychic) plane? An analogy seems to have been drawn out between *four phases* of the individual's existence and the *four seeming* phases of Brahman's (of Reality's) own life. In the context of Brahman, however, these phases have to be understood as four dimensions, *all simultaneous*, although not on the same plane as is also the case with the individual's existence. In the context of the finite individual, the *Jiva*, the states can only be *successive* but the fourth state, which is being – in – Brahman, is rarely realised. It can be seen that the description of the waking, sleep and dreamless sleep in respect of Brahman<sup>21</sup> can only be *figurative*. Yet the 'figures of speech' accomplish some very important purposes<sup>22</sup>. As far as, Brahman is concerned, the fourth, the *turiya* shows Brahman as *itself*, that is, Brahman as the *Atman*, while the third, *susupti*, shows Brahman as the primal ground as also the terminus of all *objective appearances* in so far as these all disappear or lapse *as themselves*, that is, as separate presentations. This third is the most crucial as this symbolises the turning point from the unitary objective to the transcendent non-objective, non-subjective, – from Brahman as *Tajjalan* (in cosmic reference) to Brahman as the *Atman* – the non-subjective non-objective transcendental one, immutable and eternal. Here there is, so to say, a complete change of direction. the cosmic appearances, called '*prapanca*', all lapse and stand negated in a state of situational withdrawal analogous to the state of dreamless sleep of the empiric individual (*Jiva*) in which the individual is described as losing his separatist 'I-ness' and as participating in the pure being-hood<sup>23</sup>. By illustrating the lapsing of all multiple perceptions and perceptions of plural things (which in the waking and dream-consciousness all parade as real) in the state of dreamless sleep and re-emerging of them all in the dreaming and the waking conditions from that matrix, the *sutras* seem to make articulate the purely *epistemic* character of our knowledge of existential pluralities. There is another and somewhat cognate purpose which the analogy seems to achieve. As all persons do not abide together in the waking, dreaming and in the dreamless state, so, some may be really experiencing lapsing of all plural manifestations in Brahman-consciousness or Atman-consciousness while others may continue to be living on the plane in which pluralities claim to be absolutely real. In other words, there may be experience of Brahman in all the seeming phases *simultaneously* in so far as Brahman covers everything and every manifestations, while in the context of an individual person, his life in a particular plane others in the same state or condition. This then disproves the thesis that the Advaita advocates pure illusionism as far as the cosmic appearances are concerned, since there is *simultaneous* presence, so to say, of all phases analogous to waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and the fourth, the transcendent state (*turiya*) in Brahman, the Reality.

It can be seen that the *sutras* evince interest in the analysis of the three states of the mind, – waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep in a limited way only. The state of sleep or dream is also treated as a state midway between the state of living and the state at death and in that sense the *sandhya* (junction)<sup>24</sup>. All these lend support to the view that the real intention of the *sutras* had been to explain and illustrate the various phases of Brahman's manifestation on the analogy of the different phases of one's psychic experiences. It is not that easy to show off the cosmic pluralities as purely *epistemic*, their *esse* being their *percipi* and at the same time to insist that these pluralities do not vanish in the way magical creations of but continue to hold their ground in that aspect of Brahman's manifestation which is linked with *avidya*. It has already been insisted that Reality and its indeterminable appearances somehow coexist or are coeval as also *vidya* and *avidya* are. The only difference is that while Reality *as itself* is describable as *nitya* (eternal), the veil of appearances and their sustaining principle, such as, *avidya* is *anadi* (beginningless). It is wrong to take both aspects as equally eternal (*sama nitya*) and in that sense equally true (*sama satya*) as some of the non-

Advaitists advocate what seem to be the point or insistence of the Advaita of Sankara is that Brahman which is *all and everything* has so provided that the *realisation* of its absolute one-ness as *Atman* in term of *vidya* and the other mode of *taking it* as the world of pluralities by way of *avidya* may obtain simultaneously. To put otherwise, when one *Jiva* under certain states of absolute deconditioning may live the life of Brahman as the non-deal *Atman*, other *Jivas* (who are substantially the very same Brahman) may continue to live *as themselves*, that is, as Brahman, in its world-play, parading as substantive individuals amidst, cosmic pluralities as seemingly absolute as the others are.

The analogy of the waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep however, works within certain recognisable limits. In the individuals' day-to-day experience, states, such as, waking and dreaming normally (that is, in course of natural sequence) follow one another. Dreamless sleep, however is not experienced every now and then and a state of swoon (*murccha*) is an accidental occurrence<sup>21</sup>. The withdrawal unto itself (*svamapitavya*) and the consequent participation in the pure being-hood (*sata sampannata*)<sup>22</sup>, spoken of the state of dreamless sleep, is not so much a consciously attained state of existence as it is a negative state of relief following upon temporary suspension of psychic functions. This is evidenced by occasional drift from dreamless sleep to the state of sleep involving dream presentations, and thence to the fully awakened state. Dreamless sleep brings in freshness and vigour of the mind for one returning to waking state and attending to normal works of day-to-day life. But it does not usher in any state of enlightenment of any sort, or *reformation* in outlook and attitude. To be short, it does not make one wise and reformed. Yet the known possibility of one's retiring to a state of existence when not only the existential pluralities of the world of conventional experience fail to cause any excitation but even the dream-images, which are minds own reconstructions of past impressions in unconscious response to latent desires<sup>23</sup>, fail to cause any disturbance, illustrates how Brahman as *Tajjalan*, the transcendental grouped of cosmic appearances, can be theoretically understood.

The waking and dreaming experiences both involve sense of presentations of some kind, and because of this sense of presentation, that is, sense of objectivity, both dream-images and waking perceptions seem to be real as long as they endure and are not contradicted. But the sense of objectivity or presentedness is no sure guide to reality, that is, 'being real'. In the context of B. S. 3. 2. 3. It has been said that the entire dream-presentation, in spite of its objectivity, is of the nature of a mere appearance (*mayamaya*). The reason given has been '*Kartsnena anabhivyaktasvarupatva*'. That is, the nature of a thing as it is in itself (*svarupa*) is not there manifest *anabhivyakta* in its wholeness (*Kartsnena*). This argument combined with the statements on dreamless sleep in which *Jiva* is described as participating in the real being-hood and also with the statement on the condition such as swoon *mugdha* or *murccha* in which *Jiva* is described as *half-participation* in such a state of being, goes to suggest that there is progressive moving away from Being-as-itself in dream and waking experiences of *objective presentations*. Yet in the nature of things, transition both ways from dreamless state to dreaming and waking experiences and back from waking to dreaming and thence to dreamless sleep obtains. Brahman's being the world-ground, Brahman indulging in the world-play and Brahman's becoming the plural things and beings have to be understood in the same way with this difference that while such changing states are all successive in the case of *Jiva* they are all simultaneous in the case of Brahman since time or temporality has no place in a reality which is impervious to absolute negation.

The Mandukya *sruti* laconically introduces the fourth (*turiya*) in term of quite a number of negatives. This is Brahman as *Atman*. This is Brahman realisable as pure identity and absolute one-ness without any extraneous reference whatsoever. It is very characteristic that although intending

to explain what it called the four quarters (*pada*) or dimensions (*matra*) of Brahman, the Mandukya, after having described the first, second and the third quarters or dimensions would not call the fourth any quarter or specific dimension at all. Very similar reluctance to describe the fourth as a specific part or dimension can be met elsewhere also.<sup>20</sup> The underlying reason seems to be that this fourth represents Brahman as its absolute itself, Brahman as the non-dual *Atman*, the Reality *as itself*, divested of all appearances and divested also of all reference to the appearances this, then, is the transcendent without any limit or determination<sup>21</sup>. This is not Brahman conceived as the world-ground (*visva-yoni*), this is not Brahman as the origin and the terminus of all beings, that Brahman conceived earlier as *tajjalan*<sup>22</sup> or as *pravavapyayan*<sup>23</sup>. This not Brahman as *Sarvajna*<sup>24</sup> either, or the *antaryami*<sup>25</sup>. Any description in an objective reference to cosmic pluralities, or in the objective mode of speech, is irregular as far as this 'aspect' of Brahman-knowledge is concerned. This seems to be the reason behind the use of a whole host of negatives. Thus, Brahman as the *Atman* is described as the transcendent *fourth* (which is a sense replaces all the three quarters previously described), which is not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive, not both-wise cognitive, not a cognition-mass, not cognitive, not non-cognitive, the unseen, the unusable, ungraspable, the undefinable, the unthinkable, the unnameable, the one realisable as one's absolute identity<sup>26</sup> that which is the cessation of all appearances, – the tranquil, the absolute one, the supreme good *ekatmapratyayasaram prapancopasamam santam sivam advaitam*. Such a description of Brahman as *Atman* at one place and in one context is hardly met outside the *Mandukya*.

How is one to describe the indescribables? It seem that the indescribable can only be described as *indescribable*. There is nothing enigmatic about it, nor should one take this as a mere play upon words. That is described as indescribable which is intimately known or felt like that. That which is felt to be one's own absolute identity, the one Self which is all-fulfilling, is also felt to be the one goal, the resting place. The tranquil, the non-dual the the *summum bonum*. In this part, the foregoing description seems to be *positive*, while in the rest, including the description, such as, *prapancopasamam*, the descriptions are all negative. The part '*ekatmapratyayasaram santam sivam advaitam*' seem to be containing the answer why it was necessary to describe the fourth (*turiya*) as indescribable in term of expressions which are used in the *objective* mode of speech to describe facts commonly regarded as objective or subjective. Brahman as the *Atman* is *realised as that*, just as Brahman as the world-ground, the inner-controller, the all-knowing (*sarvajna*) principle is *intelligible as that* and Brahman as manifestating itself in forms of distinct and apparently substantive pluralities is also *imaginable as that*. So here there is no description, positive or negative, which is not experience-based which is unrelated to experience of some kind. But neither the different phases of Reality nor their cognate experiences stand on one and the same level. The Vedanta articulates this issue by distinguishing two aspects of Brahman as *para* and *apara* and distinguishing the knowledge of these aspects of *para vidya* and *apara vidya*. The logical difficulty in this view defending two forms of *vidya* can be resolved if it is kept in mind that although all *vidyas*, or true knowledges, have to necessarily conform to the nature of what is known (*radvatitatprakarañjana*), while *apara vidya* is the knowledge of the *apara* aspect of Brahman or of *apara* Brahman *as that*, *paravidya* is the knowledge of the *para*-aspect of Brahman, of Brahman as *Atman* what ever may be the logical denomination of that absolute knowledge. Since this so-called aspect of Brahman is, truly speaking, no aspect', of Brahman, it is Brahman *as itself*, and *as itself*, Brahman is the *Atman*, absolutely transcendent of all phenomenal modes of representations.

A good deal of difficulty and confusion has crept in to the exposition of the Advaita doctrine of Sankara in account of some what 'casual' understanding of the concept of '*atma* (Self) as it has

been used in the Upanisads and in Sankara's own commentary, running through the different *adhyayas* and *padas*. This is, of course, partly due to the fact that in *common speech* we use the concept in the context of an individual primarily and in the context of the world ground, such as, Brahman only secondarily. So, in deciding what would be the nature of Brahman *as Atman*, in other words, what the *Atman*, which is also called Brahman in the Upanisads, *will be like*, we feel tempted to draft it in the pattern of the felt 'I' in the individual's retrospective awareness, and, therefore, as a 'bigger I', a super-individual or a super-person. This brings in a certain dualism between 'the bigger I' and the smaller 'I', otherwise called the Absolute Self and the finite self. An advaitist, even, though regarding the immediately felt 'I' in the individuals' retrospective awareness as the false Self, may, never the less feel tempted to regard the real and the true Self as another but a *bigger I*. But this will be drafting the *Atman* which is Brahman in the pattern of the *ego*, the felt 'I'. The fact is the concept of Brahman *as Atman* has *not* been understood in the Upanisads or in Sankara's commentary in this meaning, that is, as a bigger 'I'. There is another difficulty. Brahman *as Atman* has not been understood in the Advaita doctrine of Sankara as an *objectivity*, the concept has not at all been used *entitatively* but only as a *functional* concept. What that means we shall explain later. The fact is: the *sruti*-statements, as forms of language of communications are necessarily in the *objective mode* of speech. A casual understanding of the *sruti* statements may create the impression as if what these statements speak about or describe is an *objective reality*, an entity *out there*, which stands distinguished from the speaker as also from the listener. The non-Advaitists, without any exception understood the Upanisadic concepts—Brahman and Atman in that way, that is, as *objective realities*. Understanding the concept in that way, the non-Advaitists have attempted to construct their universal and Absolute Self in the likeness of what they felt to be their individual selves, as revealed or felt in their retrospective awarenesses of themselves. This has been one reason why the immediately felt individual person, a unity in and through differences, is regarded by them as a real and *substantive entity*. Unlike Sankara, they did not question the validity of their immediate awareness of a 'Self' given in retrospective awareness in the mode of the 'I'. So, the Absolute reality, Brahman, was to them, an *Atman* in the sense of a magnified 'I' a Super-person, and also as unity-in-difference as their felt personal identity is a unity in and through differences. While the dualists among these non-Advaitists kept the two types of selves thus secured—the Absolute Self and the individual finite selves, quite apart from one another even though subordinating the latter to the former by way of a relation of dependence, the Absolutists among them attempted to devise some crude relations among there 'selves' of the two orders in order to remain affiliated to the Upanisadic view which unmistakably speak of 'the one God, hidden in all things, all-pervading, the inner soul of all things, the overseer of deeds, and in all things abiding'. It is remarkable that these non-Advaitists would not countenance the last and the concluding line of the sloka—'*saksi ceta kevalo nirgunasca*'—the witnessing consciousness, the solitary one devoid of all qualities.

As far as the Advaita version given by Sankara goes, there is only one, non-dual, indivisible Self (*atman*), as there is only one indivisible Reality without a second. Where there is only one single fact, there can be no characterisation, such as, subjective or objective. This Reality, which is Brahman, is always *What it is*, that is, the one *Atman*, the one absolute identity, but it also *appears as it appears*, that is, as the cosmic order of infinite pluralities. The cosmic pluralities—the *Jivas* among them, do not *really* have separate *identity*, or *selves* of their own. But conforming to the very nature of appearances *as appearances*, there is the belief that these cosmic pluralities are substantive realities in themselves, and also that the empiric individuals besides being substantive entities have distinctive selves (*atma*) or thing own. That there is such a belief. Such a conventional way of thinking and

behaving cannot be questioned and Sankara does not deny it as being there. Besides, the over-bearing nature of such a way of thinking, believing and behaving is a positive proof that such a form of knowing and behaving is there. The Advaita only contends that this conventional knowledge, in spite of its general acceptance is *false*, (*mithya*), although it is there beginninglessly (*anadi*). This is *avidya*. It attains there as a given state of affair, and is not manipulated by man. The deceived has not worked out the mechanism or mode of his self-deception. It is beginningless and is mooted in the very nature of appearances *qua* appearances. Why Reality is not *as it appears to be* is no question at all. Such a question is logically illegitimate, for why Reality should be the same *as it appears to be*. When the distinguishing between reality and appearance is a commonly accepted fact and quite intelligible?

That our conventional knowledge and behaviour presuppose our acceptance of the world-pluralities, including the empiric individuals, as very much real is not questioned. What is questioned is if that very presupposition itself that the pluralities, including the empiric individuals, are, in their *true nature*, as they are conventionally accepted to be is a *truth of fact*. The non Advaitists, be they dualists, be they absolutists did not see the reason why such questioning was at all necessary. Sankara, however, felt that such questioning is not only necessary but it is also imperative in as much as a harmonious rendering of the *sruti*-texts demands it as a logical necessity. One does not require the aid or guidance of the *sutrapramana* or 'revealed truths' to know that the world-pluralities are really as they are ordinarily known to be. Similarly, one does not need the guidance of the *sutrapramana* to understand that the cosmic pluralities which appear and disappear have a common-source, animate or inanimate or both, which somehow give rise to them by way of creation or evolution. The *srutis* claim to be an *extraordinary pramana*, delivering the truth which is otherwise inaccessible. What may be that truth, then, about the states of affair that obtain here? One such truth is: 'here there is no plurality of any kind (*ncha nanasti kincana*). The second is: 'all is, to be sure, Brahman and nothing else beside. The third is: 'this Brahman is the one Self (*Atman*) of all'. The fourth is: 'it is precisely the knowledge of Brahman as *Atman* that liberates and this one alone is the supreme knowledge (*para vidya*). The fifth is while the knowledge of Brahman as the one indivisible and absolute self (*Atman*) is *paravidya* in as much as this conforms to the *para* aspect of Brahman, the knowledge of Brahman as the objective unity, indivisible and immutable of cosmic appearances is *apara vidya*, conforming to the *apara* (secondary) aspect of Brahman. The sixth is: one who believes in the substantive reality of the world-pluralities is agitated by fear and suffers death (*mrtyumapnoti*). The seventh is ignorance (*avidya*) is at the root of all evils. It is the cause of bondage and also of rotation in the cycle of existence from birth to death and from death to rebirth. The *srutis* bristle with countless other themes which go to establish the fact that our conventional way of believing and living is vitiated by ignorance, that one seeking liberation should look for right knowledge and enlightenment and that this consist in understanding Brahman as the one, non-dual Reality and also as the one absolute Self. In his *Adhyasabhyasa*, Sankara has taken great pains to establish how and in what way our conventional behaviour is infected by *avidya* which consists in taking a thing as absolutely *other than what it is*, and that at the basis of all there lies confusing the self (*atma*).

The most fundamental differences between Sankara's Advaitic interpretation of the Vedanta texts and that of the rival schools of the Vedanta seem to be: (1) there are no plural selves (*atma*), Brahman being the one indivisible self (*Atman* of all and (2) liberation consists in the *realisation of one's absolute one-ness* with Brahman, the Reality. Let us now see how Sankara makes out his case through his interpretation of the relevant *sutras* in *padas* III and IV of the second *Adhyaya* which relate to the *sruti* narration of emergence of the plural forms, both elemental and non-elemental. From



## Brahman

It is, indeed, remarkable how Sankara resolves conflict among the varied statements of the *srutis* on each and every issue and conclusively prove how every so called emergent has, on the authority of the *sruti*-texts, Brahman as its primal source in the sense that Brahman is the *indwelling principle*, the very self and substance in every case. Had not all evolutes or emergents been *non-different* from Brahman, the one *Sat*, the Chandogya statements that there is one such which in being known, everything becomes known— a basic proposition of the Upanisads — would have no relevance<sup>21</sup>.

The other reason why all things, both elemental and non-elemental, ~ ether (*akasa*), space (*dik*), time (*kala*), the atoms (*paramanus*), the sense-organs including the ego, the intellect, the mind etc. should be understood as *vikaras* (modification) and therefore, as effects (*karya*) is logical. It is this that whatever is *distinguishable* from other things or elements in other words, all can be distinguished from one another, will have to be taken as things having an origin. This follows from their separate namings. Separate namings become necessary in respect of the divided and distinguished, and not in respect of the undivided, the immutable and the absolute one. This logical reason is next appended to the testimony of the *sruti*-texts which describe progressive emergence of the world of distincts from the one indivisible self (Atman)<sup>22</sup>. The demand for proving Brahman (as the Self) also as a modification, and so, as an evolute, of something more primitive, proves abortive and illegitimate. The reason is, Brahman is the one '*sat*', pure formless Being-as-such the one reality-as-such (all others being appearances). The origin of being-as-such from another Being-as-such or Reality-as-such does not make sense; origin of Being-as-such from non-being, besides being self-contradictory, is logically impossible, since non-being can have no modification (*prakriti-vikarabhava*)<sup>23</sup>. The Brahman as the *being-as-such* is also the in-dwelling intelligent principle which guides emergence of one from from another, such as, in the *sruti*-statement, from *akasa* arises *vayu*, from *vayu*, *agni*, from *agni*, *upa* and from *upa* *prithvi* and so on. Without a conscious principle as *nisus* being there, there cannot be development of one form from another, and this has been established already in the Vedanta criticism of the Sankhya doctrine of *prakriti*.

In this so-called *sruti* or *sarga prakurana* what Sankara wanted to establish with the help of profuse quotations from *sruti*- texts is that Brahman is the indwelling principle, the inner-controller, the very Self (*atma*) and substance, the *ayutana* of the cosmic pluralities. This claim also receives support from the *sutras* in the third *pada* of *Adhyaya* and Sankara's commentary on them. Brahman has been established there as the one *jneya* (one object-matter of *vidya*) as the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary in the second *pada* of *Adhyaya* establish Brahman as the one worshippingable (*Upasya*), although through various symbols, in all relevant injunctions of the upanisadic texts. There, is, thus, a certain unity of purpose all through out.

It may appear that the *sutras* of the third and fourth *padas* of *adhyaya* II and Sankara's commentary on them and somewhat partial and one-sided so far as their account of the *Jivas*, the empiric individuals, is concerned. The *Jiva*, unlike the elements (*bhutadi*) and the *indriyas* etc., is not as emergent product and is not subject to birth or death' It is the body forsaken by the *Jiva* which perishes' says the *sruti*, "and not the *Jiva* as itself" The changes which are noticed elsewhere in the realm of external forms of things, moving and unmoving (*sthavara-jangama*), are attributed to the *Jivas* also secondarily but these relate to their external forms only and not to their substance or essence which is one and indivisible<sup>24</sup>. The charge of partiality or one-sidedness, it can be seen, fails entirely if it is kept in view that the Advaita does not deviate from its stand so far as it regards one and the same principle as forming the inner essence, the substance, the sustaining principle of all things and beings. The one difference is that while the concepts, such as, bondage and liberation



make sense in the context of *Jivas*, the empiric and sentient individuals, they do not make sense in the context of physical objects.

Even this above-mentioned difference disappears, if it is kept in view that all cosmic pluralities, animate and inanimate, are integral parts of the very same episode, figuratively described as the world-drama of Reality, which is Brahman. All these are necessary parts of the 'appearance' of Reality. To appear is to 'pose' as *other than itself*. So, if the one indivisible identity is to 'appear' other than itself in the exigency of the world-drama or world-play it must assume plural and absolutely distinguishable forms and how can there be such plural posings without there being plural 'bodies' and the plural elements constituting them? The entire realm of cosmic pluralities is conceived as the outer manifesting of Brahman, the one Self—it is conceived as the *sarira* (body) and Brahman as the self is conceived as the indwelling principle *sariraka*. Sankara has named his commentary as '*sariraka bhasya*' because he felt that the Vedanta account of Reality is an account of the one indivisible, all pervasive Self which is the inner-principle underlying cosmic appearances but absolutely transcendent of them all in so far as it is their 'Reality' and substance. The appearances, although necessarily plural in so far as they are mere appearances, do not have any *real* identity of their own—the one Absolute Self being their one real identity.

The way Sankara establishes absolute *one-ness* of the the Self is very characteristic of his genius. There is no attempt to side-track *sruti*-statements which seem to support just the opposite conclusion. Thus he argues, "the fact that a certain theme has not been discussed in a certain *sruti* text (and is so unheard of (cannot become the ground of its rejection if it is found discussed in some other *sruti*. A theme discussed in some other *sruti* may command general acceptance if it is that from contradiction and throws additional light into the meaning"). Plurality among selves it can be seen, may become an argument in support of the view that they are all non-eternal and have originated from some common source. It thus becomes an argument against their eternality (*nityatva*). Now, there are certain *sruti*-texts which seem to explain originating of the plural *jivatma* from the Supreme Self with the help of the analogy of plural sparks, arising out of one flame with which they are homogeneous<sup>40</sup>. There are, again, some other *srutis* which speak of the immutable Self as entering into different forms and assuming the nature of the *Jivas*" Sankara decided in favour of this second analogy and the second account. The reason is the first explanation runs into open contradiction with the most fundamental theme defended by the Upanisads in all places that the Self is without any origination and is eternal. Moreover the analogy of sparks arising out of one flame is found in the context of emergence of the vital breaths (*sarva pranah*) also, as Sankara has quoted from the *srutis*. The *srutis* do not support the view of origination of 'Self', be the concept taken in the context of the *Jiva*, be it taken in the context of Brahman, the Absolute. B. S. 2.3.17 gives the reason laconically in the expressions '*asruteh*' and '*nityatvatocca tadyah*' – which means 'origination' in respect relevant texts there of declare—the Self as eternal (*nitya*).

So, now the question arises: can we significantly speak of two varieties of self (*atma*) finite and infinite – as the dualists and the non-Advaitists maintain, and can it be that there is any *sruti* support of that view? As for the *sruti*-version, Sankara points out, the plurality of Selves is ruled out in the declaration that it is one divinity which is hidden in all things and beings, which is all pervading and the inner self of all etc<sup>41</sup>. In fact, the *srutis* nowhere have supported the view that there can be plural selves, each substantive, all-pervasive and eternal. Such a view has been defended by the dualists like the Sankhya and the Vaisheshika schools only. Under relevant *sutras* in this section Sankara pointed out the logical difficulties involved in their idea of plurality of selves. As for the *sruti* evidence against

such a view, he quotes one statement from the *Brhadaranyaka* which is singularly striking and decisive as far as the Vedanta account of the issue goes. The context was about the *one sect and support (ekayana)* of varieties of functions, coming to discuss about the so called pluralities of selves, the *sruti* points out that the varieties of forms all arise from the deferent elements (*bhutebhya*) and vanish along with them, and as these thus depart, nothing distinctive (having names, and forms) survives. Last this disappearance of the distinctive should be misunderstood<sup>11</sup> as complete annihilation of reality or of the Self, Yajnavalkya hastens to add that he was speaking about, disappearance of specific names and forms (*samya*) only and not of annihilation of the Self which is non-specific and imperishable. This remains absolutely unaffected even when the plurality and the distinctive formations all vanish away.

The Advaita and the non-advaita versions of the Vedanta differ principally, on the nature and status of the plural individual 'persons'. The non-advaitists understand the *srutis* as Supporting the view that the plural individuals are not mere appearances, that they are as substantive as is the Absolute reality which is the supreme person (*paramapurusa*), although related to the latter as parts to the integrated whole. They, thus, speak of substantive individual selves, as the dualists and the pluralists do, with the difference that, according to them, the plural *individual selves*, although, substantive and eternally real, are integral parts of the Absolute Self. As both Sankara and his rivals look to the same revealed texts and their auxiliaries *primarily*, for support of their respective views, purely logical consideration of the issue has rather very minor relevance. The question, then, is : do the *sruti-texts* support the view of *substantive* plural individual selves and do they support the view of their co-eternality with the Absolute Self?

Sankara does not deny that the *Srutis* speak of both difference (*bheda*) and non-difference (*abheda*) of Brahman and the *Jivas*. By means of various analogies there has been attempt to illustrate difference between the two. Thus, Brahman is described as the detached witness and *Jiva* as the enjoyer of fruits of action, good or bad<sup>12</sup>. Then, getting out of the body (*utkranti*) and departing thence to the other world and taking a new birth in enjoy or suffer fruits of past actions – all these are spoken of in the context to the *jivas*, not in the context of Brahman<sup>13</sup>. Then, in certain text the *Jiva* is described as atomic in dimension<sup>14</sup> but Brahman is all-pervasive *vibhu*. There, again, are *sruti-texts* which seem to describe *Jivas* as parts of Brahman (*brahmamsa*) on the analogy of the flame and its sparks (*sphulingas*). Does not the *smrti*, such as, the Bhagavat Gita, also declare that *jiva* is a part of the Lord residing in the land of the living? Then, again, when it is said that Brahman is to be inquired into, is to be known, worshipped etc, do we not get that Brahman and the *Jiva* are not the same—one is the controller, the other controlled, one is the beneficent providence, the other the benefited, one is the Lord (*prabhu*) the other the servant (*bhrtiya*)? Finally, had not there been distinctive, plural individual *selves*, quite apart from the Absolute Self and distinguished from it, we could not speak of moral responsibility, merits and demerits (*papa-punya*)? and in the absence of separate individuals 'selves' (which is the other name for *Jivas*), one's merits and demerits would visit upon all other individuals as well<sup>15</sup>.

Fully aware of the apparently different versions of *atma* (Self) and *Jiva* in the different *sruti-texts* and in different places, Sankara has attempted a coherent and cogent view in the light of the *sutras* of Badarayana. Any impartial reader and critic, we are sure, will be convinced that Sankara's Advaitic explanation is the one explanation faithful to the Upanisadic texts, taken as a harmonious whole. But what is the Advaitic version of the Self and the *Jiva* that Sankara has presented? It is not enough to say that Sankara has conclusively shown that, according to the Vedanta texts, the *jiva* is the same as Brahman and its difference (*bheda*) is only *apparent*. Much more is there in this version

of the case given by Sankara than what the classical interpreters have made out so far. It will not do to say, for instance, that Brahman, the one Self appears as plural, that is, as plural selves (Jivas) due to external limitations (*avaccheda*) or due to the presence of external determinants (*upadhi*). Indeed, these happen to be the two ways of orthodox interpretation of Sankara's Advaita doctrine. The pertinent question which poses itself is : can these artificial limitations or external determinations be admitted as *real occurrences*? How can there be any external limitations or adventitious conditioning of that which is the *one* fact in real being, and which is without a second? How can there be external determinations of that which has neither any exterior nor any interior? How are we to understand the *modus operandi* of the one Self's becoming *many*? The *srutis* states that after creating this or that form the one *atman* entered into it (*tadaivanupravisa*)<sup>45</sup>, and that all pluralities are but names and forms (*namadheyani*) of the one. *Katha* seeks to explain how the transcendent one became manifold and assumed plural forms corresponding to its nature (*pratirupam*) with the help of two analogies – of fire and the wind<sup>46</sup>. The points of special interest in these descriptions are (1) both fire and wind are conceived as 'entering into' emergent forms (which are many) from *outside* (where they are unmodified and one only, 2) even though immanent in the variety of forms in which they enter, both fire and wind *as themselves* remain transcendent of (*vahisca*) the modified forms. This their aspect of transcendence is next emphasized with the help of a new analogy, that of the sun, which although lighting up and heating world-pluralities, remains unsullied and untouched by the impurities thereof. It is the knowledge of the transcendent *one-ness*, underlying the variety of external forms and appearances, which is, finally, pin-pointed as the truth ensuring eternal peace and happiness, and not the knowledge of the multiplicities, of the variety of *names and forms*.

The most crucial issue in the above context is 'how should we understand this 'becoming many', and yet remaining not only transcendent of the 'many', of the phenomenal pluralities, but also remaining *absolutely untouched* and unaffected by the emergence of the plural forms? The non-Advaitists take This 'becoming many' as actual and real. The *Jivas* are, according to them sparks of the Absolute, encased in the multiple forms reared up by the will of the Absolute person so that these could be the bodies of the *Jivas* in conformity with their moral deserts. In their *essential nature*, the *jivas*, according to this view, are similar (*sadrsa*) to Brahman, the Absolute Self. They are thus homogeneous. Their embodied-ness is also real,—being due to their moral deserts and conforming to them. Neither mere knowledge of the nature of the Absolute person, nor mere knowledge of the true nature of themselves as finite individual selves and persons—the knowledge the *Jivas* may derive from study of the *sruti-texts*, by itself, can release them from the bondage of life. There can be no liberation for the *Jivas* so long as their 'bodies', which have determined them in finite forms, remain and do not fall off in a literal sense. In order to *achieve* this end, they are to acquire 'merits' by pious actions and also to secure the grace of the Absolute Person, the moral Providence, so. There must be *samuccaya* (conjoining of the fruits of ) of action (*karma*) and knowledge (*Jnana*). Then, since the *Jiva* is literally a part (*amsa*) of Brahman, liberation means being 'joined' to Brahman as a part to the whole. Two questions, however, remain unsolved in this exposition. (1) How does the Absolute remain a whole with a *real separation* of its parts, however, small they may be? (2) how does the parts remain distinguished in the whole *as parts* when these are released from the prison of the body? There is also a third issue connected with the foregoing—what happens to the body when it fall away and *when*, or *at what point of time* does the *Jiva* come to acquire it<sup>47</sup> and how could it acquire merit or demerit *at that time* when it must have been a 'spark' of Brahman, untained and in full blaze?

Sankara was fully aware that *sruti*—statements on the nature of th Self (*atma*), as also on the

relation of *Jiva* with Brahman, are not always uniform or un-equivocal. The plurality (*nanatva*) of *Jivas* along side the notion of an all-pervasive Absolute Reality and self may give the impression that like the physical elements, the *indriyas*, the vital breath (*prana*) etc., the plural *Jivas* might have 'originated' from the primal source, such as, Brahman. If such a supposition is allowed to go unchallenged the *Jivas* and Brahman would at once stand distinguished from each other as effect from the cause. So, in course of his commentary on B. S. 2. 3. 16-18 Sankara disproves that *srutis* have ever supported the view of origination of 'Self' of any denomination and therefore, of the so-called individual selves, otherwise called the '*Jivas*'. In course of his commentary on *sutras* from 19 to 2. 3. 29 Sankara shows that no radical difference between *jive* or the individual Self and Brahman as the Absolute Self can be established on the basis of the *sruti*-texts, which allegedly speak of atomic structure (*anuvya*) of the plural Selves, while defending at the same time all-pervasiveness (*vibhuvya*) of Brahman as the Absolute Self. In the context of B. S. 2.3 29, considered by vidyaranya as crucial for supporting the Advaita thesis of *avidya*<sup>31</sup>, Sankara shows in what way the vedanta proves that the alleged atomic structure (*anuvya*) of the *Jiva* or the so-called individual self is not fact-based but is rather derivative (*gauna*), a fiction of representation (*Kalpita*). Thus, he argues at length- it is not true that the self (*atma*) is atomic since the *srutis* do not speak of it as having ever originated (*utpattyastravanat*). Moreover, as the *srutis* speak of Brahman as that which entered into the names and forms called '*Jiva*' and remaining there as the inner controller so the natural conclusion would be that it is Brahman which is, again, the *Jiva*, since identity (*tadatmya*) and absolute non-difference of the two has been advised by the *srutis* in the context of liberation. So, since Brahman is declared as all-pervasive (*vibhu*), the *jiva* also should be understood as that.<sup>32</sup> The '*jvutva*' of the '*Jiva*', its limitedness, getting out of the body, moving in the other worlds and returning to a new form at rebirth,

all these are *apparent* and are due to the Self's association with *buddhi*, involving the ego, the intellect, appetite etc, during its *samsariva* (existence in the cycle of existence). *Tadgunasatitvat tadvapadesah prajnavat*- just as to meet the requirements or worship and prayer the supreme self, which in itself and as itself is qualityless, is invested with adventitious forms and qualities, in the same way, the Self, which is by nature all pervasive (*vibhu*) assumes the form and qualities of the *buddhi* (which is described as atomic) when *apparently* moving in the cycle of empirical existence, with the result that a characteristic, such as, atomicity, which pertains to the *buddhi*, comes to be ignorantly ascribed to it. The up-shoot of the previous discussions is, as Sankara puts, the alleged atomicity of the *Jiva* is derivative and due to adventitious condition (*aupacarika*) while all-pervasiveness or infinitude (*anantya*) is real (*paramarthika*). It is not possible to conceive *anantyam* (infinitude) as secondary or derivative, says Sankara, since all the Upanisads have only one purpose and that one purpose is to establish absolute one-ness of Brahman and the *Atma*<sup>33</sup>. There may be an auxiliary reason why the Self is, at places, described as atom-like. That reason is the inherent inscrutableness and difficulty of comprehension so very characteristic of the *atman-theme* (*durjnanatvat*). The *sastras* all support the view that the association with *buddhi* on the part of the Self is incidental to its phenomenal being-hood or *samsariva* and that this ceases at the advent of right knowledge and so, in liberation.<sup>34</sup> This is corroborated next by the *sruti* statement, such as, 'there is no other seer, hearer, thinker and knower than the one Self'. So, Sankara, when commenting upon B. S. 2. 3. 30, arrives at the conclusion that 'regarded from the metaphysical point of view, there is no *Jiva* other than the Self, conceived under the adventitious form of the *buddhi* (ego).<sup>35</sup> In confirmation he quotes from the *sruti*-text- 'One, who, as manifest in the several form of vital breath (*prana*), is a being replete with consciousness, and as mediated in the interspace of the heart is the person shining in his own splendour, that very same person, coming to be identified with *buddhi*,

moves in this world as also in the other world, and remains engrossed or in playful mood as it were'<sup>36</sup> This its involvement in *buddhi* has *avidya* as its one cause and therefore, this ceases at the advent of right knowledge only, and does not come to an end either in dreamless sleep or at the stage of so called *pralaya*' (dissolution).

This involvement in the *buddhi* is sometimes latent and sometimes it becomes potent.<sup>37</sup> But on account of it, the same self (which is absolute *as itself*), *phenomenally*, becomes the agent (*karta*), the enjoyer (*bhukta*) and develops association with the diverse senses and their objects. The *Jiva-bhava* (parading as the *Jiva*) is all due to these conditions. And such conditioning which becomes the ground of distinction between the *Jiva* (individual Self) and Brahman (the Absolute Self) and on account of which, the *Jive* becomes *Karta* (agent) and *bhukta* (enjoyer) is not *factually true* or real—all this is incidental to the phase of *avidya* which is presupposed<sup>38</sup>

It can be seen that the discussion at this point reaches rather a very crucial and critical stage without the admission of a stringent distinction and so, difference (*bheda*) between the *Jiva* and the Absolute self (*para*) and also free *agentship* and so, free-will of the *Jivas* (individual persons), moral responsibility and moral deserts proportionate and in accordance with the *nature* of *Karma* (actions) cannot be intelligibly explained. But the supposition that the *Jivas* are not separate or distinct entities, that they are the same as the Absolute Self (*para* Brahman) does not seem to furnish any explanation of moral responsibility of the *Jivas* for actions done by them and so their enjoyment of pleasures and suffering of pain become all unmerited. Besides, as Sankara candidly puts forth, there seem to be glaring conflict with the themes which has already been advanced in B. S. 2. 1. 34 and its auxiliaries such as, B. S. 2.1. 35 and 2. 1. 36 to the effect that the sufferings or enjoyments by the *Jivas* are all due to the merits or demerits of their own actions and are, therefore, *supekṣa* (dependent on moral deserts) and so, the Absolute Self Called Brahman, regarded as the creator and moral Providence cannot be regarded capricious or cruel in the matter<sup>39</sup>

None, if the *Jivas* are to be understood as the same as the one none-dual absolute Self and their *apparent* differences as manifest in their *jivahood* (*Jivatva*) be due to *accidental* association with the stuff of *buddhi* and its latent functions due to *avidya* or ignorance, where and with whom, then, shall moral responsibility for actions done lie and for whose drawbacks or mal-functions are these then, so much sufferings in the world?

As Sankara sees it, the Advaita Vedanta, is capable of boldly facing the issue of moral responsibility for actions done, and resolving the confusion that seems to have arisen. There is no conflict between the theme that the self is *one* and essentially non-dual, on the one hand, and the other theme that the *Jivas* although *one* with the Absolute Self, suffer or enjoy the fruits of their merited actions on the other, and there is neither *Kṛtapranasa* (escaping the result of actions done by one Self) nor *akṛtavyagama* (being visited upon by fruits of actions not done by one self) in the solution proposed by it. Had the *Jivas* been *sadā* (that is, born or created at a particular point of time), and were they also quite apart and so, different from Brahman, it would be difficult to explain how they could be so varied in their attitudes and dispositions so as to execute works of so varied nature, and acquire merits or demerits there from. The reason is : their actions of a certain specific nature would be dependent on their distinctive physical as also mental build, and their peculiar physical and mental build, again, would have to be understood as having originated from the merit or demerit of the same kind of actions<sup>40</sup>. So, there will be circularity of reasoning. If the *Jivas* are admitted to be coeternal with the Absolute self, having a-nature, originally, pure and uniform, it would be unintelligible how they acquire the propensity to do actions, good, bad, and indifferent as



a result of which they enjoy or suffer in life. The difficulty cannot be avoided by the supposition that the so called plural individuals 'selves' have the 'freedom of the will' to act as the like, since the acting in accordance with one's will is another name for acting in conformity with one's will is another name for acting in conformity with one's own propensity or disposition, and the issue that calls for solution is how that propensity or disposition comes to develop, how their so-called 'free will', wills in a particular way and not in any other. The doctrine of plurality of individual selves, all distinct and different from the Absolute Self and co-eternal with the latter, is not immune from logical difficulties. This Sankara had shown in the context of his examination of the vaishesika view of plural, unconscious, self-existent selves and the Sankhya view of plural purusas, — each of which is eternally pure, free and enlightened<sup>41</sup>. Difference among selves requires or differentia—some distinctiveness of nature. There cannot be a simple quantitative or *numeral* plurality. Without the presence of some quantitative differences among the plural selves, the doctrine of plurality cannot be substantiated. So the doctrine of plural unconscious selves of the Vaishesika and the doctrine of plural pure and conscious selves of the Sankhyaites fail equally.

The Advaita solution of the Tangle is that the *jivas* are no separate, self-existent distinctive 'selves'. There is only one non-dual self (*Atman*) which has, phenomenally, *assumed* infinite plurality of forms which are all *epistemic* in — so far as all plural *Jivas*, thus formed, are substantially and therefore, metaphysically identical with Brahman, the Absolute Self. It is *avidya* which shows the *Jivas* as different from the absolute self and therefore, different from absolute one-ness. As a consequence, that is, in so far as the sense of absolute identity is lost, the *Jivas*, all behave as absolutely different from one another. This loss of the sense of identity and the substitution of it by the emergent sense of non-identity or difference, which both are due to *avidya* (nescience), has worked out for progressive differences, among the individuals (*Jivas*) so much so that they work in their individual and so, distinctive ways, conforming to their varied dispositions (attachments, detachment, craving for, hostility towards etc). In this way, as agents they do works of a certain nature and as enjoyers, they come by the resultant fruits of their actions, merits or demerits. As they sow, so they reap, and their infatuation for the course of existence they live in, entangles them in the cycle of existence, birth, death and rebirth. At the root of all this, there is *avidya* and this *avidya* consists in the lack of understanding that the *Jivas* are non-different from the one Absolute Self, that their absolute identity with Brahman is the truth of fact and their distinction and difference an enchanting, falsehood. The course of phenomenal existence, otherwise called '*samsara*' is a beginningless process and *avidya* or ignorance of the absolute. One-ness of the self, is the *root-cause* of all this (*anartha-hetu*)<sup>42</sup>. The *avidya* is the germ or seed (*vija*) and from it progressive self-alienation and mistaking not-self for the self follows endlessly like *vija* leading to *ankur* and the latter-again to *vija* in an unending course,— if not circumvented by *vidya* or knowledge of truth. The charge of *nairghrnya* (cruelty) and *vaisamya*<sup>43</sup> (partiality or favouritism) against Brahman as the absolute ground of the cosmic order cannot also be sustained, since the '*Jivas*' are non-different from Brahman and the so-called *samsariva* (rotation in the wheel of existence) of *Jivas*, their enjoyment and sufferings, are, in a sense, Brahman's own in the *assumed* phase of its phenomenal existence as world-pluralities under the cover of *maya* or *avidya*, although the whole show, considered from the metaphysical level, is purely *epistemic* and, in that sense, *vyavaharika* (relative to conventional experience) only.

Regarded in the light of the foregoing discussion, the so called agentship (*kartavya*) and enjoyership (*bhoktriva*) of the *Jivas* cannot be supposed to be absolutely free or independent. Complete independence of the *Jivas*, their *absolute* freedom of the will would have militated against the doctrine of absolute one-ness of the Self (*atma*). The *Jivas* behave and conduct themselves as the Self or



Brahman, which *as itself* is absolute freedom, enlightenment and bliss, could be expected to behave and conduct itself under the cumbering influence of *avidyā*<sup>44</sup>. Failing to distinguish itself from the assemblage of causes and their affects (*karyakāraṇasamgh-ātavivekadarśan*) which as a natural consequence of *avidyā* visits upon the Self as the *Jiva*, the *Jiva* enacts the roles of the agent and the enjoyer in the cycle of existence called *samsāra* or phenomenal life. This happens under the dispensation of the Absolute Self, the Reality (*tadān ujnava*). What capriciousness or cruelty can be there if, some one under the spell of ignorance and the resultant confusion behaves and conducts himself in a certain way and comes to reap the fruits of his actions of a particular nature? Surely, ignorance and confusion can only work for bondage and suffering. But it is provide in the very same law of the very same Reality that the Self-form parading as the *Jiva* can work out its own salvation, its release from bondage as also from agent-ship (*kartṛtva*) and enjoyer-ship (*bhoktrtva*) by developing within itself discriminative wisdom (*viveka jñāna*). The agent-ship and enjoyer-ship of the *Jiva* is, therefore, not to be looked upon as absolutely free and in that sense, self-initiated. It is conditional upon and determined by the law of *avidyā*, so to say, and it is Reality, the Absolute Self, itself which has provided this law or rule even for its own Self when *apparently* toiling under the encumbrance of *avidyā*— a mode of its self-expression collateral with *vidyā*. This gives meaning to such *śruti*-statements as 'it is this (reality) which through the *Jiva* gets done (*karayati*) a good action whom it wants to elevate and gets done a bad action by that *Jiva* whom it intends to degrade in the scale of existence. Apparently, the above statements smack of capriciousness and cruelty on the part of the dispenser and the supreme regulator. But this may be rectified if the above statements are understood to mean that there are certain rules regulating means and ends and all the Vedas in the Karmakanda prescribe specific actions as means to the realisation of specific ends (such as, *svargakāmo yajeta*). So when Brahman, the Supreme Self, is described as causing some one to do a good act in order to get elevation and as causing some other to do a bad act and to get a bad result, all that is meant is that upon someone's doing a good action or bad action the dispenser dispenses results conforming to the nature of the action done<sup>45</sup>.

The final issue to be settled in this context, then, is in what relation do the *Jivas*, (phenomenal individuals) stand to the one, non-dual, Absolute Self? That the *jivas* have all originated from Brahman in the same way as the physical elements, psychic forms, vital breaths and the *indriyas* have originated, has been denied.<sup>46</sup> The thesis<sup>47</sup> that there are eternally self-existing plural selves with or without consciousness, alongside, or in lieu of one Absolute Self, has also been rejected. From the existent plurality (*nanātva*) of empirical persons, it becomes necessary either to postulate a plurality of 'selves', in some way, dependent on an Absolute Self as the non-*advaitists* (dualists and theorists) assume, or to take the plurality as the plural manifestations, all empirical and phenomenal, of one Absolute Self which, as itself, is non-dual and transcendent. As a commentator of the *Brahmasūtras* and the related Upanisadic texts, Sankara seeks to follow assiduously the version of the case that can be made out through a harmonious rendering of the *śruti*-texts. Now, the *śrutis* have introduced quite a number of analogies to explain the *nature* and *states* of the plural 'selves' or '*jivas*' and their relationship to the Absolute Self. The question, therefore, is how should we interpret these analogies so as to arrive at a view, which not only conforms to the spirit of the *śrutis* but is also logically defensible.

That the *śrutis* support an absolutistic version is beyond all doubt. They speak of one absolute principle, self or person (*puruṣa*), assuming diversity of forms, all replicas (*pratirūpa*) of itself, and yet remaining transcendent (*vaḥiṣa*) of them all, *as itself*. This gives the impression that the Absolute reality or Self spoken of in the Vedānta, is both immanent and transcendent. In Indian terminology, a relation implying both immanence and transcendence is generally understood as '*bhedābheda*'. It

is widely claimed that the *śruti*-description of the relation of *Jiva* to Brahman unmistakably suggest both difference and non-difference, and therefore, *bhedabheda*. Taken separately, the two concepts *bheda* (difference) and *abheda* (non-difference) are logical contradictions. Can it be that the relation of *Jiva* to Brahman can only be articulated by a pair of opposite notions put together? Sankara is possible the first thinker to cry halt to such hasty stipulation. Although Brahman is all and everything that there is or appears, the notions, 'Brahman' and 'jiva', belong to two different levels of thought, as Sankara seems to feel. The *śrutis*, to be sure, do not speak of '*Jivas*' except on the conventional level of experience of plural subjects and objects. When it is said that Brahman is to be inquired into, Brahman is to be meditated upon as one's very Self—such instructions, naturally, involves duality of *Jiva* as the inquired or contemplator and Brahman as some kind of an 'object', transcendent of the subject (*Jiva*) and in that sense, different from the subject *Jiva*. The *śruti*-*pramāṇa*, it can be seen, was well-aware of this anomaly. This is evident from such statements as 'where there is duality, as it were, one sees another and so on but where everything, turns into one (non-dual) Self, there who would see or know whom?' Therefore, the 'absolutism' one construes on the basis of conventional experience of multiplicities, which are necessarily regarded as different from their causal ground, — their integral unity, as also different from one another, involves, the so called *bhedabheda* or transcendence and immanence both together. A logical incongruity thus turns into a flawless logical description. But one is likely to get a quite different picture, if instead of starting from the level of conventional experience of many subjects and many objects, and implicitly accepting all there as real, one starts from the notion of a non-dual pure experience of absolute one-ness, such as, the seers claim to have sighted in the transcendent level of their contemplation or revelation, that is, from the given experience of one absolute, all enveloping, self-hood. No other alternative seems to be left under such circumstances than to assimilate the conventional order of many subjects and objects as 'mere appearances' of the one immutable and indivisible Self—which, although appears as different from the one Absolute Self, is really non-different (*ananya*). Here, then, the differences (*bheda*) are not accepted as differences (in any form of reality), but only as apparent or seeming, and non-difference of the plural appearances, becomes true, not only logically but metaphysically also. The seems to be the logical basis of Sankara's contention at the end of his commentary on B. S. 2. 3. 47. Thus he says that the relation of *amsa* and *umśi* (part and whole) between *Jiva* and Brahman would have been accepted as true if the supposition of *bhedabheda* could be substantiated. But the fact is the vedanta is not interested in *bhedabheda* at all but only in *abheda* (non-difference), and it is this notion of non-difference and absolute one-ness which alone assures liberation and immortality<sup>17</sup>.

Our Conventional mode of speech is based on our conventional experience and behaviour. This necessarily involves dualism of subject and object and is necessarily presented and elaborated in the objective mode of descriptive language. Now, if Reality is, as the Vedanta claims and the *śrutis* speak of, non-dual, it follows, necessarily, that such a reality or its nature as 'revealed in intuitive experience cannot be expressed in the modes of conventional speech. This is the reason why the Upanisads spoke of Reality as beyond thought and speech. This also seems to have been the reason why Sankara in his *Adhyasabhasya* took the stand that our *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahara* (presentation of experience in term of distinction of knowledge and known) is vitiated by *avidyā* that is, a natural distortion in the presentation. Even, then, we do not have any alternative way to articulate our experience of Reality to communicate our truth-experience to others. Much depends, therefore, on the way that a linguistic expression is interpreted and understood. One rule for guidance may be that what is claimed to be indescribable in thought language, should not be literally taken and understood. It is the intention of the Speaker which has to be followed up in the determination of meaning or significance or the 'figures' used in a description. Even language drawn up in the

mode of objective speech can be so interpreted as to suggest a clue to the non-subjective non-objective truth Sankara also has observed elsewhere that the Vedanta texts, as presented in term of language, although *anrta* (vitiated by falsity) are capable of furnishing the clue to the truth -experience (*Upalabhi*) which is transcendental<sup>64</sup>.

Now, for the *sruti*-statements on the issue of relationship of *Jivas* and Brahman. As Sankara has shown, the Brahmasutras 2.3.43 to 2.3.50 examine this issue of relationship from various angles, both logical and ethical, with reference to varied *sruti*-statements, in order to make out a sense which meets the requirements of a harmonious and cogent interpretation. There are statements which suggest *amsa-amsi* (part-whole-*sambandha*) such as, in the illustration of flame and its sparks. There are statements, which suggest the relation as between, controller and the controlled, or between master and servants. These also support material differences (*nanaiva*) between the *Jivas* themselves. There are again, statements which suggest Brahmanhood (*brahmatva*) of all *Jivas*, enclosed in the assemblage of cause-effect relationship, the differences among *Jivas* being understood as due to names and forms (*namarupa*) only. Thus, the *dusas* (slaves, or people belonging to the lowest castes in the social ladder), even the *kitavas* (gambles and swindlers) have been called Brahman from the creator downwards to the inanimate pillar (*a brahma-stambha*) *paryanta* everything has been called an emanation of Brahman. There are also statements which describe Brahman as female as also male, bachelor as also maid, the newly born babe as again the old and in firm, supporting themselves on staffs as they walk. These statements do not support the whole-and-part relationship, -everything and everybeing accepted as Brahman in phenomenal formation<sup>65</sup>. There is, again, the description which takes all things and beings as different powers or the one thousand-headed person, whose one quarter only is covered by all that are there and the remaining three quarters from the immortal in the luminous<sup>66</sup>. In the Gita, again, the Lord declares 'it is verily a part (*amsa*) of mine that assumes the form of the eternal *Jiva* in the mandate order. This raises the question even if the *Jiva* be regarded as a part (*amsa*) can this so-called 'part' stand for a 'physical part'? The Absolute a composite something? If so, the Absolute ceases to be itself since it would then be a bare summation of all its parts, and therefore, a bare name for its component parts put together just as a chariot consists of its several parts. This looks absurd. Moreover the *Jivas* are subject to affiliations of all kinds. So, if the *Jivas* were accepted as physical parts of Brahman, the sufferings of the *Jivas* would surely visit upon Brahman, rather Brahman, being the whole, would have greatest amount of sufferings, if the *amsa-amsi-sambandha* be understood literally, and if the sorrows and sufferings of *Jivas* be accounted for as having been due to causes other than infatuation and wrong sense of 'appropriation'<sup>67</sup>.

When the *srutis* declare that *here there is no 'many-ness'*, no plurality, and also that one, who sees plurality or many-ness and takes that to be real, falls victim to death and mortality the only reasonable conclusion seems to be that the plurality or manyness is a matter of *appearance only*. Quite in conformity with such rendering, the *srutis* introduce quite number of analogies to make intelligible this notion of 'mere' appearances' - this *distorted image* or the one a the cosmic plurality. It would therefore, be fundamental wrong to take this distortion as a *real development* in the nature of reality as that. It would be equally *wrong to take this distortion as a no fact at all*, as a mere nothing, that is, as something which does not obtain there in *any sense whatsoever*. The phenomenal, of course is no metaphysical extension of the real, and so far, it does not imply any addition to or extension of, the nature of Reality as that. Being *anadi*, that is, without a beginning in the temporal process, it cannot also be described as any 'event' or 'occurrence' in the nature of Reality, because these two concepts imply beginning in time. The phenomenal is there *as phenomenal*, that is, as a *distortion of the real*. This distortion, however, is an *epistemic fail*, nothing metaphysical. According

to the Advaita version of the case, Brahman, *phenomenally appears* as the *Jivas* not that Brahman *actually becomes* the *Jivas* by way of transformation (*parinama*), or by a process of *actual resolution* into 'parts' (*amsa*), even of one quarter of itself, as the Chandogya figuratively puts it<sup>72</sup> The immutable cannot have any mutation, the partless cannot have *real* parts, the one, non-dual and indivisible, cannot 'become' many or plural *except epistemically*, and so, as appearances: mere appearances or illusory appearances. Yet, this 'becoming' many, on the part of Brahman has to be admitted as a *fact*, although epistemic. The expression 'becoming' *in this context*, is of course, misleading, although unavoidable, since we do not have any other word in our vocabulary to replace it. It is misleading, since there can be no time gap between Reality and its appearance, between its '*being*' the *nondual one*, and its '*becoming many*'. The metaphysical 'being itself' and the epistemic 'becoming many' are actually contemporaneous and both are without beginning. But this is not equivalent to the admission of '*samanityata*' (coeternality) or '*sama-satyata*' (being equally real or true) of the two. While the epistemic is changeable, the metaphysical is not so. Again, while the metaphysical is *ever true and real*, the epistemic is *ever false* and so, neither real nor unreal.

It can be seen that the Pada IV of Adhyaya II, alongwith Sankara's commentary on the *sutras*, is concerned with a harmonious rendering of *sruti*-texts which describe how *prana*, the vital principle, alongwith its auxiliaries, originated from the self-same root-principle, Brahman. The *sutras* in the concluding part of Pada III of the same *Adhyaya* seem to have more crucial purpose. This consists in showing what sort of rendering of the *sruti*-passages on relation of Brahman to *Jiva* properly reconciles somewhat equivocal statements of the *srutis* and also how this interpretation and none other, can truly meet the requirements of ethics and ritualistic practices. But a very momentous issue seems to have cropped up from Sankara's Advaitic version of the relation of Brahman to the *Jivas* and the phenomenal order. It is this that the narration about origination (*sarga*) of this or that physical, vital and physical principles or elements from Brahman, vis-a-vis *non-origination* of *Jivas* (although belonging to the same phenomenal order) will have to be reviewed in non-temporal logical sequence rather than any temporal sequence of before and after. The question as to the origin of things is an intellectual question, and intellect, by its very nature, resolves a certain given unity into fragments or aspects and thereafter seeks to reconstruct that unity as a *relational* totality of some kind, very different from the original pure unity which it breaks up. The causal account of the phenomenal order, its development from one stage to an other—which the *sruti*-texts about origination (*sarga*) have furnished, at times in a discordant way, will have to be regarded as an intellectual reconstructions of this nature. It is based upon a '*reflective analysis*' of the given order, viewed objectively and it presents a developing process in time-sequence. If this account is *literally* accepted, a distorted image of the whole, would be the net result. Besides language has its own disabilities – it can only present the simultaneous as successive moments of a relational totality.

Brahman's '*becoming*' the world, the objective unity of phenomenal pluralities, is no '*event*' in the time-sequence. Although the *srutis* declare that *in the beginning*, all was one pure formless Being, and nothing particular, or specific, even winked at that stage<sup>73</sup>, and *thereafter*, the undifferentiated one intended to become 'many', ... it would be totally wrong to take the view that this '*being*' the undivided one, and the '*becoming*' the divided and mutually distinguished 'many', actually involved a time-gap, and that the phase described as 'becoming' followed the other phase, that of 'being' in time-sequence of before-after. By the expression in the beginning 'no beginning' in time is implied. Similarly, the 'thereafter' does really mean a time-gap. Priority, if any such thing is intended, is the relative logical priority of Being to Becoming: what is eternally the one indivisible Being and the one Self, *phenomenally appears* as a system of many subjects and objects, and this, again,

beginninglessly. There can be no time-gap between Reality *as itself* and what it 'appears' to be, between the rope and its snake appearance.

Now, Reality, *as itself*, is for intuitive grasping and Reality, *as it appears*, is the object-matter for analytic and reflective study by the intellect (*buddhi*). Sankara's Advaita account of the Vedānta philosophy has made this eminently clear. The order of phenomenal existence is a matter for intellectual analysis and interpretation. This intellect, otherwise called *buddhi*, is itself an ingredient of the phenomenal order. Although an ingredient, and *as that*, inseparable physically from the objective totality or unity, that is, from the expressed phenomenal order called *visva* (universe), it is capable of reflecting, reviewing and thereby presenting that objective whole in the way it does. When thus reflectively represented, the *visva* (the expressed order of multiplicities) seems to consist of two kinds of ingredients – the *Jivas* which are necessarily to be accepted as *uncreated* (*a-janya*) and the mass of *Jivas*' objective surroundings including those that combine with the *Jivas* as their 'natural' determinants – the physical, vital and psychical sheaths (*kośas*) or coverings of the *Jivas* themselves. These latter, the mass of elements, which are distinguished as 'objectives' in relation to the *Jivas* (asserting themselves as 'subjects') are regarded as '*Janya*', or caused in the sense of having developed in a certain sequence of priority and posteriority, which is, not so much temporal as it is logical. The *Jivas* are 'necessarily' accepted as 'original' and uncaused, since the *Jivas* are the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the *buddhi*, intellect, which regards the objective whole in that there may be a referential reflective assessment at all. Let this pass even as a 'presupposition' of some kind. Coming to reflect or review what would be the *proper* way of regarding the relation of Brahman to the *Jivas*, the proper and the cogent interpretation of the relevant *śruti*-texts on this issue, the *sūtras* in the concluding part of *Pada III* of *Adhyaṣa II* seem to be posed for a decision between *two alternatives*. The first alternative is that the *śruti*-statements about Brahman's '*becoming many*' should be *literally* accepted. There are, thus, an *existential plurality* of individual 'selves', and since, Brahman is described as '*becoming many*', so these plural individual selves are to be taken as parts (*aṃsa*) Brahman, co-existent and cosubstantial with Brahman. But since the 'parts' are always dependent on their whole so a relation such as, of subordination and superordination obtains between the *jivas* as individual selves and Brahman as the Absolute self. Then, again, to be a 'self' is to be a self-conscious 'person' (*puruṣa*). So in the metaphysical order, there is, so to say, some form of a 'confederacy' of individual selves and the Absolute Self—all of which are self-conscious persons. The individual selves enjoy or suffer according as they, perform good acts or bad acts. Their so called 'bondage' and sufferings are entirely due to themselves. Regulated as these individual selves are by the *law of Karma* and the fruits of their own actions, their bondage and suffering are both real. Liberation for them is not achievable by mere knowledge of themselves, of the causes of their bondage and suffering. They are required to extricate themselves from their physical body and the handicaps which the peculiar mental and moral build of their personalities involves. All these are due to accumulated fruits of their past actions in the beginningless cycles of their Mundane existence. Mere knowledge of the nature of the Absolute person and His relation to the individual selves (*Jivas*) secured through scriptures, also cannot help them in securing release from the bondage of worldly existence, since this bondage is *real* and is due to the cumulative effects of their past misdeeds. Actions, both righteous and pious, guided by right knowledge, may ultimately help the '*Jivas*' to secure divine grace and salvation. So, insofar as the '*Jivas*' stand distinguished from the Absolute in a relation of subordination, emphasis is laid on worship and prayer, on purificatory acts to be done by them in order that they may secure absolute release from their bodies and also from the cycle of existence, and may enjoy bliss and freedom as members of the Divine common wealth, so to say. However crude and inept in its several aspects, this seems to be the view defended by the



non-Advaitist schools of the Vedanta, each school in its own peculiarly sectarian way.

The other alternative version of the relation of the 'Jivas' to Brahman has been worked out by Sankara in his commentary, particularly on the *sutras* of the third and fourth *padas* of Adhyaya II and the *sutras* of *Padas* I and II of Adhyaya III. For a convenient and connected presentation of this view, which takes as essentially the very same as Brahman, – the differences being all formal and apparent (due to *avidya*), we shall follow a summary method though cross references. Brahman's *becoming many*, and the evolution of specific forms, such as, the various elements, the *indriyas*, including mind and intellect (*buddhi*) the principal vital principle and its derivatives, will all have to be non-literally interpreted. As Brahman has been described in the *srutis* as nondual (*advaitam*), indivisible (*anamsa*) and immutable (*a-parinami*), it can be subject neither to any material change (any real modification), nor to any actual splitting up into parts (*amsa*). Brahman's becoming the world of plural things and beings (*Jivas*) without any detriment to its absolute one-ness and indivisibility can, therefore, only mean that this 'becoming many' is only an apparent becoming, – a logical device provided in the *srutis* to explain how the *Jivas*, who are capable of realizing their absolute oneness with Brahman, – the one non-dual self, may, under the spell of cosmic nescience or *avidya*, phenomenally appear as different from Brahman. In other words, how the *Jivas*, who do not have any separate identity or 'self' of their own, may, under the spell of *avidya* realise (mis-know) themselves not only as distinguished and alienated among themselves but also from Brahman, which is the one identity for all of them. The 'becoming many' on the part of Brahman, is *not*, therefore, real becoming, and the *sruti* statement is *not meant to be taken literally*. The *srutis* all intend to show that this 'becoming' many is to be taken as an apparent fact, a state of affairs which, as a 'necessity of logical thought, the *srutis* provide in order to render intelligible the concept of absolute one-ness of Being, that is, of Brahman's dual, immutable, Absolute Self. According to the Advaita version of Sankara, there is, thus, no plurality of selves, no plural identities. There is only one self, which phenomenally appears as many selves without dissipating its absolute one-ness. So, a talk about relation of *jivas* to Brahman is meaningless except on the supposition that the 'jivas' are 'mere' appearances or 'illusory' appearances of Brahman, according as they are taken as 'appearances' of Brahman, or as 'substantive entities' as themselves. The Vedanta cosmology which describes the emergences of the physical, psychical and biological principles or elements, while insisting on non-emergence or non-origination of the '*jivas*', otherwise called the individual selves, is no historical narrative about emergence or evolution of things in certain chronological order. The Vedanta is a philosophy, not a science. It is not interested in the historical beginning of things. The historical or chronological accounts which the various theories of evolution furnish are all an exercise in *postulation thinking*, which involves the possibility of alternative suppositions always, with the result that it fails to give any final decision in the matter<sup>74</sup>. The inanity of speculations of this kind has been unequivocally brought forth in the hymn of the Rgveda, which goes by the name 'song of creation'<sup>75</sup>. So, it stands to reason that the Upanisads, which represent the culminating part of vedic wisdom, did not really indulge in tomfoolery by projecting what was to be taken as a historical narrative about evolution of elements from Brahman as the *materia prima*. The account of emergence or development of this or that given in the *srutis*, will, therefore, have to be treated as a reflective analysis of what is logically prior and what is logically posterior.

The Vedanta is called the '*moksa sastra*' that is, a discipline having liberation or freedom from the bondage and suffering of phenomenal life as its primary objective. It also stands for terminal knowledge or absolute knowledge. The upanisads, which represent this Vedanta, have the one purpose to guide from darkness to light, from ignorance (*avidya*) to right knowledge (*vidya*),



from falsity (*anrta*) to truth, and finally, from bondage to liberation. This being their sole purpose, they would not have any relevance if the conventional way of our looking at things and undergrounding of them, if our habitual behaviour (*naisargikeloka-vyavahara*) in regard to them, were based upon truth, if things were just as they appear to be, if our conventional way of understanding and behaving could be regarded as unexceptionable and sacrosanct. The Vedānta texts seek to introduce us to radical 'reformation' of our behaviour. This means, as Sankara has insisted in his *Adhyasabhasaya*, that our conventional knowledges and behaviour will have to be understood as vitiated by *avidya*, which is *positive* ignorance, that is, knowing things as quite different from what they really are (*a-tasmin tadbuddhi*). In as much as, this *avidya* or positive ignorance (*bhavarupamithyaprataya*) is a beginningless (*anadi*) process into which we all are born, this must be regarded as a certain phase of existence, of the state of affairs that obtains in *rerum natura*, and not as a temporary aberration of the individual's own mind. That this was no unfounded presumption on the part of Sankara, that the *sruti*-texts themselves bear it out, will be clear and evident from the following. Thus, the Brhadaranyas says. There are assuredly two forms of Brahman the formed (*murta*) and the formless (*smurta*) the mortal and the immortal, the moving and the stationary, the actual (*sat*) and the you (*tya*)<sup>26</sup> The Maitri upanishad also states – "There are assuredly two forms of Brahman the formed and the formless. Now, that which is the formed is unreal, that which is the formless is real, is Brahman itself and the light" The Manduka also distinguishes 'Tadaksara' and 'Etedaksata' 'para' and 'apara' Brahme in its opening passages.

As Sankara saw, the basic nature of this *avidya*, this positive ignorance, consists in the confusion of the *Self* with the *not-self*<sup>27</sup>. The *jiva*, which, according to Sankara's Advaita version, is not only unborn but is *absolutely one* with Brahman, the non-dual Absolute Self, confuses under this phase of *avidya*, its 'self' with not-self, such as, the body, the senses, one's own near relations, even one's landed property and purse. Two basic modes of this confusion, as Sankara has illustrated in the *Adhyasabhasaya*, are *Ahamidam* – '*I am this*' (empirical individual, the bodied being) and *Mamedam-Mine this* (*my body, my relations, my property my bank account etc.*) Is not this '*mis-identity*' of *atma* (self) and *anatma* (not-self) in respect of the *Jiva* the very something as Brahman's own transgression of *non-dualness* (*advaitatva* or *ekarasata*) as also the transgression of one absolute Self-identity (remaining in its '*being as itself*') and *apparently*, '*becoming many*'? For, who is this '*Jiva*', on the Advaita version, pray? Is it not the same as is *Brahman*? Is there anything there which, according to the *sruti*-texts, not in essence, *Brahman itself*? So, what irregularity is there if Sankara interprets Brahman's '*becoming many*' as all '*a matter of appearance*' only? What differences is there between Chattopadhyaya's becoming fair-complexioned, tall, slender, a Brahmin, an old man, a professor, a poor man, without any landholding, any bank account, any house of his own, again, a father, a son, a grandfather, a teacher and also a student of Sankara Vedānta etc. and Brahman's becoming so many things and beings (*Jivas*), although, *as itself* Brahman is the *absolute one*? If this Chattopadhyaya is, at the core, Brahman itself (since all is Brahman, according to the Vedānta), is not Chattopadhyaya's misidentification of the *true self* with the not-self (*anatma*), that is, with his being Chattopadhyaya, analogous to Brahman's *seeming to become* the world of plural forms and names?

And what is this talk about self (*atma*) and not-self (*anatma*) pray? Are there any *stable entities* answering such descriptions? To begin with '*anatma*', what is this *anatma* (not-self) and where is its habitat in an order where everything is Brahman, and as such, the one Self? A good deal of confusion seems to have crept into the classical (traditional) interpretation of the Advaita Vedānta which speaks as if there are certain *entities*, all existential, which are fit for the descriptive title '*anatma*', and and such, are the radical opposites of the mysterious *atma*, which is localisable in a

distant 'haven' of its own. How such an account accords with Absolute non-dualism of Sankara is an issue which the traditional interpreters of Sankara must answer without hedging or camouflaging in verbal monstrosity. Could the self or '*atma*' be kept within defined limits, it could not be 'all that is there', could not be the Brahman. Conversely, could Brahman be restricted within any limited jurisdiction of self-luminosity outside the realm of cosmic pluralities and the world of becoming, Brahman could not be the *all*, the actual (*bhuta*) as also the possible (*Bhavy*) and therefore, the all-comprehensive one. It can be seen, therefore, that the notions '*atma*' and '*anatma*', as used in the upanisads and the Vedanta of Sankara, will have to be taken as *functional concepts*, and that they do not denominate any stable or fixed entities.

The Self (*atma*) of anything is its 'itself', it is that with which it can be identified, giving rise to certain sense of fulfilment or satisfaction. That one is the '*absolute Self*'. With which things may all be absolutely identified, giving rise to absolute fulfilment (*paramartha*). The Self or *atma*, then, is a certain 'discovered' or 'realised' 'identity'. The self is this *fact of identity*, as '*not-self*' is that heretofore-known-identity which is no longer regarded, or '*realised*' as the identity, but is thrown out or repudiated as spurious matter (*tuccha*). As falsity is a heretofore-'known truth' now *defunct*, and repudated as untruth, in like manner, the *anatma* or notself is what was once regarded as '*atma*' or part of it, but is now spurious (*tuccha*).

At the root of all mischief lies the world and weired 'many-wise' 'Self-display' or 'self-parading' of the 'Self' (Atman). Is it not the same as, or analogous to, Brahman's so called bid to *pose* as 'many' as the *srutis* declare? Like a wandering minstrel, or a roaming vagabond, the concept of the 'Self' seems to be moving in all directions, and there after, withdrawing from its several old and favourite 'perches', one after another, and retiring into an absolved and final 'retreat'. All these are, of course, rhetorical expressions, and these are used to suggest a certain *vagrancy* associated with the notion of the 'Self' which creates the 'not-self' out of its old and once-frequented perches, now abandoned by withdrawal and retreat. It seems that the 'Self' seeks to enlarge itself limitlessly, to envelope and 'own' whatever is there in one kind of movement, and this is reminiscent of Brahman's transgression, though apparent, of its non-dual and non-plural *being as itself*, and *becoming the 'many'*, although all this is purely *epistemic* as the Self's self-expansion to cover what would be subsequently repudiated as '*not-self*' as also an epistemic fact, and nothing metaphysical. The 'not-self' (*anatma*) of the vedanta is not, thus, any original matter, lying there handy to be superimposed on the so called pure Self. It is the repudiated and the rejected 'perches', where the self-feeling once dwell and now no longer dwells, consequent upon its withdrawal from them in modes of '*Sa neti, netyatma*' – "He, the Self, is *not* this', not 'that'. In the states of affairs that figure in our experience, there are movements in both directions – going *outwards* and *expansively*, and retiring *within* and *incisively* into one's own stable, eternal and immutable being *as itself*. As far as the '*Jivas*' are concerned, the former can be said to be 'self-losing', and the latter, the 'self-finding' movements. And all these are provided in the nature of reality, which is Brahman, – although both are from the standpoint of Brahman, the Reality, *phenomenal* in the sense of being *epistemic* (*vyavaharika*), since Brahman is the eternally self-realised, self-accomplished *identity*, and in it, the self-expansion into many-ness is only playful and so, apparent, and this does not involve any self-losing, that is, any dissipation of its absolute one-ness. The changes are all matter of form and name (*nama-rupa*) only. This has been called Brahman's '*maya*'. Were this '*becoming many*' a *real becoming*, and were Brahman, as conceived in the Vedanta, any 'person' analogous to the human individual or agent, we would be required to fall back upon the notion of a potency of '*Sakti*' in the Lord. But Brahman of the vedanta is no lord God of religion. Brahman is the absolute, non-dual identity-experience which ensures immortality and freedom from fearfulness. Brahman's '*becoming many*' is all *epistemic*, and nothing metaphysical, since, although the cosmic appearance does not cease for all, and is also

beginningless, yet it ceases from the one, who is liberated through realisation of absolute one-ness in the Absolute experience, which is the Reality *as itself*. To treat to this 'maya' any metaphysical status would be denying the possibility of liberation and release. Its epistemic status is the only one consonant with Sankara's conception of it as the '*anirvacaniya*', the neither real nor unreal. That 'maya is magic, or a spell that deceives, and that Brahman is an arch-magician (*mayavi*) is all rhetorical speech. What else can be the meaning of Sankara's expression '*mayaviva mayaya*'<sup>10</sup>, pray?

Now, returning to the concept of the '*Jiva*' as discussed in the concluding part of Adhyaya II, we find, what is called '*maya*' in the context of Brahman is not *substantially* different from '*avidya*' spoken of in the context of the '*Jivas*', – insofar as both concepts are *epistemic* and none metaphysical, although the traditional commentators have over-exercised their ingenuity to chalk out certain lines of distinction. Difference between the two notions, if any, simply lies in this that while at the level of Brahman, there is *not* even apparent self-losing in seeming to become many, at the level of the '*Jivas*', there is that *apparent self-losing*. In fact, it is to explain the *actuality* of this apparent self-losing, an *epistemic fact*, in the context of the '*Jivas*', which are *non-other* than Brahman itself, that the *srutis* felt it necessary to provide for Brahman's *apparent becoming* into many 'names and forms'. For how otherwise could the *real and substantial one-ness* of '*Jivas*' with Brahman, *against* their *apparent* difference, and this latter, a purely epistemic development, be explained? Were not the '*Jivas*', apparent self-losing 'provided as a feature involving at least a *formal possibility* in Reality's, which is Brahman, how could we explain this apparent losing of self in the 'not-self' on the part of the '*Jivas*', who are one with Brahman? It is really astonishing that the *srutis* not only establish the fact of self-losing by the '*Jivas*' as an *apparent* and merely *epistemic fact* by demonstrating absolute one-ness of '*Jivas*' with Brahman in *liberation* through right knowledge (*vidya*), but they show also the *possibility* of the '*Jivas*' being steeped in *avidya* by providing a *formal basis* of this *avidya* in the apparent self-dissipation of Brahman in the cosmic 'many'. Thus far, Sankara's concept of '*Maya*' and '*Avidya*' imply one another, *even if* the two concepts are not accepted to be one and the same in substance.

Now to return to the Vedanta texts and the *sutras* on the *Jiva-Brahman relation*. On the authority of the *sruti*-texts and through a harmonious rendering of them (without omitting passages which on the surface seem to be at variance with his thesis – a procedure the non-Advaitists generally have followed), Sankara establishes the Advaita thesis that they '*Jivas*' are the *same as* Brahman, and cannot, therefore, be described *literally* as parts (*amsa*) of Brahman. How could there be, literally speaking, parts of Brahman when the *srutis* describe Brahman as *niramsa* (formless), *niravayava* (without avayavas or components), *nirkara* (formless), *nirguna* (quality less) and *ekarasa* (of one simple taste or experience)? No doubt, the *srutis* have introduced quite a number of analogies and metaphors while seeking to bring home to our comprehension how there could be the *Jivas* as also the various objects of the cosmic order in the context where Reality is one indivisible self. But these analogies and metaphors are all rhetorical expressions with limited purpose. These several descriptions do not stand for any actual state of things that *happened*. They are used to elucidate graphically an issue which is philosophical, and so, has to be understood by reflective thinking. The so called emergence of the *Jivas*, is really the other name for Brahman's *Becoming* 'many'. Sankara in his commentary emphasizes the fact that the *Jivas*, according to the *sruti*-texts, are not entities having any origination or beginning in time. The non-Advaitists also do not suggest that the *Jivas* have ever been created. Even the non-Vedantists, such as, the Vaisesikas and the Sankhyaites, defend

the view that the *jivas*, who according to them are a genuine plurality, are all uncreated (*a-janya*) and eternal (*nityavastu*). So, in the context of his review of the relationship of the *Jivas* to Brahman, Sankara seeks to decide in the light of the Vedanta *sutras* which of the two views – the Advaita view of substantial one-Vedantist view of real plurality of the *Jivas* as separate *existential realities*, can best meet the requirements of the ethical and religious practices of mankind.

In so far as the *śrutis* seem to suggest both difference and non-difference (*bhedabheda*) of Brahman and the *Jivas*, some might suppose that this indirectly supports the view of the 'Jivas' as a part of (*amsa*) Brahman. Sankara stoutly rejects this view<sup>19</sup>.

He takes the stand that had the *śrutis* laid equal emphasis on both difference and non-difference the above supposition might have been accepted as true. But, as a matter of fact, the *śrutis* have laid emphasis on non-difference and *not on difference*<sup>20</sup>, and again, the supremes and of life, liberation, is described as realisable only through the intuitive knowledge of Brahman as the one Self. So, Sankara concludes that Brahman being '*niravayava*' (without component parts), the *Jiva* cannot be *literally* understood as a part of Brahman. The only alternative left therefore is to take the *Jiva* as Brahman itself *under an assumed form*, which is due to *avidya* only<sup>21</sup>. And this rendering subserves the purposes of ethics and religion. For, without, the supposition that there is, in some way, a beginningless relationship of the *Jivas* with their body and the sense-organs, injunctions to do acts of a certain kind and to refrain from acts of different kind (*anuyapariharau*) cannot have any meaning or relevance<sup>22</sup>. Again, how otherwise can there be this beginningless relationship of the *Jivas* with their bodies and sense organs except through *Avidya*? This means that without relationship with body and sense-organs there can be no activity and so no actions, moral or otherwise, on the part of a self which is pure and spiritual in nature, and that such relationship or association can only be *apparent* (since the Self is spiritual, pure, and free in its original make up) and such *apparent* association or relationship can only be a matter of *avidya* or ignorance. And if reality be one non-dual self, does not this mean that it is Brahman itself which assumes the form of the plural *jivas* under the phase called *avidya*?

Let us consider the other alternatives. The non-Advaitists believe in a *real plurality* of selves or *Jivas* which are parts of the supreme self, Brahman. As parts of Brahman, they are as real, as pure, and as eternal as is the Brahman itself. How could such pure part-selves acquire demerits and fall into bondage? How is their 'original sin', and also their association with the body which has been understood to be real and also as due to their demerits, to be explained? The same difficulty vitiates the Sankhya and the Vaiśeṣika doctrines of *plural* selves. Sankara throws light on the discrepancies of these theories on this issue in his commentary on the concluding *sutras* of *padā* III of Adhyaya II. The plural *puruṣas* of the Sankhya are all pure, all-pervasive and all are conscious principles. In the absence of a qualitative differentia, their plurality remains unestablished. Even if this plurality is taken for granted, then, since all *puruṣas* are all-comprehensive, and Prakṛti is their common object, possibility always remains for the 'enjoyed order' of one *puruṣas* are all-comprehensive, and Prakṛti is their common object, possibility always remains for the 'enjoyed order' of one *puruṣas* to belong to another. This can be called the fallacy of cross connection (*samkaryadosa*). The Vaiśeṣika theory of plurality of unconscious selves is also vitiated by this difficulty since, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the plural selves are all all-pervasive (*vibhu*). In their case, as also in the case of other doctrines emitting an original plurality of selves, there is this further difficulty that there is nothing to regulate the stuff called *adrsta* which stands for the accumulated results of past misdeeds<sup>23</sup>. How the plural pure selves of the Sankhya and of the non-Advaitists come to *acquire* their fruits of actions, how

they come to be associated with their bodies and the senses, require an explanation which is not there. The Vaishesika Selves are, originally, unassociated with their bodies. So, why and how these are at all associated with their bodies and sense-organs without the least possibility of an *original* sin or demerit being there, remains a mystery. The crux of the problem is there can be no bondage (*bandha*) real or apparent, no moral or enjoined activities and no merits or demerits without the body and the sense-organs being somehow associated with the so called plural selves, all eternal and pure in nature, be they conscious substances as the non-Advaitists among the Vedantists and the Sankhyaites maintain, or be they unconscious substances as the Nyayavaishesikas hold. So how to explain the possibility of their acting morally or immorally and acquiring fruits of action—merits and demerits, which may result in their bondage, if their coming to be associated with the bodies and the sense-organs cannot be intelligibly explained? Without association with the bodies and the sense-organs, these plural selves, pure and eternal as they are, cannot engage themselves into activities of any kind, and again, without activities and doing of unrighteous actions, how can they acquire demerits as a result where of, they get special kinds of bodies and sense-organs, which serve to distinguish them one from another? As all the plural selves, be they as they are taken by the non-Advaita schools of the Vedanta, be they the Sankhya '*purusas*' or be they the unconscious substances which *acquire* consciousness adventitiously as the Vaishesikas describe them, are all eternal (*nitya*) and all-pervasive (*vibhu*), and there is nothing to distinguish one such self from another without their association with their respective bodies and sense-organs. Without their physical embodiment or their association with their bodies and sense-organs they are indistinguishable, and so their plurality is a *fake* plurality. What is more, without this their association (real or apparent) with their bodies and sense-organs, they are incapable of executing any action and acquiring merits or demerits for their actions, and finally, without demerits or acquired taints (*papa*), they cannot be in bodily bondage. So, there is a vicious circle and unless and until some intelligible account is given how they come to be embodied, not only their 'plurality' but also the possibility of their moral and religious action, their moral responsibility—all remain unexplained. The supposition of an infinite process of action and bodiedness, in which each preceding set-up determines each succeeding set-up on the analogy of the seed and the sprout (*vyankuravat*) cannot help. It is astounding that the traditionalists have taken the process in the way of an infinite *progression*. Its hollowness as a piece of logical argument becomes clear once we take it as it really is, that is, as an *infinite process or regression*, which cannot explain *anaditva* (beginninglessness), and is a logical fallacy, since the entire process hangs in the air without the 'first seed', the original sin or demerit, which will have to be accounted for. And the Advaita criticism specially turns upon that point. It is just here that the Advaita of Sankara has a solution which is wanting in the other rival accounts.

That solution is this. The plurality of the '*Jivas*' (or of the so called individual 'selves') is all *apparent*. Due to *Avidya*, there has been an apparent modification (*vivarta*) of the one non-dual self, which, then *seemingly appears* diverse and plural under equally *seeming* conditioning of the physical, psychical and biological factors, which latter constitute the so called body, life and the sense-organs of the phenomenal individuals. The *jivas*, although the *same as* Brahman, figure as empirical persons or individuals under the spell of this *avidya*, which, so to say, forges their *apparent conditioning* by their bodies and the sense-organs. The nature of this *apparent conditioning* is constituted by, as Sankara has expressed a false sees of identity with the body (*tatsamhatatvabhimanat*)<sup>44</sup> So long as this sense of identification lasts the *Jiva* looks upon itself as the doer and the enjoyer. Injunctions and prohibitions are meaningful for *Jivas*, as empirical individuals, at this stage. Merits and demerits, moral responsibility for actions done, devolve upon such individuals. Even those who know that their 'self' is other than and so, additional to their bodied personality, cannot escape this moral



responsibility so long as their *abhimana* (age-sense or I-feeling) in the body persists. Such 'I-sense' in the body, or feeling of identity with the body, is the work of *avidya* (ignorance). If and when this I-feeling or sense of identity with the body is *completely got over*, moral and religious injunctions and prohibitions become irrelevant or meaningless. Not that an individual, at such stage, acts licentiously without regard to norms of conduct<sup>45</sup>. His actions become *dixinterested* completely, since with the lapsing of the sense of identity in the body, the individual is no longer activated by any motive or desire, and his responses or actions, if any, ceases to be 'his', actions. So, Sankara, says 'in every case', it is the '*abhimana*' – the sense of appropriation in the body, which becomes the motive-power-'*sarvitra abhimanasyaiva pravartakatva*'<sup>46</sup>. Since bondage and suffering are due to wrong sense of identification with the body and the sense-organs, and through them with one's own extra-physical relations, such as, with one's own relations or one's own landed property act, release from bondage can be secured only through right knowledge<sup>47</sup>, which shows the falsity of that sense of identification, otherwise called '*atma-anatma -adhyasa*'<sup>48</sup>.

How far this notion of *avidya* solves the problem of bondage and liberation and also the problem of moral responsibility which, according to the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary on them, other systems admitting original plurality of selves cannot satisfactorily account for, requires a closer and more incisive review. Here, the real issue is: does the concept of one non-dual Self, *apparently* taking individual forms under apparent conditioning (*upadhiyuktata*) by psychophysical complex, otherwise called '*dehadisamghata*'<sup>49</sup>, solve problems of morality and liberation in a more convincing manner the problems which theories admitting original plurality of selves cannot solve? To take the moral problems first. All the systems of Indian Philosophy, with the solitary exception of the Carvaka system, admit individual's moral responsibility for works done. His sufferings and enjoyment in this life and his re-incarnation (rebirth) in the various grades of existence are all admitted as necessarily regulated by the accumulated results of his past actions, otherwise called, the stuff of '*adrsta*'. Are not issues, such as, moral responsibility of individuals discordant with the notion of there being only one non-dual Absolute Self, a view that Advaita defends? B S 2 3 49 and 2 3 50, together with Sankara's commentary on them, constitute the Advaita reply to such questions. It can be seen, we can speak of moral actions, moral responsibility, fruits of actions only about bodied beings, and not about disembodied 'selves' if there be any. The birth, death, and rebirth or re-incarnation also can be significantly be spoken about bodied subjects or empirical individuals, and not about disembodied and pure 'selves' or souls, if there is any. The reason is such 'selves' or souls are admitted to be *av-  
tanya* (without birth) *nitya* (eternal) and free as themselves. Moral responsibility, *Karmaphala* (fruits of actions done), birth, death, and re-incarnation have nothing to do, therefore, with the idea of self in its essential purity – be this self one, non-dual, or several and many. It is the association with the psycho-physical complex and the nature of determination by such complex, which constitute empirical individuality on all accounts. And it is this empirical individual so constituted that has moral responsibility, birth, death, and re-incarnation, and not the free spirit or Self, non-dual or plural. As for the theories which defend original plurality of selves, with or without a super-self superintending over them, it becomes difficult to show how there can be their *real* association with, or development in, the psycho-physical complex *without their meriting* that entanglement by some previous actions of which, in their original condition, they are absolutely incapable of. To suggest such entanglement as *unmerited* would cut at the root of their doctrine of moral responsibility. To suggest that their entanglement is willed and is, therefore, forced upon them by a Super-Self will not only show such a super-Self in an air of utter capriciousness and moral irresponsibility but also as cruel and also as a partisan (*nirghrta* and *visama*)<sup>50</sup>. It cannot also be contended that the Super-Self intends such



association with the psycho-physical complex, as the theists might hold, or that the plural *purusas* themselves get into such entanglement (real or apparent) in order to achieve discriminatory wisdom, as the Sankhyaites might say, is also abortive and meaningless. Plural Selves, originally pure and without agentship, do not stand in need of any moral training. And as for the Sankhya Purusas, which are eternally pure, enlightened and free, there can be no need for any more wisdom of the form of discriminative knowledge. The entire issue, therefore, hangs on an unsolved mystery.

If, to solve the problem discussed above, it becomes necessary on the part of all the schools to fall back upon the notion of *avidya*, of primal ignorance, in some way, the law of parsimony requires, that there should not be multiple Supposition if one simple supposition can work with success. The Advaita account is that moral responsibility for actions done, bondage and liberation are meaningful concepts in the context of the *Jivas* only. The supreme Brahman (*para*), that is, Brahman *as itself*, remains untouched and unaffected by the vicissitudes in the *jiva*'s career – his bondage and sufferings, and is not under any moral obligation. It is the sense of identification with the body and sense-organs etc. (*dehadityamahhava*)<sup>1</sup> which is the one determinative factor in bondage, suffering, moral obligation etc. and where there is no such sense (*dehadityamuhhava*), no occasion for entanglement of any kind arises. Even, in the case of the '*Jivas*' themselves, sufferings through the sense of 'appropriation' (*adulihkukhmana*) is *not real*, occasioned as it becomes by the error of non-discrimination with the body, the sense-organs etc., which latter become the adventitious determinants (*upadhi*) of the *jivas* under the spell of *avidya*, which causes individuation characterised by different names and forms<sup>2</sup>. A close look into the foregoing statement, which is Sankara's own, brings out the two aspects of *avidya*, so elaborately discussed by Sankara's followers – *avarana* (covering) and *viksepa* (projection). In the given context, the determination in term of adventitious factors (*upadhi*), such as, bodies and sense-organs etc. – the psycho-physical complexes, having different names and forms, constitutes the *avarana* so far as these give rise to *apparent modifications* (*vivarta*) of one non-dual Self (Brahman-*Atman*) in the names and forms of the plural '*jivas*'. In our exposition, we have admitted this phase as that of '*mere appearances*'. Following upon it, in a sequence which is to be taken as a logical sequence, there is to be the *a-viveka* (sense of non-discrimination) on the part of the '*Jivas*' of their true self, and so, of their *real identity* (which is Brahman) from the adventitious determinations of them as bodied subjects, – resulting in the wrong identification of the '*jivas*' with the bodied beings. This wrong sense of identification with the adventitious names and forms of the psycho-physical complexes and 'appropriations' of the vicissitudes which befall such complexes after such wrong identification, is the *viksepa* aspect of *avidya*, and this, in our exposition, has been indicated as the '*illusory appearances*'. The sense of reality and identification, under this phase, passes on to the adventitious conditioning, turning a '*mere appearance*' into an illusory appearance. And this is '*Jiva*' in bondage and suffering, also the *jiva* enjoying and suffering from the results of their own actions. This is the *Jiva* as *karta* (agent) and *bhokta* (enjoyer or sufferer).

To be frank, it is not at all easy to rightly comprehend Sankara's meaning, which, however, is the one logical meaning which the various Upanisads have laboured in their own ways to intelligibly present to us by means of varied analogies and metaphores. In what follows, we shall attempt to clarify Sankara's meaning in the light of the *sutras* of the third *adhyaya* and through a comparative and critical review of the classical *avacchedavada* and *pratibimhavad*. There is no difference among the interpreters of Sankara as regards his exposition of the nature of Brahman *as itself*, that is, Brahman in its aspect of *para* Brahman, of Brahman *as nirakara*, *niravayava*, *nirguna* and *niranyana*. We have some amount of doubt, however, if the classical interpreters of the two principal schools have fully gauged the meaning of the *sruti* description of Brahman *as Atman*, *vis-a-vis* the *sruti*-

description of Brahman as *all* and *everything* (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*) and also Sankara's own guide lines on this issue. The Chandogya statement '*sarvam khalu idam brahma*' has to be taken as a statement on '*idam Brahman*', which the Mandukopanisat describes as '*etadaksara*' and distinguishes from '*tadaksara*'. The '*idam Brahman*' or '*etadaksara*' stands for Brahman as the *objective unity* or one-ness of the cosmic appearances. Not so the '*tadaksara*' or Brahman as *Atman*.

This latter is *indescribable* in the *objective mode* of speech. This is only realisable in its state of release by the *Jiva*, this is *the one pure identity of all*, in which there is complete lapsing of all *prapanca* (appearances). This is knowing the pudding by tasting as different from knowing it from *outside*, that is, knowing it from its outward appearances, or from descriptions by others who claims to have tasted it. In a way, this intuitive realisation of the absolute one-ness of Reality is the *proof*, decisive and final, that Brahman or Reality, *as itself* is such, that is, the absolute one-ness of *jiva* and Brahman, – the *nirakara, nirguna, santram, svam, advaita*. Without the possibility of an experience of such kind, the entire lot of descriptive epithets of Brahman would be sheer play upon words. This aspect of Brahman (if we can call it as an aspect at all, since this is Brahman as *Atman*, this is Brahman *as itself*), is no *object matter* of *pramana-jnana*, since there can be no dualism of knowing and known in it. It is indeed ridiculous to talk about a *virtuynana* (modal experience) 'reflecting' the nature of this Brahman *as itself*. It is here that all fundamentalists have erred fundamentally. Brahman as *Atman* is known and realised only by complete withdrawal from cosmic appearance (*jagatprapanca*) by reaching up to the absolutely unconditioned formless Being by transcendence of the subjective-objective show, which veils it as the screen of *avidya*. Self-realisation is absolutely different from any knowledge in the objective mode. *Virtuynana* is, even in its ultimate stretch, knowledge in the objective mode. Such kind of knowledge is absolutely incapable of leading to realisation of Brahman as the one absolute *Atman*. The latter is knowledge as *absolute self-realisation*, that is, realisation of pureoneness of all things in the unity of absolute self-consciousness. In so far as the classical interpreters speak of a *virtuynana of Brahman*, derived from the *sruti*-texts by constant recitation, reflection and contemplation of them, as leading up to Brahman-realisation, they seem to be believing in the realisability of Brahman in an objective attitude, where as Brahman as *Atman* can be realised as the truth and reality – one and supreme, in complete transcendence of both subjective and objective attitudes only.

Sankara's exposition on the nature of '*jiva*' seems to be one of the most intricate part of his philosophical thought. The wide diversity in the interpretation of this theme one notices in the expositions of the diverse schools of Sankara vedanta proves as much. Is the '*Jiva*' and '*avaccheda*' (artificial limitation) of Brahman? Or is it a *pratibimba* (reflection) of Brahman in *avidya*, serving for an *upadhi* – an adventitious medium of some kind? The *srutis*, of course, abound in analogies of various sorts, and these diverse modes of interpretation, which are called '*vada*s' seem to have been very much influence by them, so much so that some interpreters seem to have taken the analogies, not as analogies, that is, 'figures' of speech, but as representing facts *as they are*. There are several things which should be borne in mind to arrive at a correct interpretation or understanding of the nature of the '*Jiva*'. These are (a) one must keep in view the basic thesis of Sankara that there is no plurality of Self, that the Self is one non-dual indivisible Absolute Reality, outside or along side which there is no other reality (b) The *Jiva* is *substantially the same* as Brahman, the one non-dual Self, and that this sameness is *realisable* in the state of release only. But, ordinarily, and habitually, the '*Jiva*' feels itself as a substantive fact or reality by itself, and in that respect, as very much different from Brahman, (c) There is a radical difference between *vidya* and *avidya*, as between the true knowledge of cosmic pluralities as all *appearances* and the *conventional knowledge* of them, which

is false and which takes the plural appearances *not as appearances* but as substantive realities themselves. (d) As the 'Jiva' is the same as Brahman in the realised state of release, Brahman is also the 'jivas' and the cosmic pluralities in its *murta* (manifested) aspect under the cover of *avidya*, which is the determining factor of the 'jivas' bondage, and of *jivas* feeling of 'otherness' from Brahman. (e) The *srutis* and the *sutras* speak of there being *two* states or situations – that of *bondage* in ignorances (*avidya*) and of *release* in right knowledge (*vidya*) and of the possibility of transition from the first to the second (*tamaso jyoti*). (f) The *srutis* or *sutras*, nowhere, speak of cessation of *avidya*, *simultaneously* for all 'jivas', that is, for all phenomenal modes of Brahman. They also nowhere speak of this *avidya* having a temporal beginning in time, and so, as '*janya*' (caused), although they maintain that this *avidya* may be *upasanta* (may be got over) in individual cases. (g) There is a sense, in which Brahman is its non-dual, in which Brahman is *all that appears as many and plural* – both the actual and the possible. One gives the *pura*, the *tadaksara*, the other the *apara* Brahman, the *etadaksara*. If, from the standpoint of the former, it is true that 'here there is no plurality' (*neha nanasti kincana*), it is also true from the standpoint of the latter, that the plural appearances, are not all absolute 'nothing', absolute voidness (*sunyata*). The latter is the '*anirvacunya*', some thing, although *positive*, is neither determinable as *real*, nor again, as *unreal*. (h) As the one Self and reality appears to individuate itself in the plurality of names and forms, there is a sense in which the *avacchedavada* of Vacaspati the theory which explain the plurality of 'Jivas' of *jivas* who are *substantially one* which Brahman, on the analogy of one all-pervading Sky or Space being *artificially delimited* by pot, temple, buildings, etc., while retaining its substantial one-ness is true as a figurative description. The relation of *amsa* and *amsi* of the homogeneous under artificial limitation also fares well as an *approximate* description. But, taken in another way, the analogy of the Sun and its various reflections on different pools of water (*upama suryukadivati*) also has its relevance, and in that way, the *Bimba-pratibimba-vada* of the Vivarana school has a degree of plausibility as a figurative putting of the relation. *Avidya*, working as *upadhi* (adventitious conditioning) seems to cause a certain change of nature in the '*jiva*' so that instead of remaining the original '*bimba*', it takes the character of the reflection (*pratibimba*) in the medium of *avidya*, functioning as an *upadhi* which causes a certain *distortion* of nature. It can, however, be seen that while *avacchedavada* lays emphasis on the aspect of *abheda* (non-difference), the *pratibimbavada* emphasizes more on the aspect of *bheda* (difference).

What, then, is Sankara's own view on the issue? Let us concentrate on the nature of the '*Jiva*' and the role which *avidya* plays in raising a barrier between the '*Jiva*' and Brahman, in Sankara's opinion. Sankara, it can be seen, takes the analogies as analogies. These are calculated to make intelligible to the commoner a theme which is not easy even for an erudite scholar to grasp if he allows himself to be misled by 'picture-thinking'. Whether, the '*Jiva*' is Brahman itself under the *artificial limitation* of the body and the sense-organs as the Bhamati school seems to regard it, or a *pratibimba*, that is, a reflected image of Brahman, so, a *distortion of Brahman* in the medium of *avidya*, as the Vivarana school seems to hold, cannot be decided *a priori*, on the strength of the analogies, which are of a varied nature. The issue is decidable only through a review of the nature of *avidya* and its role in the determination of '*Jivatva*' or the '*Jiva*', eclipsing the '*Jiva's*' Brahmanhood. This '*Jivatva*' of the '*Jiva*', according to Sankara, is a consequences of the '*Jiva's*' '*sasariratva*', This consists in the false sense of the '*jivas*' identity with the body, otherwise called '*sariradyatmabhimana*' – that is, the self-feeling in the psycho-physical complex called the '*sarira*' (body). This '*sasariratva*', says Sankara, is due to false knowledge – '*mithyajnanananimittatva*'<sup>41</sup>. But why should this be regarded as false knowledge? The reason is, as Sankara explains, the self (*atma*) is eternally '*a-sariri*' (without body) and its relationship with the body (*sarira-sambandha*) is *a-siddha*<sup>42</sup> (contrary to fact and reason) in as much as the Self unrelated to any activity whatsoever (*a-karma-*

*mūrtatvat*) and as such, has no connection with the merit and demerit (*dharmadharma*) arising as the fruits of actions done by it. Why, then, is there the association of the 'Jiva' with the body, and why is, then, the sense of identification of its self with the body? It is, indeed remarkable how Sankara proves that once you admit that there is a self and this self is an eternal reality, and as itself pure and imperishable, you will evidently fail to prove that there can be any connection or association with the body except through ignorance which *wrongly identifies*—the self with the body. And a connection or association, which is forged through *avidya* or misconception, *can never be real*, and it will be foolish to suppose that it is real. We do not know if the non-Advaitists have any reasonable answer to this point. The basic point in the argument is worth quoting in full. Thus, Sankara argues, *sarirasambandhasya dharmadharmayo-statkrtyasya cetatetarasrayatvaprasangat andhaparampara easanaditvakalpna*<sup>65</sup>. This is an argument against the common error of proving a relation through an infinite process, which leads no where and as such is blind (*andha*), and which simply hangs in the air in the absence of anything which can establish the first item of relatedness in the process<sup>66</sup>. The argument here is relationship with the body is dependent on merits and demerits (*dharmadharma*) of the works done and the possibility of such work or activity is dependent on there being an association with the body already. So here is a circularity of reasoning called '*anyonyasraya*' and if this extended infinitely, what is, in an infinite process to prove that the process is beginningless (*anadi*), it singularly fails since the very first connection in the link hangs in the air in so far as the this connection is been preadmitted as '*janya*' (caused).

Sankara continues his argument in the following way. There is no '*kriya samavaya*' in the self. That is, 'action' cannot *inhere* in the self, as the Vaishesika might wrongly suppose. So there can be no *real* 'agent-ship' (*kartrtva*) of the Self. Nor can the Self be credited with action in a derivative sense (*gaunārtha*) as happen in the case of a master who causes things to be done by servants under his payment. In this case, no such master-servant relationship, through payment or persuasion, can be even imagined (*na kincid sakyam kalpayitum*)<sup>67</sup>. So, Sankara concludes it is the false sense of one-ness with the body, the *mis-owning* of the body through *avidya* which alone can account for the self's association with the body where such association is basically false. So, the Jiva's '*Jivatva*', which is a consequence of the self's association with the body, and which makes him an empirical individual, and eclipses the 'Jivas' '*Brahmatva*' is an *apparent fact*, and *avidya* is the one reason for it. Sankara rejects the suggestion that the sense of identity of the Self with body which the Jiva labours under on account of his being under the spell of *avidya* may be an instance of '*gauna pratyaya*' (secondary sense) such as, when we describe a man as a '*lion-man*', thereby identifying the man with a lion on the basis of certain and qualities that commonly belong to a man and a lion. He observes that there may be a primary sense and secondary sense of a certain-matter where the distinction between the things which are brought under such uses is clearly known and commonly understood — *prasiddhavastubhedasya*. This does not and cannot happen in a case where the things identified are not *clearly known* as distinct and different — *a-prasiddhavastubhedasya*. Here, not only the people, who do not have discriminative understanding of the Self and the not-self, regard the psycho-physical complex as the self and 'own' it by the use of the expression '*I am so and so*', but also those who claims to understand the difference between the two. They also behave in the same ignorant way (even pundits behave as cowherds do)<sup>68</sup>. So, the unavoidable conclusion is that the sense of 'bodied being-hood' (*sasariratvam*) of the Jiva is entirely due to false conviction (*mithyapratyayanimitatvat*), and also that a truly enlightened person, who has right knowledge of the Self, is really 'bodyless' even when living in this life<sup>69</sup> and in this body.

The above gives the much needed key to the understanding the nature of a 'Jiva' under *avidya*,

as Sankara himself wanted to bring home to our minds. It is not Sankara's view that there is nothing which stands for the body, or that the world of objects by which we are ordinarily surrounded is an empty illusion. That is nonsense, plain and clear, sometimes grafted on Sankara's version of the Vedanta by those who misconstrued the Vedanta and misconstrued Sankara's meaning as well. *Avidya* or ignorance consists in the *wrong identification* of the Self with the psycho-physical complex called the individual's body, and in the development of the self-sense (*atmabhimana*) in the bodied being. This is reiterated in the bodied being. This is reiterated in the context of B.S. 2.3.48 where Sankara says - 'there arises a perverted sense (*viparitapratyaya*) in the owning by the self, this psycho-physical complex under the form 'I am so and so'. Before the advent of right perception such ignorance pervades all living creatures<sup>90</sup>. This establishment of adventitious relationship with the psycho-physical complex is occasioned by *avidya*<sup>91</sup>. Not that there is no psycho-physical complex, called the body, nor, again, that it should not have been, or need not be there. Such issues are irrelevant. The relevant issue is, even supposing that there is such a body (and also many other objects in the environment), it was not necessary that one should have developed wrong sense of self-identify with it, should have been infatuated with it in the belief that one does not have any 'identify' other than that of one's own body and bodily relations.

Now, that difference is there between the 'Jiva's assuming 'jivatva' under ignorant union with what is its *upadhi* and Brahman's becoming 'many and plural', *phenomenally*, under the varied covering of cosmic appearances? Does it not appear that Sankara *alone* is faithful to the *sruti*-statement that, although the non-dual and indivisible Absolute one, Brahman also assumed multiple names and forms *phenomenally* to parade as the 'Jivas' who, although substantially one with Brahman, appear as different under the course of their *jivatva* (*Jiva-hood*)? The *substantial one-ness* of the *jivas* with Brahman as the one undivided Self is known or realised in the state of release or liberation. The *formal difference* of the 'Jiva' and Brahman and the 'Jivas' parading as separate and independent 'many selves' is known in the conventional experience of mankind. And it is the Vedanta thesis that this latter is *false appearance*. It is false since, as Sankara has observed, this has been occasioned by *viparita pratyaya*<sup>92</sup> (diametrically opposite knowledge or conviction). We shall now concentrate upon this '*viparita pratyaya*' and its determining conditions, and see to what extent the *pratibimbavada* and *avacchedavada*, reared upon certain analogies used by the *sutras* and Sankara's commentary, have been relevant, and to what extent again, they have been inadequate or wrong.

This '*viparitapratyaya*' consists, or is occasioned by, the sense of identity or one-ness of the 'Jiva' with the psycho-physical collocation (*samghata*) or complex, which is there as its *artificial limitation* (*avaccheda*) or *adventitious condition* (external determinant), *upadhi*. In the context of B.S. 3.2.11 and in many other places<sup>93</sup>, Sankara has regarded these artificial limitations or *upadhi* etc. as the pre-posed (*pratyupasthapita*) of *avidya*. What can this mean? The question is *not* as to whether *there is anything*, such as, bodies sense and physical objects or not. The question is *not* about existence or non-existence of things at all. It is a question about certain items of our conventionally known 'things' being the *upadhis* (external determinants) or limiting adjuncts determining the one non-dual Self into plural 'Jivas'. This role or functioning of the psycho-physical complexes as *upadhis* limiting adjuncts, etc. is to be treated as having its root in *avidya*. And due to this *avidya*, again that which was *pre-posed* (*pratyupasthapita*) as external adjunct or artificial limitation is not regarded as that, but as cutting into the very being of the 'Jivas' so much so that the 'Jivas' remain completely identified with it. They identify their very 'self' with it. So, logically speaking, we can distinguish two stages in the development of 'Jivas' through a process of radical distortion (transformation in the opposite way). First, certain items, such as, body and sense organs,



are to hold on as *external* adjuncts or limitations giving the *appearance* of certain plurality. This we have regarded as the phase of 'mere appearance'. In the classical Advaita terminology this is called the '*avarana*' aspect of *avidya*. The second phase, the very next one, is that in which the external limitations or adjuncts cut into the very nature of the '*Jivas*' and there is misidentification of their 'self' with the *upadhis*, which, evidently, are an 'other' of the 'self', and so, the '*anatma*', although in this context, not regarded or known as that. This, in our terminology, is the change of a 'mere appearance' into an 'illusory appearance'. In this phase, the '*Jivas*' parade as *substantive* realities as *themselves*, and there is complete identification of the 'Self' of the '*Jivas*' with their *upadhis* – no longer regarded as extraneous limitations or *upadhis*. In the classical terminology, this is called the '*vishkapa*' (projection or distorted being-there-ness of something – '*avivarta*'). There is no demand any where in Sankara's commentary for making a distinction between '*maya*' and '*avidya*', or between the so-called '*matavidyā*' and '*tutavidyā*', and there seems to be no need for them, logically or epistemically. There is no *sūtra* which speaks of '*maya*' as '*śakti*' (potency). From Sankara's usages '*mayamatram*' or '*mayamaya*', '*maya*' seems to mean what is an unsubstantial appearance or a 'mere' appearance.<sup>94</sup> Even the magical creations of a magician in such analogy as '*mayaviva mayaya*' do not stand for anything different.

It can be seen that there is some difference between somethings figuring as an '*upadhi*' of the '*Jiva*' being known as that, on the one hand, and that '*upadhi*' cutting into the very nature of a '*Jiva*' resulting in the '*Jiva*' identification of its very 'self' with the '*upadhi*' on the other. For one seeking release, the recognition of the '*upadhi*' as '*upadhi*', that is, as '*anirvacaniva*' is the first stage, regarding it as '*Tuccha*' is the second stage, whereas, realisation of absolute identity with the non-dual self is the final goal.<sup>95</sup>

There seems to be unanimity among interpreters of Sankara that the '*Jivatva*' of the '*Jiva*', as different from its '*brahmatva*' is due to its wrong identification of the self' with its body and the senses. Dissension among them centres around interpretation of the nature and *modus operandi* of this misidentification. That this mis-identity is a given fact, which is there already and not caused, is the view of Sankara himself. The classical interpreters have all erred on this point. This is evident from the fact that '*Jivas*' mis-identity with the so-called *upadhis* is the *very same* as Brahman's so-called desire to 'become' many or plural. Brahman's becoming 'many' is no historical incident or accident, it is no event in time. The *śruti*-statement is meaningful only, in being figuratively taken. There can be no 'real transformation' of the formless and partless. We have already shown that an 'apparent modification' is always an epistemic fact, nothing metaphysical. The 'appearance' of Brahman as the totality of cosmic plurality is an epistemic fact. You may call it as '*maya*', you may account for it by saying that it is due to '*avidya*' (which is *anadi* (without beginning) and coeval with Brahman as itself (Atman), although not coreal or coeternal, just as you like. That this '*Jivatva*' is an epistemic context, just as Brahman's becoming plural '*Jivatva*' is an epistemic context, just as Brahman's becoming plural '*Jivas*' and plural objects is epistemic, becomes evident from the fact that this '*Jivatva*', although beginningless, is terminable (*santa*) in the case of one getting release and regaining *brahmatva*. It ceases, thus, in liberation, which is the same as the *Jivas* regaining *brahmatva*. If Brahman's 'becoming many' were not figurative and *epistemic*, the '*Jiva*'s '*Jivatva*', which involves mis-identity with the so-called *upadhis* (body and the sense), would have been a 'real' development, and not an 'apparent' modification, as is claimed to the case in the Advaita Vedanta schools. It is utter non-sense, therefore, to hold that Brahman *appears* as the world-pluralities due to His '*maya-śakti*' or that Brahman creates the world-appearance by His '*maya-śakti*'. Does the rope create the snake-appearance, or does it simply appear as snake on account of one's ignorance of its nature as a rope? 'Appearing' involves no activity, – no active 'dressing up' becomes necessary, provided



ignorance or *avidya* is there as an epistemic fact. So also in the context of '*Jivatva*' which is as much the Brahman's *becoming* the '*jivas*' as the '*jiva*'s becoming the '*Jiva*' and thus other than Brahman, through misidentity with the *upadhi*. And this mis-identity is a fact of *avidya* or ignorance.

It will be erroneous to suppose that the 'mis-identity' of the '*Jiva*' with its so-called '*upadhi*', such as, the body and the senses is a *historical event* for which the '*Jiva*' is responsible. That, the *Jiva* 'wrongly identifies itself with its *upadhis*, or that a 'misidentification, takes place, is only a *mode of speech* intended to express that *such identity is already there* as a fact of *avidya* or ignorance.

It is precisely this that is suggested by Sankara's own expression '*upadhidinanca avidyapratyupasthapitatva*' which means external factors, or adventitious conditions, function as *determinative of the nature* of a content on account of *avidya* only. To put otherwise, the body and the sense-organs, or simply, the psycho-physical complex which all are external and adventitious conditions of factors, become determinative of the nature of the '*Jiva*' as the '*Jiva*' (the empirical individual) because of *avidya* which is primal and beginningless.

How is something known as an *upadhi* or extraneous factor, pray? Can it be that, fully knowing something as an extraneous factor an *upadhi*, one deliberately takes it as an 'inner determinant' and misidentifies one-self with it? When is the body with its sense-organs known as extraneous to the *true nature of the 'Jiva'*? The only meaningful answer is. As and when the true nature of the '*Jiva*' is known, and it is known also that this true nature is not only independent of the body and sense-organs but also that the association with the latter leads to distortion of the true nature. As for the psycho-physical complex, it is known as an *upadhi* when the '*Jiva*' is restored to his true nature in the state of release, when it regains its true selfhood and true identity in '*Brahmatva*'. The talk about '*upaditva*' of the psycho-physical complex is, therefore, consequential to a reflective review of, or looking back towards what was *previously there* and was pre-posed by *avidya*. Is this not the only meaningful rendering of Sankara's '*avidyapratyupasthapitatva*', which he repeated so frequently?

The vedanta is a reflective analysis of the given order of experience and of all subjective-objective presentation it involves, to its utmost depth. It discovers the 'falsity' and the 'vanity'<sup>106</sup> of the conventional order of experience and behaviour in the ecstatic vision of a realisable supreme truth experience. This discovery is made not by a horizontal exercise of inferential or manipulative reasoning, but by a vertical survey through calm contemplation and meditation, by '*tapas*'<sup>107</sup> (austerity), as the *srutis* declare, of the several *depths* of consciousness. These depths of layers have been described as *five*, and the supreme truth-experience, it has been indicated, lies *beyond* these five layers of consciousness, otherwise called the five sheaths (*kosas*)<sup>108</sup>. These '*kosas*' are: (1) The substance as food (*annamaya*) (2) the substance as the vital breaths (*prana-maya*) (3) the substance as the psyche (*manomaya*), (4) the substance as 'consciousness (*vijnana maya*) and (5) the substance is blissfulness (*anandamaya*). These are the several layers of the conditioned being. Truth or Reality is the unconditioned being-itself. This is described as '*satyam*', *jnanam*, *anantam* (*anandam*). These are called '*svarupa laksna*' –the marks which are *pointers* (*laksana*) to the unconditioned, that is, to *Reality-as-such*. Insofar as this unconditioned constitutes the reality and truth of the world of appearance, its one substance, it is called the one, non-dual, indivisible Absolute 'self' of all –*Atman*. The other reason is the empirical individuals are capable of realising their true identity (Selfhood) in *this* in liberation. This latter constitutes the epistemic ground as also the ground of verifiability of the doctrine of absolute one-ness of Self, of truth and Reality. This shows that the vedanta is no postulatory metaphysics. It is concerned with the Reality as such, and is no conceptual analysis – no descriptive metaphysics<sup>109</sup> either.

But, even when the *Reality as such* is discovered at the farthest depth through progressive unconditioning, the task of the Vedanta as the philosophy of mankind, with the practical aim of rendering the truth supreme accessible to others as well for their supreme good, does not end. There is not only exhortations<sup>119</sup>, inviting all others to realise the supreme truth, which and immortal, but there is also a progressive statement, under various analogies and metaphores, how the Reality, absolute and one, gave rise to the manifold of cosmic appearances. Reality, it is said, displayed an aspect of seeming 'becoming', which is no *real* extension of itself but a realm of 'mere appearance', capable of degenerating into a realm of illusory appearances. In course of this, there takes place 'mis-identification' of the one Self with what is brought in by *avidya* as its *upadhi*, that is, artificial limitations or adventitious determinants. The psycho-physical complex, functioning and parading as the 'self' through this sense of mis-identity, is a development of this kind. This misidentity of Self with the psycho-physical complex (which is the same as that psycho-physical complex parading as the substantive Self)- is the work of *Avidya*. This, again, is instrumental to the Reality's being presented as a totality of objective appearances, stretching endlessly, showing itself up in endless pluralities, both actual and possible (*bhūtānca bhavyānca*). As *avidya* is at the root of this cosmic display of appearances, the entire show will have to be accepted as *epistemic*. But even though epistemic, this will have to be regarded as *provided as a phase in Reality as its appearance* (consisting of mere appearances degenerating into illusory appearances, or kept floating as mere appearances as the case may be. This gives Reality as *objectively* represented, or *objectively* manifest. This has to be distinguished from Brahman, the Reality, *as itself*. This latter in Brahman as *Atman*, the Absolute experience of indivisible self-identity. Mandukya describes this experience as '*santam, sivam, advaitam* (type nondual unity bliss tranquil).

It can be seen that all classical interpretations of Sankara's *Advaita*, associated although these are with names of scholars of incredible erudition, have accepted Brahman in the sense of Reality 'out there' and *objectively presented*, with very vague idea as to what the *amurta* (formless) aspect of Brahman was to be. Even when describing Brahman as the *Atman*, they seem to have understood this 'Brahman-Atman' as Reality *objectively* '*Jivas*' and understood as something 'out there'. By 'reality', people conventionally understand some objective entity, independent of individual's knowing. It is not very clear if our predecessors had actually understood the concept in some other way. This is reflected in the famous '*avacchedvada*' of the illustrious Vacaspati and the '*pratibimbavada*' of the illustrious Vacaspati and the '*pratibimbavada*' of the more orthodox and rigidly sectarian *vivara* school. While Vacaspati seems to emphasize on the aspect of *substantial one-ness* of *Jiva* and Brahman, the *vivara* seems to have emphasized on the aspect of their *difference, although apparent*. Both schools rightly take *avidya* as the principle of *apparent individuation* of one non-dual Reality. But both seem to have wrongly assumed that *avidya* or '*Maya*' is a *metaphysical principle*, although subordinate to Brahman, the supreme metaphysical principle. It is very much doubtful if the *avacchedvada* and *pratibimbavada* can escape dualism, fairly and squarely, as the *antirvacanīyatavada* of Sankara's own does. The protagonists of both the schools seemed to have taken the view that various modes of *avidya*, as *antahkaranavai*, of diverse kinds, *stand ready* there in advance, to be associated with what they call '*Caitanya*' (meaning Brahman, perhaps, in its declared aspect of pure consciousness) as its '*upadhis*' (external determinants). The difference between these two schools of interpretation seems to boil down to this that while according to Vacaspati, Brahman as pure '*Caitanya*', *itself figures as the Jivas* under artificial limitations of *upadhis*, which as external conditions, cannot affect the nature of '*Jivas*' but have the less distort their true identity, according to the *vivara* school the *upadhis*, although external factors, work as the media wherein the '*Jivas*'

come to figure as varied 'reflections' of one luminous 'Caitanya by way of projection as in were. In both the accounts, *antahkarana* works as the *upadhi*. But in one case, it *delimits* the universal 'Caitanya externally, in the same way as a pot, a temple (muti) etc. externally delimit one all-pervasive space or ether within, *without affecting its one-ness*, in the other account, 'Caitanya', in the casement of the *upadhi*, turn into 'reflected images' of the original, and in that respect, become discrepant in nature. But the analogy of the sun reflected on mirror, or in water is as much an 'objective' picturing of the situation as is the analogy of one space or sky being externally limited by this or that object and receptacle.

What is Sankara's own version of the case? It seems, he is neither disposed to accept the view that the 'Jivas' are *artificial segments (amsa)* of one-all pervasive 'Caitanya under *upadhi* which are created by *avidya*, nor is he disposed to support the *vivarana* interpretation that the 'Jivas' are reflections (*pratibimba*) of the luminous Self in the varied media of *avidya*, and as such, are not even apparent segments (*amsa*) of one universal Self but only its *reflected and somewhat distorted images*—each a reflection of the original. Both the interpretations are exercises in picture-thinking on the basis of certain analogies, —not treated as analogies but as representations of facts as they are. Besides, if it is true that Brahman, or the unitary Self, described as formless and colourless cannot have any reflections (*pratibimbah*) as the Bhamati school argues, it is equally true that no external limitation can give that 'bahutva' (many-ness) of Brahman as is intended in the *sruiti*-statement—'May I procreate myself into manyness', where in each and every form, the Self-same Self is to figure in its one-ness and wholeness, and not as segments. Besides, although B S. 2 3 29 gives prominence to 'buddhi' or '*antahkarana vrtti*' as *upadhi*, almost everywhere, Sankara speaks of '*dehendriyadisamghata*', the psycho-physical complex which includes *antahkarana*, the *ago*, the *buddhi* and manythings more, as the *upadhi* and cognate matters, which are *preposited by avidya*, as the *raison d'être* of apparent individuation. So, the speculative exercises, tiring, baffling, and at times verging on absurdity, indulged by the classical scholars of either school, seem to be, to a very considerable degree, anachronistic and *textually* incorrect. We also hear of Brahman's becoming many 'Jivas' under names and forms (*nama-rupa*)! Do 'nama-rupa' signify *antahkarana* for its excellence as a transparent medium with *sattva* elements predominating? This is palpable nonsense, even though vigorously projected by the most illustrious among people. While Sankara has tirelessly argued in his commentary on the concluding *sutras* of pada III of Adhyaya II and on B S. 1 1 4, that there can be no connection whatsoever between the Self (Atma) and the psycho-physical complex, except through *avidya* (which gives no real connection but only a fancied one), these classical scholars have taken the view that the individuals have a hand in acquiring and generating *avidya*. Such a supposition, not only puts the cart before but is absurd up to the limit of utter desperation. Is not *avidya* spoken of as *anadi*, without a beginning, so far as this appearance of cosmic multiplicities is concerned?

Wherein lies the solution, then, of the one, non-dual *apparently becoming* the cosmic pluralities, inclusive of the 'Jivas'? The solution is there in the conception of Brahman in two forms—*para* and *apara*, the former metaphysical and the latter *epistemic*. This distinction is fundamental. That Brahman is both '*para*' and '*apara*' is a mere mode of speech. About the '*para*', one can only speak negatively. The '*para*' is not accessible to thought or language. It is the Self-realised '*realisable*'. It is realisable in liberation and as realised, it is the eternally self-realised. Does this speaking give any glimpse into *para's* nature? It does not. To say that it is realisable only, is saying that it is not accessible to mere thought or speech, that it is not any content of knowledge as a *pramana*. It does not say as to what it is, it says only what it cannot be. This is brought out by Sankara, in his commentary on B S. 3 2 11. The '*para*', that *sutra* says, does not have *ubhayalinyata*, that is, both

*nirvishesata* and *savishesata*. As Sankara explains – *vidya* does not accept its content in terms of alternatives. That is *vidya*, again, which *liberates* (*vimucyate*). Two kinds of *vidya* have, of course, been distinguished – ‘*para*’ and ‘*apara*’. But they do not have the same subject-matter. ‘*Para*’ knows ‘*para*’ as ‘*para*’, the ‘*apara*’ knows ‘*apara*’ Brahman as ‘*apara*’. What are we driving at? Let us clarify by an analogy constructed on the basis of a Katha Statement. That statement is: ‘The Self-existent pierced the openings of the senses *outwards*. Therefore, one looks outward, not within himself. A certain wiseman, while seeking immortality, shuts out the outmoving senses to see the Atman within face to face’<sup>2</sup>. This is said in the context of the *Jiva*. Is not the *Jiva* the very *same* as Brahman under assumed forms, called *nama-rupa* (psycho-physical complex), which, in the current philosophical terminology, Sankara calls ‘*upadidini*’ (*upadhi* etc.)? There are two *directions* of the *Jiva*’s Self-expression. The normal, the conventional, and the *avidya* – *Vitiated* direction is through the late-mays of *outgoing* senses, which are parts of its body, and as a consequence of the functioning of these outer senses, the *Jiva* remains identified with its body etc. Sankara says as much when he says: ‘In course of identification of its Self with the psycho-physical collection, there arises the *viparita* (contrary) *pratyaya* (awareness, cognition and conviction). Such is noticed in case of all animate creatures (*sarvaprani*nam). I am going, I am coming, I am blind, I am not blind, I am stupid, I am not stupid, such uses in three cases, become current. Such aberrations cannot be cured by any means other than right perception (*sumyak darshana*)’<sup>11</sup>. What is the mode of this right perception? As the *Katha* in the above quoted *stoka* has indicated, this consists in shutting out the outgoing senses and changing the direction of consciousness progressively inwards by the disciplined meditator (*dhira*), as a result of which one sees his identity with the Self within (*antahratna*). What is esoteric in the solution as given by Sankara, of the riddle of Reality in its dual presentations as ‘*para*’ and ‘*apara*’? His *Brahmasutrabhasya* is called the *Sariraka Bhasya*. As outer perceptions, their seats and the contents of such perceptions form the several parts or aspects of the *outer realisation* or outer manifestation of the *Jiva*, so the totality of *objective appearance*, of all objectives manifestations or presentations, both *bhuta* (actual) and *bhavya* (possible), together with their several conditionings, as also their expressed contents, from the *out-going manifestations* of one, non-dual Brahman, which, *as itself*, is one indivisible *Atman*, experienceable as *Santam*, *sivam*, *advaitam*, or as *satyam*, *jnanam*, *anantam* (*anandam*). The out-going expansion or objective presentation in the form of cosmic pluralities, in so far as it shows a *distorted* picture of a unity, absolutely one, indivisible, immutable, stable and eternal (in the sense of non-temporal), formless Being, has been taken as *avidyavesa* of Brahman as *Atman*. It is *epistemically* there, but does not represent the nature of Reality *as such*. So it is *sadasadvitoluksana*, the indeterminable (*anirvacaniva*), neither real nor unreal. Why it is there is an irrelevant question (*anti-prasna*), since it is there already as a given or presented fact having *avidya* for its one absolute reason. Why is *avidya* there as an epistemic factor there? One reason is without this *avidya* there could not be the blissful and relieving experience in *vidya*. Is it not gainful to understand that our life of stress and tension is not the final word, the unshakable truth in the realm of wisdom. That all is not only not vanity but there is a realisable truth which renders all vanities as a no-fact, although posing to be the fact of existence. Reality is, and it appears also, but it is *not as it appears*, it only *appears as it appears*. This is ‘*anirvacanīyāta-vada*’ of Sankara which neither treats the world-appearance as an empty illusion, nor, again, as rooted in Reality, since, as the *sutra* 3.2.11 puts, – the *para*, that is, Reality itself is not *both* the reality *and* the appearance. But, as Sankara has explained, the appearance, the *savishesata*, is an *epistemic development* through *avidya*, the mode of functioning of which is causing identity with what is later on discovered and rejected as mere external conditions or *upadhis*. This is ‘*upadhidinam avidyapratyapasthapitatvat*’<sup>12</sup>. So the *Bhamati* speculation about external limitation (*avaccheda*) of one pure consciousness (*caitanya*)

in term of *anahkarana* and the Vivarana stipulation in term of reflection (*pratibimba*) of one luminous *cattanya* in the media of *antahkaravrtti*—all modes of *avidya*, are irrelevant matters as far as Sankara vedanta is concerned. Is *cattanya*, the alleged essence of Brahman, any *luminous body* like the sun, the noon, the lightning, the fire etc.? Is it not said that all these are not self-shining, the they are all objectivities glistening in the borrowed refulgence of one absolute Self, which is not an objectivity, and cannot be made into an objective content<sup>114</sup>? The Bhamati and the Vivarana seem to have attempted to understand the understander.<sup>115</sup>

The bondage of the *Jiva*, then, means its dwelling in the wrong sense of self-identity with its body, the psycho-physical complex, and as a consequence of that, losing sight of its *true self* and *real identity* in Brahman. This is not only a consequence of *avidya* but it itself is an expression or phase of *avidya*. Under the spell of this, the *Jiva* behaves as a *karta* and *bhokta*, although, as Sankara explained in the context of his commentary on B.S. I I 4., the *Jiva*'s bodied being-hood as also its figuring as *kartabhokta* etc., is *factually untrue* (*mithyajnananimithatvat*). But so long as realisation of its true identity does not take place, this ignorance persists, and the *Jiva* behaves as an agent, and enjoys or suffers the fruits of the actions done by him. Where the bondage is due to false knowledge, which generates false association, release can be had only by developing right knowledge and understanding (*samyakdarsana*)<sup>116</sup>. And the pre-requisites of this knowledge are the several disciplines, mentioned by Sankara in the context of his commentary on B.S. I I I. as *sadhanacatushtaya*, since these alone can change the direction of consciousness from outward to inward. A complete change in attitude and in the habitual disposition of the mind becomes necessary. This is why Sankara rejected the suggestion that actions of the kind enjoined by the Vedas, purificatory or otherwise, should be admitted as necessary precondition of the inquiry into the nature of the Brahman, the true Self. This is also why he insisted on a radical distinction between the aims and objects of *Brahmajinasa* and those of *dharajinasa*.

It can be seen that none of socalled '*sadhana catushtaya*' (four-fold disciplines) is a form of action. The knowledge of discrimination between things eternal and things perishable, utter disinterestedness towards enjoying fruits of actions in this life as also in another life, control of passions of any kind and discipline infatuation toward inner or outer objects, endurance and forbearance, ardent desire for release from the bondage of phenomenal life, and meditation and excavation into the depths of one's own conscious being—none of these can be called an action in the accepted sense of the term. Whatever is necessary for stemming the *outgoing movement* of the mind through outer senses for changing the direction of consciousness from outward to inward in order to regain its *original base* in the absolute consciousness which is absolutely unconditioned and free has been advised in these four-fold '*sadhanas*'. Does not this show that Sankara did not propose any absolute denial of the epistemic facthood of the world-appearances (*prapanca*), that he only proposed that, for one seeking liberation and immortality, it is absolutely necessary to discover the true, the one self, which is the indwelling principle of all external manifestations which latter are appearances of Reality as distinguished from Reality as itself? Was it not a real beauty, a display of insightful ingenuity in the *sruti*—provision that the formless, indivisible and immutable 'one' desired to 'assume' infinitely plural forms, and that, after having created the physical, biological and psychological '*forms*' of our common knowledge which all bear distinguishable *names* (*nama*), *entered into* or *pierced into* every one of them? (*tadevanupravistat*)<sup>117</sup>? If it is boorish to take this figurative statement as description of a 'real creation' in time, it is also quite unbecoming of a scholars with clear insight to take this 'becoming many' not even as an epistemic fact or 'mere appearance', but as a 'not fact' all together. This is the reason why Sankara provided for this cosmic plurality the



status of a 'mere appearance' and described it as the indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*), that is, neither real nor unreal. This also helped him to demonstrate how the *Jiva* is the very same as Brahman substantially, although 'formally' and 'empirically' different. And this 'empiric difference', which is purely *epistemic*, he explains by showing how *avidya* can generate a false sense of identity in the *Jiva* with its psycho-physical form, which latter passes by the name of the body (*saṁsāra*) of that which is bodied in out-going transaction through out-going sense-organs but which is again, eternally body-less (*a-saṁsāri*) in the realisation of its true, and one real identity as Brahman itself.

*Vidyā* and *avidyā* are two ways of looking at things. Following the drift of out-going consciousness through the mechanism of outgoing senses which are parts and parcels of one's own body, one progressively looks for and finds *false identities* and false 'selves' in the pluralities which environs him. This is Sankara's '*atma-anatma-adhyāsa*'—a 'given fact', not one of a person's own manipulation. The very same individual, when wise (*dhiṛa*) and enlightened, will know how to shut out the openings of the outgoing consciousness (*avrttacakṣu*) by means of the four-fold '*sādhana*' that Sankara speaks of, and with such means of knowledge as '*śravaṇa*, *manana*, and '*nididhyāsana*' will progressively pass beyond the five sheaths (*kośa*), which as *avidyā-vṛttis* have 'conditioned' although *apparently* one's eternally unconditioned true self-hood in the one, non-dual, absolute experience. So *vidyā* and *avidyā*, freedom and bondage, peace and turmoil. Immortality and mortality, Being and Becoming, the true and the false, light and darkness hang on side by side without coalescing. Had there not been an ignorant condition attended by strife and suffering, had there been no state of bondage and self-losing, otherwise called, '*atma-anatma-adhyāsa*' leading to mortality and movement in the cycle of existence (*samsāra*), Self-regaining in conscious self-identity with the non-dual Reality could not be the supreme goal of life and the state of immortality for the '*Jiva*'.

With the nature of bondage and liberation thus explained there remains very little to add as means of this liberation and release, very little to add in justification of Sankara's claim that '*sa-saṁsāratva*', being due to wrong conviction and false knowledge, the enlightened can be '*a-saṁsāri*' (liberated) even while living in this life<sup>118</sup>. What Sankara has interpreted is also the upanishadic view of things. If the non-Advaitists like Ramanuja, combated this *jivanmuktivāda*, it is only because they did not understand the Upanisads at all, because they distorted the meanings of the *Brahmasūtras* by foisting upon them certain sectarian fads and popular myths of their peculiar persuasion.

Too much has been attempted to be made out of the presence of quite a number of *sūtras* (particularly in the third and fourth *pādas* of *Adhyāya III* of the *Brahmasūtras*) as also from the presence of some injunctive statements in the various branches of the *śruti*, which seem to be related to those *sūtras*. The non-Advaitists, on the strength of these *sūtras* and the *śruti*-statements, have argued that the upanishads do not uphold or support the Sankarite view that liberation can be had by knowledge (*vidyā*) alone. These *sūtras* and the *śruti*-passages, they argue, lend support, on the contrary, to the view that the means of liberation is that knowledge which is enlivened and furthered by practical efforts, such as, *upāsana*, and ritualistic actions, (*karma*)<sup>119</sup>. It can be seen that this non-Advaitic view is not only vitiated by misunderstanding of the 'impact' of the *śruti*-statements which enjoin *upāsana* and other modes of *karma*, but it involves also an acute misunderstanding of Sankara's own view on the subject. Sankara's insistence on knowledge of the form of intuitive realisation of absolute one-ness of *Jiva* and Brahman as the means relates to *absolute* and *ultimate release only*, and liberation or release in the proper sense of the term, Sankara holds, can only mean this and nothing else. So far as this ultimate release from the bondage of life is concerned, *Karma* of any form, be it of the nature of devotional worship and prayer, be it of the nature of performance of righteous acts is absolutely irrelevant, and without a scope. Actions whatever be their nature,



presuppose a dualism between the subject (doer) and the object (unto, or toward which an action is done). This dualism itself is a matter of ignorance (avidya), since Reality itself is non-dual, since it is of the nature of Absolute Self-experience. Such being the case, it is the knowledge that reveals absolute one-ness with the non-dual Absolute Self, which alone can serve as the means to liberation and *not any other endeavour, auxiliary or otherwise*.

It is the stand, neither of the Upanisads nor of Sankara, that since knowledge of absolute identity with the non-dual Reality is the only means of ultimate release, therefore, man *can live* without food, *can be righteous* without fulfilling moral obligations, or *can be religious* without devotion to God. There are diverse requirements for fulfilment of diverse needs. Had dualism in any form been *true*, had dualism been the final shape of things, ritualistic action and devotional acts of a prayer, worship and self-surrounding to God could be the appropriate means of release from the bondage of phenomenal life. The crucial question is whether the *śruti*s support the view that the Absolute Reality is a *unity-in-difference*, whether in the final account, Brahman has been taken only as the material cum efficient cause of the cosmic order, or if, at the final level, the upanishads all lead us to the view and perspective of a non-dual Reality, which is of one texture (*ekarasa*), immutable and changeless, which is the Self itself, and absolutely transcendent of all appearances. Sankara has made out his case quite convincingly that this latter view represents the vedantic view and none other. This he has done by a harmonious interpretation of the *śruti*-texts and the Badarayana *sūtras*. This harmonious interpretation (*samanyaya*) of the Vedānta texts can be distinguished into *three phases*. To begin with the lowest stratum of Sankara's exposition in the *sūtras*: (1) It has been established in the second part of the first *adhyāya* that all diverse *upāsana* (religious contemplation) through a wide variety of symbols are all *upāsana* of Brahman, just as the wide variety of the *modes or forms of contemplation*, discussed in the last two *padas* of *adhyāya III*, are all different modes of contemplating (*upāsana*) the Brahman, the world-ground. (2) It has also been established in the third and fourth *padas* of *adhyāya I*, all through out the second *adhyāya*, and in the first two *padas* of *adhyāya III*, that the Reality to be known (*jñeya*) and to be *realised* is non-dual, immutable, uniform, the inner-controller and the Absolute one, which *is not*, and cannot be *abhayaṅgi* (of dual form – *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*) but is, *as itself*, *nirakara* (formless) *nirguna* (quality-less) and *ekarasa* (of one undifferentiated experience). (3) From an over-view of all the facts of the Brahman-doctrine, expounded and articulated in the vedānta texts, it has been made clear that the absolute reality, although non-dual and uniform as itself, that is, as the *Atman*, yet *appears* as the cosmic multiplicities, actual and possible, – both *distributively*, as the apparently independent and substantive entities, and *collectively*, as an *apparent objective unity* of the multiple appearances, all arising from it, staying in it, and disappearing and being conserved into it – and that this is the all-comprehensive Brahman. So, if it is true that Brahman is all and everything (*sarvam khalu idam Brahma*), it is equally true that Brahman is the *substance* of all multiplicities, which are mere appearances – mere named and forms (*namarupa*). And what is most true is that this substance of all plural appearances is so, when *epistemically* taken as the *objectively knowable*; but *as itself*, as the *Atman* of all, that is, as the *realisable identity* of all, it is the transcendent *nirakara*, *nirguna*, *ekarasa*, *sanātana*, *śiva*, *advaita*. Furthermore, if the world-pluralities are called '*vivartas*' (apparent modifications) and not '*parinama*' (real modifications) of Brahman, it is only in the light of this nature of Brahman *as itself* – as the *Atman*. When Sankara speaks of liberation or release, he means the realisable absolute identity in this one selfhood or pure being. And this is no matter for worship or devotion or prayer. It is a fact of Absolute experience, to be realised intuitively in an identity experience, which is *not* dualistic.

At the end of B.S. 1 | 11 and before entering into discussion on the '*Anandamaya*' – *sūtra*,

Sankara himself has admitted that the Vedanta texts have presented Brahman in *two distinctive ways*<sup>120</sup> Quoting quite a number of passages from the upanishads he also made it clear that, according to the *sruti*-texts, there obtain (bhavati) *two phases* in the manifestation of the Real – one phase which is characterised by apparent duality (*dvaitamiva*) and the other phase which is absolutely non-dual<sup>121</sup> In the same context, he has explained that in thousands of passages in the *sruti*-texts these two forms of Brahman have been distinguished clearly as the form revealed in *vidya* and the form revealed in *avidya*<sup>122</sup> The form which presents Brahman as an 'object' of worship and devotion is vitiated by duality such as obtains between a worshipping subject and the worshippable object. This is, of course, ultimately false, since Reality as such is non-dual and without a division Even, then, Sankara has conceded that although the various modes of worship and devotional contemplation, vitiated as these are by dualism, fall short of absolute knowledge of Reality, which, *as such*, is non-dual, these are not without their use, not absolutely puerile and valueless. Some of them cause moral and spiritual elevation, some lead to advancement (*abhyudaya*) in the practical affairs of life, while some modes form graduated steps to the final release (*kramamuktyarthani*), which however, is possible only through realisation of absolute one-ness with the nondual Reality What Sankara means is that the attitude involved in worship and devotional contemplation, so very characteristic of religious approach, has a certain proximation to absolute knowledge in so far as it looks upon Reality, which is Brahman, as the one ultimate ground of cosmic pluralities, their creator, sustainer, inner controller as also the providence But Brahman, the Reality is have regarded in distinction from the worshipping individual agent, who can, by no means, be regarded as *outside* the *objective whole*, which is, again, Brahman There is certain inner contradiction in the view which takes Brahman as the ground and source of all cosmic pluralities, including the *Jivas*, and yet regards the *Jiva* in some sense distinguishable and isolated from Brahman, who according to the *sruti*-version, is all and everything that is there. The relation of part and whole, however integral it may be construed to be, remains vitiated by dualism, and fails to make meaningful the *sruti*-statement '*yatra tu asya sarvamatmatvahnur tat kena kam puyet*' etc., –where everything will be one Self (one subject) in that cases, who will see whom etc Besides, all *objective taking* of Brahman as the Reality which is *out there* presupposes the distinction as between object and subject with the result that Brahman is neither represented as the absolute and all-comprehensive whole that it is, nor, again, as the *one* true Self and subject Such as *objective view*, says Sankara, is an *outside view*, and necessarily regards Brahman as the integrated totality of all appearances, and therefore, qualified by them This is presenting Brahman as qualified by *adventitious* divisions and distinctions, and relegating unity or one-ness to a secondary role, unintended by the Vedanta texts. Yet this sort of regarding Brahman is not absolutely useless or irrelevant, although it is false from the ultimate viewpoint This gives the *Saguna Brahman* of the *sruti* texts – characterised by the so called '*tatastha laksana – a*' (adventitious characteristics) such as, creator, sustainer, destroyer or conserver and the Moral Providence. This also takes Brahman as the Supreme Person in relation to other persons, finite and dependent. This is the Lord God of religion Worship and devotional contemplation of Brahman in this objective attitude achieve one very important purpose. The human ego, falsely regarded as a separate and substantive Self, loses much of its edgers and angularities in *self-surrender*, its aggressive and assertive 'I' is toned down by its surrender to the 'Thou', and this helps the process of final 'self finding' in the Absolute non-dual one through *realisation of absolute self-identity* in *intuitive knowledge*. So, Sankara concedes that *acts* of worship, prayer, and devotional contemplation also have their relevance in the gradual appropriation to the final goal (*kramamukti-sabayakani*) although these all fall short of the requirement of the final plunge, which is possible by *jnana* only This final step requires supplanting of the objective attitude by the transcendental, which is non-objective and non-subjective

and involves no dualism whatsoever.

So, the non-Advaitists, such as, the Ramanujists, can gain nothing by pointing out that the *śrutis* have actually provided for various modes of *upasanas* (devotional contemplation), such as, the *udgitha* or *omkara-upasana*, the *Gayatri-Upasana*s and the various forms of symbol-worship. They also can gain nothing from the presence of the *sūtras*, such as, *Sarvapekṣa cā yajñadīrṣṭerasvavat* (B.S. 3.4.26) or *Avrittirāśaktiupadeśa* (B.S. 4.1.1). While commenting on the Brahman-*sūtra* 3.4.26, Sankara has conceded that although the final release from the bondage of phenomenal life can be had through absolute knowledge (*vidyā*) alone, and not by any form of *Karma* or action, ritualistic or devotional, these latter may have also relevance in some cases in preparing the ground for that absolute knowledge. His statement is exactly the following, '*Vidyā*' sometimes (*cā*) depends on the modes of actions or disciplines prescribed for the different stages of life (*sarvaṇi āśramaakaramaṇi*), and is not absolutely indifferent in respect of them (*nātyantamanapekṣaiṣa*). If it is argued that this statement that there is also dependence on '*āśramakarma*', and, again, non-dependence on such *karma* involves self-contradiction, our reply is that such is not true. What we mean is that once *vidyā* is formed, there is absolutely no dependence on any auxiliary. But there is dependence on enjoined disciplines in the formation of the attitude towards *vidyā*. By quoting a passage from the Chandogya, such as, '*Atha yat yajña ityucakṣate brahmacāryameva tat*', Sankara establishes that when speaking of *yajñadī* and dependence of *vidyā* on that, the *śrutis* actually speak of dependence on celibacy, purity of conduct, and other meritorious attitudes, which form parts of '*brahmacārya*'. Besides, he argues, the presence of the indicator '*aravavat*' (like horses) in the *sūtra* suggests that the insistence on the *āśramakarma* here is due to the fact that these may be conducive to the development of such states of the mind as *sama*, *dama* etc. (disciplining of the external and internal sense-organs), which for other purposes, much in the same way as horses are employed to draw chariots and not for drawing the plough-shares in the fields. The preceding *sūtra*, B.S. 3.4.25, again, argues about absolute irrelevance of ritualistic actions as side to the development of *vidyā*. So, the net result is that only such actions, which are conducive to the development of the four-fold '*sādhana*s', Sankara speaks of in his commentary on the very opening *Sūtra* of Badarayana, that can have any relevance in the case in question. It can be seen that this admission of the use and relevance of *karma* (action) of a certain kind in the context of B.S. 3.4.26 does not go against Sankara's stand in the context of B.S. 1.1.1. In that earlier context what Sankara had stated is that there could be no 'absolute dependence' on the prescribed (actions) for one seeking to know Brahman, since one can know and realise Brahman with or without the help of sub. actions, provided that one has matured one self in the four-fold '*sādhana*s' indicated by him.<sup>21</sup>

The *sūtra* '*Avrittirāśaktiupadeśa*', the opening *sūtra* of the first Pada of Adhyaya IV, seems to be a direct refutation of *Sādhapāroksavāda* of the Vivarana as far as the maxim '*Tat tvamasi*' is concerned. One has to look into the diverse modes of teaching followed by Uddalaka to bring home the realisation 'that thou art' to svetaketu.<sup>22</sup> Sankara's own attempts in the *Vakyavṛtti*, the *Atmajñānopadeśavidhi* and in the *upadeśasahabṛi* illustrate how difficult is this process of bringing home this truth even to an ardent disciple. But from this it is not to be concluded that the *sūtra* supports the Ramanujists contention that it is *jñānakāraṁsamuccaya*, that is, *jñāna* supported by devotional acts of worship and contemplation, which has been advised as the means of release, and not *jñāna* originating from a clear grasp of the meaning of the Vedānta sentences (*vakyarthajñāna matram*).<sup>23</sup> It is to be borne in mind, however, that the '*jñāna*' which Sankara has insisted all throughout as the means of liberation is of the form which causes removal or eradication of ignorance (*ajñānavṛtti*) and not the one which can be said to give rise to the consciousness of absolute self-identity with Brahman as the one non-dual Self, since this latter is an eternal fact of truth, which

does not require any extraneous help to be established. The knowledge which dispels ignorance culminates in the knowledge as *truth*, the knowledge which is the 'means' culminates in the knowledge which is the 'end', and therefore, the distinction between the 'means' and the 'end', in this context, becomes a simple epistemic one.

In his commentary on the very opening *sutra* of the Vedanta, Sankara speaks of *means* - knowledge (*pramana-jnana*) as terminating in *brahmanagati*, which is the end-knowledge. This means-knowledge has been described in the *srutis* as three-fold—*sravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana*. None of these can be called a form of action (*karma*). An action is directed upon an end external to itself, and this cannot be *another* action, it is, on the contrary, something which is to be the *fruit* of such action. But knowledge as a means or *pramana* is directed upon itself as the end. This is brought out by Sankara when he said that '*brahmacodanu tu purusamavabodhayatyeva kevalam*'<sup>126</sup>. The *means* knowledge is to mature in the *end* - knowledge. Speaking of the means-knowledge, such as, *sravana*, *manana* and *nididhyasana* and their repetition as indicated in B.S. 4 I.1, Sankara observes that the intention of the *sruti*-texts is that these are to be continued till through elimination of *avidya* there arises direct intuition of the one-ness of Self-hood, which latter is to be the *drstārtha* (accomplished result here and now)<sup>127</sup>.

Sankara seems to have evinced no interest in the discussion if *Sravana* is to be a *vidhi*, or if *sravana* is to be regarded as the *principal* means-knowledge, the other two playing only an ancillary and secondary role - a discussion which has found its place in the more orthodox of the two principal schools of Advaita Vedanta, such as, the *vivarana*. Facets of orthodoxy such as this seem to have compromised the position of the *vivarana* school, turning it into a ritualistic Advaita Vedanta. Sankara, by all counts, is less orthodox and more liberal in his exposition of the Vedanta philosophy. That which bids to be the consummate wisdom of mankind and a world-philosophy cannot afford to be sectarian and ritualistic.

In the remaining *sutras* of *pada 1*, '*Adhyaya IV*', Sankara shows the *essential difference* between the contemplation of Brahman as his *atma* by an empirical individual (*jiva*) and the contemplation in the mode of *symbol-worship* (*pratika upasana*) such as, contemplating the 'mind' or the vital force (*prana*) as Brahman. The latter is called '*dhyana*' which is a *manasikṛtya* (mental act of reflection only, and no knowledge (*jnana*)). This has been once explained in the context of the fourth *sutra*, called the *samanyaya-sutra* of *pada 1*, of *adhyaya I*. Such modes of contemplation or *upasana* may be contributive towards development of that knowledge which serves as the means to the final realisation. But as themselves, they fall short of that *means-knowledge*. The *means-knowledge* proper works upon the principle of absolute identity (*adhedo*) of '*Tat*' and '*Tvam*', and the ego-sense (*aham-bodha*) accompanying the '*Tvam*' gets completely transcended or dissolved<sup>128</sup> in it.

The second *pada* of *Adhyaya IV*, as Sankara has explained, deals with the various kinds of achievements (*phala*) that follow from the modes of contemplation which have the *apara vidya*, that is, regarding Brahman as an objective reality as their theoretical basis or ground. For our main purpose, which is concerned with *para vidya*, these discussions do not have any direct bearing or relevance. But still, then, it is to be noted that the Vedanta of the Advaitic formulation does not discourage or condemn all other modes of contemplation although they fall short of the type of contemplation advocated by it as a form of knowledge. The *sutras* of *pada 3* of *Adhyaya IV* deals with the various states of spiritual elevation that a contemplator of Brahman as the *Atman*, in case he falls short of self-realisation in Brahman, secures, as distinguished from the others who engage themselves in symbol-worship only. The concluding *pada 4* of *Adhyaya IV* is however, of great importance so far

as the Advaita Vedanta is concerned. The first *sutra*—establishes the point that the state of liberation which is the transcendental one-ness of the *jiva* with Brahman, the Reality, is not to be taken as a consequence or result newly achieved. The presence of the word '*svend*' in the *śruti*-statement '*sevnu rupenabhinispadyata*' suggests that it is not a new state or form of being that the '*Jiva*' comes by in conscious realisation of self-identity in Brahman. This means that liberation is, '*restoration*' to a state of being which was eternally there but was lost sight of on account of ignorance. It is *praptasya prapti* (getting at what was one's eternal nature), and not *a-praptasya prapti*, that is, getting at something altogether new, and which was not gotten already. The difference between the eternal *brahmatva* and *mukhatva* of the '*Jiva*' consists only in the fact that in the latter there is retrospective awareness (*pratiyana*)<sup>129</sup> of an erstwhile state of ignorance and bondage, which since then has passed away. What originates or develops in this case, is therefore, the negative fact of cessation of the state of *avidya* and bondage, and not the state of liberation *as such*. The expression '*abhinispadyate*', which suggests a new development has to be taken as a mere mode of speech. It is like saying, 'one has recovered from illness'—which does not suggest attainment of any new condition.<sup>130</sup>

An embarrassing question is frequently raised by the non-Advaitists against the Advaita position. It is this: if the '*Jiva*' is Brahman itself, and if liberation in the Advaitic sense does not mean the attainment of any new state of being if it means simply 'being reinstated in an eternally existence state or condition, then, does not this make nonsense of the fact of release? Moreover, whose is this releases, if the '*Jiva*' is eternally the same as Brahman itself in its true nature? It is indeed remarkable with what ease Sankara has answered such questions. His reply is to the following effect: this liberation or release will be that of the *questioner himself*. If he argues that as a *Jiva* he is already Brahman as others are, the reply will be: then, liberation or release does not relate to any body whomsoever. Any objection to the *advaitic* position in the form whose is this ignorance and whose is this liberation becomes meaningful only if the questioner is labouring under the influence of *avidya*, since it is *avidya* alone which posits the non-dual as dual. If, non-dualism is already admitted then both the questioner and his question become out of place and irrelevant.<sup>131</sup>

About the nature of the state of liberation lots of things have been said which are not equally important. Thus, it is said in the Brahadaranyaka (4.3.22)—'here a father becomes a no-father', 'the Vedas cease to be the Vedas'—all the *pramanas* or the conventional sources of knowledge become defunct for the liberated. All divisions and distinctions disappears there remains no second, all become undivided and the seen is reinstated in his own glory (*sva mahimni*). Audulomi says that all becomes reduced to pure consciousness (*cattanya*) but Badarayana is of the opinion that there is no contradiction between the 'Great Self's remaining in pure undivided consciousness (*cattanya*) as itself, and *phenomenally* expressing itself in many forms and names, and such is evidently the nature of Reality. How otherwise could the phenomenal expressions be there?

In this discussion of the last kind, there seems to have arisen, a confusion between the state of the liberated and Brahmanhood (*Brahmatva*) which stands for that state of liberation eternally accomplished. Some of the discussions are relevant in the context of the liberated, some others in the context of Brahman, the Absolute Self. As for the latter, we can say that its nature is self-shining refulgence (*vyoti*) as also infinite consciousness, absolute existence and absolute freedom. As for the '*Jiva*' in the state of liberation it can be said that there is cessation of all turmoil and strife, cessation of agentship and enjoyership, cessation of all individual separateness and seclusion and there is participation in the life of Reality itself. The controversy between Jaimini and Badarayana on the questions if the *Jiva*, at liberation, is capable of retaining his possession of body and sense-organs

seems also to be meaningless<sup>12</sup> Since, after merging in Brahman and realising absolute identity with the one non-dual Self, the '*Jiva*' does not remain any separate entity and so whatever is true of Brahman becomes *mutatis mutandis* true of the '*Jiva*' also. If the one non-dual self can phenomenally appear as so many with distinctive names and forms there is no absurdity in the *Jiva* also behaving in the same way. What is important is that the '*Jiva*' no longer suffers from the delusion caused by *avidya* and there can be no more rolling in the circle of existence as a suffering individual<sup>13</sup>.

### References

- 1 B S B. 2.1.14
- 2 Svetā U. 2.5. RV. 10.13.1
- 3 Katha 1.3.14
- 4 Cf. the distinction made between 'Preya' and 'Sraya', Katha 1.2.1-4
- 5 Katha. 1.2.23. Mundaka 3.2.3
- 6 Katha. 2.1.1-3
- 7 Taittiriya 3.10.5
- 8 Chhandyogya. 13. and some other places
- 9 'Tadvisesam prati vipratipotteh' B.S.B. 1.1.1.
- 10 Ch. 3.12.6 also Rv. 10.90.3
- 11 Mund. 1.1.6
12. Munda 2.2.9
13. Atareya. 1.1.1, Br. Ar. 1.4.1.
- 14 Chand 6.2.3.
- 15 Chhandyogya 8th Prapathaka, Khandas 7-12.
16. 1.2.22
- 17 Katha 1.3.13 The interpretation given is in conformity with the spirit of the entire text. See. 1.3.15 and the verse 2.1.1.
- 18 Katha 2.2.12-13
- 19 The distinction spoken of is this that it is about the Self that one can say that it self-shines (*bhātī*) and not about the sun, the star or the lightning. All others are dependently shining (*vibhātī*) insofar as they shine by borrowed light (*anubhātī*).
20. Taittiriya – 2.4 and 2.9
- 21 Cf. Mandukya. also Br. Aranyaka 4.3.7-33
- 22 B S B. 3.2.7 'Svapnajagaritayastupadhisamparkavasat pararupapa pattimivapeksya tadupsamamaitra susupte svarupapattirvivaksyatac' of Sala. 'Jada sampanno bhavati, svamapito byhavati' Chhandyogya 6.8.1 also Br. Ar. 2.3.97, 4.3.21, and Kausitaki 4.19.
- 23 B S B. 3.2.1. B S.B. 3.2.10
- 24 *ibid.* 3.2.7
- 25 B S B. 3.2.2 Compare also Br. Ar. 1.1.18. 'Sa yatratat sapnyaca-rati. sve sarire yathakamam parivartete'
- 26 B S B. 3.2.2 Compare also Br. Ar. 1.1.18. 'Sa yatratat sapnyacarati. svaa sarire yathakamam parivartate'



- 27 Br. Ar. 5 14.3 Maitri 6.19., 6 11.
- 28 Chand. 4 9.2.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 3.14 1.
- 30 Mandukya 6 and Katha 6.11
- 31 Mandukya 6 and Mundaka 1 1 9., 2.2 7
- 32 Mandukya 6, Br Ar 3 7
- 33 Mandukya 7. Hume, in his translation, takes, '*ekatama pratyayasaram*' to mean the essence of assurances of which is the state of being one with the Self. The expression seems to be logically linked with the expression '*prapanopasamam*' which follows it. So, it may mean the sense of absolute one-ness with the Self, or being reduced to the sense of identity with the Self which is non-dual, tranquil and the supreme Good.
- 34 B S.B. 2 3.6. 'Vyatireka hi sati ekavijnanena sarvam vijnanam ityam pratyjna hiyeta
- 35 B S B 2 3 7 'Atah srutipramanai ekasmat brahmanah akasadimahabhutotpattikramena jagajntamiti nisciyate'.
- 36 B S B. 2.3 9
- 37 *Ibid.*, 2.3 16-17
- 38 'na kvacit a-sravanam anyatra srutam varayitumarhati, srutyan tarugatasyapyaviruddhasyudhikasyarthassya sarvatropasamhertavyatvat' B S.B. 2 3.17
- 39 Mundaka 2.1.1 'As from a well-blazing fire sparks of like form spring up by thousands, so from the one immutable manifold beings, all originate and again, merge into'
- 40 'Tot srstva tadevanupravisat' Taittiriya 2 6. Tadanu pravisya saccatyaccabhavat, niruktam caniruktante nilayanancanilayananca, vijnanancavijnananca, satyanancantanca abhavat, etc
- 41 Svet. 6 10-12
- 42 Br Ar 4.5 13. It can be seen that the *sruti* in this context, *deliberately* causes confusion at first and thereafter, removes it. The expression '*ne praty samjnas*' not only confuses Maitreyi but, as is evident from his translation of the word '*samjna*' as 'consciousness', it created confusion to R E Hume in our time. Maitreyi understood by the expression total destruction of the individual Self as the thought that immortality meant eternal existence of the individual self. Yajnavalkya corrected her and pointed out that immortality means 'being-in-the one-undifference and self'
- 43 The analogy of the two birds clasping alone the self-same tree, one eating sweet pippala and the other simply looking on without eatings Rv 1-164 Mundaka 3 1 1, Svata 4 6
- 44 B S B. 2 3 19, Br Ri. 4 4 1-6
- 45 *Ibid.*, 2 3 22-28.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 2 3.49
- 47 Taittiriya 2.6., Atareya 1.3.13., 3 1 2-3
- 48 Katha 2 2.9-10
- 49 We have already pointed out that the infinite process of regress on the analogy of circularity of seed and sprout provides no logical solution in our criticism of the classical account of the *origin of adhyasa*
- 50 Vivaranaprameyasamgraha
- 51 B S B. 2 3 29

- 52 *Ibid* 'Sarvopanīśatsu Brahmatmabhāvasya Pratīpādayīśatīvat.
- 53 B S B 2.3.30
- 54 Paramarthatastu na jīva nama buddhyupādhi parikalpitasvarupavyūtrekenasti' *Ibid*.
- 55 *Ibid* .
- 56 B S B 2.3.32
- 57 Avidyāpratyupasthāpitāvat kartṛbhoktrivayoh' B S.B. 2.3.40.
- 58 See B S B 2.1.34-36.
- 59 B S B 2.1.35 'Sextyuttarū katam hi sarīradivibhagapekṣam karma karmāpekṣasca sarīradivibhagah itī āretarāśrayatvam prasajeta'
- 60 B S B. 2.3.18
- 61 See Adhyasabhasya. Last sentence
- 62 B.S.B. 2.1.34
- 63 *Ibid* 2.3.41
- 64 2.3.42
- 65 The Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya view
- 66 'Svadeśadeyam yadvuḥkhavapi bhedaḥbhedaḥ pratīpādayīśītau syātām, abheda eva tvatra pratīpādayīśītam Brahmatmatvopratīpātau puruṣārhasiddheḥ' B S.B. 2.3.47
- 67 Avagatisadhanānanca śravanādīnam vedanuvacanādīnanca vidhiya menatīvat' B S B. 2.1.14
- 68 sarvesameva namarupakṛta-karyakāraṇasamghata-pravīṣṭānam jīvanam brahmatvamanubh' B S B. 2.3.43,
- 69 B.S.B. 2.3.44.
- 70 *Ibid* , 2.3.46.
- 71 'Padosya visvabhūtāni tripadasyaṁrtam divi' Chandogya. 5.12.6. also Rv. 10.90.3
- 72 Anareya I.1., Chandogya 6.2.
- 73 B S B 2.1.11
- 74 Rgveda x. 129
- 75 Br. Ar. 2.3.1., Taittirīya 2.6
- 76 Maitrī 6.3.
- 77 Adhyasabhasya whole and entire
- 78 B S B 2.1.1, 2.1.28.
- 79 'Nebhānasti kṛmāṇā' Katha 2.1.10-11
- 80 'Na ca nīravayavasya brahmano mukhyoniso jīvaḥ sambhāvati itī uktam Tasmāt paracchaikah jīvaḥbhāvenāvasthītatāh. B S.B. 2.3.47
- 81 B.S.B. 2.3.48.
- 82 *Ibid* . 2.3.51
- 83 B S B 2.3.48
- 84 *Ibid* 'na ca nīyogabhaat samyagdarsino yatheṣṭaceṣṭaprācsanga'

- 85 *Ibid*
- 86 *Ibid* 'Na hi asyah samyagdarsanadanyat nivarakamasti'
- 87 See Adhyasabhasya.
- 88 B S B. 2 3.48
- 89 *Ibid*, 2.1 34.
- 90 B S B. 2.3.46.
- 91 *Ibid*, 'jivasypavyavidyakra-namarupanirvritadehendriyadyu padhyavivekabhramanimitta evaduhkhabhimano na tu paramarhiko si'
- 92 B S B. 1 1 4 'sasaritvasya mithyajnananimittatvat
- 93 *Ibid* 'Nityamasaritatvam a-karmenimittatvat saritasam-bandhasyasiddhatvat dharmadharma-yoratmakratvasiddheh'
- 94 *Ibid*
- 95 It can be seen that Sankara's own argument on the analogy of the seed and the sprout is not exactly of this sort, since there is admission of a primal ignorance in the infinite process, read *progressively*, and not regressively as here.
- 96 *Ibid*
- 97 *Ibid*. 'Atmanstmaivivekinomapi penditanam ajavalpalanamiva aviviktau subdapratyau bhovateh'
- 98 *Ibid*. '...siddham jivalopi vidusam a-saritatvam'
- 99 B S B. 2 3 48 'Dehad rayam sanghatohamevetyatmani viparita pratyayotpattih. praktu samyagdarsanat pratatise bhuntin sarvajantunam
- 100 *Ibid* 'Tadaevamavidyanimitta-dehadyupadhisambandha kitat '
- 101 B S B. 2 3 48
- 102 B S. 2 3 46 - 'evamavidya pratyupasthapite buddhyadyupadhyupahite jivakhye anse ' B S B. 2 3 29-30, B S B. 2 3 40- 'avidyapratyupasthapitatvat karibhokirtvayoh' B S B. 3 2 6, 3.2 11 'upadhinom ca avidyapratyupasthapitatvat.
- 103 B S B. 3 2 4 ' samastasya prapancasya mayamatratvam sandhyastayastu prapancah pratidinam badhyata ityuto sandhyasyamayamat ratvamuditam ' See also the Sutra Mayamatrantu kartsnena anbhivyakta-svarupathvat.' B S B. 3 2 3
- 104 Cf K C Bhattacharyya - The Doctrine of Maya in his studies in Philosophy Vol I
- 105 This expression is Biblical - 'All is vanity Cf also K C Bhattacharyya's studies in Philosophy volume I page 95. 'Is the theory of the illusoriness of the world the necessary formulation of the feeling of the vanity of life ?'
- 106 See the Bhrguvalli of the Taittiriya.
- 107 See B.S.B. 1 1 12 Also Taittiriya Brahmananda Valli and Bhrguvalli.
- 108 The term of Strawson's coining - See his Descriptive Metaphysics
- 109 Svetasvatara 2.5 'Harkan, all sons of the Immortal'. etc.
- 110 Br. Ar. 1 4 7 Chandogya 6.3 2 'anena jivenatmananupravisyā namarupa vyakaravani'
- 111 Katha 2 1 1
- 112 B.S.B. 2 3.48

113. Katha 2.2 132 Sveta 6 14 Mundaka 2.2 10.
114. Br Ar 2.4 14 4 5 15
115. B S B. 2 3
116. *Ibid*
117. 'Jasmatirhyapratyayanimitatvat sa-sariratvasya, siddham jvato pi vidusah a-sariratvam' B S B. 1 1 4.
118. 'Karmasumuccitaj – jnanadapavargah' Cf Ramanuja's Sree Bhasya 1 1 1 Suresvara in his Naikarmasiddhi combats this view advocated by his non-Advaitic predecessors.
119. 'Dvirupam hi Brahmanvagamyate namarupa-bhedopadhyavisistam, sadviparitanca sarvopadhyavivoriijitam', etc
120. 'Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram pasyati, yatra tvasya sarvamaitmaivahhut, tat kena kam pasyet etc' Br Ar 2 4 14 and 4 5 15.
121. 'Sahasraso vidyavidyabhedena brahmanodvirupalam darsayanti vikyanu B S.B. 1 1 11 Kenopaniset ' nedam yadidamupasate
122. *Ibid*.
123. Cf 'Tesu hi satsu pragapi dharmaji jnasayah urdhanca sakyate Brahma jnasitum jnatunca, na viparyaya' B S B. 1 1 1
124. Cf Chandhyogya 6th praputhaka ending with 'tadvasya vijnau' see B S B 2 1 14 also B S.B 4 1 2.
125. See Sreebhasya kim vakyadvakyarthajnanamatram, ut tanmulamupasanatmakam jnanamiti? etc '
126. B S B. 1 1 1
127. *Ibid*, 4 1 1
128. *Ibid*, 4 1 3.
129. *Ibid* 4 4 2
130. *Ibid*, 4.4 2 yatharogonivrttavarogo bhinispadyate iti, tadvat'
131. *Ibid*, 4 1 3
132. B S 4.4 10-4 4 18.
133. Anavrttih sabdat anavrttih sabdat. B S. 4 4 22.

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Professor Shyama Kumar Chattopadhyaya is best known as a genuine scholar of Philosophy particularly in the field of Indian Philosophy and great teacher of outstanding quality and personality. He had the rare distinction of being the best student with true scholarship from the Sanskrit College and Presidency College of Calcutta and then passed Post Graduate in Philosophy from the Calcutta University with the highest merit Certificate of his batch.

He had written more than hundred articles, delivered guest lectures in almost all the Universities of the Country wherever he was called. He was selected for the President of the All India Philosophical Congress in its Chandigarh Session. He was also selected in the International Metaphysical conference in Cairo, Egypt, where his paper was deeply appreciated. He was invited to U.S.A. Germany, U.K. to deliver talks. However, for his genuine scholarship in 'Vedanta', the U.G.C. selected him for the preparation of a Original Text on 'Sankar Vedanta' which was written by him in the form of this present book with unadulterated ideas and genuine scholarship. He religiously dedicated his entire life time after true learning, writing and teaching and lived by Philosophy only.

In 1954, he joined Ravenshaw College Cuttack and retired from that college as Head of the Department of Philosophy.

**ISBN 81-8625-222-0**

**Jacket Design by J.M.S. Rawat**

**2001, Size : Crown.**





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